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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with rural development in Ghubeish village communities 
in En Nahud district, Northern Kordofan, Sudan. The area currently experiences an 
intervention in its traditional rain-fed agriculture by an NGO and is supposedly an area 
where rural development is underway .The thesis has to make use of an 'eclectic 
approach' which, in my view, is theoretically grounded to provide a holistic account 
of the development process. The 'eclectic approach’ is an amlagam of the micro- and 
macro-approaches to development. Traditional anthropological approaches to 
development are mostly predicated on the too narrow premises of micro-models (e.g. 
transactional, actor-oriented etc.), and this renders them ill-equipped to take any 
account of the macro-level processes (such as local government, agencies etc.), which 
come directly to bear on the local scene. This, plainly, does not fully grasp the totality 
of the development enterprise (micro and macro). Despite being viewed as polar 
opposites, both the micro- and macro-approches are necessary for the study of rural 
development at the local level. Rather than detracting from theoretical strength, 
combining such models in an overall 'eclectic approach' adds to the vigour of the 
theoretical analysis.
Ten villages were selected for the present study,with between 274 and 1957 
inhabitants. The population is from the Hamar tribe, which has historically witnessed 
a long process of transformation from semi-pastoralism to sedentaiy agriculture, 
combining subsistence and cash crop production. The basis of agriculture is 
predominantly traditional, using simple implements in a savannah environment. The 
majority of the inhabitants are smallholder farmers cultivating less than thirty 
makhamas (1 makhamas = 1.79 acres), though a significant proportion are large 
landowners. In addition to household labour hired labour and sharaka (share- 
cropping) contribute to the overall structure of the farming system. Despite the fact 
that land remains plentiful, expansion of the area under cultivation was restricted by 
capital shortage (which gave rise to informal and exploitative credit systems), and the 
simplicity of the agricultural technique.
The intention this thesis is to bring to the foreground the views and perceptions of the 
people in these villages who are affected by the development project and to compare 
them with those held by the agency itself. It is shown that some of the respective views 
square and others diverge, whilst closer communication works to bridge the 
misunderstanding and misplaced stereotyping held by both sides. The study also shows 
that the government authority tends to ignore the villagers in their remoteness despite its 
plans for conununity development.
Evaluation of the project shows that over the limited period of three years (mid-term) 
of project implementation the agency has partly succeeded in its experiment with 
institutionalising a low-cost and sustainable credit/extension system appropriate to the 
needs of smallholder farmers. But, on balance, it had had a limited impact towards 
reaching its goal of raising, significantly, smallholders’ income.
CONTENTS
Page No.
PART ONE:
Introduction ....          .. 1
Chapter One:
Oral Tradition, The Hamar And Major Trends In The Establishment
OfDarHamai'.. 26
Chapter Two : Social Organization .....      .... 58
Chapter Three : Agricultural And Economie Patterns .... .... .... 87
PART TWO:
Chapter Four: The Project ...       .... 147
Chapter Five : Agency Versus Clients: Views, Conceptions And G oals  195
Chapter Six :The Project Impact       .. .. 254
PART THREE:
Chapter Seven : Rituals, Religious Beliefs And Development ....    .. 289
Chapter Eight: Local Government ................................  . .... ............  342
Conclusion ...     .... ....  365
Appendix ...     .... ....  375
Bibliography ....  ....  ......... .... ....  377
List of Tables and Maps
Table (1) Major forms of the domestic group in selected project villages.. 
Table (2) Jamaa recruitment
Table (3) Field crop and iubraka Mix ... .... .....
Table (4) Highest and lowest areas and yields for groundnuts, millet, sesame, 
and sorghum relating to 1983 season
Table (5) Percentage of seed purchased (1988/89 season)...................... ......
Table (6) Average seed dressing used per makhamas and per farmer 
(1988/89 season)
Table (7) Farming tool kit .........  .........
Table (8) Labour inputs for millet and millet/watermelon 
Table (9) Labour inputs for groundnuts and
groundnuts/watermelon  ......  .......
Table (10) Labour inputs for millet, groundnuts, watermelon
by type of planting ....  .....  .......  ......
Table (11) Labour inputs for minor crops, iubraka and gum arabic
Table (12) Labour inputs for sesame and sorghum.............. ....  .......
Table (13) Number of sharaka cases and the variation between the selected
project villages (among the PFs)  ...........
Table (14) Average household incomes by source in the project
villages (1990) ....  ........  ...........
Table (15) Populations of the rural councils of En Nahud district
(1983-1988 censuses) .... .....  .......
Table (16) Distribution of associations and cooperativres among
thePVs ....  ......  ....  .......
Table (17) Participating and control villages for 1988/89,
1989/90 and 1990/91 .... .....  .......
Page No. 
60 
82 
92
95
101
103
104 
108
109
109
1 1 1
112
131
139
149
161
194
Table (18) Planned and actual tai*gets .........  ........  .... 257
Table (19) Average yield in PVs and CVs for 1988/89, 1989/90 and
1990/91 seasons ....  .....  .......  ... 260
Table (20) Average areas cultivated, 1988/89, 1989/90 and 1990/91   261
Table (21) Average area cultivated of the two main crops
(1990/91) for each village ..       262
Table (22) Change in the food and cash crop prices, 1988,
1989 and 1990 (LS) ....  .......... .......  .... 264
Table (23) Percentage of farmers purchasing food for the 1988,
1989 and 1990 seasons .......  .......  ......  ... 264
Table (24) Average yields for women iubraka crops for 1988,
1989 and 1990 ....     .... 267
Table (25) Repayment profile for ENSAP PFs for 1988/89,
'89/90 an d '90/91         268
Table (26) Cause of default in loan repayment among ENSAP PFs  268
Table (27) Project impact on sheil system (percentage of farmers
with sheil) for 1990/91         270
Table (28) Seasonal labour in ENSAP project villages ..........   279
Table (29) Number of iubraka women receiving in-kind loans ....................  281
Table (30) The numerical values of the Arabic letters     317
Table (31) The significance of some of the Arabic letters .........    318
Table (32) Comparison of the social services in the seven councils
of En Nahud district ....        347
Table (33) Estimates of the zakat over the past four years   349
Table (34) Amount of the groundnuts crop supplied at En Nahud
market and the sales prices for the period 1981-1990     351
Table (35) The amount of gum ai'abic supplied at En Nahud market
and the sales prices over the period 1985-1990     352
Table (36) Number of animals supplied at En Nahud livestock mai'ket ... 355
List of Maps (End Pocket)
Map No. 1 Kordofan and the surrounding country
Map No. 2 Project site location (villages affected by ENSAP project)
Map No. 3 En Nahud (special reference to Dar Hamar)
PART ONE
Recent development thinking had seen a dramatic shift from advocating macro­
level models to the formulation of micro-level planning. The traditional models of 
development draw their tenets from modernization theory which conceives of the 
development of the present-day underdeveloped societies in terms of a need for the 
diffusion of modern technology from the advanced nations. Conceived of in this 
manner, less developed societies are labelled as passive recipients of planned 
change which is unproblematically fitted into indigenous social, institutional, cultural 
and political arrangements and settings ( see, e.g. Moore, 1963; Smelser, 1967).
This sort of thinking has been recently condemned by both policy-makers, 
international organizations, not to mention social scientists, particularly 
anthropologists, as having accentuated the veiy problems which it purports to solve: 
it inflicted more poverty on the poor of the developing world. For example, deeper 
investigation into the conditions under which the poor lived had resulted in 
empirical findings which showed that the values embodied in the diffused 
techniques do not square with indigenous local values. Thus, the newly emergent 
thinking calls for reversing traditional wisdom with a closer focus on the social 
context at stake (see, Adam, 1989; Bastide, 1973; Dalton, 1987; Johnston, 1979; 
Long, 1977; Schumacher, 1973 ; Weintraub and Margulies, 1986).
One alternative to the imposed models of planned change was the actor-oriented 
approach which is another version of the transactional model (see. Long, 1977; 
Riches, 1979; Holy and Stuchlik, 1983). Favoured by many anthiopologists, the actor- 
oriented model is predominantly a decision-making construct for dealing with 
individuals and groups in “problematic situations” such as allocational choices. Thus 
Long argues that when documenting the ways in which groups or individuals
utilize resources in novel situations the premise is to analyze “why is it that certain 
individuals or social categories pursue particular courses of action; and to assess 
the economic, organizational, and other outcomes (intended and unintended) of such 
decisions” (1977:135). By so doing the model claims to make provision for 
explaining why actors behave, or more specifically, respond as they do when 
confronted with economic opportunities (e.g. development projects). The model 
had been touted for its capacity to explain both the reasons behind the actor's 
positive as well as negative responses to planned interventions.
However, in its attempt at resolving the pitfalls of the imposed macro-models of 
planned social change, the actor-oriented model has gone to the extreme of being 
an over-stressed micro-level formulation of reality. The relevance of such a 
formulation is much stronger in conditions of indigenous development and 
evolution that are predominantly internal to the community. More specifically, it is 
largely relevant for analyzing self-help or community development projects 
planned and executed by the local people. However, rural development projects 
usually involve government and international agencies in the planning and the 
implementation processes, and it would be theoretically inadequate not to take 
account of the macro-level processes inhering with and adding shape to the micro­
level context.
A model of planned social change should therefore be theoretically grounded to 
account for local processes (with the deployment of the actor- oriented model) and at 
the same time deal with macro-level processes which come to bear in local 
situations. This call has also been made by Dalton in a recent study of planned 
change interventions. He suggests that analysis of planned change interventions 
should put into consideration "policies of central government which directly 
impinge on [the level of the] local group..[which] traditionally has been the focus of 
anthropologists" (1987:373). In another context I have argued that in studying
development "we should define our concepts in such a way as to fit what 
developers purport to do with the goals and ends which local groups have in 
respect of development " (Adam, 1989:6).
A very recent approach to the practice of rural development implicates these 
theoretical discussions. This has been the assignment to anthropologists the task of 
conducting participant-observer's evaluation of development projects. The World 
Bank which upholds this approach, contends that development includes dimensions 
which are not discernible to the outsider and should therefore be treated from 
within. It further argues that traditional project-impact evaluations "consisted of 
before-and-after measurements of such project effects as changes in income or 
health" (Salmen, 1987:5) which are of an insignificant magnitude and difficult to 
explain solely in relation to the intervention. The World Bank's concern is the 
closer understanding of local people through improved communication between the 
interfering agency and its clientele on behalf of adjustments while the project is being 
implemented. Problems which arise in respect of project implementation are 
considered as most serious since they occur even in a context in which the 
clientele and their agencies initially agree on the overall premises of planning (see 
e.g. Wenger, 1982). Thus the World Bank stresses that "traditional evaluations fail 
to address issues that arise during the course of project implementation, such as 
the degree of communication between beneficiaries and management, they do not 
shed light on community power relations that might determine who has access to 
the benefits of the project, and they do not reveal the values and behavior of 
beneficiaries" (Salmen,1987:5). In contrast, having a participant observer on the scene 
throughout the implementation stage means that these issues can be addressed.
I would note that this participant-observer method is by and large subsumed within the 
basic interactional, actor-oriented theoretical model, as it has as its essential premise
the processes of communication (i.e interaction) between the development agencies 
and their clients. As such it provides no alternative to the pre-existing anthropological 
approaches to the study of planned change situations. This is clearly discernible 
from the Bank's statement that “paiticipant-observer evaluation may also be used to 
monitor the interaction between the project and its beneficiaries so that project 
management can take on-going self-corrective action” (Ibid.:6). The importance of 
the participant-observer's approach to the study of development projects 
fundamentally lies in its contribution to the evaluation of project sustainability 
which forms one of the basic goals of the interfering agents. “After a project is 
completed the [ participant observation ] techniques may be used to assess whether 
the benefits have been sustained and what indirect effects the project may have 
produced over time” (Ibid.:7). This is consistent with the normal way by which 
anthropologists study local level development.
What is evident from the World Bank’s approach, then, is that the development plans 
themselves are treated as givens: the focus of attention is on whether or not they square 
with the culture of the recipients. This means that what led to the formulation of the 
plans is left in the background. In other words, the approach does not grasp the 
overall situation since it ignores the perspective of the agencies themselves. In a study 
which includes the agencies, the interest is in the reasoning on the part of the 
developers that led to the plan being constructed and presented in the way it 
was. Indeed, how the plan was then objectively received by the natives can be 
secondary. But as this would also be theoretically inadequate at the other extreme, it 
is ideal that a study should have it both ways, focusing on the aims, understanding 
and knowledge about the development situation of both sides, and examining how 
discrepant they are.
It is therefore my contention that a holistic approach which makes use of the 
interactional, actor-oriented, participant-observer's evaluation but which also
incorporates the macro-level (e.g. external factors such political constraints on the 
agencies) setting is absolutely important for the study of rural development projects.
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The fundamental problem is that the study of mral development has commanded the 
attention of both economic anthropologists and economists. Whilst anthropologists are 
mainly concerned with micro-level issues such as interpersonal relationships, the 
lineage system and village institutions (e.g. traditional authority), economist are 
concerned with macro-level phenomena, such as rural-urban migration, the effects of 
government policy on local producers and local government's contribution to 
community development. I have indicated that preoccupation with one perspective to 
the neglect of the other has led to inadequate examination of the phenomena under 
investigation. What underlies this either/or situation? The main reason is that by 
focussing on the 'deciding actor' (into whose cultural predicament development inputs 
are introduced) the anthropologist strikes up a subjectivist position, and so finds it too 
difficult to integrate the macro-level (or objectivist) standpoints. This refers to the 
limitedness of the 'systematic' or 'unidisciplinary' approach.
Such difficulty is particularly damaging to applied anthropology since this seeks 
implications of its findings and analyses beyond anthropology. Applied 
anthropologists select data for analysis on the basis of their relevance to current 
issues rather than ancient precept (Eddy and Partridge , 1987: 6). For that matter they 
try to learn the processes by which cultures change when acted upon (e.g. by 
development agencies), and for the purpose of the agency or project planners who are 
interested to know more about the success and failure of their innovations they find it 
imperative to compile cases so as to draw comparative conclusions from them. But in 
their endeavour to deal with these issues applied anthropologists are restricted by 
micro-models which say little about the exogenous factors (such as government 
intervention) which come directly to bear in the local situation. As Long says (1977:
1), rural phenomena cannot be understood without taking into account the wider 
socio-economic structure. “A second related question is whether one can identify 
particular local institutions or [else] macro-level factors which might be said to inhibit 
the process of socio-economic development. And the obverse of this is identification of 
facilitating factors...or the so-called socio-cultural prerequisites” (Ibid.: 5). Note here 
that even the most radical critics from the developing world agree that “pure” and 
“applied” anthropologists must free themselves from the colonial modes of thought; 
must discard the prevalent traditional/modern dichotomy; and must in the Third 
World, be oriented to practical problems of social development (see e.g. Ahmed, 1977; 
Long, 1977 ). Yet the present position applied anthropologists hold is two-fold: at 
one extreme there are those who set themselves the task of “defending the 
clients/actors” against the overwhelming intrusions of development planners, on the 
grounds that such interventions serve the interests of a “powerful class”. At the other 
extreme are those anthropologists who side with social planners and seek to change 
the people concerned in accordance with the aims of these planners. Critics from the 
first group consider the failure of outsiders' plans to be the result of 
"inappropriateness"; or that planners fail to "listen to the local people" 
(Salmen, 1987). The second group, on the other hand, direct accusations which tend to 
"blame the victim"; in such terms as " actors' conservatism" and "inationality". It is 
the shortcomings of both camps which lead me to an analysis that combines the micro­
level and macro-level models of social change. As a new model of applied 
anthropology (cf. Eddy and Partridge, 1987: 6) it derives significance from its 
contemporary implications for the solution of social problems, where the 
anthropologist has to "cross disciplinary boundaiies, investigate problems which are 
novel to anthropological traditions, and select data for analysis on the basis of their 
relevance for current issues" (1987: 6).
Merging the micro- and macro-models in the analysis of mral phenomena gives rise 
to what I call an 'eclectic approach'. Eclecticism results from shifts in the level of
analysis as necessitated by the phenomena under investigation: at one level the 
researcher may, indeed, need to gain insight from the history and the oral tradition 
which enables him to make important suggestions for applied research. In this 
instance the researcher looks for "past experiences" which contemporary people, too 
often, invoke as shaping their present-day actions or strategies (see Adam, 1989). This 
calls for development of abstract anthropological perspective. Note that the data 
compiled from the oral history may or may not tell us of how people today form 
groups, accomplish tasks or solve problems (Eddy and Partridge , 1987). At another 
level reference need be made to the living actors, their social arrangements, 
ecological patterns and ideology (included here are local people's values, plans and 
goals). Pertinent to this level of analysis is the actor-centred or actor-oriented model, 
and the interactional approach (see Long, 1977; Stuchlik, 1976). At this juncture, and 
for the purpose of compiling material which has practical implications, specific 
features arising from the deployment of the actor-centred model could be identified 
as "socio-cultural prerequisites", or, for that matter, "community vitality features" 
(see Bowles, 1979:67 ).
At yet another level the researcher is bound even to touch on crucial macro- issues 
inhering in the local community . This points to the role which local government 
agents (and, indeed, project agents themselves as planners) play on behalf of 
planning, or lack of planning, for the local people. The fact that local people develop 
their own perceptions and ideologies (such as self-help movements) in reaction to 
government policies necessitates such analysis. A micro-level analysis which restricted 
itself to examining such ideologies, goals and plans would certainly lead to 
oversimplification of the facts, let alone be theoretically inadequate. Herein lies the 
strength of the 'eclectic approach' : it deals with local level processes, but also maps 
out the macro level factors which come to bear in the local situation.
Some further clarification of 'macro-processes' and 'eclecticism' is in order. As
deployed here 'macro-processes' should not be taken to refer to 'analytical models of 
development', e.g. centre-periphery, Marxist underdevelopment models etc. Rather, 
'macro-processes' in this context precisely refer to (i) empirical events in the nation­
state at large that have bearing on what will prevail in the local community (even if 
members of the local community do not subjectively appreciate them), or to (ii) 
perceptions of the agents who come into local communities in the context of 
development, or (iii) some combination of the above.
As will be shown (iii) deals mainly with the subjectivities of the development agents, 
and that these subjectivities arise directly from (ii).
'Eclecticism' may refer to (a) a mixture of analytical perspectives on the same field of 
investigation ( e.g. groups interacting), looked at from different angles. This will be 
elaborated on when we refer to the notion of hermeneutics (below). Or (b) discussion 
in which there is continuing shift from one subjectivity to another (i.e. subjectivity of 
the agents to subjectivity of clients): detailing the different experiences which 
underpin these respective subjectivities; showing the way that the different 
subjectivities constrain misunderstandings of the 'other side'; and also at the same 
time detailing the efforts, by each party, to bridge such misunderstandings through 
attempts to “understand” and “communicate”. In sum, it is this latter concept (of 
understanding and communicating) that describes 'eclecticism' as used in the thesis 
(note that this beai's on our understanding of yet another concept, "holism" ).
Overall the thesis makes the point that it is desirable to include in discussion a 
comprehensive account of the processes and subjectivities bearing on all actors 
involved in the development, yet this can only be done at the cost of 'eclecticism', 
i.e. by freely admitting that the subjectivities of the different key actors (agents 
and clients) are theoretically unbridgeable since their respective 'realities' are quite 
different. All, therefore, the analyst can do is shift perspective from one side to the
other, highlighting the communicative successes and failures between the two as 
the development project unfolds. It should be finally added that being myself a 
citizen from Dar Hamar (the area of the research) is itself an advantage, presuming that 
idiosyncrasism and ethnocentrism can be guarded against (a danger which unavoidably 
confronts anthropologists dealing with the subjectivities of their own tribes).
Hermeneutic theory (e.g. Bleicher, 1982) elucidates the crucial interpretive process 
implied here. The essence of hermeneutics may be grasped in terms of a contrast with 
structuralism and ethnoscience. Salmond has illustrated the intrinsic differences 
between these anthropological approaches in the following way: stmcturalists view 
the societies they are studying as if from a height, which gives them full control 
over the objects under investigation. Ethnoscientists, on the other hand, elect to 
take the actor's point of view, and this enables them to escape being accused of 
ethnocentrism and value judgement. Meanwhile, in hermeneutics, the 
anthropologist tries to narrow the gap between himself and the other and 
concentrates on where the two viewpoints converge. This Salmond refers to as 
the "merging of horizons" (Salmond, 1982,74). Upholding hermeneutics , Bleicher 
(1982) points to the vigour of such an approach in that it exposes the 
anthropological principle that intrinsic to the research the anthropologist is going to 
have to deploy prior knowledge of 'other' who is under study. He argues that "it 
is only on the basis of some pre-understanding that the study of social 
phenomena is possible" (Ibid, 2). Transferred to the scenario of this study the 
hermeneutic approach attends to the anthropologist's capacitv to grasp and explain 
ideas and knowledge pertaining respectively to the agents and clients , and to tap data 
which lends itself to contributing to improvement in the targeted community. 
This perspective , by which the hermeneutic approach may be characterised as 
practice-oriented (Ibid.: 27) since it is concerned " not with a theory of the 
language of science, but with a theoiy of inquiry" (Ibid.: 27), draws attention to the 
anthropologist's background circumstances. In my case I am, as I have mentioned, a
citizen from Dar Hamar (the area of the research ), and this itself is an advantage 
because the communicative gap is likely to be small and ethnocentrism is guarded 
against (a danger which unavoidably confronts anthropologists dealing with other 
cultures).
If we are to appreciate Salmond's illuminating argument that hermeneutically 
oriented disciplines are concerned with "instances of human creation" (ibid.: 69) 
such as words and actions which bear witness to the intentions, hopes and fears 
of suffering among individuals, then hermeneutics is also theoretically grounded 
to enable us to appreciate the communicative relationship between development agents 
and their clients. This is mainly because the encounter between developers and the 
people at the grass-roots always entails goals and puiposeful actions which give 
rise to hopes and fears : hopes for attaining a better form of life (on behalf of 
more income, etc., from development ) and fears of loss as a result of failure. It 
goes without saying, however, that the agents need to gain a pre-understanding of 
the local society on which to base their implementation activities. This undertaking 
involves learning the social structure of the people (e.g their leadership), the 
social network system (e.g. reciprocity or cooperation) and the people's ideas and 
responses to new opportunities. It is this pre-understanding and knowledge 
gained by the agents that lies at the heart of their intervention programmes (i.e. 
on the basis of which they come to act). Yet it is too often neglected in social 
research. Whether the agents' and clients' views, perceptions and goals converge or 
diverge, meet the planned target or run afoul of one another is partly attributable to 
such pre-understanding, which we refer to as 'the hermeneutics of the developers'.
1.3 Theoretical Ideas And Empirical Material From Ghubeish Villages,
In this sub-section we turn to demonstrate how our theoretical ideas apply to the
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concrete project context. The communities we are dealing with are the Hamar of the 
Northern Kordofan region, Sudan. The Hamar are Muslim communities and their 
social life is mainly influenced by Islamic beliefs and concepts. Like the other tribes in 
Northern Kordofan, the Hamar practise rain-fed agricultural cultivation in a savannah 
environment. Being remote from the central government, the majority of these 
communities are left out of the development process. As a consequence, development at 
the grass-roots level is mostly the concern of the local community, though local 
government might often be involved in planning for the local people. The ENS AP (i.e. 
En Nahud Smallholder Agricultural Project) project was launched in 1988 by CARE 
(Cooperative for American Relief Eveiy where: an NGO) with the aim of improving the 
well-being of the Hamar farmers through the provision of cash credit and extension 
education. Therefore, our theoretical discussion will directly reflect local people’s 
views relating to the improvement of their own well-being, notions about local 
government and the NGO, and Islamic beliefs. It will also contrast local people's views 
and perceptions about development with those held by the ENSAP agency and by the 
local government.
When it comes to the analysis of the empirical material, the eclecticism in the theoretical 
framework can be observed throughout the basic concern of the thesis. In the first 
instance, since the research proposes to tackle issues such as the aims and goals 
of both the agency and clients, the focus of the coverage shows a predilection for 
the transactional model of social change. The model holds that actors behave 
purposively and according to the actor's knowledge. This behavior is explained in 
terms of the goals, realised or intended to be realised, by the actors (see e.g. Riches, 
1979). Following from this understanding, the theoretical framework focuses on 
(a) the concepts indigenous people have as actors and (b) the concepts the agents 
hold as actors. Secondly, since goals are associated with certain situations (e.g, 
constraints and incentives), which may be referred to as problematic situations, 
(since they elicit the actor's response) it is ideal that these situations confronting the
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actor be examined in order to come to grips with the actor's response (this is 
paiticularly the premise of chapter 5).
The above theoretical analysis helps us deal with :
a) change in the local people's human activity (i.e traditional farming) during the 
project implementation process, which is facilitated by the availability of the new 
economic opportunities (project loans and services) designed to respond to their 
situation;
b) change in people's ideals (new outlook towards the notion of interest from an 
Islamic context ) due to the newly developed social relationships between the farmer 
and the agents;
c) the study of external factors (as far as the agency itself is extraneous to the local 
community); needless to say agencies have their aims and goals as well; and
d) the effect c) has on a) and b) and on the various social relationships 
and institutions in the project area— specifically the institutional 
arrangements and social organization at large. Germane to this last matter,
Mai'vin Harris points out that:
while every social species.has ecological patterns and social structures, 
only human groups have ideologies.Ideology includes explicit and 
implicit knowledge, opinions, values, plans, and goals that people 
have about their ecological circumstances; their understanding of 
nature, technology, production and reproduction, their reasons for 
living, working and reproducing( 1971:146).
The sad fact of the project situation is that the local people's knowledge is grossly 
neglected by the agency. This is further compounded by the stereotypes both the 
agency and the clients have of one another (incorporated in their respective 
ideologies) which cause divergence of understanding and frustration. These are the 
conflictual situations of development interventions which the anthropologist must
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be able to observe and explain.
The eclectic approach invites a second aspect of concern in this study. Here we turn 
away from individuals and agents (agencies) , and their goals and perceptions and 
ideologies. It is argued that social anthropology is the study of the systems of 
cooperation (Mair, 1961) based on the general recognition of the rights and 
obligations and the role that each individual is expected to play in the various 
situations likely to confront him, by which people succeed in living together in 
some sort of harmony. I am thus required to investigate local people's cooperative 
efforts both among themselves and with the agency to strike that harmony. This 
point made by Mair is essential for examining the crucial matter of local people's 
recruitment into economic and social situations. It finds theoretical support from 
Stuchlik (1976).
Drawing inspiration from Mair and Stuchlik, the theoretical framework thus shifts 
to adopt both a group-centred and a norm-focused approach (see e.g. Boissevain, 
1968). As such the analysis will seek to explain patterns of actual situations in 
relation to local group membership (ethnic group, domestic group etc.). The study 
does not purport to find out the forms of activities implicated by membership in a 
given group in the society since it is argued that " it is almost impossible to find any 
system of activities which would be repeatedly and normatively performed by 
individuals as members of corporate groups" (Stuchlik, 1976:8). The study, though, 
is able to observe and explain the mechanisms of recruitment of village members 
in the context of interactional situations (chapter 2); in other words, pertinent groups 
will be seen as the outcome of patterns of activity.
In line with Stuchlik, recruitment is referred to here as:
a process through which an individual, on the basis of his knowledge of 
socio-cultural alternatives and of his evaluation of relevant factors, come to 
the decision as to whether he will participate in a given situation and what
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position he will occupy in it.. It denotes the process through which an 
individual comes to the decision about inviting other specific individuals as 
partners in the situation (1976:8-9).
However a key point in this regard is that as they thus engage with one another 
individuals are liable to societal norms. A few illustrative examples will suffice from 
the following situations of group mobilization for cooperation and assistance among 
the project villagers of Ghubeish communities.
The first case is that of aljuhdal sha’abi (public effort or self-help). When community 
members express a felt need of, say, constructing a local water yard (i.e. a system of 
tanks and machinery for supplying water to a community) for village welfare, they 
have the alternatives of approaching local government officials to do it for them, or 
otherwise mobilizing human and material resources within the community on a 
voluntary basis. Should the first alternative fail, as it too often does, then particular 
groups will voluntarily assume the role of arranging group meetings, electing a 
water yard committee and the recruitment of particular village members for 
contributing material and labour resources for that specific target. Members selected 
abide by the normative system which stipulates the value of helping out for the 
community's interests (and also supported by a goom na'ayeenak [lit. "should you 
help yourself, I will help you"] ideology). Usually the selected members are known 
from previous experience of cooperation. The same public norm of helping out on 
behalf of the community's interest holds when the villagers decide on arranging a 
karama ( lit. sacrifice) ritual to induce plenty of rainfall or to ward off bad omens.
Another example is the nafir (communal work groups) system in the sphere of 
agriculture. Almost the whole life of the village farmers in the project area revolves 
around nafir. The nafir is a choice made by a farmer to have his farm weeded by 
particular villagers of acquaintance as an alternative to the hired labour system, sharaka 
(share-cropping), or the exclusive use of household labour. When decided on nafir
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recruitment the individual farmer should make accurate calculations of those who 
should participate, depending on his previous participation in others' nafirs as well as 
his present social relationships (e.g. neighbourhood, kinship, ethnic etc.).
Yet a third example draws from the villagers' experience with the project itself. 
Before being deemed eligible for project loans, the participating farmers of the 
project were required to form Jamaa (lit. groups). Each group is to be headed by a 
damin (lit. guarantor). Every farmer should have a guarantor if he is to be entitled to 
the project loans. Thus recruitment into a Jamaa is determined by who guarantees 
whom, depending on the pre-existing relationships between the damin and the other 
farmers subject to be guaranteed. A farmer himself makes such calculations 
concerning who should guarantee him when determined to participate in the project, 
given "the cultural alternatives", to borrow Stuchlik's (1976:9) phrase, that guide the 
acceptance or refusal of his demand.
Equally pertinent to our analysis is Stuchlik's distinction between relational factors 
and situational factors of recruitment and future action. Relational factors refer to 
various rights and obligations incumbent in an individual's on-going relationships 
with others and which in turn determine the intensity of the relationship between the 
organizer of and the participant (e.g. kinship relationship, neighbourhood or 
acquaintance). The situational factors are those which are not included in the 
'relational' but which occur as a result of mere ability to be present or to perform 
the activity which is the object of recruitment (1976:9). A nafir recruitment is a good 
example of future activity determined by relational factors, while recruitment into the 
sharaka system is totally guided by situational factors (such as a meeting by 
chance in the town market between a land owner and the sharaka labourers). 
However, the distinction between relational and situational factors becomes difficult to 
strike in relatively small villages such as El Halfaya, or indeed even in large villages 
(e.g. Murabaat) in which village members see themselves as all ahal (lit. all relatives,
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or kinsmen ). In such cases the intensity of the interpersonal relationships are shared 
by almost all members in the relevant social context (e.g. rain-making rituals , or 
funeral rituals).
The third point in the eclectic theoretical framework is the social soundness analysis 
model.
This relates to the practical benefits the present study may deliver. The social soundness 
analysis in social theory is deployed to assess the alternative ways of implementing 
projects and the likely consequences and effects such inteiwentions would have in 
specific communities, or a specific group within a community (cf. Bowles, 1979 ; 
Norman and Kenneth, 1985 ; Derman and Scott, 1985 ; Carbett, 1985). Bowles sees 
social impact assessment as concerned with the impact of planned change on a 
group's quality of life, in terms of its traditions, social relationships and 
institutions. Generally, impacts which development interventions aie expected to have 
on particular aspects of a community are grasped in terms of the concept of 
“community cohesion”. Thus “although a project may be designed, for example, to 
increase farm productivity or facilitate access to markets, the primary aim of SIA 
[social impact assessment] is the positive adaptation of .. the community to the 
external intervention” (Norman and Kenneth, 1985:78).
We are concerned with community because it is only in relation to the whole 
community that we can come to grips with such concepts as 'target groups' or ' 
participants', and the nature of interactions these target groups have in respect of one 
another. The major roles groups play can not be taken in isolation from the 
community from which they draw. Such concepts as “organisation”, neighbourhood, 
households and jamaa should accordingly be construed with reference to the notion of 
a whole community since these are only component parts of it. Thus Norman and 
Kenneth define community cohesion as "the activities within the unit that tie people
16
together in positive ways and enhance personal identification with the group., it is 
advanced by high prestige, attractive activities , cooperative and voluntary 
relationships and abundant provision for individual's needs" (1985:79 ; see also 
Finsterbusch, 1980 :77-78). As such this emphasis is a necessary adjunct to Mair's 
stress on the concept of harmony in social living ( see above).
A most important aspect of the social soundness analysis which finds reflection in 
this study is Bowles' characterization of 'community vitality' features judged 
conducive to project success. Community vitality features need to be identified 
before project implementation proceeds so that the project may make use of the pre­
existing features of community vitality and also so that the effects the project had on 
them may be subsequently assessed. As a prelude to the entrance into the body of the 
study we need to shed light on the vitality features pertaining to the communities 
covered in the fieldwork. In the following list I compare features of project villages in 
relation to the characteristics of 'community vitality' described by Bowles (1979:67-
6&h
Characteristics of 'communitv vitality'
a) many collective events.
b) high degree of member participation.
c) the events are internally organized and 
controlled.
d) routine services.
e) life crisis support provided for by 
internal networks.
f) few people are socio-metric isolates.
Manifest in tfor our village communities!
(i) aljuhdal sha'abi. nafirs. rain-making, kaiama.
(ii) recruitment into (i) above.
(iii) existence of organizers' of collective 
activities who influence participants by the 
goom na'ayeenak ideology,
(iv) reciprocity and repetitive mobilization.
(v) domestic and egocentric groups mobilized 
in drought periods (karama. rain-making).
(vi) broadness of the individual's sphere of 
social relations.
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g) stable structures of internal governance, (vii) inheritable offices of village sheikhs.
h) community responds collectively to (viii) traditional counter raids against the
intmsions. Kababeesh tribal raids.
i) people gauge h) in collective as well (ix) reference to ahal in conditions of
as in personal terms. mobilization.
With very many aspects of local village life satisfying the desired characteristics of 
community vitality we turn, in the body of the thesis , to see how such fitness features 
were made use of by the project agency , as well as the effect the project had on the 
pre-exiting vitality features. A socially vital community is viewed by impact assessors 
(i.e social scientists) as one that is well fit to utilize, cope with and control the 
impact of a project through the mobilization of its local resources (Norman and 
Kenneth, 1985:80). Our analysis of the project communities in terms of the 
mechanisms of recruitment into socio-economic situations has proved potent in 
elucidating, identifying and explaining these features of community vitality (see 
chapter 2 ).
A few words about the ENSAP (En Nahud Smallholder Agricultural Project.) which is 
the substantive focus of this study. The project is a joint-venture by CARE 
organization (a non-governmental development agency) and the Government of 
Sudan (represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Bank of Sudan). 
It is located in En Nahud district of Northern Kordofan, Sudan, and is targeted to 
benefit smallhoder farmers through the provision of credit/extension 
services.Ghubeish rural council (which is but one of the several mral councils 
comprising En Nahud district) is selected for the innovation; its population is mainly 
from the Hamar tribe (see e.g. MacMichael, 1912; 1922). The ENSAP project was
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implemented in 1988 and now involves seventeen villages in a major development 
enterprise, particularly involving the the creation of a viable credit institution for the 
provision of loans and extension services to smallholder farmers who are required to 
maximize returns from agricultural production (mainly groundnuts and millet crops).
1.5 Research
The research methodology of the fieldwork was also largely eclectic (for the above 
mentioned reasons). It ranged from active participation in the project site to 
occasional interaction with the project agency based at En Nahud town. While 
spending time with the project management access was secured to the available 
project documents and interaction was initiated with the project staff. The aim was 
to gain closer understanding of the agency's interest and of the reasoning on the part 
of these developers which led to the formulation and presentation of their plans. 
This also involved participant observation of the work relations between the 
national staff and international experts. Stay in the district town. En Nahud, also 
entailed a review of the present and past attempts by the local government at 
community development. This also allowed the observation of the involvement of 
project farmers (or peasants) with the town market. Finally, it permitted the reading 
of the relevant literature on the area and its people (specially the Hamar who are the 
principal beneficiaries of the project).
Another part of the research entailed accompanying the project consultants, recruited 
by the project management, who are chaiged with the evaluation of a specific aspect 
of the project. This helped draw inferences on the way foreign and national 
experts approach local people providing them with blueprints for project 
development. It should be noted that the ENSAP agency was able to compile a lot of 
data on various aspects of the project (e.g. village population composition and size, 
household membership composition, migration patterns , cooperation and the 
leadership system, the pre-existing agricultural patterns, etc.). The material was
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collected by trained enumerators, the project staff themselves and, occasionally by 
outside experts who were invited to evaluate a pai’ticular aspect of the project (either the 
credit or the extension component). It should therefore be pointed out here that ENSAP 
provides a lot of my data, particularly when I come to deal with agricultural and 
economic patterns (chapter 3) and also the subsequent chapter which covers the project 
proper.
Incorporated into paiticipant obseiwation in the project sites, a further part of the 
research consisted of unstructured interviews with important people such as 
government officials, village leaders, teachers and the project beneficiaries. Due to 
time constraints brought about by logistical difficulties and the formidable task of 
covering a relatively large number of project villages, questionnaire research was 
also conducted with project far mers for qualitative information. But since such a 
technique requires some rapport to have been established with the interviewees for 
the provision of accurate and reliable information, the task of supervising the 
questionnaires was assigned to the project AFEs (Agricultural Field Extensionists 
who are village based). The assumption was that since the project agency had 
placed the AFEs in core villages to establish intimate social relations and tmst 
with village farmers , then these AFEs were the most appropriate for the task. This 
helped resolve the inherent danger that " the questionnaires are often intimidating to 
poor people confronted by an unknown interrogator" (Salmen, 1987:4). The 
research was conducted in such a manner that it touched on issues relating both 
to pre-project as well as post-project implementation.
The organization of the different parts of the thesis shows my predilection for the 
holistic approach which incorporates the micro-level processes and the the macro­
level setting. In the first part I deal with the social context of the project.Thus 
chapter 1 deals with the project communities, adopting an historical approach. This 
enables us to show the major trends in the social and the structural transformations
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that had occurred over the generations on the Hamar tribes, the major 
beneficiaries of the project. Particular emphasis is put on the tribe's migration into 
the area, the development of their leadership authorities and the internal changes 
due to tribal sub-divisions as well as those caused by contacts with people who 
were formerly indigenous to the area.
Chapter 2 deals with pre-project local social organization. An analytical model of 
recruitment into social an economic situations is adopted in this part. The major 
concern is with the internal social relationships that bring individuals and groups 
together, and with the individual's membership in specific social groups, as well as 
their relations between neighbouring villages. The object is to locate the actor vis-a- 
vis the other members of the community as well as his place within the whole 
society. The chapter provides an overall picture of the ways an actor or actors 
in the society manipulate the various relationships for the realization of specific 
goals.
Chapter 3 delineates the existing farming system in the project area. It provides a 
descriptive analysis of the basic features , and agricultural and economic patterns , 
of the traditional system, referring to Makings' (1967) model of agricultural 
transition. It is shown that the traditional system is constrained from expanding 
production for the market by both capital shortage and simplicity of techniques, as 
well as by environmental hazards. In addition a pattern of low agricultural yields is 
revealed , which leads to low income returns. It is also shown how both 
household and hired labour are assigned to the various agricultural operations, in 
addition to the recruitment of communal work groups (nafir) for the weeding 
operations. Sharaka ( share-cropping) is also demonstrated to occupy a modest place 
in the traditional farming system. It is shown that the sharaka is an inefficient 
form of pai'tnership as it works to subsidize the labourer at the expense of the 
land owner. The share of the land owner is shown to be less than one third of the
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total revenue rather than being one half . It is suggested that an alternative system 
of hired labour is most conducive to ENSAP project smallholders if the project is 
to achieve its target of "significantly increasing the levels of income for the 
participating farmers".
Part two covers issues related to project implementation, agency's versus clients’ 
views, goals and conceptions on development, and the project impact. Chapter 4 deals 
with the project proper. Despite the fact that the project is in its infancy and is still 
experimenting with adaptive techniques and innovative practices, it succeeded in 
initiating a credit and extension institution that could be safely adopted by the 
government of Sudan upon the end of the project life cycle in 1993. In this chapter, 
loan policies as well as the extension methodology of the project are particularly 
emphasized. It is shown that new local organizational forms (e.g. 'associations', 
cooperatives and jamaas) are institutionalized and assigned administrative and 
executive roles which ultimately lead to sound coordination and communication 
between the project agents and their clients. In addition this is shown to contribute to 
the agency's goal of 'sustainability' and grass-roots involvement for project viability 
and continuity.
Chapter 5 deals with the agency versus its clients in terms of the similarities and 
differences in views, conceptions and goals. Here we incorporate both the 
viewpoints of the project clientele and of the agency. The interpretation of both 
perspectives allows us to come to grips with the often divergent aims and goals 
held by both the agency and its clients.
It is shown that while both parties agree that development is desirable some 
divergent views and conceptions about development occur. This relates to the 
fact that basic values guiding the views of the clients are predominantly micro­
level derived and grass-roots oriented, while those of the development agency are
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often macro-level derived. This is mainly because the NGO is influenced by the 
experiences of other international development organizations with projects of 
similar concern, and which it desires to 'replicate' in the project context. However, 
the agency's intervention through local leadership and its reliance on clients' 
evaluation of the major aspects of the project (and acting upon feedback from 
smallholder farmers) worked to narrow that divergence. It is also shown that 
communication between project agents and their clients helped resolve mutual 
misunderstandings and stereotypes of one another. The analysis puts special emphasis 
on the institutionalization of innovation (so much as the project itself implies the 
deployment of new resources and ideas for agricultural expansion ).
Chapter 6 evaluates the project performance and shows that the project had achieved a 
limited success towards the goal of increasing, 'significantly', the incomes of 
smallholder producers. The productivity of the farms is adversely affected by low 
rainfall and crop failure. However, the project evaluation reports made by the agents 
reported some significant increases in yields of groundnuts and millet crops relative 
to those of farmers outside the project. In addition some significant increases in area 
devoted to the cultivation of the major crops were also observed. This did not conflict 
with local environmental factors such as encroaching on grazing land and 
desertification since the agency makes provision for environmental control (in its 
policy of financing only a limited number of acres). It is also shown that the 
cultivation of cash crops in the 1989 and 1990 seasons started to be less 
remunerative in comparison with the rising prices of the millet crop (the food 
crop) .The argument points to grievances felt by smallholder farmers who allocate the 
bulk of their farm land to producing groundnuts for cash and yet fail to provide for their 
subsistence due to the persistent rises in the price of millet. This prompted farmers to 
increase the area devoted to the cultivation of the food crops relative to that of the cash 
crops, in a purposeful attempt to provide for subsistence.
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The chapter also reveals that the most salient impacts the project had on local 
communities were the abandonment of the traditional shell (money lending) system, 
the reduction of out-migration by the able-bodied villagers and the increased ability of 
the households to retain their animal herds rather than selling them to finance the 
farming enterprise. An indifference factor, however, was also present: when 
interviewed, some people (though not a significant proportion) were reluctant to 
acknowledge any significant positive impact being made by the project agency. 
Equally important is the project's impact on non-participants who enjoyed the 
benefits of gainful employment as hired labourers with the project. It is also shown 
that the project had succeeded in assisting women producers build a preliminary 
resource management capability which will help village women augment their potential 
for coping with the cash lending programme yet to be implemented by the agency.
Part three consists of the ritual practices and religious beliefs bearing on the project, and 
local government's efforts at local community development. Thus in chapter seven full 
coverage is given of the rituals, religious beliefs and practices and their effect on, or 
their being affected by, development. It is shown that these practices existed prior to 
the implementation of the project but also seem to be perpetuated by the project. 
Their effects on the project varied according to the practice concerned. The beliefs 
about rainfall signals ( alma) had little reflection on the project as these were held 
mainly by the older generation. Religious rituals of rain-making and amulets for 
the various purposes connected with agriculture were both elaborate and well 
practised throughout the project villages. The project makes no intervention in 
respect of the rain-making rituals, while it lacked cognizance of the amulet ritual 
practices.
Chapter 8 provides information on local government. It is shown that local 
government draws a significant part of its revenue from taxing local producers while 
on its part it makes little contribution towards community development. It is shown
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how this led to the development of a negative attitude by local people towards the 
government. Paradoxically the government's negligence of local people had resulted 
in greater self-reliance on the part of local communities which enabled them to 
mobilize local labour and material resources for the betterment of their 
communities. This ideology provided a favourable base for the agency on which 
to launch its interventions into the rural communities.
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Oral Tradition,The Hamar And Major Trends 
In The Establishment of Dar Hamar
It has been recently ai'gued that for a development project to be successful it must be 
implemented at the right time in the right place and for the right people targeted by it. Failure 
to account for the historical and social context into which the project is introduced can result in 
considerable difficulties being faced by project planners (Salmen, 1987: 72). In this chapter 
we cover the oral tradition of the Hamar people, the principal beneficiaries of the project, and 
the major trends in the establishment of Dar Hamar (lit. the home land of Hamar) in an attempt 
to show one aspect of the social context germane to the project.
The presently available literature on the Hamar, currently settled in Northern Kordofan 
province (see maps No.l and No.3, end pocket), presents divergent views about their 
genealogy. MacMichael has presented a detailed account of Hamar genealogy . In some 
accounts he classifies the Hamar with the Baggara Arabs. In other places he considers them a 
mixture of Beni Ommaya, Beni Abbas, Anag, Ashraf and Fur. And in yet another account he 
traces their ancestry to the Guhayna ethnic group (see MacMichael, 1912). MacMichael offers 
a short historical review of the Hamar tribe during the nineteenth century and into the early 
1900's. But he is unable to trace the Hamar genealogy to the common parent, El Ahmar, from 
whom they claimed (in his period) to descend. Hereunder we will be dealing with major 
events in the history of the Hamar which have had profound influence on present-day social 
life: their migration into the area, the development of their leadership authorities, and the 
establishment of Dar Hamar. Internal changes in the Hamar tribe due to tribal sub-divisions as 
well as those caused by contacts with locals are also explained.
The history of the Hamar as a tribe in present-day Dar Hamar (see map No. 3, end pocket) 
dates back to some two centuries ago with the rise of the founder of Dar Hamar El Hag
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Munaym. Unlike MacMichael, my research shows that the Hamar can claim direct decent 
from one common ancestor, Mohamed El Ahmar, who is genealogically linked to the prophet 
Mohamed's family through the latter's uncle's son, Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Hence, their name, the 
Hamar, derives from this 'great grand parent' El Ahmai% Thus the tribe is not aboriginal to its 
contemporary location: it migrated from the Gezira Arabia (El Yemen) during the rule of Hajaj 
Ibn Yusuf (in the second half of the seventeenth centuiy) and entered the Sudan through the 
western route to Dar Fur and settled in Kabkabia. Then the tribe gradually moved eastwards 
in seach of grazing land and water sources. The migrant tribe was divided into two groups, the 
Dagageem section of the tribe headed by Abu Tabir, and the A'asakir section, headed by 
Sheikh Salim Taiishu. A lai’ge proportion of the migrants from the former group perished in 
their endeavor to reach the Nile borders in the eastern part of Sudan.
The A'asakir migrants, however, settled in Abu Zabad town where Salim left his son, Elhag 
Munaym, after which he left for another area in northern Kordofan region. Elhag Munaym 
was later elected by the tribe as a chief, and left for Dar Fur where he met with the Sultan of 
Dar Fur, from whom he purchased the aiea now called Dar Hamar for 1,000 camels and 1,000 
slaves. The whole area was 51,634 square kilometres.
Unlike MacMichael's argumentation (1912:156), that the Hamar vaguely 
claim decent from the Arab ancestry of Abdalla el Guhani and Mohamed El Ahmar, my finding 
has documented the Hamar's claim quite explicitly. My interview, in 1990, with an 
extremely knowledgeable secondary school teacher, Mustamhil Makin, a Hamar from the 
Ghai'aysia section, provides a series of (ascending) genealogical links to Mohamed El Ahmar, 
Abdalla el Guhani,and further to Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Thus Mustamhil (65 years old) traces his 
genealogy in ascending order as follows: "Mustamhil, Makin, Mufarrih, Hammad, Na'eem, 
Sallam, Abdel Sal am, Manal, Abu Tanu, Abu Zeid, Gibreil, Raddad, Hasaballa, EL Riheima, 
Own, Salama, Abu Go am. Mohamed EL Ahmar. Say id Dardig, Say id Mohamed el Hassan, 
Say id el Ma'arif, Sayid Ahmed, Say id Rafi', Sayid A'amir, Say id Mohamed, Say id el 
Hussein, Sayid Ismail, Sayid Abdalla El Guhani. Sayid Ibrahim el Imam, Sayid Musa, Sayid
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el Karim, Sayid Ga'afar Sayid el Sadig, Sayid Mohamed el Baghir, Sayid Ali Zein el 
A'abideen, Sayid el Hussein, Sayid el Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib".
The Hamar tribe is today divided into three main sections; the A'asakir, the Dagageem (from 
whom Mustamhil is a member) and the Gharaysia (who separated from the Dagageem and are 
still refered to as Dagageem in origin). According to Mustamhil, the basic tribal divisions and 
sub-divisions stem from the following common ancestry:
a) Bani Badr and Ghishimat who formed the A'asakir section.
b) Awlad Salaama who formed the Dagageem section; and
c) Awlad Abdel Salam who formed the Gharaysia section.
The Hamar use the term awlad to refer to lineage . Thus the lineage named Awlad Abdel 
Salam is the one descended from Abdel Salam.
From these major sections of the Hamar tribe other sub-divisions arose, as members of 
certain clans invoked their 'grandparents' as founders of subsections. The main reason why a 
clan may invoke its own grandparent as a founder of a subsection is that such a clan desires to 
reaffirm its identity vis-a-vis the other contemporary subsections. To illustrate this we may 
consider the following example: Malih and Sa'ad both belong to the Bani Badr subsection (as 
A'sakir). When the lineages of Malih and Sa'ad (see the table below) are formed they were 
assumed to identify with Bani Badr. But in fact the descendents from Malih ellected to identify 
with Malih as a founder, and are therefore referred to by other subsections as Milalha (See the 
full complement of sub-divisions listed below). The same applied to the descendents from 
Sa'ad who, in turn are referred to as Sa'adat.
The three sections of the Hamar tribe include the following lineages:
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Two important Hamar teachers participating
in a feast in En Nahud (No. 2 and No. 3 from left):
No. 3 from left is Mustamhil Makin.
a) A'asakir Section b) Dagageem Section
GhJshimat Barli Badr Awlad Salaama
Malih Sa'îJd i----------- -^-------------- rI I ________________  Own En Nur
n [Ü W.a Nla ISlla l\4atlub ivluhalhil el-Sul Ghinum [“  ^ j
El Riheima N.a
Sibeih Sari Hasaballa H  T  7T, I  !  ,  IGemaama Buras Shiaebat Amir Shadwanc) Gharaysia Section 
Awlad Abjel salam
S alim el Paras Ï?.a
r  1--------- 1------------ ]Jweid Hweid Hadhud Shighan
Garfa A'acii Gabir sliharif ^urm i
The full complement of sub-divisions of each of the three main sections is listed, by 
founder, in MacMichael (1912). In the following list we use the letters (capital^ to denote a 
highest level in the Iwarchy. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 ....etc. denote a higher level, and a,b,c 
...etc., a high level.
It should be noted, however, that McMichael's list is somewhat confusing. For example, 
when he dealt with B) in the Dagageem section he placed Awlad Sibeih in a level (i.e., b) 
lower than that of Nas Sari (i.e., 1). But in reality Sibeih and Sari come from the same lineage 
(in other words, the same hirarchy, see above). McMichael also makes yet another mistake 
when he locates a latecomer sub-section in a level as high as that of its predecessors (e.g. he 
places Wailia on a level higher [i.e. A.] than that of Awlad Abdel Salam [i.e., 2 ]). We have 
seen above that Awlad Abdel Salam (who later formed the Ghraysia section) is the first lineage 
among the Gharaysia section, which implies that Walia is a latecomer. The same mistake is also 
repeated when McMichael assigns Mahilhil a level [ i.e. b) ] (see the A'sakir section below) 
equal to that of Malih who obviously occupies a higher level (see above).
29
The Dagageem Section The A'sakir Section
A. WAILIA A.EL GHISHIMAT
1. Nas Hasil 1. Awlad Gami'a
2. El Huit a) Awlad Ma'ayz
3 Abu Hamaydan Shena'bir
4. Hamir c) Ghara'ra
5. Harush d) Merazik
6. Raha 2. Sidayrat
7. Abu A'win 3. Awlad Ma'ali
8. Abu Gemanin 4. Awlad Gasi
B.NAS ABUZAYD 5. Awlad A'li
1. Nas Sari B. BANI BADR
a) Nas Gabir 1. Meramia
b) Awlad SIBEIH a) Milalha (from Malih)
2. Nas Abdel Salam 2. Sa'adat (from Sa'ad)
3. Faragulla a) Awlad Ghannum
4. Abu Tenu b) Mahahil
C. El SHIAEBAT c) Nas Zayd
D. AWLAD SHADWAN d) Nas El Sul
E A MIR e) Matlub
F. BURA’S C. El KHAMASAT
G SIHAIA 1. Mayamin
1. Nas El Sod a) Awlad Subuh
2. Feraywa b) Budrania
3. Ribbayh 2. Menadir
4. Abu N a'amir 3. Gikhaysat
5. Musellam a) Um Haysin
6. Khala b) Awlad Dhiab
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H. El Gema'ania
I, El Gharaga
c) Abu Dan
d) Merahil
e) Nas Mua'mar
4. Menana'
5. Khayrasat 
D.EITARADAT 
1. Da'mai
a) Subayhat 
1. Nas Sodari
b) Gelada
c) Tayaisa
1. Awlad Ali
2. Gawabra
3. Nawara
4. 'Abasia
d) Fawadil
e) Ghanaymia
1. Nas Abu Gebel
2. Nas 'Ali
3. Nas Bilal
4. Nas Gamu'a
f) Noagat
g) Awlad Khadra
h) "Abadia
1. Nas Abu Guma'a
El GHARAYSTA SECTION:
A. El HADAHDA (from Hadhud, see above)
1. Awlad Hammad
2.Awlad Um Butnayn
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3. Dububa
4. Awlad Sherif
5. Awlad Nimr
6. Bera'im
B. AWLAD SHIGHAN
1. Nas Isma'il
2. Um Kisayba
3. Nas Nusr
4. Nas Abu Merakih
5. Nas Mohamed
6. El Homran
C  AWLAD JWEID
1. Nas abu Higaywa
2. Nas Turf a
3. Awlad 'Adi
4. El Hababish
5. Nas Murmi
6. El Sa'adia
7. Awlad Gabir
8. Nas Sahaiif 
D. EL SUB AHA
From all these various sections and sub- divisions there lived in the project location only the 
following sub-divisions from the two main sections, the Dagageem (merged with Gharaysia) 
and the A'sakir. But as will be noted other new sub-division (such as Jalada and Jawamees 
among the A'sakir, and Awlad Garfa among the Dagageem Section) also appear in the list. 
Here the sub-divisions which occupy the same level of the hirarchy are assigned similar 
notation, e.g. all sub-divisions assigned A/1 or B/1 occupy the highest level, those assigned 
A/2 or B/2 occupy a higher level, and A/3 or B/3 a high level.:
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A.The Dagageem Section 
(A/l= highest level;
A/2 and A/3 higher and high)
A/1 Gharaysia
A/1 Abu Zayd
A/2.Awlad Sari
A/1 .Sha'ibat
A/1.Awlad Bur'as
A/1.Awlad 'Amir
A/1 Wailia 
A/2 Awlad Garfa 
A/1 Awlad Shadwan 
A/1 Awlad Sihaia 
A/1 Gema'ania
B.The A'sakir Section 
(B/l=highest level ;
B/2 and B/3 higher and high) 
B/1 Bani Badr 
B/1 Tai'adat
B/1 Ghishimat 
B/2 Mayamin 
B/2 Mena'a 
B/2 Gikhaysat 
B/3 Ghanaymia 
B/2 Manadir 
B/3 Noaygat 
B/3 Tayaisa 
B/3 Sabha 
B/3 Ma'arka 
B/3 Khawazma 
B/3 Jawamees 
B/3 Jalada 
B/3 El Merazig 
B/3 Awlad Khadra 
B/3 Subayhat 
B/3 Shama'in 
B/2 Khayraysat
As I have mentioned , the present-day Hamai' tribes in the project area trace their early 
settlement in Dar Hamar to their 'grand parent' Elhag Munaym. Immediately after their
33
settlement in the area The Hamar followed a semi-nomadic way of life raising sheep and 
camels.
The sheep which the Hamai' raised was internationally known as the Hamari sheep (i.e after the 
Hamar) due to the animals’ special characteristic of being highly resistant to diseases, ability 
to travel for long distance, and the good quality of the meat. The nomadic tribesmen moved 
during the annual cycle from El Odaya and Foga in the southern part of Kordofan, to UM 
Sumeima and Um Badir in the northern paid, and further eastwards to Abu Haraz, Um Shidera 
and Gebel Abu Sinun (see map No.l, end pocket, and MacMichael, 1912:156).
These movements brought the Hamar into perpetual conflict over grazing land in the northern 
part of Kordofan province with the Kababeesh, the pastoral people who have long been 
indigenous to this area. Unlike the other nomadic tribes in Kordofan, the Hamar "multiplied 
prolifically in Kordofan and not only did their herds of camels in the Turkia exceed those of 
most other nomadic tribes on the west of the river, .. their villages occupied extensive tracts 
between En Nahud and Gebel Abu Sinun"(1912:157). This growth both in number and in 
wealth of the Hamar was attributed to the enterprise of the descendents of Elhag Munaym. The 
lineages of this family later provided the principal leadership of the tribe which in turn was 
inherited by the succeeding generations. The lineages derived from the family of Elhag 
Munaym were presented by MacMichael( 1912: 157) as follows:
[ S h e i k h  s a l l m  T a r i s h u ]I
E l ha j  Munaym
I------------------------------i--------------------------- 1
I s m a ' i l  Mekki  Mekln
T-------------- 1—-^-------------------- 1 ' *
I b r a h i m  M o h a m e d  Gi d i a  = El Mel lh  El Bek r i
el S h e i k h
I s m a ' i l  A h m e d  I b r a h i m  Bey S a l i m
I------------------ "T------------- 1----------- f
M o h a m e d  A h m e d  VasIn  Yuse f  
El S h e i k h
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Elhag Munaym's 'grand sons' thus succeeded him in tribal leadership as nazirs (lit. boss of the 
tribe) and sheikhs (see chapter 8).
Pallme (1844:114) had described the Hamai' as "one of the most amiable class of people in this 
province.. I never heard of their having ill-treated or robbed any stranger, much less of their 
having committed murder". Later in 1876 Ensor described them, contrary to Pallme, "the 
most war-like and thievish of all the tribes in Dar Fur [refering to those of Hamar groups left 
behind in the journey to their present abode, Dar Hamar]... and an ill bred and surly lot of 
fellows" (Ensor, 1881:86).
Upon the beakdown of the Mahdist rule (1880's), feuds and raids by the Kababeesh resulted 
in a considerable reduction in the number of camels owned by the Hamar and so the tribe 
turned in part to agriculture and became primarily a sedentary population. "They have large 
areas of cultivation and areas of gum forests round Rihaywa.. but most of them are further 
west round [En] Nahud rural council and Foga (MacMichael, 1912:159). In turn the Hamar 
made counter-raids against the Kababeesh around 1880's and took over their nahas (lit. war 
and chiefly drums) from them. Nahas is a prerogative of chiefs (i.e. sheikhs and nazirs), and 
entitles its holders leadership over non-owners. Up to the present-day it is repeatedly heard in 
En Nahud rural council that the Dagageem had thus secured their leadership over Dar Hamai* by 
force. However, the Hamar also preserve their own traditional nahas. said to be handed 
down from their ealiest ancestor, thus giving the Hamar a more ancient legitimation of chiefly 
control of the whole area. Thus, Mustamhil Makin ai’gued that the Awlad Jweid and Awlad 
Abu Zayd (see above) owned nahas. known also as dimli. The preservation of the nahas was 
until recently accompanied by elaborate ritual ceremonies and practices. In the past the nahas 
announced the nomadic movements of the tribesmen from one grazing ground to another. As 
the tribe later sedentarized, the practice became confined to religious festivals and national 
ceremonies. The nahas is also beaten to announce the death of a sheikh or an important 
member of his family as well as for particular social events such as the nafir. Today the nahas
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is beaten to summon the farmers who participated in ENSAP for meetings, nafirs and self-help 
tasks.
A process of disintegration and reintegration has occured in the Hamar tribe during the past few 
decades through inter-marriage with the non-Hamar tribes of the area who were also 
immigrants into Dar Hamar. These tribes included the Tunjur, the Mimi, the Gura'an, 
Manadeer, Ma'alia and the Berti, to name but the more well-known. These tribes are often 
referred to as westerners (from western Sudan) to distiguish them from the pure Hamar. Both 
the westerners and the Hamai' tribe came to the aiea at different times and both claim the right to 
land ownership, based on these respective occasions. However, the Hamar seem to have more 
of a legal claim by virtue of the fact, as they believed, that their ancestor Elhag Munaym 
purchased the land from the Sultan of Dar Fur (see chapter 8). Be it mentioned, here, however, 
that these western Sudan tribes never came into open conflict over land with the Hamar since 
land is plentiful and their respective populations were intermingled within the administrative 
villages (i.e the officially recognized villages) and clusters of surrounding settlements (which 
include officially unrecognized villages) locally known as areet (see chapter 2).
The villages are separated by vast field spaces, and they ai*e linked by a web of tracks and 
foot paths and occasionally by roads. The surrounding settlements are evident in groups of 
thatched houses each with a jubraka (kitchen garden). Most central villages are headed by a 
local sheikh, well recognized on the part of the rural district council based at En Nahud, the 
district town (the functions of the sheikhs are elaborated in the chapter on local government). 
One may mention here that the sheikhs are the lowest level chiefs in the native administration 
system, and are assigned the function of tax collection, maintenance of order, and the 
distribution of, and settlement of disputes over, land at the village level.
Despite the multiplicity of ethnic groups, the daily social organisation is made unproblematic 
by the amiable social relations that have developed between the Hamai' and their co-residents. 
Never have the non-Hamar groups came into conflict over village leadership or authority.
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Throughout the project area the majority of the village sheikhs come from the Hamar ethnic 
group.
Out of the fifteen villages participating in the ENSAP project in 1990,1 observed only two 
villages headed by a non-Hamar sheikh. These villages were Ibeid whose sheikh is a Berti and 
Seranbi whose sheikh is a Gura'an.
In the past, migrant non-Hamar groups in Dar Hamar were allowed to settle within Hamar 
villages in order that the villages would be large enough to qualify for the social services 
rendered by the governmental authority. Growth in the total number of village residents 
meant a larger tax payable to the government, hence the worthwhileness of the village for 
social services. It was in the village sheikh's interests to allow non-kin to settle in his 
village particularly for exacting these taxes. Thus immigrants were allowed access to 
cultivable land associated with a village: they contributed taxes to the village sheikhs who 
allocate the available agricultural land. Villages in Ghubeish with this experience included 
Dirra, Rasheed and Um Dubeiba.
This process of gradual fusion with the other tribal groups (with the local loss of tribal 
identities; see also MacMichael, 1912), which was also partly affected by inter-marriage and 
immigration, comes under the heading of what I call the disintegration and reintegration in 
Hamar historical experience. The ongoing tribal sub-divisions among the Hamar (see above) 
exemplify the process of disintegration (as the Hamar themselves consider the continous tribal 
division and sub-divisions as leading to disunity), whitest social cohesion with the other tribal 
groups, as well as a general growth in population and power (relative to the other tribal 
groups), have contributed to tribal reintegration.
As the present nazir of Dar Hamai' puts it, "it is largely because we [the Hamar] succeeded in 
assimilating the other tribal groups and in amalgamating with them that we enjoy our persent 
leadership and power" (Abdel Gadir Munaym, personal interview, 1990, En Nahud). This
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trend among the Hamar seems to have been iniatiated long ago in their early settlement and 
became fully developed few decades ago. Thus, it has been argued that "large tribes such as 
the Hamar.. only formed themselves, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when 
they were joined by other mixed groups" (Trimingham, 1949:81). This process of 
disintegration and reintegration was also accompanied by a concomitant rise and fall in the 
tribal ownership of wealth. This could be established from the following anthropological 
observation:
The power of the Hamar had increased so rapidly that by 1876. Ensor 
considered them the richest of nomadic portion of the Kababeesh, and almost 
equally[equalling !] the whole of that tribe including the settlers on the bank of 
the Nile. They lost nearly all their wealth in the dervish days, and at the 
reoccupation the Kababeesh looted from them much of what was left. They are 
now almost entirely sedentary, but fairly rich in camels and sheep (MacMichael, 
1922:321).
Thus the main reason, among others, for the gradual change from pastoral nomadism to 
sedentary agriculture is this sizeable reduction in the animal population. In 1983, the 79,649 
people in Ghubeish were organized into one hundred and forty villages mainly situated in the 
plains alongside fields and roads. Villages which have their own sheikhs, are considered as 
modern administrative centres, but note that there are a number of administrative villages 
which had more than one distinct settlement (pertaining to different seasons). Moreover, when 
an administrative village, as is the case with Abu Geid, encompasses different sub-divisions 
of the Hamar tribe, the respective lineages are residentially separate, each one occuping a 
particular section (area) of the village.
For example, in Abu Geid we have three households belonging to the Manan'a, next to them 
there aie eight housholds belonging to Bani Badr, next there are ten households of Awlad 
Shadwan, next to them are the five households of Kharaysat, next the seven households of 
Abu Zayd, and the rest from the Bani 'Amir sub-division. This implies that despite the
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intermingling of the various tribal sections and sub-divisions with one another, as well as with 
the other non-Hamar tribal groups, there is still an evident predilection for groups originating 
from the same subgroup to come together vis-a-vis non-members.
It is clear from the above discussion that contrary to what had been reported by 
anthropologists for African tribal systems and their relationship with land tenure, villages in 
Ghubeish rural council have not developed any sort of conflict over land tenure as a result of 
the interlacing of ethnic groups, or of sub-divisions within the dominant Hamar population. It 
is usually assumed that in Africa in general, kinship explains the complexities of land tenure 
systems (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950). In Ghubeish, as we have seen, men get access to land in 
return for their ability to pay taxes to the village sheikhs and this allows the village to further 
attract services provided by the government. Any potential conflict over land tenure is obviated 
by the fact that in addition to land being plentiful, the residential groups put into cultivation 
only a small proportion of land and land appropriation is not considered of primary 
importance.
The local philosophy for help and community development is implied in the expression " 
goom na'yeenak ma targud naheenak" (lit. "I will help you should you be active, failing this I 
would rather humiliate you"). Literally this means self-help with the objective of self-reliance. 
The result of putting this ideology into practice is outstanding: a large number of villages 
have established their own schools, water-yards (a system of tanks and machinery for 
supplying water), cooperative mills and health units through aljuhdal sha'abi which is the direct 
practice of the goom na'yeenak ideology. For the ENSAP agency this philosophy provided a 
suitable basis to launch its implementation activities. The villagers are constrained by their 
own traditional ideology to support the project: failure to support the project would lead 
project agents to accuse them of negating their own ideology.
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Below coverage is given of some significant features and points of interest in some selected 
villages. Time and methodological considerations of course render comprehensive coverage 
of each village impossible. This is to give the reader a feel for the overall social 
environment of the study area and to expose issues which will be dealt with more 
systematically in subsequent chapters (sources of the data include ENSAP and my fieldwork). 
The location of these villages is given in map No.2 (end pocket).
L 2ol S era im b i:
Seranbi is a small village composed of thirty households quite isolated from one another by 
jubraka (kitchen garden) and field plots. The village has a small population of approximately 
347 who are predominantly agriculturalists.
The village is composed of three distinct tribes: the Gura'an who make up the majority of the 
village population, the Wailia Hamar and the miamin. The sheikh is a Gura'an whose 
inheritance of the office may be traced back through six generations.
Local people reckon the establishment of the village to date back to the period proceeding the 
Mahdist rule (approximately 1850s) but the village has a very low population growth relative 
to neighbouring villages. The village is very poor in terms of infrastiucture and most of the 
land owners, who (with their families) comprise nearly half of the village population, settle 
during several months in the year (the post-harvesting period) over neighbouring villages such 
as Abu Rai. The main reason for this is the lack of water, health unit, grain mill and schools. 
The villagers are currently planning to construct a water-yard (i.e. a system of machinery and 
tanks for supplying water to a community) through aljuhdal sha'abi (lit. self-help) as this will 
motivate its population to stay in the village.
The village, then, experiences a process of desertion and rehabitation during the off-farm 
season and the rainy season. A good proportion of the villagers move to the neighbouring
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villages after harvesting, but eventually reassemble when the rainy season restarts. Thus the 
village experiences full habitation while the faimers are engaged in the planting, weeding and 
haiwesting operations. Then nafirs are summoned almost every day on a reciprocal basis. 
Nearly every member of the village knows one another, thanks to the smallness of its size.
Social events such as marriage, funerals and rain-making rituals are fully attended during the 
rainy season, when all the population is present. This is unlike villages where the population 
is relatively stable thioughout the yeai', where ritual practices are arranged to take place in the 
off-farm season to allow farmers to fully utilize their working time for agricultural 
operations.
Seranbi had participated in the ENSAP project since the second operating season of the 
project, 1989. Twenty faimers had received project loans and extension services, including the 
sheikh who, however, dropped out from participation in the following season, 1990, for 
religious reasons connected with repayment of loans. The sheikh believed that "there are forty 
sins in dealing with [economic] interest the least of which is as if one had committed 
promiscuity with his mother".
However, Seranbi farmers see that despite being important, such services can not be sufficient 
as to allow sustainable improvement in the village since the lack of water has prompted the 
villagers to invest their financial resources in surrounding villages touted for providing a 
better life and economic oppotunities. Thus, Abu Rai village, which draws the majority of 
Seranbi farmers, has a big market which allows growth in trade and brings in a large number 
of consumers and middlemen thereby opening broader avenues for marketing and income 
generation. Without equally attacking the problem of lack of water, the village farmers argue, 
real indigenous improvement will not be easy to attain.
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From right to left; sheikh of Seranbi, a participant farmer,
ENSAP Credit Officer and Agricultural Coordinator. Seranbi, 1990.
L
Dirra is a large village with a population of some 1957 persons. The village is inhabited by 
two Hamar ethnic groups and three non-Hamar tribal groups. The Hamar are the majority 
population and from them the village draws its leadership which is inheritable. The two Hamar 
divisions are the Tradat (the majority, from whom is drawn the sheikh) and Awlad Khadra. 
The other tribal groups include the Tunjur, Mimi and the Berti.
The sheikh himself is a very powerful and active person who has played a significant role in 
village development. Through aljuhdal sha'abi. which the sheikh was able to mobilize, the 
villagers were able to build a primary school for both boys and girls. The school admits 
children from Dirra, its areet (sattelite villages which extend from the mother village) and 
neighbouring villages, such as Rasheed. The village also has a small market of some twenty 
shops selling consumer items such as tea, sugar, coffee, oil, soap, matches, rice, cloth etc. 
The water-yard which was constmcted by the government has a local committee responsibe for 
its maintenance through fund raising from the villagers. The sheikh has also established a 
local market committee which was made responsible for the supervision of the market against 
the malpractices of 'black market’ merchants.
Under the auspices of the new Salvation Government of 1989, the sheikh has now been 
elected as the head of the Agricultural Committee for The Popular Salvation Committee of 
Dirra. The committee consists of nine members who are local farmers and it was assigned the 
function of assisting local farmers to solve farm-related problems such as the lack of 
implements, seeds and pest control. Local farmers view the committee as the basis for future 
expansion in agriculture and look to it with great hope. The committee has provided a favorable 
base for the ENSAP project which looks forwai'd to the mutual coordination of activities.
The village committee is well organized and influential in mobilizing local villagers for 
communal tasks. In 1988 the committee was able to organize self-help groups for the 
establishment of a local cooperative grain mill, the total cost of which was covered through
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fund raising. The cooperative mill is the only mill currently efficiently functioning in the area. 
Prior to the establishment of the cooperative mill, the villagers had to spend considerable time 
travelling to the neighbouring villages to do their milling, a situation which had adversely 
diminished the time spent in farming. In Dirra, hired labour is in short supply relative to 
neighbouring villages and the bulk of the agricultural operations have to be done by household 
labour. For this reason the hired labour wage rate for weeding in Dirra is relatively higher than 
that in the neighbouring villages. Thus, while the ruling wage rate in Dirra was LS 60 (LS= 
Sudanese pound) and LS 250 for the agricultural seasons 1989 and 1990, respectively, it was 
LS 50 and LS 230, respectively, in the surrounding villages. Due to the shortage of hired 
labour, some farmers, including the sheikh, arrange sharaka (sharecropping) with Dinka 
immigrants from the southern part of the Sudan.
The faimers of Dirra village, unlike the farmers of the other villages currently pai ticipating with 
ENSAP, tend to think of farmers' problems and disagreements relating to agriculture as 
similar to everyday problems and disagreements affecting household members and that, 
therefore, they should be democratically resolved by the villagers (no different from ajoudia , 
which is a traditional session for dispute resolution away from the court). Thus, the village 
committee was observed to hold occasional meetings during the agricultural phases of land 
preparation, rameil (lit. seeding shortly before the full start of the rains), and weeding to 
democratically discuss relevant matters. All the farmers attended such a meeting, including 
ENSAP's participating farmers, to state their problems, which were then put before the 
committee for resolution. Those farmers who were lagging behind in the weeding of their 
farms due to the lack of hired labour would be quickly assisted through nafirs being mobilized 
by the committee. For greater democracy to be secured on behalf of the ENSAP project, which 
is enthusistically welcomed by the villagers, the traditional village committee was incorporated 
in the project and was assigned the functions of:
a) coordinating local farmers with ENSAP;
b) following-up and monitoring the destination of spending ENSAP loans so as to
c) select those farmers who are eligible for the loans and those who should be dropped out;
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d) supporting f aimers participating with ENSAP through the provision of farm implements;
e) supporting the elderly in terms of organizing nafirs.
A related factor concerning the ENSAP project is that, in Dirra, local farmers were 
developing an attitute of self-reliance for ENSAP will eventually get 'phased out' by 1993. 
Thus for a sustained source of credit to be available, Dirra faimers have planned to initiate a 
local fund from member donations contributed by those faimers participating in ENSAP. 
Farmers have argued that they are now accustomed to receiving loans and that their dumman 
(lit. guarantors; these are the farmers who should publicly undertake to bring a defaulted 
farmer for prosecution) have gained experience and trust which enables sound management 
and supervision of the forthcoming local fund.
Barnawi is an average village of a population of 1165 persons who are primarily 
agriculturalists. It was established in the last century (aiound 1900) and has experienced rapid 
population growth. The sub-groups in the village include Bani Badr who are the majority of 
the population, Ghishimat, Tayaisa and Berti. With the exception of the Berti, all the other 
groups are sub-divisions from the Hamar tribe. The village sheikh is a Bani Badr. The village 
itself is often named after the Bani Badr for it was people from this sub-division who first 
settled in the aiea.
The village sheikh. Murkab, has inherited the office thiough his grandfather who established 
the village. The four sub-groups relate with one another through marital ties and have thus 
established a form of village cohesion that has resulted in consensus over community affairs 
and leadership. This social cohesion is also expressed in villagers' repeated statements that "we 
are all one ahal [all relatives], the same and have one say" which implies the absence of 
conflict and social friction. When later on asked to state their relatedness through ahal it 
became cleai' that in fact there existed no kinship relationship as such between the sub-roups 
in spite of the fact that this term may connote (see introduction and, also, Stuchlik, 1976).
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Village unity also finds expression through the community mobilization efforts for the 
improvement of certain aspects of the village. Alhuhdal sha'abi was fully organized in the last 
decade for the constmction of the local water-yard, and still its maintenance lies with the village 
people themselves. A committee was formed which was assigned the responsibility of 
managing the water-yard. Procurement of spare parts, fuel and clerks lies with the committee 
members who raise money from the small contributions of the village members. The committee 
was also touted by the local villagers for its success in getting a local grain mill constructed by 
the government authorities in 1990. The village, however, lacks basic social services such as a 
health unit, a market and schools.
The village people are in contact with the neighbouring villages of Wad Mitgil (itself 
participating in ENSAP), Um Dibeiba and El Tayib Wad Um Jineih in the weekly market days 
as well as for participation in social events. Donkeys are the main means of transportion here. 
Nafirs were actively summoned throughout the weeding period in August 1990; they are 
also summoned for the constmction of houses and mosques.
Barnawi has participated in ENSAP since 1989, initially with 52 farmers of whom only 35 
were receiving project loans in 1990. The reason for this reduction in the number of 
beneficiaries was that some of the jamaa (lit, traditional 'group' organized by the project) 
members were dropped as the result of default on the pai't of their dumman (guarantors).
1.2.4 Ibe id :
Ibeid (or U'beid) is a relatively large village with a population of 1460 persons the majority of 
whom are small farmers producing partly for subsistence and partly for the market. It lies at 
approximately 108 kilometers distance from Ghubeish town. The village has more females in 
its population than men. These are 810 and 650 respectively. The village is headed by a sheikh 
who is responsible for a multi-ethnic population. The respective tribal groups include the 
Berti who are the majority and from whom the sheikh draws, the Kenana, Zaghawa, Masalit
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and a few Hamar groups who follow a pastoral nomadic way of life. Ibeid was established in 
1881, almost a century ago. The Berti were the first group to settle in the area and were able to 
wield authority by appropriating the right to village leadership. Literacy is provided through 
an elementary school which enrolls both sexes. In addition there are two khalwas (lit. 
traditional quranic school run by local faki (i.e religious man)) in which children are taught 
Islamic religion, mainly the Quran, which the children are required to commit to memoiy.
Local villagers were for decades concerned about village development. Their incessant 
demands for village improvement were doomed to fail as the government authorities had 
shown little interest in fulfilling those demands. The government was able to supply only 
teachers for the elementary school which was constructed through aljuhdal sha'abi. 
Consequently the villagers repeatedly voice their criticism toward governmental authority. 
They accuse the government of neglecting to supply health facilities for the local health unit 
which the villagers had also established through aljuhdal sha'abi. As a result the local 
dispensary is currently not functioning and the poeple have to seek medication in the 
neighbouring villages and the town of Ghubeish.
Previous experiences with non-governmental organizations aimed at village improvement had 
resulted in positive attitudes on the part of the village toward external interventions. In the 
1980's the aftermath of the drought had brought the intervention in the village of UNICEF 
for the provision of vaccination services, which were enthusiastically welcomed. The villagers 
posited that this experience had demonstrated to them the genuine interests of NGO'S in 
village improvement, contrary to their own government. Later on when the RFPP (Regional 
Finance and Planning Project) run by CARE organization approached the village in 1989 to 
rehabilitate the village water-yard, the village exhibited a high interest. As the result a water- 
yai'd committee, a VDC (Village Development Committee) and an administrative committee 
were added to the pre-existing traditional mosque and education committees.
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Ibeid has participated in ENSAP since 1989 with a maximum of 75 faimers receiving project 
loans. Local teachers were described by the village people as "key persons" here. It is they 
who actively encourage local farmers involved with the RFPP and ENSAP project to attend 
the meetings arranged on the part of ENSAP and the RFPP extensionists. These teachers, in 
turn, appreciate being commended and respected by the community members.
Most of the village population tends to stay inside the village throughout the whole year, with 
negligible seasonal outmigration. Trading is carried out by local business men in the dead 
season from January to April.
In Ibeid women are quite involved in community affairs. One of their activities in the past 
decade was the establishment of a women training centre to cater for women's problems. 
However, due to financial bottlenecks the centre came to a halt four years later. Other 
women's activities included the formation of a savings box, nafirs and helping out men in the 
farms. Women are also included in the RFPP project which trains two female"encouragers" 
meant to help fellow village women in local development issues.The two "encouragers were 
trained in handicraft and extension and their functions were to disseminate knowledge and 
render services to village women. The VDC arranges meetings which are presided over by 
these female "encouragers" as the main channel for communication with community members. 
The community members were developing a positive attitude towards community 
development and the existence of the RFPP and ENSAP projects had aroused their concern for 
development. However, as aresult of the faimers default on ENSAP loans for the 1989 season 
Ibeid was dropped from participation in the project in 1990.
L2.
Wad Fadol is a small village with a population of 308 persons. The main groups are the Abu 
Zayd and Awlad 'Amir, both of which are Hamar sub-divisions. The sheikh is from the first 
group which provides the majority of the population. The village is entirely devoid of basic 
services and depends on the neighbouring villages of Abu Geid and 'lyal Na'im (see maps end
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pocket) for water, marketing and health services. The village has five areet around it, 
associating with it for collective self-help projects and participation in wedding, cicumcision, 
funerals.nafirs and rain-making rituals. Wad Fadol inhabitants pursue agricultural production 
as the main occupation. Due to the dearth of water and basic services the village had lost about 
forty households during the 1980's as a result of migration outside the village. The local village 
estimated the number of the migrants to be around 450 persons. The problem of lack of water 
during the summer as well as shortly prior to the start of the early agricultural operations results 
in considerable time being spent by the active adults in search of water in the neighbouring 
villages. A number of attempts by the local villagers to get the government to construct a 
reliable water system in the village were refused by the government. Despite the village's 
positive response to ENSAP agricultural service the villagers' overriding concern was to get 
a viable source of water to stabilize the local population and make them more committed to 
agriculture. Due to this primacy being given to water as opposed to agricultural credit the 
farmers who participated with ENSAP project in 1988/89 season recorded a poor repayment 
performance with the project. As a result the whole village was dropped from participation in 
the project in the subsequent season.
1.2.6 U m  SAdaiir:
Um Sidair, a village of approximately 8 km square in size, was in 1990 inhabited by a 
population of 1780 distributed over some 194 households. The village is notable in that the 
size of its families is relatively lai'ge, averaging nine members per household. The level of 
illiteracy is very liigh among the ageing population. 90 percent of the villagers over thirty years 
of age are illiterate but most of those under thirty had at least primary school education. The 
village is inhabited by two main Hamar sub-divisions, the Shi'aebat and the Sabaha who were 
recently joined by a small number of people from different Beiti groups.
The village skeikh. Ahmed Jadalla, is a Shi'aebat Hamar who is touted by his ethnic group as 
having made strenuous efforts towards community improvement, mainly through the 
mobilization of aljuhdal sha'abi. Among the most prominent village institutions which have
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been established through local self-help is the construction of a water-yard through the 
mobilization of local labour and financial resources. The village is relatively the most self- 
sufficient in terms of water supply. Another contribution is the primary school for both sexes, 
which still receives maintenance through the village school committee which raises the money 
from the village members. Part of the income generated from the sale of water from the village 
water-yard is devoted to finance local community development projects. The local health unit 
which was built thiough aljuhdal sha'abi lacks basic health facilities and the villagers have to 
seek health assistance from En Nahud and Ghubeish towns.
The villagers being predominantly smallholder producers have enthusiastically responded to 
ENSAP innovations which they posited squared with their goals of agricultural 
improvement. The introduction of the ENSAP project in the village incidentally meant a 
strong blow to the shell (lit. the traditional credit system) system which traditionally provided 
the only source of credit to the smallholder producers. This system is now rapidly falling apart.
Um Sidair farmers keep camels, sheep,goats and donkeys as the main form of store of wealth. 
Prior to the introduction of the project some farmers with a surplus income would invest that 
surplus by purchasing a camel at a price of LS 2,000. The camel might be used as a means of 
transport and, later, should financial deficit occur, it could be resold at a lucrative price of LS 
4,000.
Despite the villagers' enthusiasm towards ENSAP, however, religious ideas came slightly to 
bear on the farmers' response to project loans. Islamic fundamentalists accuse the agency of 
involving village farmers in usurious credit, an act which contradicts Islamic ethics. By the 
second operating season of the project in Um Sidair village at least one farmer participating 
with the project was not utilizing the loans he received in agriculture. However, the majority of 
the village farmers have not been strongly influenced by religious opinions as the number of 
farmers joining the project in the subsequent season 1991 dramatically increased. While in the 
first implementation season of the project in the village in 1990 there were only 56 farmers
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who effectively participated , the number rose dramatically to a maximum of 88 farmers in the 
following season. Part of the reason adduced by the farmers themselves for this high response 
to joining the project was that some village farmers came to realize that the project has really 
resulted in the expansion of farm productivity. "The traditional farm productivity was exactly 
40% of the fai'm productivity under ENSAP" some farmers have remarked.
It is a small village inhabited by one group, the Ghishimat Hamar. The total village population, 
274 in 1990, who are predominantly smallholder producers. The village households are 
agnatically related to one another which has resulted in strong social cohesion and cooperation, 
though the village lacks all sorts of basic services. It depends on En Nahud, Khashum and 
Kileijow for education, health, marketing and for off-farm employment. As was the case with 
Wad Fadol village, the problem of water shortage had stimulated a proportion of the village 
members to seasonally migrate to the neighbouring villages, especially during the summer 
period when the demand for water reaches its peak. A significant portion of the village 
members had also been prompted to migrate completely outside Sudan for lucrative 
employment, the younger generation in particular being stimulated to do so from observing 
the wealth brought from this source enjoyed by their fellows in neighbouring villages such 
as Wad Fadol and Rasheed. The bulk of the wealth which these young migrants remitted was 
invested in the purchase of livestock. The average number of livestock per household is about 
10 head but a few farmers own up to some two hundred head of sheep. Donkeys and camels 
are kept for transportation to the neighbouring villages of Kileijow and Khushum from which 
water is fetched and with whom trading carried out during the period from Januaiy to March. 
The handful of people asociated with the village from the sub-divisions, Bidayria and 
Gharaysia had been prompted to move out of the village and form two separate areet named 
after the groups. As a result the village had become homogeneously inhabited by the dominant 
group, the Ghishimat Hamar.
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Nafirs were fully summoned during the weeding season through August 1990 and such 
participation brought all the village members together, as well as its areet : reciprocity in 
cooperative practice goes beyond 'ethnic' boundaries.
Farmers, however, depend mostly upon household labour for farming operations due to the 
chronic shortage of a hired labour supply. A handful of farmers were observed to engage in the 
sharaka arrangement with Dinka labourers from southern Sudan. The average number of 
Dinka for each such farmer was four, but one farmer was observed to have arranged a sharaka 
with a maximum of forty Dinka labourers in the 1990 season.
The ownership of livestock had enabled the El Halfaya farmers participating in ENSAP project 
to repay their outstanding loans thereby recording the best repayment performance among the 
villages paricipating in the scheme during the 1989 agricultural season.
1.
Murabaat, which is also referred to as Murabaat/Kirja (Kirja being now separated from 
Murabaat as an independent village), was said to be established by a Mahdist hero, Kirja, 
shortly before the start of the Mahdist revolution in the second part of the last century. The 
village is inhabited by a population of 1108 persons distributed over 100 households the 
majority of whom are the Wailia Hamar. few other tribal groups are also represented, 
including the Riash, Bidayria and the Berti. Agricultural production is the mainstay of the 
whole village population. Production is both for household consumption and for the market.
The village people had succeeded considerably in their efforts aimed at community 
improvemnent through putting into practice the village philosophy of "abni wa 'ammir" (lit. 
build and reconstruct) which is another version of aljuhdal sha'abi. Thus, in 1969 the 
mobilization of "abni wa ’ammir" was supported by government assistance to the community 
in the establishment of a local water-yard. Up to the today the water-yard's management and 
maintenance has lain with the village community which procured its own local technicians for
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running it. Later, in 1975, the "abni wa ’ammir" slogan was again raised whereby a primary 
school for both sexes was constructed. This success had also stimulated the further 
mobilization of the village masses for the constructon of a local health unit shared by the 
village and its areet (including Um Jamal, Darig Rasak and Tweifra). The village, however, 
includes a few rich merchants who traditionally provided sheil credit to small faimers. Relating 
to the ENSAP project, 1% of farmers currently receiving loans from the project also 
approach the traditional sheil lenders for credit.
The majority of fai'mers (approximately 80%)have gum Arabic fields which provide part of the 
household’s cash income. Cultivation of the gum Arabic starts upon the conclusion of 
agricultural operations in December, and lasts until February. The gum produce is then 
marketed at Ghubeish and En Nahud towns. Also, nearly 80% of the farmers own goats and 
30% own sheep. A handful of farmers own up to 400 to 500 heads of sheep but these people 
are not currently participating in the ENSAP project. The village instiucted some of its elders 
to keep a special calendar' which would enable the farmers to anticipate exactly the onset of 
rainfall in relation to which their agricultural practices should be put in train (see chapter 7). 
The village is very active in nafir mobilization which follows the norm of reciprocity. Dozens 
of nafirs were arranged during the weeding phase in the 1990 season, and one nafir , arranged 
by the sheikh, called into participation a maximum number of 100 people, some coming from 
three neighbouring villages (Abu Geid, Wad Fadol and Gassari). Non-turning up to a nafir if 
having been invited is fully penalized by the community members. A fine of 1 Ib of sugar is 
levied and the person concerned is formally interrogated and asked to provide acceptable 
reasons for failure to attend the ritual.
When ENSAP was first implemented in Murabaat in the 1989 season the farmers were of two, 
divergent views. A first group was affected by Murabaat's proximity to, and contact with. 
Wad Fadol village which participated in the project in the first season, 1988. Some farmers 
from Wad Fadol were not able repay their loans and the project did not prosecute these 
defaulters. This information leaked out to the farmers of Murabaat who eventually thought that
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the project was distributing 'grants' as opposd to 'repayable loans’. The second group included 
those who could understand ENSAP’s lending policy (and these were the majority of the 
fai'mers) and were later able to convince the first group to repay its loans lest the whole village 
be excluded from participation in the subsequent season.
One of the most prominent effects of the ENSAP project on Murabaat farmers has been that 
households which traditionally hired out part of the household labour as workers on the farms 
of rich families, are now able to fully utilize that labour for the cultivation of household farms. 
Moreover those families which were traditionally producing mainly for household subsistence 
have become increasing mai'ket oriented thiough the cultivation of groundnuts. Another effect 
has been the abandonment by some of the poor of the traditional land lease practice. 
Traditionally the poor landowners would lease out to relatively rich faimers some part of their 
land, at LS 50 per makhamas for three consecutive seasons. As a result of pNSAP 
implementation this practice is now in decline.
Rasheed is a large village of 1264 persons engaged in agricultural production for household 
consumption and for the market. It was established around the mid-1800’s and is currently 
inhabited by a Bani Badr subdivision of the Hamar, coexisting with Berti tribal groups. The 
village skeikh. Adam Salih, is a Bani Badr who inherited the office from his father. The 
village leadership has lain with the Bani Badr tribe (the majority of the village population) since 
the eai'ly establishment of the village and continues to rest with that group thiough inheritance. 
The village sheikh has in the past two decades appointed a local village committee which has 
been assigned the function of mobilizing and administering the village development tasks.
The village institutions which the local villagers have been able to establish through aljuhdal 
sha’abi are numerous. In 1974 the village members raised some LS 10,000 for the 
construction of the village water-yard. Up to then the problem of water shortage had 
adversely affected the overall agricultural productivity of the village since the supply of hired
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farm workers depended on an availability of adequate water. Local farmers argued that "lack 
of water to supply to the hired workers had made our village unattractive to them to the extent 
that the wages paid to solicit more labourers conficted with the optimum allocation of labour 
and even to loss". Up until recently the recurrent breakdown of the water-yard had resulted in 
farmers assigning a considerable part of their farm income toward maintenance. A number of 
continuous attempts on the pai't of the village sheikh at solicitting government assistance for the 
supply of fuel and spare parts for the rehabilitation of the water-yard were doomed to fail due 
to the lack of concern on the part of the central government.
Aljuhdal sha'abi had also, later, contributed to the establishment of the village elementary 
school for both sexes. The villagers contributed local material (stools, desks and thatch) and 
labour, which later prompted the government to supply the teachers. The school is still 
maintained by the local village committee of elders which was elected by the community 
especially to attend to problems arising in respect of the village school. Later, in 1980, the 
village was able to send one of its volunteers to the district town, to receive training in health 
provision in order to assist in the community's health unit, also constmcted thiough aljuhdal 
sha'abi. However, the health unit provides only meagre assistance with first aid to the village 
members due to the dearth of its facilities.
Rasheed has a small market composed of some 20 shops which supply tea,coffee, salt, sugar, 
cloths etc. to local customers. Local producers supply the groundnuts and gum Arabic crops 
which are marketed through village middlemen who transport the crop to the main towns of 
Ghubeish and En Nahud.
The village farmers lack 'cooperative' consciousness (that is, relating to a formally 
register'd cooperative, rather than cooperation in the broader meaning). A large number of the 
farmers who participated in the ENSAP project in 1989 showed indifference as to whether it 
was in their interest to form a cooperative or an 'association' (a formally organized 
development grouping), for the coordination of the project activities. It seems that while they
54
voluntarily chose a cooperative rather than an 'association', in reality the choice was not 
guided by rationality. The decision to opt for the cooperative was a 'negative' choice, arrived 
at only because the farmers were unfamiliar with the 'association' and with the functions it 
was likely to play.
Rasheed farmers were observed to aiTange karama during the wahid 
(February) month of every year. Here, the village members go outside the village , kill a 
sacrificial animal and conclude the ritual with a dua' (lit. invocation of God). More information 
about this ritual practice is chapter 7).
Local faimers conventionally allocated pait of their agricultural surplus as tribute to be paid to 
the village sheikh in the form of zakat (Lit. Islamic alms). This was not a specified sum as the 
amount given fluctuated according to the seasonal agricultural yield. Some farmers, however, 
pay zakat to poor families in an attempt to redress economic equality and effect income 
redistribution. This does not imply the absence of a rich class in the village. On the contrary, 
the migration of some village members to Libya in 1984 (during the drought period) on 
camels and lorries had resulted in a handful of rich people. The key fact here is that these 
expati'iates were able to remit a large amount of money which was invested on the purchase of 
livestock which is the main form of store of wealth in the village. The reason for this 
outmigration of village members was, according to the elders, that "our sons were motivated 
to 'emulate' their fellow expatriates who owned large livestock heads in the neighbouring 
villages., every one of these people goes out and hoards money and we should also follow 
that example".
The project, however, worked to stabilize the village population who became more committed 
to agricultural production, few farmers in Rasheed were observed to arrange sharaka with the 
Dinka labourers. At least two of the farmers participating in the ENSAP project in 1990 
engaged in such a shaiaka arrangement.
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Abu Geid village, which was established towards the middle of the past century, is inhabited 
by a population of over 800 persons distributed over some seventy households. The village 
derives its current name from its original founder Abu Geid whose lineage still wields the 
leadership represented by sheikh. Abu Geid Bashir. The village is inhabited by six Haniar sub­
divisions. These are the following, arranged in a descending order according to population 
size. Awlad 'Amir, Awlad Shad wan, Bani Badr, Abu Zayd, Khiraysat and Manana'a.
The vilagers are predominantly smallholder producers who were traditionally prevented by 
lack of finance to expand production for the market. As a result the majority of the farmers 
produced for subsistence with only a minimum allocation for the production of marketable 
groundnuts crops on behalf of the household's need for cash. The village members, 
however, occasionally contributed part of their meagre cash income to the maintenance of the 
village water-yard previously established by the government. The water-yaid committee which 
was elected by the local villagers is actively engaged in fund-raising for the rehabilitation of the 
water-yard.
'Acts of god' [by which was meant crop failure resulting from the shortage of rainfall and pest 
attack] too often resulted in a considerable loss of household income. This had prompted the 
outmigration of a large number of villagers in 1984, who fled to Khartoum in search of 
employment.
Despite the fact that the village households tend to cluster in comartments according to 
'ethnicity' (each 'ethnic' sub-division being located separately), there evidently exists strong 
social cohesion that binds the whole village community together. Karama. nafirs. aljuhdal 
sha'abi and rain-making bring almost all the different sub-divisions to equally participate in the 
village rituals. The concept of 'ahal' is strongly adhered to by the village members who use it 
indiscriminately to refer to their relatedness with one another.
56
The village consumers and producers depend on the Friday weekly market in the neighbouring 
village of Abu Rai which supplies the bulk of the community's basic needs, for example for 
the sale of agricultural crops to merchant buyers. Donkeys and camels provide the principal 
means of transport to these weekly markets.
When ENSAP agents first approached Abu Geid village to introduce the project the villagers 
divided into two opposite camps, representing divergent views concerning the major goal for 
the village. The divergence in views was expressed in a local ijtimaa (lit. meeting) which saw 
the elders in direct opposition to the younger generation. The first group, represented by the 
elders, viewed the provision of a sustainable source of water to be the priority goal for the 
village. This was justified on the grounds that over the past few years many village members 
migrated outside the village in great numbers, a situation which threatens to drain the village of 
its able-bodied population and to sabotage community improvement. The establishment of a 
reliable water-yard, it was thought, would contribute to the stabilization of village membership 
and to greater commitment to agricultural production.
The second group, led by four unmarried villagers, viewed the overriding goal of the village to 
be the provision of a sustainable source of credit to the smallholder producers. This was 
justified on the ground that credit provision would allow the expansion of the area cultivated 
and provide a lucrative farm income which could in turn be invested in community 
development. This first group, however, absolutely resisted the younger s' views and claimed 
that "in so far as these members are 'unmarried' their word should not be given any weight".
Abu Geid is currently paricipating in the ENSAP project with a maximum of 48 smallholder 
farmers receiving the project loans. Despite the fact that ENSAP project has not yet made any 
observable impact on Abu Geid village due to the adverse effect of crop failure and drought, 
the project has definitely raised local people's aspirations and expectations of material wealth 
and farmers' income.
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Social Organization
In this chapter we will be dealing with major issues bearing on the indigenous social 
organisation of the Hamar communities into which the ENSAP project was introduced. These 
will include discussion of the specific social groups, as well as of the relations which link 
communities. Stuchlik's (1976) analysis of recruitment into social situations is deployed in 
this chapter.
The main object of this chapter is to locate the actor vis-a-vis the other members of the 
community as well as his place within the whole society. By and large, we are concerned here 
to provide an overall picture of the ways an actor or actors in the community manipulate the 
various relationships for the realisation of specific goals.
2.1
A typical house in the project area is a conical thatched house called guttia (lit.: as a bed­
room). Nearby will be one or two rakuba (square -shaped thatched building), one for 
women (who use it as a kitchen) and the other for men's entertainment and the reception of 
guests (see photo below:farmers congregating in front of a rakuba: a guttia is in the 
background). The sociological importance of the house lies in the fact that its members 
comprise the smallest social unit in the village community. The ideal type of 'household' 
consists of a single elementary family- which usually obtains- when the newly-married couple 
lives neoiocally. However, throughout the project villages, a significant degree of patrilocality 
is present, where the newly-married couple is clearly incorporated under one roof, 
joint/extended household, with the husband's father the head of the resulting single social unit. 
Such an arrangement is known as hosh (lit. big household). But note that in the case of
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A group of farmers in front of a raknfia 
(a guttia Is In the background)
polygynists there will be a separate household corresponding to each wife- between which the 
husband will share his time. However, among the Hamar, there are very few cases of 
polygyny.
Due to the perpetual movement during the seasonal cycle, by members of the household from 
the main/administrative village to the areet. joint extended families often tend in practice, to 
appear as a simple elementaiy family. This is mainly during the farming season when 
some members of the household need to get closer to their farms which lie far away in the 
areet of the main village, sited there in order to open up new arable land for cultivation. 
There are other types of movement with similar patterns of change in the structure of the 
domestic group. For example there is the motivation to secure social services not available in 
the village of origin. This is even the case in main/administrative villages such as Seranbi. 
When the majority of the inhabitants regularly move from Seranbi to Abu Rai and the other 
neighbouring villages during the post-harvesting period the family members who remain 
effectively constitute a smaller social unit. Note that, in the case of non-administrative villages, 
this process is also prevalent. We also note that living in a main/administrative village has 
the advantage over living in a non-administrative village in providing the security which comes 
from living in a larger community.
The co-residential household group, which typically ranges between seven and eleven 
members (in some cases of joint-extended households up to seventeen members can occur) is 
marked out in a number of ways. First it enjoys commensality, albeit that the genders eat 
separately. Secondly, mutual nafir recruitment is not all that frequent and intensive among 
members of the same joint extended family. Finally, in social events (e.g.. wedding, funerals 
etc.)it is the members of the household group relating to the person of ritual interest who 
preponderantly perform the various rituals and services from among the large number of 
participants who attend.
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Throughout the project area two types of domestic group are therefore observed to occur, 
exemplifying both the elementary and the extended family forms (the temporarily split 
extended households properly count as single extended households). Proportions are given in 
the following table.
Table (1) Major forms of the domestic group in selected project villages:
Village 
Abu Geid
Type of domestic group Total number of households 
33 elementaiy
47 extended 
Murabaat 80 elementaiy
30 extended 
Dirra 93 elementaiy
67 extended 
Barnawi 89 elementaiy
39 extended 
Ibeid 98 elementaiy
64 extended 
Rasheed 119 elementaiy
52 extended 
Seranbi 31 elementaiy
7 extended 
Sabi 48 elementaiy
17 extended 
WadFadol 23 elementary
7 extended 
El Halfaya 27 elementaiy
7 extended 
Source: ENSAP plus my fieldwork.
80
110
160
128
162
171
38
65
30
34
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The occurrence of lar ge numbers of domestic groups from the elementary family type reflects 
the people's normative system which conceives of the elementary form as the ideal type.
A number of factors inform whether or not this ideal is achieved (and these can have a bearing 
on people's experience with the ENSAP project). For example, due to ecological factors 
coming differently in securing land suitable for providing extra jubraka fields, a newly-married 
couple may elect to stay with the husband's parents thus effecting a joint extended family. 
Mainly the reasons for the occurrence of different types of residence could be traced to the 
availability (or absence) of plenty of unoccupied land in the village of origin (both near to the 
parents' residence and/or far away in the village). It also often occurs that the elderly brothers 
in a large-size household may manipulate the available land within/and closer to the parents' 
residence to the disadvantage of their younger brothers who instead are forced into finding 
residence elsewhere.
Where joint extended families occurred ENSAP project staff were in the first season of project 
operation observed to distribute their loans to only one spousal unit, namely that under the 
name of the original household head. The other was left without a loan despite its being 
eligible. When, later on, the base line survey of the project detected that more than one 
'family' often occurs under the same roof the project included the other part of the joint 
extended household as eligible for the loans. Meanwhile, the majority of cases, where the 
elementary type prevailed, reflects the fact that in a neolocal destination the newly married 
couple can normally find enough space to establish a jubraka field for the cultivation of 
consumption crops. Concomitantly, the villages which have closer and more numerous areet 
in the neighbourhood have more elementary family forms than the joint type, the main 
reason for this being that a newly married couple can easily move into the areet, especially 
if the areet is growing in terms of local services such as schools, markets and health units.
The existence of the joint family, however, does not imply a domestically unacceptable form 
of social grouping. On the contrary, most villagers appreciate having one or two parents
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living with them under the same roof. Indeed it is normally observed that a father or mother, 
divorced sister, or widowed sister could easily come and join the household of married kin 
(for example a son or a brother). A relatively large size of domestic group can also be pertinent 
in conditions when hired labour becomes locally in short supply for agricultural activities such 
as weeding. In such conditions the domestic group represents a pool of labour to be 
effectively mobilised to increase areas cultivated to secure greater productivity. Women, on 
their part, produce the jubraka crops and partly supply farm labour, with the fruits of such 
labour accruing to the whole household. Children over five years of age look after the animals 
lest they trespass on the farms of other villagers leaving the household head to incur the 
traditional fine (this fine was estimated at LS 1.50 per destroyed plant in 1990).
The concept of the 'common good' deployed by Stuchlik (1976:79) is also pertinent for our 
analysis of the economic structure of the domestic group. In the period immediately preceding 
ENSAP implementation (1988), many villagers seasonally or permanently moved outside the 
community in search of gainful employment (to destinations both within and outside Sudan). 
As the domestic group's economic activities are influenced by the principle of co-operation an 
absent member would leave his wife and children under the guard and responsibility (and thus 
in the household) of a close kinsman (a father or a brother) until he could remit money at a later 
date, or until he returned home. In this way, for example, a large number of villagers had 
migrated from Wad Fadol and El Halfaya villages. These villagers going out of their villages 
for gainful employment were said to be tempted by the wealth brought into the village by their 
fellows who had gone abroad before. A returned member of the domestic group is likely to 
assist the remaining members through prestations and gifts.
'Common good' relating to the domestic unit is also evident in the way the Hamar keep goats, 
sheep and camels as a store of wealth upon which to rely in conditions of need and when the 
normal avenues of securing income close down (at present animals can even be sold to repay 
ENSAP loans). The domestic group considers these animals as belonging collectively to the 
whole household and each member is therefore keen to look after them. For example, donkeys
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which are the main means of transportation are used by almost all household members 
indiscriminately. In this regard "ownership relations become relevant only when the object is 
to be sold or temporarily given to a non-member of the domestic group" (Stuchlik, 1976:80), 
such as when a neighbour borrows a donkey for transportaion.
There are instances where prestations occurred between close kin from different households, 
we note that the notion of 'common good' is intensively expressed in the farmers' verbal 
statements in the ENSAP context. This is in cases where ENSAP funds are manipulated by 
recipients. Thus a participant farmer from Um Sidair village (which joined the project in the 
1991 season) who received an ENSAP loan remarked that "as I am motivated by religious 
opinion not to use an ENSAP loan, I shall take it and pass it away to my sister's son who 
usually tends my animals" . The fact is his sister’s son (from a different household) was not 
eligible to receive an ENSAP loan, but the faimer was attaching primacy to the indigenous 
ideology of 'collective good' over the agency's stipulations relating to loan use.
The household has clear corporate functions. Be it the elementary or the extended family type 
the head of the household is the one who usually decides on the organisation of the household 
economic affairs. It is he who decides on the number of makhamsat (1 makhamas=1.79 acres) 
to be cultivated and the way available resources are to be allocated. While his relations with the 
unmarried adults and children aie largely paternalistic, with married members of the household 
they are those of co-operation and inter-dependence. The wife on the other hand is treated with 
respect; she is the 'mother' for all household members, who decides on the household work 
and jubraka activities cairied out by the women in the residence.
Similaiiy indicative of household corporateness, in cases of nafir recruitment people who join 
the nafir from another domestic group stand as representatives of their whole household. Such 
representation is recognised only if the participant is above twelve years of age since this is 
roughly the age at which a village youth's labour is considered to be equal to that of an adult.
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Note that a household head can even decide who should represent the household in other 
people's nafirs.
In extended family households the importance of male authority in the domestic group 
becomes evident when conflict arises between a married son and his wife. In such a case the 
head of the household, i.e. the son's father, often assisted by adult neighbours, could arrange 
a joudia (lit traditional session for dispute resolution held by the elders), to be held in the 
house, in which a solution is sought to restore the conflict. It is very difficult to turn down a 
decision of the joudia as this is socially unacceptable.
The inhabitants of a single project village, whether they are from the majority Hamar tribe or 
not (see e.g.. previous chapter), generally conceive of their society as a single organised 
system. This is contrary to how things were when their ancestors first arrived in the area. In 
the past the Hamar alone considered themselves autochthonous inhabitants of the land since 
the area itself,Dar Hamar, was derived from Dar (i.e. the homeland) and Hamar (collective 
name of the specific tribe of people). For this reason the early Hamar settlers viewed 
themselves as the original owners of the land which is presently shared with the non-Hamai- 
tribes. Today, however, that conception has faded and all people living in the area see 
themselves as one ahal (lit. all relatives, or, kinsmen). The various non-Hamar tribal groups 
who entered Dar Hamar and lived among the Hamar have established strong social ties of 
friendship, acquaintance and marriage. In addition co-operation at nafirs. weddings and 
funerals has brought these people into closer contact with one another.
A related factor is language. The fact that nearly all the various groups use the Arabic 
language as the main medium of communication has stimulated a feeling of unified identity and 
of belonging together. This feeling of unified identity is plainly observable in their contact with 
people from Dai* Fur such as the Zaghawa, who are bilingual. Thus the non-Hamar groups, 
upon meeting Zaghawa, tend to identify themselves with their Hamar co-inhabitants who
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speak Arabic, rather than uphold common cause with the Zaghawa (for example by clinging to 
their non-Arabic dialect). Yet other factors contributing to unity between Hamar and non- 
Hamar in Dar Hamar are the typical forms of houses, dress, consumption patterns and 
predilection for sociability which appear to be common among all these people.
A key observation is that all villagers in the area are fai'mers cultivating the same cash and 
food crops with the same type of farm implements , labour and even rituals (see chapter 7).
An important feature of social life in the project villages is the marked generosity and 
hospitality extended to guests and strangers. What has been stated earlier by Ensor (in the 
previous chapter) of the Hamar that he "never heard of their having ill-treated..any stranger" (in 
MacMichael, 1912:86), not to mention his description of them as the most amiable class of 
people of Kordofan province, well describes the inherent hospitality of all tribal groups in this 
area.
This is overtly expressed in people's local proverbs that "when a passer-by diverts to this area 
to be referred to the correct destination not only will he be entertained, he also will be 
personally escorted outside the village until the right way is found".This hospitality is 
repeatedly expressed by ENSAP visiting teams who came to report in their notes that "a very 
appreciable social phenomenon in the project area is the clients' arrangement of karama (here 
refers to a sacrifice) for the project staff visiting the villages". The visiting team will never 
escape being served a meal upon its airival in the project villages.
Local village people have a set of economic relations which guide recruitment into economic 
spheres. These include a) the land tenure system, b) the right to use land in another 
neighbouring village , c) land use through lease, d) engaging in sharaka (sharecropping) with 
a labourer (see chapter 3 ), and e) co-operation at social events.
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a) The Land Tenure System:
As we have seen in the previous chapter, from their early days of settlement in Dar Hamar up 
to the present period, the Hamar have experienced almost a radical change from an economy 
which was largely nomadic to one that is characteristically sedentary agriculture. During the 
colonial period and even until shortly after national independence (1956/57) land was 
considered common property among the domestic groups forming the local community. The 
village skeikhs would allocate the land to individuals by virtue of membership in the 
community.
i) Village Versus Awarrat:
Village and awarrat refer to different social groups (as mentioned above). The group of people 
in a village as we have established, draw entitlement to the use of land by their being 
administratively recognised on the part of the municipal council. Each administratively 
registered village is assigned a sheikh to officiate on village affairs. An awarrat (satellite 
hamlets or villages), on the other hand, theoretically has no legal existence as concerns land 
tenure since the land on which it is established belongs to the main/administrative village. The 
aieet (plural of awarratl is the collectivity satellite villages (non-administrative) drawing social 
services from a main/ administrative village. The largest areet in the project area was that for 
Rasheed village which included seventeen satellite villages; for Dirra it was nine . The smallest 
was reported for El Halfaya village with three satellite villages. Recently, however, population 
density had necessitated opening new land in the areet.
Some main/administrative villages derive their names from persons, for example Abu Geid 
and Kirja. Other main/administrative villages were named after natural features, for example 
Murabaat (lit. squares), which refer to the four trees at the four corners in which the village is 
located. On contrast, most of the villages in an aieet draw their names from the persons or the 
tribal sub-division living in it. However, the naming of a village or an awarrat after an early 
settler (mostly a sheikhl does not imply that ownership of the land all reverts to him. He is only 
required to allocate and regulate land use to late comers, thanks to his knowledge about land 
boundaries.
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Fathers pass usufruct rights to land by inheritance to the male sons. This entitlement to use the 
land in the village or its areet does not end if the land owner moves to another village. The 
same land tenure laws established on behalf of land surrounding the main/administrative 
villages apply for the areet. However, the final word lies with the sheikh who could eventually 
deny an individual's right of use to land if such an individual fails to put this land into 
cultivation for ten consecutive yeais.
Women, on their part, own jubraka fields on which they grow consumption crops as well as 
some additional cash crops. Almost eveiy married woman had one or two iubraka gardens. 
These are obtained upon marriage from the husband who is required to make such a plot of 
land ready prior to the consummation of marriage as women grow in age they transfer the use 
of their jubraka to their daughters who continue producing for the good of the whole 
household. Widows also establish the right of use for this purpose over the inherited land in 
the deceased husband's farms, especially when her children are still below marriageable age.
But men are observed to make the agricultural decisions not just in the main farm, but for the 
women in jubraka as well. In Barnawi village male farmers even prohibited their women from 
receiving ENSAP loans. This led to the sabotage of the jubraka loans which ENSAP delivered 
in that village.
When a family expands its land holding by moving to the awarrat ,then, even young sons can 
secure rights in the cultivable land provided that the land is cultivated for the conraion good of 
the household. Meanwhile the father will supervise the cultivation of the original plot in the 
main/administrative village. While this pattern of moving a part of the family to work in the 
areet farms can lead to the expansion in the total area cultivated, it also results in improper 
allocation of household labour since land fragmentation implies a waste of labour time and 
resources.
67
Unlike the main/administrative village the awarrat generally lacks structured-ness in the sense 
that its houses are sparsely scattered. The exception are those which are fully developed into 
administrative villages (e.g. Murabaat was an awarrat for Kirja). Thus an awarrat normally 
lacks basic infra-structure such as schools, health units, markets etc. Nor does its populace 
form village committees as happens in the main/- administrative villages. If a joudia is called 
to settle a particular problem relating to two persons from the same awarrat the meeting is 
usually arranged in the house of one of the disputants since they will consider themselves as 
ahal. To take the matter outside the confines of the awarrat is to negate this concept of being 
related and is tantamount to their considering one another as strangers who usually settle their 
disputes through the court.
Most of the ar eet covered in my field work were inhabited by homogeneous social groups who 
are agnatically related and from the same subdivision. Thus, relating to El Halfaya village, the 
Gharaysia awarrat is Homogeneously inhabited by the Gharaysia Hamar who belong to one 
kinship group. They live in ten agnatically related but dispersed households. The same is true 
of the Bideiria awarrat of El Halfaya which encompasses thirteen isolated households.
Due to its tiny size an awarrat's members invariably marry exogamously, usually with a 
partner from the main/administrative village to which it belongs. The agnatic/patrilocal pattern 
in areet organisation results. Thus with regard to the main/administrative village of Kirja ninety 
five percent of the male married household members of its areet claimed that they had secured 
their wives from the main/administrative village; similarly , with regard to the main village, El 
Halfaya married males in the Ghar aysia awarrat and ninety eight percent of the Bideiria awarrat 
claimed that their partners were from the main/administrative village. So it was commonly 
mentioned by people in the areet that marrying wives from the main/administrative village 
resulted in matrilineal ties with the people of the latter community. This in turn gave rise to 
mutual co-operation on occasions of recruitment for social and economic help (e.g. wedding, 
funerals and nafirs).
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b) The right to use land in another village:
As we have seen earlier, the right to use land in another village is
enjoyed by villagers who seek adequate fertile land for cultivation while the main family lives 
in the original village which provides better services and shelter. An example is the villagers of 
Abu Rai who use Seranbi land mainly for agricultural production and return to their 'home' 
village during the off-farming season. As one establishes the right to use land in a 
neighbouring village it eventually passes through inheritance to the male son who becomes 
directly entitled to its use. From among eighteen Abu Rai farmers par ticipating in the project on 
Seranbi land eleven had inherited the land use from their fathers whilst the latter were still 
living in Abu Rai village where social services make life more comfortable to stay. The 
remaining seven farmers had established the right to the use of land on their own initiative.
c) Land Use Through Lease:
Land lease in the project villages is rare but it can occur between two farmers from 
neighbouring villages, where one has abundant fertile land and the other has not. An 
arrangement is made whereby land use is conferred on a person for an agreed period of time 
for an agreed amount of money. Thus in Murabaat village, prior to the introduction of ENSAP 
project, this amount of money was specified at LS 50 per makhamas. The arrangement 
involves the presence of at least two other persons one for each of the two parties to witness 
the deal.
Moreover, the disposal of land outside the community membership has become a rare 
phenomenon. In the past land lease was commonly effected with a new entrant into the village 
community who could use it for a number of successive years. Today this practice is very rare 
(observed only in Murabaat village). We have seen in the previous chapter that in the past the 
need by a village sheikh to extract taxes from the residents had played a crucial role in the 
provision of rights over land use. Thus a new entrant into the community could establish 
access to the land by merely being linked into community membership by a close neighbour or
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a person of acquaintance from the same subdivision already settled in the community, or by 
directly approaching the sheikh with a demand for a plot of land.
In the previous pages we have provided an analysis of the relation among groups in the 
community and the bases of recruitment. That analysis, however, provides a normative 
statement of what occurs (i.e. the conscious model) in a generalised descriptive form. In the 
following I move to actual situations of economic co-operation as they have taken place in the 
project communities.
As we have seen the elementary or the joint extended family domestic group organises 
agricultural activities aimed at the sustenance of the household and to cover cash needs. In 
actuality these economic activities often call for the co-operation of people from beyond the 
unit of the domestic group. Such co-operation involves people from the same subdivision or 
even individuals from the society at large who are familiar with the organisers of the co­
operative work. In our analysis below we deal with three main types of formalised economic 
co-operation in the project villages. These include a) the nafir ,b) hired labour and c) shaiaka .
During the weeding phase through July and August 1990 Dirra, Murabaat and El Halfaya 
villages had organised a large number of nafirs which were systematically reciprocated by the 
participants and the organisers. Only nafirs arranged among farmers participating in ENSAP 
project are treated here. The following, from the villages mentioned above, are given as 
representative of nafirs in the project area. There was obvious practical difficulty in 
enumerating all nafirs summoned in the project villages due to a) their multiplicity and b) the 
mobility of the reseaicher from one village to another at the time such activities were organised.
The following case studies are presented to reveal the nature of the relationship between the 
organiser of the economic activity and the participants.
70
An active nafir: El Hafaya, 1990
m
a t
Entertainment of ngfir participants: El Halfaya, 1990
organiser
Omai'a Eisa
totals
participants from 
the domestic group 
2 brothers
1 wife 
1 F.B 
1 son 
5
neighbours from 
same village 
4 close neighbours
distant neighbours
participants 
from an areet 
1 from 
Um Darota 
1 from Um Sa'ata
2ALc Nafir
Adam Salih
totals
1 wife
2 sons
1 brother 
1 sisters' son 
1 daughter's son 
6
9 close neighbours 
7 distant neighbours
2 from Ahmadia 
1 Jidada
3 Jadel Sid
16
nafir No. 1
Hamid Hamdan 1 son
totals
15 close neighbours 
4 distant neighbours 
19
none
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nafir in Murabaat, 1990
Murabaat: food preparation for nafir participants, 
AFE watching, 1990.
organizers
nafir No. 2
Participants from 
the domestic group
neighbours from same 
village
participants 
from an areet
an old woman 1 grand son
1 daughter
totals 2
nafir No. 3 
sheikh's nafir
(verbally gathered) 10 kinsmen
1 female (close) neighbours
4 distant neighbours
5
totals 10
52 close+distant neighbours 38 all
paiticipants 
from an areet 
52 38
Ajab Ahmed Ajab
totals
11 brothers' sons
3 brothers 
6 sons
1 wife
4 brothers' daughters
2 daughters 
2 sisters
29
same kinsmen 
also close neighbours none
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The cases make it clear that the contribution of the participants from the non-domestic group 
recruited for economic co-operation is well above that of the members of the domestic group 
organising the activity.
Hired labour is generally in short supply within most of the project villages. Thus the most 
common form is to hire a labourer from another village. But farmers who do hire internally 
justify their decisions on moral grounds, as providing services to distant neighbours instead of 
favouring a non-villager. Hired labour occurs largely between local farmers and labourers who 
come from neighbouring villages, and only occasionally does it occur between farmers from 
the same village community. But here aie some cases.
a) El Sadig Omer is a farmer from Um Sidair village who participated in the ENSAP project in 
the 1990 season. He is married and lives with his family. As his own children were too small 
to graze his animals he employed his sister's son to do the job. This was not a paid job, 
however, but he rewarded his sister's son by giving him ENSAP loans since he himself thinks 
it irreligious to use loans (this case has been mentioned eailier in this chapter). The loan is then 
given back to El Sadig at the end of the harvesting season to repay it to the project credit staff. 
Had ENSAP not been available, El Sadig states, he should have rewarded his sister's son by 
giving him a newly born sheep in return for one year’s work. Others, he claimed, follow this 
latter rule. In this case El Sadig's justification was that it was advisable for moral reasons to 
employ his sister's son as the reward passing to the latter would ultimately boost the 
economic standing of the whole domestic unit. Should he employ a distant villager or an 
outsider then he would risk losing such an advantage.
b) Osman El A'ajib employed two distant neighbours from his own village, El Riteirit, at LS 
150 per makhamas to do the weeding labour in his farm in the 1989 season. He heads a family 
composed of two children who belong to his long-absent brother and for whose responsibility 
Osman has for the time being ,received no economic reward.
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c)Hamad Na'man employed a distant neighbour for weeding his farm at LS 200 per 
makhamas. He is married and has three daughters. His wife and daughters were fully engaged 
in the cultivation of the jubraka crops while he devoted his time working on the main fai*m. He 
often arranges a nafir should hired labour prove difficult to recruit.
d) Zeinab Mastur, a widow farmer with three little sons and a daughter over five years of age 
lived in Wida'a village. She employed an acquaintance of her dead husband to do the farm 
work. The relation between the dead husband and the labourer was established when both were 
staying in another area called El Majrur. When in 1988 the labourer was passing through 
Wida'a village looking for hired work he preferred to work with Zeinab by virtue of his 
friendship with her dead husband. He did not claim monetary payment at the ruling wage rates 
but received free entertainment and justified his refusal on moral grounds.
2.5 S
Sharecropping is a form of economic airangement in which a land owner recruits a migrant 
labourer (usually a Dinka) to perform agricultural production operations, usually on a half­
share basis. Though, in rare cases a labourer from the same locality may be a part of the 
sharaka deal.It is usually established on behalf of the production of cash crops (groundnuts). 
The arrangement lasts for one season though success can lead to future renewal (this is fully 
elaborated in chapter 3).
Villages:
Ideally, sharaka occurs between a village farmer and outsiders, given that security measures 
can be obtained, normally in terms of trust. The following cases of sharaka , which obtain 
between members of the same community (or as the result of intermediation by a village 
member or a relative), are largely based on strong social ties between the farmer and the 
labourer. Close social ties which obtain as a result of friendship, acquaintance or 
neighbourhood are deemed satisfactory to ensure mutual trust and honesty. When the parties 
are not so related illegal acts are liable to prosecution at the court. But such measures would not 
be applied against someone who is considered to be related to the other partner since in this
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instance non-fulfilment would be a matter of 'shame'. The following cases of sharaka are 
largely based on "relatedness" by friendship, acquaintance, neighbourhood or even by the 
ritual of “eating together from the same dish”, locally referred to as lingi (this ritual rules out 
any probability of dishonesty (see below).
a) El Sheikh EL Tigani, a married farmer lived with his family in the middle of El Riteirit 
village. He employed two unrelated villagers from El Riteirit on a sharaka basis for the 
production of groundnuts. His children were below the working age of seven. The two 
villagers are on a lingi relation with his brother, and consequently, lingi applies to him as well.
b) El Tom Suleiman, a married farmer with a big family of ten members lived in El Riteirit 
village. He contributed two sacks of groundnuts for a sharaka arrangement with his friend who 
supplied seven sacks (in 1989) on his part. The proceeds of the sales after the harvesting 
period were then divided according to the share of each part in the arrangement. El Tom was 
unable to solicit Dinka labourers for the sharaka due to the latter already supplying their labour 
on a sharaka basis elsewhere.
c) Halima Ahmed, an old widow in a family composed of three children lived in Wida'a 
village in the neighbourhood of the village sheikh. Her sons were at a marriageable age (late 
twenties and early thirties). She engaged in a sharaka arrangement with a poor unmarried 
labourer from the same village in 1989. The labourer had an acquaintance relationship with one 
of the sons who helped him arrange the sharaka with his mother. The son had found it 
reasonable to recruit a person of acquaintance to do the sharaka work since he himself was 
engaged in off-fami employment.
These forms of sharaka were considered as situations of economic help within the one village 
community and thus largely differ from the sharaka in its pure economic form as arranged with 
outsiders (i.e. the Dinka). Fuller analysis of sharaka is given in next chapter.
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Co-operation at social events is exemplified by the organisation of rituals in one community 
which involves the participation of other communities.
The following is a case of a funeraiy ritual in Dirra village in 1990 which is typical of rituals in 
the other project villages in terms of recruitment of the participants. The funeral ritual was 
organised in the sheikh's house.
funeraiy ritual in Dirra ,11th August 1990: 
Organiser
Sheikh Mohamed Ibeidalla
Villages Sending Participants No. of 
participants
Rasheed 21
Safi el Dintareet for Rasheed! 4
Adam Abbakartaieet for Rasheed! 5
Abdel Bagi tareet for Rasheed ! 6
Himeir Salim 13
Ghubeish town 9
En Nahud town 4
Tyba 5
Sineinat 1
Ibeid 6
A1 Li'ayit Abu Hibeilat 2
Participation in social events is laigely guided by the norm of reciprocity.
Where organiser and recruited live in two independent villages the recruitment of paiticipants is 
determined by personal knowledge of the organiser of the ritual and by friendship, kinship or 
marriage ties. Usually the information about the ritual comes to the participants either through 
a word of mouth or by gossip among the villagers in common places such as the village
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market, or else by sending a letter through intermediary acquaintances. The funerary ritual of 
Dirra (above), though representative of funerary rituals in the area, in fact recruited a large 
number of participants relative to the average of those organised by ordinary villagers. The 
reason was that the sheikh of Dirra has a broader scope of personal knowledge and social 
relations than the average village man.
,1
Karama is a form of offering based on religious beliefs and is locally considered as sadaga (lit. 
the Islamic form of almsgiving). It strictly differs from sadaga in that it is offered in public by 
a group of people in the form of commensality, while sadaga is paid to the poor on an 
individual basis (for more detail on commensality see below).
Karama is intended to ensure the favor of supernatural forces (mainly God) or else is made as 
thanksgiving on behalf of a recently recovered seriously ill person, it is also observed to be 
practised to ward off bad omen days, such as Wednesday in the Wahid (Arabic:. Saffar) 
month. The most commonly practised karama ritual in the project villages is that for ensuring a 
good hai vesting season. Thus Rasheed village arranged two karamas in the 1990 season, one 
for rainfall and the other for the Wahid month carried out on Wednesday. Barnawi village, on 
the other hand, arranged two karamas in August 1990 to break a long subna (drought). El 
Halfaya and Seranbi villages also each arranged a kaiama in the same season for rainfall.
A karama ritual is decided upon by a group of farmers who congregate in a common place in 
the village. The idea is first raised by one of the participants who mentions that the farm’s 
fortunes are gravely affected by a long subna. He then suggests that it would be helpful to 
arrange a karama. Others express their agreement and a plan is made to raise money for the 
ritual. On the appointed day a sheep is killed early in the morning and all men participants share 
in the preparation of food. Passers-by are invited for entertainment as the ritual is usually 
performed in the street so that a large number of people may test the food to secure more 
blessing.
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The karama has its principal paiticipants those who planned the ritual and raised the financial 
donations and a secondary group who join later in the preparation and distribution of food. An 
average cost of a karama in the villages in 1990 was LS 300. The participants aie entertained 
with meat and tea and upon the conclusion of the ritual a collective du'a (invocation of God, 
see chapter 7)is performed and the gathering dissolves.
A Wahid karama is usually planned two to three weeks in advance, the planning starting 
approximately during the middle of the month preceding Wahid. It has become a custom that 
information regarding Wahid is mediated by the elders since it is the elders who keep their 
records in terms of the Islamic calendar. As local villagers get informed that Wahid is 
approaching volunteers eventually visit their neighbours for donations for the imminent ritual. 
A sacrificial animal is bought (a goat or sheep) and the pai ticipants move outside the village to 
perform the ritual. As usual the ritual gets started with the sacrificial killing and is concluded 
by a collective du'a. This time the objective is not rainfall but for the supernatural to spaie the 
villagers the bad omens of this particular day in that particular month. The people of Rasheed 
village who arranged the Wahid karama in the 1990 season stated that "the reason for 
arranging this ritual particularly on Wednesday of the Wahid is that the Arabs [meaning the 
Hamar] believed that the grave of prophet Adam was dug on this specific day..and for this 
reason we do not go to work on Wednesday of Wahid". Recruitment into a karama ritual is 
according to neighbourhood relations, though kinsmen or persons from the same domestic 
group could be among the paiticipants.
Eating together is usually practised among the members of the same domestic group, or 
occasionally the participants in social events such as wedding, funerals and karama. Men eat 
separately from women. Food is served in the rakuba (see the photo below) where men 
congregate, and the young children serve the food for the men. Guests also share the domestic 
group’s food. What has been observed by Stuchlik (1976:173) with respect to the Mapuche
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Commensality in En Nahud.
misa (food eating ritual) is the same for the villagers of Dar Hamar: future behaviour and the 
social relations between two persons is influenced by who has eaten from the same dish. Thus 
the term lingi refers to a relationship that has been established between two persons, mostly 
friends, as a result of sharing the same food for a prolonged period of time (not by chance or 
once and for all). The difference between the Mapuche misa and the Hamai' lingi. however, is 
that while luisa between two persons can be "done ceremonially with the puipose of instituting 
a misa relationship, or more or less by chance" (1976:174), lingi gets established only when 
one party has lived with the other in his home for some time and without intending that a lingi 
relationship will be instituted. Moreover a lingi. once established between two persons can 
apply to their respective families.
A lingi relationship, once established, sets well defined rights and obligations for both parties 
who should abide by its rules. Rights and obligations involve mutual help when conditions 
necessitate, respect and, above all, tmst. People in fact usually talk of lingi when one party has 
already 'broken' the lingi. Criticism is voiced through gossip that these people had eaten the 
lingi with one another yet one of them had beti ayed his pai tner (partnership in terms of a joint 
business, trade or friendship). Once broken it would be too difficult to restore. As a matter of 
fact no actual case of lingi was observed in the fieldwork, though it is expressed in people's 
verbal statements.
Nafir is organised as an egocentric group while Aljuhdal sha'abi. funerals and karama rituals 
involve a polyegocentric group. Stuchlik deploys the concept of egocentric group to refer to 
situations of recruitment in which
the participants do not enter the situation on the basis of any relationship they may have 
among themselves, but on the relationship each of them has with the organiser. In fact, 
this group is composed of a series of dyads all of which have one constant member 
(1976:188).
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We have seen that participants in a nafir decide on participating according to the relationship 
they have with the organiser, in our case locality and kinship being important but not 
necessarily determinant of recruitment. This is typically egocentric in the sense that nafir 
composition cannot be derived from the existence of any paiticular perduring group defined in 
terms of kinship or locality . Egocentrality in recruitment should reveal distinct social 
preferences which relate to socio-spatial distance. Thus more preferred will be close 
neighbours who aie also close relatives (as we have seen in the case of the nafir arranged by 
the Halfaya villagers, cited above), then a distant relative who is also a neighbour, then distant 
neighbours (neighbours are within the village).
A polyegocentric group is formed in situations where it is not a single individual but a group 
which organises the affair, and which recruits a large group of associated participants.
Thus in the case of a karama the collective organiser is a group of kins-men and neighbours, 
for aljuhdal sha'abi it is the village community and for a funeral it is a section of the village. 
The process may be easily understood as a series of egocentric groups each with single 
organiser and participant recruits linked together at the level of organisers to form one 
collective group: thus the polyegocentric group. The point to be established here is that in the 
process of recruitment the organising group does not work corporately. Since the individual 
organisers recruit their own participant groups which then merge together, the polyegocentric 
group which results does not(similarly to the egocentric group) form a perduring group (cf. 
1976:189). This results in recruitment organisation varying along a spectrum from a situation 
in which a participant/organiser clearly recognises those with whom he is involved as his own 
relations, to another situation where he recognises no such relationships (since these 
participants on their part have relations with other organisers from the polyegocentric group). 
Thus, in aljuhdal sha'abi. for instance, where the mass of local people is mobilised for , say , 
building a school it is likely that an organiser (or one of the organisers) works hand by hand 
with a participant whom he personally does not know. Typically a polyegocentric group is 
formed when each organiser forms his own network of social relations independently of the
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rest of the domestic group with whom he shares the same house. Thus, a member of a 
household who happens to visit an awarrat or a neighbouring village market for business could 
form acquaintance relations with some of its residents which later could result in them being 
brought in as active members in a funeral arranged by him. Such was the case with the funeral 
arranged by the sheikh of Dirra in 1990. Some of the participants in the funeral whom the 
sheikh did not recognise were close friends of his neighbour who later told him that they were 
his own guests who also came to share in the ritual.
The concept of the egocentric group has refracts on certain aspects of the ENSAP project. 
Since ENSAP works through a Jamaa (lit. gimip)which revolves around a particular damin 
(guarantor), then this group in its process of formation would follow the procedure of 
recruitment into an egocentric group (group or Jamaa formation is discussed in chapter 4). 
Suffice it to be mentioned here that each guarantor selects participants (i.e. members into his 
Jamaal on the basis of physical proximity such as the same awarrat or a neighbouring areet.
An 'association' (an organised development grouping which is composed of many Jamaas , 
see chapter 4) in ENSAP is a good example of a polyego- centric group. It is formed by the 
merging together in one body of the respective groups representing different Jamaas. Thus we 
have the following Jamaas in selected project villages which collectively form an 'association'.
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Table ( 2 ) 
Village No. of Jamaa Total No. of members recruited into
fi.e. No. of egocentric group") the 'association'
Wad Gassim 5 18
Wad Mitgil 5 15
Dirra 8 48
Rasheed 6 31
Um Sidair 8 61
Tamba 8 43
Barnawi 8 35
Sernbi 6 19
Murabaat 16 112
El Halfaya 7 36
Abu Geid 7 47
Sabi 11 73
El Riteirit 
Source: fieldwork.
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One fact occurred to me concerning the way interaction develops within the polyegocentric 
group, which was not mentioned by Stuchlik. It was observed that in the early days of an 
'association' (i.e. polyegocentric group) individual farmers would tend to initiate interaction 
solely around their own Jamaa due to previous social relations with the co-Jamaa members 
(thus polyegocentricity). Eventually however, as time passed and the 'association' meetings 
and activities became more intensive and frequent (after several months in most of the cases) 
members from one Jamaa within the 'association' started to enlarge the sphere of their 
interaction by developing further interaction with members from the other Jamaas in the 
'association'. Towards the end of the season, and working together in the project, all 
'association's' members had merged together by virtue of the newly established links of social
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relations. As a result, and this is the point to be established here, the polyegocentric group 
lapsed into a form of egocentric group as one member from the whole association could now 
recruit every other member for situations of economic help such as the nafir or the 
karama.Thus have argued the farmers of El Halfaya to whom the case pertains.
(
The independence of every village is frequently disturbed by market contact with neighbouring 
villages, by children’s attendance at schools located in a neighbouring village and by the 
sharing of particular social services with other villages (e.g. health unit, grain mill or water 
yard).
Market villages are recognised as distinctive venues and the people
gathering every week in the market become permanently interrelated, and therefore well 
known to each other, as for example, specialist merchants and their customers. For instance, 
the merchant at Abu Rai serves up to ten neighbouring villages. These markets are open all 
days of the week but become crowded during the market days of Monday or Wednesday. In 
the markets, merchants supply grain and consumption goods such as sugar, tea, coffee and 
cooking oil. Women from the village or neighbouring villages supply eggs, chicken, cowpeas, 
cucumber, pots, firewood, yoghurts, pepper and home made handicrafts such as mats bags 
and hats. Hawkers supply farm implements such as knives, axes, hashasha (weeding tool) 
and threads for making angareibs (lit. beds). Some supply animals such as goats, sheep, 
donkeys, camels and cattle.
A village market opens as early as eight o'clock in the morning and lasts until five in the 
evening. First suppliers come carrying their goods and later come the buyers from the same 
village, from the areet and from the neighbouring villages. The market place provides an arena 
for gossip, sociability and flow of information. Such news as weddings, funerals and 
divorces taking place or about to take place in the area is quickly spread between the merchants 
and local producers and their customers and then still further when they return home. Farmers,
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especially, consider the main village markets as indispensable for procuring agricultural tools 
and chemicals such as aldrex-t which is also supplied by the project to the farmers paiticipating 
in ENSAP. Moreover, farmers will have developed linkages with the villagers living in the 
market villages, resulting in friendship and acquaintance. Visits are made by people from the 
distant villages to their friends in the market villages and gifts aie often exchanged. In addition 
to the marketing business the villagers enjoy making trips to these neighbouring villages and 
consider it as a break from the routine of the village life.
Again, the areet of the main/administrative village which usually seem quite separate become 
well integrated with it in the day market as all villagers merge together.
Mai'ket villages have played a significant role in disseminating information related to ENSAP 
project. Farmers from the different villages will gather in the village market to discuss matters 
related to the project. For instance a project team which was surveying some villages for the 
delivery of loans or agricultural inputs might upon concluding its tasks in one or two villages 
declare that it intends to cover other specified neighbouring villages as well. When farmers 
from the villages visited by the project team meet in the village market with other farmers 
paiticipating in ENSAP whom the team has not yet reached, then the latter get ready to receive 
the project team with full attendance.
Equally, when ENSAP’s visiting team approaches the project villages in preparation for the 
delivery of services the village mai'kets are taken to provide a favourable occasion and place to 
meet with participating fanners. Farmers who met the project team in the village market will in 
turn infoim their fellows about the results of the meeting when they return to their villages. 
Also in the mai'ket farmers in a village who had not succeeded in performing well in applying 
the 'propuxure' chemical recommended by the project for combating local pests would hear 
positive views from other village farmers who had succeeded in applying the chemical. 
Again, illiterate farmers from Seranbi village would meet in the village market Murabaat 
farmers who were relatively more literate , and would benefit when the latter could explain the
84
information embodied in Daleel ENSAP (lit. ENSAP's guide; it is a newsletter by which 
extension messages are disseminated) which the project distributes to supplement the 
extension messages delivered by the AFE's.
The market villages also play the role of financing rural farmers in occasions of need. A buyer 
who had established strong social relations with a merchant in the village market would 
approach the merchant for the purchase of items he needs without paying in cash. Repayment 
would usually be postponed until after the hai vesting period, preferably when the farmer had 
marketed his crops. Farmers who approached the village merchant in the weekly markets 
appreciated being able to borrow from the latter without running the risk of having their crop 
prices underestimated. Were the village merchant to refuse to lend money to the small farmer 
then the farmer would have to borrow from the shell merchants (money lenders) with the 
probable adverse consequence of the value of their produce being underestimated.
Most of the administrative villages possess a nahas (i.e. chiefly drums; this was described in 
the previous chapter) kept in the sheikh's house. Adjacent villages which share social services 
with the main/ administrative village have developed with one another strong relations of 
mutual defence and the nahas is used as an alarm to announce and summon villagers from 
such neighbouring villages for collective action against an impending danger (e.g. robbery of 
animals etc.). The villagers thus summoned arrive in numbers to defend their 
main/administrative village against the intmder.
Intervillage religious practices were confined to Friday prayer when the people from the smaller 
villages join a mosque in a neighbouring village.
Rain-making rituals would also bring people from the neighbouring villages, especially during 
drought periods when the lack of rainfall affects all the surrounding villages alike. These 
activities ai*e more intense, however, between a main/administrative village and the surrounding 
aieet than between two lai'ge main/administrative villages.
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As the commercial economy has penetrated the rural villages of Ghubeish the farmers have 
become increasingly dependent upon the imported goods and services not locally produced. 
Thus the market towns supply the local farmers with their basic needs of clothes and 
consumption items such as tea, coffee and sugar. This has resulted in greater contact between 
the village community and the outside world.
The most prominent market towns immediately beyond the villages presently paiticipating in 
ENSAP and with which greater contacts were developed include Sug'el Jamal in the north of 
Ghubeish rural council and En Nahud town in the north-east of Ghubeish. The villages in 
Ghubeish rural council which lie closer to En Nahud town, such as El Halfaya village, tend to 
approach the town market for trade. Moreover faimers from El Halfaya village have built trade 
relations with merchants from En Nahud town who purchase the agricultural produce supplied 
by these village farmers. The farmers of the El Halfaya are motivated by the lucrative prices 
offered by the merchants in En Nahud town - thanks to the Daleel ENSAP which the project 
supplies to its participating farmers in which crop prices mling in En Nahud aie included.
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Agricultural And Economic Patterns
This part of the thesis attempts to delineate the pre-existing farming system in the 
project area so that we may be allowed to later evaluate the fitness of the ENSAP 
project, including how it is likely to affect the traditional farming patterns. Overall, it 
provides a descriptive analysis of the basic features and agricultural and economic 
patterns, of the traditional system, we will reveal that the traditional system is 
constrained from expanding production for the market by both capital shortage and 
simplicity of techniques, as well as environmental hazards. This also results in low 
incomes to farmers. It will also be shown how both household and hired labour are 
assigned to the various agricultural operations, in addition to the recruitment of 
communal work groups (nafirs ) for the weeding operations. Sharaka (which partly 
discussed in the previous chapter ) is also fully demonstrated to occupy a modest place 
in the traditional farming system. After comparing the sharaka with the hired labour 
system it is suggested that an alternative system of hired labour is most conducive to 
ENSAP project smallholders if the project is to achieve its target of " significantly 
increasing the levels of income for the pai ticipating farmers ".
In line with Making (1967), the transformation process relating to the evolution of 
peasant farms could be described in three stages: traditional, transitional and commercial 
farming. In the first stage the techniques of production are static and traditional, in 
which case the faim is inseparable from the household. Production is primarily for 
consumption. It is also characterized by the absence of scientific research, and 
extension, credit and marketing facilities.The second stage marks a slight weakening
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in the farm-household relationship with the development of an orientation to purchase 
part of the agricultural tools or inputs from the market. Credit, extension and 
marketing become more important. In the third stage the farm-household relationship 
tends to become severed and production decisions come to be based on rational 
calculations and expectations of economic returns by orientating the farming 
enterprise into commercial business. Institutions are well developed to back farmers in 
producing increasingly for the market.
Applying this model to the project area we find that the majority of the villages in 
the farther northern part of the project location were (before the project was 
implemented) still in the first stage, pursuing traditional agriculture with the use of 
simple and ti'aditional implements. The use of chemicals was entirely absent. 
Marketing bottle-necks adversely constrained production for the market which is 
therefore effected on only a limited scale, while production for household consumption 
is characteristically predominant. Located in the savannah (with erratic rainfall) zone, 
the respective villages (eg. Rasheed and Dirra )were handicapped by poor soil fertility 
from producing cash crops such as the groundnuts and sesame - these are produced in 
the zones in the southern parts of Ghubeish which enjoy better soil fertility. Only a 
few of these far northern villages have become involved in the project.
However, the bulk of the villages touched by the project were already passing the 
second stage and were at the threshold of the third stage , since such institutions as the 
Plant Protection Department, the Cooperative Department, the Agricultural Office of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) had been 
recently making strenuous efforts to assist farmers in improving their traditional 
techniques and in increasing their production for the market. The majority of these 
villages passed into the transitional stage through the 1960's and 1970's with the 
introduction of the groundnuts crop into the area on a massive scale. However, any 
further transformation into the 'third stage' was hampered by the absence of
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extension, research, modem credit and marketing institutions. By and large the major 
inputs injected into the area have been mainly the different varieties of groundnuts and 
the improved pesticide known as aldi'ex-t. Villages which could be depicted at this stage 
include Murabaat, Kirja, Dirra, Barnawi,Seranbi, Wad Fadol, Widaa, El Riteirit and 
Ghabash Hammad (to name some of the villages covered by the research).
The third stage, then, was entirely absent prior to the introduction of the ENSAP 
project, and it is the task of the ENSAP project to get this stage initiated. This task 
lies with the extension component of the project which purports to initiate within the 
ti'aditional smallholder rain-fed sector a sustainable extension/credit system. The 
placement of the Agricultural Field extensionists (AFEs) among the village fai'mers is 
meant to upgrade farmers farm management and technical skills thereby resulting in 
rational decision-making in farming and a greater orientation towards commercial 
business.
Having articulated the farming system of Ghubeish communities in terms of the 
transformation model (i.e most of the project villages being placed in the second ’stage’ 
prior to the introduction of ENSAP) we now move to touch on the major agricultural 
and economic patterns of the village relating to this stage.
A distinction between 'large-scale/progressive' and 'small holder/transitional' farmers 
(cf. Ortiz, 1973:177), is also applicable to the project village producers. This 
distinction is made for three reasons. First, villagers themselves make such a 
distinction, contrasting those who cultivate relatively large areas of land from 
smallholder farmers. Second, the project agency makes such a distinction when it 
identifies the beneficiary group: It screens those farmers who are characterized as
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Targe-scale/progressive' and targets only those who are labelled as 
'smallholder/traditional' farmers. Third, I deploy this concept in an endeavor to show 
the emerging trends of economic aspirations in Ghubeish communities affected by the 
project. Most of the data provided below derives from 'smallholder/transitional' 
farmers (because these constitute the vast majority of farmers, roughly more than 
95%). The maximum area put into cultivation by these 'smallholder/transitional' 
farmers is 40 makhamasat ( including the land for gum Arabic). For this reason this 
figure is taken as the demarcating line between 'smallholder/transitional' farmers and 
large-scale/progressive' farmers. 'Large-scale/progressive' farmers, on the other hand, 
cultivate up to a maximum of 60 makhamasat. But one 'large-scale/progressive' farmer 
was found to own up to 119 makhamasat. including the area devoted to the production 
of gum Arabic.
The combination of household labour and hired labour is influenced,amongst other 
things, by the composition of the household and the age structure of the household 
members. The average household size is 7.2 persons and the maximum number of 
household members reported was 13. The following data on the composition of the 
household is broken down into categories of married men, married women, bachelors, 
unmarried women, boys older than five years of age, girls over five years of age, and 
children under five years of age. The age of five years was chosen because after the 
age of five children begin performing small tasks in the field (e.g. bird-scaring, 
assisting in the seeding operation etc.) and contribute to family labour in farming 
activities. However, household composition is, generally, represented by the following 
percentages: adults make up 50.7% of the members of the household ( of these married 
women make 18.6%, unmarried women 8.4%, married men 16.5%, bachelors 7.2%) ; 
while 26.4% are children older than five years of age (boys 13 %, girls 13.4 % ) and 
22.9% are children under five Note that the number of dependent children is overall
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relatively high . Households with many children (both over and under 5 years of age) 
can not make use of the full labour of a sizeable proportion of their members and are 
thus economically disadvantaged in relation to other households where the bulk of 
family members are of working age( those of working age are generally referred to as 
the economically active portion of the household). This is one of the reasons why 
households with large family size in the project area can not adequately expand the 
areas cultivated. Other restrictions include the type of technique and environmental 
hazards.
The farming system of the project area evidences a largely uniform pattern. The bulk 
of the land is owned by individual smallholder faimers and the average landholding 
size is about 28.2 makhamas (1 makhamas =1.79 acres) (as estimated in ENSAP 
project survey, 1989:10). This included those areas devoted to the tapping of gum 
Arabic as well as those for both cash and consumption crops.Farmers practice fallow 
cultivation, though,the number of years an area of the farm would stay fallow varied 
between a minimum of two years to a maximum of eight years. Women own iubraka 
(kitchen garden) near to the house, in which early maturing food crops are 
cultivated.The most important crops grown in the iubraka include cowpea, okra, 
maize, sorghum, cucumber and pumpkin. Nearly 90% of all rural households have 
iubrakas:but women also assist their husbands in the main farms. All farmers grow 
groundnuts (and some grow sesame which has been only recently introduced and is 
not yet widespread) as a cash crop and millet as a food crop. Other crops cultivated 
include sorghum, watermelon, cowpea, hibiscus (karakdi) which are largely inter­
cropped with the two major crops. The allocation of the total landholding in all project 
villages among the existing crop varieties is presented as follows (including the 
iubraka):
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Table (3): Field Croü and Jubraka Mix
üercentases 
Crop Locale Farmers Area Average area /farmer (in makhamasat)
Millet : field 100% 61.1% 17.3
iubraka 35.5% 38.5% .5
total 100% 60.1% 17.8
(ie. field+Jubraka)
Groundnuts:
field 100% 25.1% 7.1
iubraka 6.5% 7.7% .1
total 100% 24.3% 7.2
Sesame: field 45.2% 2.1% .6
iubraka 3.2% 0.0% .0
total 48.2 2% .6
Sorghum: field 25.8% 2.1% .6
iubraka 38.7% 15.4% .2
total 61.3% 2.7% .8
Watermelon (intercropped) 
field 93.5% 45.6% 12.9
iubraka 3.2% 0.0% .0
total 93.5% 43.6% 12.9
Watermelon (sole-cropped):
field 22.6% 6.4% 1.8
total 22.6% 6.1% 1.8
Others: field 64.5% 3.2% .9
iubraka 77.4% 38.5% .5
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total 90.3% 4.7% 1.4
Gum Arabie ( non-cultivated land ) :
96.8% -  53.6
TOTAL field 100% — 28.2
iubraka 87.1% — 1.3
Source: ENSAP Base Line Survey, 1989, p ,ll.
The table shows that millet is obviously the major food crop and groundnuts the 
primary cash crop, occupying, per farmer, an area of 17.8 and 7.2 makhamasat. 
respectively. Recently introduced sesame and sorghum are both minor crops in the 
faiming economy of the villages.Each occupies an area of less than 3% of the total 
cropland on average. 'Others' referred to in the table include hibiscus, okra, cowpea, 
maize, cucumber and pumpkins. Farmers know of a number of crop varieties for 
groundnuts, millet, sesame, sorghum and watermelon.Thus groundnuts has two 
varieties- Abu fraisha and barbeton . Abu fraisha is the traditional crop, which was 
replaced by the barbeton variety which was introduced into the area in the late 1950's 
and early 1960's. Its advantages over the traditional variety (now entirely absent) were 
stated by farmers to lie in facilitating weeding and harvesting, and in being relatively 
higher yielding. It also matures in ninety to one hundred days.
Millet has three varieties, identified as dimbi. sharoba and hammir. Most preferred of 
these by farmers were sharoba and dimbi for the main field; and sharoba and hammir 
for the iubraka. Sesame is of three varieties. These are the red, white and herahiri. 
listed here in order of their preference to the farmers. Sorghum has the wad el 
m irghani, nagad. dagoga. zunnari. salula, kurki. yellow,white and wad a'akkar 
varieties (the most important of which ai'e zunnari and wad el mirghani. Watermelon 
varieties include white, um dam , hamari. baladi, pink and kaka (again, listed 
according to their importance to the faimer). With regai'd to all these crops, some of the
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varieties have been newly introduced from the outside, such as wad a'kkar (sorghum) 
which was brought from the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan region. The 
salula and kurki varieties of the sorghum were also newly introduced, to the extent that 
a large number of villagers do not know them.
Faimers do not follow a systematic land allocation pattern for the various crops and the 
areas allocated to each crop variety vary from one season to another as well as from 
one village to another (and even from one household to another). But in general the 
majority allocates a larger size of the plot for the production of the staple crop, 
millet,relative to the other crops.
The most important determinants of land allocation in this region were the household's 
economic status (in terms of its financial standing), its farm's soil fertility and its 
labour resource. Being in a good financial position, with a large amount of land, a 
household could opt to allocate a relatively large size of plotland for the production of 
the cash crop since household subsistence would not be risked because the aiea of land 
concerned remained small proportionate to the whole. A poor farmer, on the other 
hand, would not risk devoting a geat deal of land for the production of groundnuts 
since for all smallholder cultivators household subsistence viability is the overriding 
concern. Generally, for both 'smallholder/transitional' and 'large-scale/progressive' 
farmers, the proportions of the food and cash crops areas to be put into cultivation are 
decided on the basis of the current household needs for cash and food, the ruling prices 
for both crops and the ready cash in pocket. Soil fertility also influences the land 
allocation pattern since farmers had through experience came to know those types of 
soil which suited a specific sort of crop vai'iety more than another. Thus the most 
fertile land is devoted to the cultivation of the millet crop and groundnuts, rather than
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for the production of sorghum or sesame. The nature of the agricultural season also 
can affect the land allocation pattern since faimers could be tempted to increase the area 
under cultivation for all crop varieties in a 'prosperous' rainy season.
Table: ( 4 ): Highest And Lowest Areas And Yields For Groundnuts, Millet, Sesame 
and Sorghum Relating To 1983 Season (Source: Base Line Survey, 1989:16)
% of farmers Groundnuts Millet Sesame Sorghum
Planting this crop 93% 96% 41.9% 32.3%
Average Area planted 8.0 13.6 1.2 1.6
(in makhamasat/farmer)
Maximum Area/faimer 40.0 35.0 3.0 4.0
Minimum Area/farmer 1.0 2.0 0.3 0.5
Average Yield/faimer 6.3 1.0 1.9 2.1
Maximum Yield/farmer 18.0 2.3 5.0 5.0
Minimum Yield/farmer 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.2
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Overall, prior to the introduction of the ENSAP project farmers undertook the 
following pattern of land allocation. The table (above) specifically refers to the 1983 
season since, for the area, this is the most representative of a good agricultural season 
(the area was affected by recurrent seasons of drought and crop failure during the 
1980's). The table shows the highest and the lowest areas and yields for millet, 
groundnuts, sorghum and sesame (both smallholder and large-scale farmers).
Thus it is clear from the table that farmers vary their allocation of land for 
groundnuts between a minimum of one makhamas and a maximum of 40.0 
makhamasat with an average of 8.0 makhamasat. However, the figures should be 
treated with caution; they largely depend on farmers' memories, since they were 
asked to recall a period five years before the project implementation.
As was shown in the table (3), the average area cultivated, per farmer, (excluding the 
iubraka) is 28.2 makhamasat. This was to be allocated to the various crop varieties 
according to the determinants of land allocation cited above. There were, however, 
differences as to the various crops mixed together on the one plot of land.Thus, a 
farmer would either have a plot of land soley cropped by millet or else have the millet 
inter-cropped with watermelons. Similarly, the groundnuts crop would either be sole 
cropped or inter-cropped with the watermelon crop. By and large, the inter-cropping 
pattern predominates, with a relatively larger percentage of the land being inter-cropped 
with millet and watermelon compared to that with the groundnuts with watermelon. 
The convenience of inter-cropping is that watermelon production does not compete 
with either of the two major crops in terms of labour allocation. The watermelon crop
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is usually planted late in the season shortly prior to the harvesting of the major crops, 
and it depends for its growth partly on the cold weather. The watermelons are planted 
in the bare spaces between the plants of the major crops, thus not involving extra 
labour to weed it. Moreover, the watermelon does not compete with the other farming 
operations of harvesting or marketing since it is usually harvested in the post­
marketing period of the two major crops.
'Large-scale/progressive' farmers are profit maximizers and are ready to undertake 
large-scale business agriculture. 'Smallholder/transitional' farmers, in contrast to 
’Large-scale/progressives’, plan ahead the amount of land to be put into cultivation, 
and the corresponding labour needed, both of which are allocated at the right time [Ortiz 
(1973) refers to decisions thus made as 'decisions made in the course of the activity ]. 
It is these 'large-scale/progressives' who first introduced the sharaka (share-cropping) 
system in the area. This was mainly because expansion of the area cultivated above the 
average for the village starts to conflict with consti aints relating to the allocation of the 
available labour supply, as well as the extra labour which can be recruited on a 
reciprocal basis (nafirs). As a result large owners were prompted to engage in share- 
cropping with Dinka labourers coming from the Southern province. Financing the 
share-cropping enterprise is made possible by the huge landowner's possession of 
substantial capital, usually in the form of animal ownership. 'Large-scale/progressive' 
farmers own between a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 300 heads of herds (mostly 
sheep and goats , and to a lesser extend, cattle and camels). Animals could be sold at 
anytime during the agricultural season to finance agricultural production, or household 
subsistence needs during the 'hungry season'.For this reason, and in contrast to 
'smallholder/transitional' farmers, 'large-scale/progressive' farmers do not work as 
hired labourers on others' farms. In hiring labour to accomplish the weeding and 
harvesting tasks large-scale/progressive' farmers do not forsake the traditional nafir
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system, as has been the case with other parts of the Sudan (eg. Ahmed, 1977), or other 
similar cases (eg. Ortiz, 1973:177). In these other cases the forsaking of the reciprocal 
communal work system by large landowners occurs either due to the impossibility of 
abiding by the norm of reciprocity ( Ahmed, 1977 ), or due to the 'progressive 
faimers" disdain of this traditional system of labour recruitment (Ortiz, 1973:177). In 
the case of Ghubeish villages this does not apply since the norms of reciprocity are not 
put in jeopardy by 'large-scale/progressive' farmers. A 'large-scale/progressive' 
farmer even if he does not himself attend an active nafir arranged by fellow villagers, 
may be represented by one of his household members (an undertaking which is 
consistent with the norms of reciprocity). But that said,'large-scale/progressive’ 
farmers do not depend on reciprocal labour for weeding their own farm, to the same 
extent as 'smallholder/transitional' farmers do. With enough cash at his disposal a 
'large-scale/progressive' farmer would opt to hire wage labourers rather than to 
compete with 'smallholder/traditional' farmers over communal work groups. This is 
mainly because a farmer who needs to recruit nafir labourers must plan such 
recruitment in such a way that his own nafir should not concur with others' nafirs (a 
situation which too often happens because all farmers start the weeding operation at the 
same time). Concurrence of nafirs leads to fewer participants attending each nafir since 
an invited farmer cannot attend more than one nafir at a time. So, hiring wage labourers 
guarantees the prompt supply of labour.
Smallholder/transitional' farmers, on the other hand, do not make such accurately 
planned decisions, mainly because such decisions are made while the agricultural 
season has already commenced. For example, a 'smallholder/traditional' farmer who 
plans to put into cutivation 15 makhamasat of the millet and grounduts crops, could by 
later deciding to hire out his labour in rich farmers' farms, end up weeding only about 
10 makhamasat on his own farm. The reverse is also true: A farmer who supplies his
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labour on others' farms may suddenly cut this supply and decide to accomplish the 
weeding activity on his own farm, arrange a nafir. or a combination of both. The 
farmer's cash needs (or economic standing) are often involved in the formation of such 
decisions. Partial hiring out of labour contiibutes to redressing cash shortage problems 
arising during the agricultural season. Such decisions made during the course of the 
activity (such as a sudden withdrawl from hiring out one's labour) can also adversely 
affect 'largescale/progressive' farmers concerning the recruitment of labour. Since he is 
not certain of the actual number of days a hired worker may continue to work on the 
farm, a 'large-scale/progressive' farmer is often forced into spending a considerably 
long period of time looking for labourers to continue a task started by a previous hired 
worker. The final result would be a less amount of land weeded (well below that 
actually planted).
The relative animal wealth owned by rich farmers has often led to such wealth being 
considered contrary to the common ideology, as their main source of well-being, not 
agriculture (see eg. Holy , 1987). However, 'large-scale/progressive' farmers' clinging 
to agriculture during the aftermath of the 1984/85 drought in an attempt to redress cash 
shortage problems (resulting from the death of their animal herds) points to the 
importance of agriculture for 'large-scale/progressive' farmers. Comparable 
observation relates that when rich farmers leave farming and engage in trade they do so 
only gradually^ after they have strongly established themselves in this new business 
(cf. Ibid, 1987 ). 'Large-scale/progressive' farmers also own large gum Arabic fields 
which ensure additional source of income. These fanners' gum Arabic trees are tapped 
by hired labourers after the harvesting season (December to February). Gum Arabic 
fields vary in size between 15 m a k h a m a s a t and 40 m a k h a m a s a t . 
'Smallholder/transitional' farmers, on the other hand, own gum Arabic fields in the 
range of 2 to 20 makhamasat. Ownership of animal herds coupled with large gum
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Arabie fields provide a good annual income for 'large-scale/progressive' farmers. 
'Smallholder/Uansitional' farmers who produce gum Arabic are able to augment their 
income earnings and to assure a basic level of security.
The major agricultural phases for the farm communities of the project area include land 
clearing ('warshaD. early planting(rameil), planting proper (seeding), weeding (kadeib), 
second weeding (junkab), harvesting (hasad) and threshing. The intensity of labour 
applied in the various types of agricultural tasks is also governed by the simplicity of 
the techniques and tools, which remained largely traditional. Although a handful of 
smallholder farmers owned animals in the villages of the project, the separation of 
animals and the farm is a characteristic feature of the smallholder farming system of 
Ghubeish communities, and the use of animal drawn implements is entirely absent. 
Tools and seeds and, often, aldrex-t chemical (pesticide) aie directly obtained from the 
market.Of the total seed used, a certain proportion is usually provided from the 
farmer's own stock from the previous harvest,which is stored in the m atmura 
(underground pit). The remainder of the seed must be purchased from the local village 
markets or from the distant markets at En Nahud, Ghubeish, Abu Rai or Sug'al Jamal. 
The table below shows the percentage of seed purchased for the major crops and the 
average price paid for seed, with the total cost per faimer.
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Table (5): Percentage of Seed Purchased (1988/89 season)
Crop seed % purchased Average amount Average price (LS) Cost per farmer (LS)
(malwa/kantarl
Millet 33.2% 4.2 malwa 7.8/malwa
Groundnuts 35.6% 2.4 kantar 47/ kantar
Sesame 64.3% 0.3 malwa 4.6/ malwa
32.7
110.1
1.3
Sorghum 39.4%
Watermelon 17.2% 
'other crops’ N.a 
Total —
N.a (included in 'other crops')
N.a (included in 'other crops')
N.a 14.9
159.8
Source: Base Line Survey, ENSAP Project, 1989, p 22.
One malwa equals approximately 3 kilograms for millet, sorghum and sesame; and one 
kantar of each of those crops equals about 15 kilograms. One kantar therefore equals 5 
malwa for these crops (a malwa is normally a measure of volume rather than quantity).
The high percentage of seed purchased, in contrast to the amount provided from the 
household matmura (storage), is explained by the fact that the previous agricultural 
season left the farmers with an inadequate amount of seed for replanting.
With respect to the traditional use of the aldrex-t chemical, the Ministry of Agriculture 
recommended an application rate for the chemical of 3 wagia per kantar, equivalent to 
0.25 pounds (rads) per kantar) for all crops. The following quantities of seed dressing, 
per kantar, were actualy being used by farmers (source: ENSAP Base Line Survey,
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1989%
Millet 0.75 rati
Groundnuts 0.22 rati
Sesame 3.45 rati
Sorghum 2.85 rati
Watermelon 0.45 rati
The figures show that the smallholder farmers clearly applied concentrations of
chemicals to their various types of seeds which are higher than the rates recommended 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the farmers justified this on the grounds that 
their previous tests with the chemical resulted in limited control over the agricultural 
pests. As the aldrex-t chemical is usually supplied through local merchants it was well 
known that the chemical supplies were adulterated and thus do not give the desired 
results. Farmers also used the chemical for purposes other than those for which it was 
intended such as the poisoning of rats.This had inflated the figures for application. The 
table below gives an indication of the average number of ratls of aldrex-t that were 
used per makhamas and per farmer.
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Table (6): Average Seed Dressing Used Per Makhamas And Per Farmer (1988/89
season)
Ratls Used Per
Crop Seed Makhamas Farmer
Millet 0.04 0.67
Groundnuts 0.21 L47
Sesame 0.23 0.20
Sorghum 0.21 0.27
Watermelon 0.05 0.60
Others N.a 0.28
Total 2L72
Source: Base Line Survey, ENSAP Project, 1989, p 24.
The average aldrex-t price reported by farmers was LS 21.7 per rad. As shown in the 
table, the average amount of aldrex-t used by the farmers who used aldrex-t was 
2.72 ratls. The average cost of the chemical used by the farmers was therefore LS 
49.50 per farmer.
As we have mentioned above the farm implements used by farmers in the project 
villages remain largely traditional. But while many farmers retained their farm
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implements from previous seasons, the number who purchased tools in the 1988/89 
(before project implementation) season was relatively large.The table below shows the 
number of tools purchased, average prices and the average tool costs per farmer.
Table (7): Farming Tool Kit, Prices And Costs (1988/89 season)
Type of Tool % of Farmers Purchasing No of tools purchased Av.Price Total Cost
(per season) (per farmer) (per farmer)
Axe 38.7% 0.7 8.8 6.3
Rake 5L6% 0.9 12.0 10.4
Hoe 77.4% 1.9 7.0 12.4
Hashasha (for weeding) 87T% 4.0 7.4 29.9
Knife 9.7% 0.2 4.3 0.8
Other 61.3% -------- —
Total 93.5% ----------- 88.3
Source: Base Line Survey, ENSAP Project, 1989, p. 25.
The first column in the table indicates the percentage of fanners purchasing each of the 
types of tools listed.The number purchased (second column) is the average number of 
tools for all farmers including those who did not need to purchase any for the 1988/89 
season. The average number purchased should represent the tool kit that a farmer 
would purchase if he had to purchase tools every year. The total cost is the average 
total cost for all farmers. It is the average number purchased times the price. The slight 
differences in the table between total cost and the product of the number purchased and 
the price are due to rounding.
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Having provided information on the agricultural techniques,crop varieties, and use of 
chemicals, we now turn to the particular agricultural tasks on which such allocation of 
labour occurs(starting from land clearing to the harvesting of the crops).
Land clearing (warshall) is a land preparation activity which is usually started in April 
and is focussed on the clearing of the small bushes from the farm as well as the 
residues of the stalks of the plants from the previous season. These plants were 
believed to compete with farm crops for the limited water supply and to provide 
favourable ground for the multiplication of agricultural pests. This activity, however, 
was utterly opposed on the part of the project extension agents on the grounds that 
clearing the bushes would accentuate desertification and result in low rates of moisture. 
However, farmers were still observed to practise warshal in the 1990 agricultural 
season. The bushes were collected and used for fencing the farm and this- or so 
farmers argued in defence of the practice- resists desertification since it implies a 
barrier against the blowing winds. Being cleared of the small bushes and plant residues 
the land gets prepared for rameil, i.e., the seeding activity proper.
Rameil is an early sowing activity conducted by farmers shortly before the full start 
of the rainy season.This activity, however, is not practised by all farmers since it 
involves high risks should the rain fail to come early or prove inadequate. For this 
reason rameil is observed to be carried out by those farmers who boasted a good deal of 
farming experience. These farmers, who are mostly from the elder generation, have 
kept notional records about the onset of the annual rainy season which they used as a 
calendar for reference to the major fluctuations of rainfall ( see chapter 7). Accordmg to
105
this calendar (which I refer to as the kharif calendar, which means calendar for the 
rainy season) these farmers would commence their agricultural operations in 
accordance with what they believed were "precise expectations". In other words, most 
of the farmers who practised rameil would expect the rain to fall within a maximum 
of two weeks time. Should rains come according to these "expectations" then the plant 
would be at its best since it would make full use of the available water, unlike other 
farms which had been planted at a later stage. Rameil is practised in early May, and 
the farmers involved profess being well satisfied with the activity. Among the villages 
where cases of rameil were observed and cited were Murabaat, Seranbi, Kirja and El 
Halfaya.
The weeding operations usually get started immediately after the planted crop grows a 
few inches and the weeds start to rival the plants in size. The weeding operations are 
divided into two phases; the kadeib (first weeding), and the second weeding. The 
kadeib is the most important, requiring both to be got started at the optimum time (lest 
it should be too late) and to have proper planning with regard to labour mobilization.
It involves both the weeding and the thinning of the plant; both are conducted 
simultaneously. It is the most laborious activity, claiming a large part of the farmer's 
time and labour. Household labour, hired labour and communal work groups (nafir) 
are fully utihzed and reach their peak intensity during this period, which staits in June 
and continues through July and into early August. The second weeding is less labour 
demanding and involves no reliance on nafir. though hired labour may be summoned.
Farmers practise thinning during kadeib because seeding seeds aie applied at rates 
slightly higher than the optimum rate recommended by the Plant Protection Department
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(PPD).The farmers' reasoning for this lies in the fact that due to widely spread 
agricultural pests such as rats, traditional experience had shown that at PPD rates, the 
number of plants which would grow would be too few to afford a good harvest. 
Applying more seeds would mean a guaranteed growth of plants out of which some 
would be cut out in the thinning operation, the rest would be the number of plants 
judged optimum on the part of the PPD. The extension agents of the project seemed to 
discourage farmers from practising thinning and instead recommended the application 
of chemicals to combat the infestations of agricultural pests.
Harvesting and threshing are concluded during the peak 'hungry' season towards 
October and September and for this reason significant numbers of farmers outside the 
project villages often took to seasonal migration to neighbouring villages in search of 
wage employment on the farms of rich farmers in order to secure the wherewithal for 
immediate household subsistence. This often implied that such farmers delayed their 
own harvesting to a later stage when they returned to their villages. An alternative to 
wage labour is the sheil (traditional money lending, discussed below) system through 
which the poorer farmers secured enough cash to buy food through this 'hungry' 
season. These various agricultural activities were often supported by ritual practices 
such as rain-making or the use of various types of farm amulets (charms) which draw 
from the society's belief system. This is dealt with in chapter 7.
We need to see how labour is allocated to the various agricultural operations in the 
project area. As this calls for supportive figures we present them from the Base Line 
survey of ENSAP project (1989:16-20) since this amounts to a good summary of 
labour inputs in the project villages on behalf of the various crops and through the 
different agricultural phases.
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The tables, excepting table 10, provide information about the average labour burden 
overall project villages calculated in terms of person days per makhamas for each 
operation and the cost of hired labour in Sudanese pounds per farmer per makhamas. 
These labour burdens exclude the cost of nafirs which the farmer summons should he 
be constrained by time or lack of labour supply. The relatively large proportion of 
hired labour clearly indicates the quite high degree to which households can cope with 
bottlenecks in labour supply relative to their limited internal membership sizes.
Table (8)Labour Inputs For Millet And Millet/watermelon (L/c = cost of hired labour in 
Sudanese pounds per farmer per makhamas) :
Millet Onlv Millet With Watermelon
Operation PersonDays HkedL/c Person/Days Hired/ L/c
Clearing 1.4 2.2 1.7 0.4
Rameil 0.3 0.5 0.5. 0.0
Seeding 0.8 0.1 1.5 0.0
1st Weeding 5.1 19.1 4.3 2.5
2nd Weeding 1.0 4.5 3.1 1.3
Harvest 1.7 7.2 1.8 8.4
Threshing 0.4 4.5 0.6 4.0
Total 10.6 38T 1L5 16.7
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Table ( 9 ):
Labour Input For Groundnuts And Groundnuts/Watemielon
Groundnuts only Groundnuts/watermelon
Operation person days Hired L/c person days hired L
clearing 2.5 0.0 3.4 1.8
rameil 1.8 ITa 1.3 8.2
seeding 3.5 6.4 1.4 0.3
thinning and weeding 4.7 12.2 5 ^ 16/2
second weeding 1.6 0.0 3.3 4.2
harvest 7.3 3&8 5.7 20.1
threshing 2.0 7.4 1.7 4.1
Total 22B 72.2 24.1 61.0
Table (10): Labour Inputs For Millet, Groundnuts And Watermelon By Type Of Planting:
proportion of labour per type of crop)
Type Of Planting 
Millet (sole cropped)
Millet inter-cropped with watermelon 
Groundnuts (sole cropped)
Groundnuts inter-cropped with watermelon 
Watermelon sole cropped
Watermelon inter cropped with Millet or Groundnuts
Millet Groundnuts Wateimelon 
61%
39%
21 .6%
78.4%
10%
89.3%
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Note that groundnuts inter-cropped with watermelon is more labour consuming than 
millet inter-cropped with watermelons (exactly double the amount of labour for the 
latter). The main reason is that due to the closer spacing involved in the groundnuts 
planting the weeding of this crop consumes a relatively large amount of labour. This 
also later makes the interplanting of watermelons in the bare spaces labour consuming.
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Table (11): Labour Input For Minor Crops, Jubraka And Gum Arabic
Minor Crops Jubraka Gum Arabic
Operation Person Davs Hired L/c Person Davs Hired L/c Person Davs Hired/L/c
Clearing 2.8 0.7 3.1 1.5 0.0 0.0
Rameil 0.0 0.0 1,2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Seeding 3.1 0.0 2.4 0.0 N.a N.a
1st Weeding 5.1 0.5 4.6 0.0 N.a N.a
2nd Weeding 4.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 N.a N.a
Harvest 6.9 5.0 5.6 1.6 0.3 2.3
Threshing 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.2
Total 22.6 6.2 1&8 3.1 0.4 2.5
Minor crops refer to okra, hibiscus (karkadi). and beans which occur in the field either 
inter-cropped or sole-cropped. Jiibrakas were the kitchen garden plots cultivated by 
women and are close to the house. Note that as gum Arabic is not a cultivated crop it 
shows only small figures. Tapping is done independently of the other farming 
activities, in the post harvesting period (towards December).
I l l
Table (12): Labour Inputs For Sesame And Sorghum
Sesame Sorghum
Operation Person Days Hired L/c Person Days Hired 1
Clearing 3.3 0.0 3.0 0.0
Rameil 0.4 3.6 1.2 0.0
Seeding 2.9 0.0 1.5 0.0
First Weeding 4.4 0.0 7.0 15.5
Second Weeding 1.3 0.0 4.5 0.0
Harvesting 2.2 7.6 3.5 8.6
Threshing 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.0
Total 15.2 11.5 2L2 24.1
The fact that sesame and sorghum involve a smaller amount of hired labour, relative 
to millet, points to the low importance attached to them by the smallholder producer, 
with limited cash at his disposal.
The figures in tables (8 - 12) are also partly explained by the availability of hired 
labour. The hired labour supply varies from one village to another, but in general, and 
as shown in the tables, hired labour contributed the larger proportion of the farm 
labour input. The exception is the labour input for the iubraka and the minor crops 
which clearly involved a higher amount of household labour. In the case of the foimer 
because of the proximity of the iubraka to the house (women thus having not to spend 
any time reaching it ) and because of the relatively small size of the iubraka plot which 
makes it opthnally manageable within the capacity of the women farmers.
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A differential supply of hired labour in the project village communities is explained in 
terms of the ruling wage rate in a given village relative to the other neighbouring 
villages since the wage rates vary from one village to another. Being able to secure 
information (through gossip) on the different wage rates in the project villages the 
worker would opt to supply his labour to the villages which offered lucrative wage 
rates. Thus, in the 1990/91 agricultural season the wage rate for weeding ranged 
between LS 200 to LS 230 in Murabaat, Kirja, Um Sid air, Ibeid and Barnawi, whilst 
in El Halfaya, Abu Geid and Wad Fadol it was LS 240-250 for the same operation.
The overall economic conditions of the village seemed to be a strong reason behind this 
differential wage rate. Unlike those villages which had partially succeeded in their 
efforts at village improvement,the villages which lacked basic welfare facilities were 
trapped into offering higher wage rates in order to solicit the hired worker who would 
then work under relatively harsh economic conditions. One major factor which 
discouraged wage workers from approaching the relatively disadvantaged villages 
relates to the availability of water. Villages such as El Halfaya had been experiencing a 
regular drain of their members (prior to the introduction of ENSAP) through the 
process of out-migration, largely because of the problem of inadequate water supply. 
This had led the village members to rely increasingly on nafirs to assist in the 
accomplishment of the weeding tasks (information on nafir is given in chapter 2). 
Having provided a detailed coverage of land and labour as two factors of production, 
we now move to give some account of the traditional credit system, sheil. as this 
provides the main means of capital to smallholder fanners.
Sheil refers to the mortagaging of farm crops for cash payment prior to harvesting. A 
farmer (mainly after concluding the weeding operation) who is in need of money to
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spend on household consumption (or, in agriculture) would approach a moneylender 
(e.g. a village merchant) to assist with the supply of adequate capital. The sheil deal 
stipulates that the borrower (i.e, the farmer) agrees to sell in advance (at the time of 
borrowing ) a specified quantity of his ( forthcoming ) crop in return for the money he 
he needs to receive from the sheil merchant. A contract may often be signed by both 
parties in addition to a third party who is a witness. What the two parties need initially 
do is to agree on the price at which the farmer should sell his crop, in advance, to the 
moneylender. The sheil merchant alerts the farmer of the current price of the specific 
crop (sheil is made mostly for cash crops), and then bargains on that basis until finally 
the farmer accepts the bargain (whose price is called sheil price). The difference 
between sheil price and the real price goes (as revenue) to the moneylender for his 
service. But because sheil prices are usually less than the prices prevailing in the market 
some farmers (and later on the agency) argue that sheil amounts to usuary whereby 
moneylenders exploit local fanners. The majority of smallholder farmer interviewed in 
my fieldwork were found to have engaged in sheil deals .
3.7
One important aspect of labour which was traditionally confined mainly to the relatively 
large land owners and which seems to have some bearing on the ENSAP project is the 
sharaka (share-cropping) system. A handful of cases were observed among the project 
farmers currently receiving loans from ENSAP. As this particular form of labour 
arrangement seems to pose some challenge to the project staff who had partly voiced 
their worry about the sharaka system it is appropriate that I consider it in some detail. 
Sharaka occuis only for groundnuts production.
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Sharaka was an institution introduced in the 1960's. It consists of an arrangement 
between an owner of the means of production and 'owner(s)' of labour. It is 
primarily a form of share-cropping whereby the proceeds from cultivating a cash crop 
are to be divided in halves between the two sides of the arrangement. Although not 
exclusively so, the labour part in the agreement is usually made with people from the 
Dinka ethnic group who started to migrate into the northern Kordofan area in large 
numbers in the 1950's and early 1960's, at a time when labour demand for agriculture 
was considerable.
The sharaka arrangement specifies the responsibilities for both the owner of the means 
of production and the worker. The owner of the means of production has to provide the 
seeds, fertilizers, land and part of the consumption expenses for the worker(s). The 
worker’s responsibility lies with undertaking the various agricultural activities, from 
land preparation to the harvesting of the crop. Proper farm management is also the 
responsibility of the worker and the land owner may visit the farm frequently to ensure 
that the work is proceeding smoothly. To assist the worker in adjusting to the local 
farming conditions, as well as to ensure proper farm management, the landowner 
constructs a small thatched hut for the worker to live in on the fami. This not only cuts 
down the time the worker spends getting to and from the farm, it means the labourer 
can guard also farm against animal trespassing which is quite widespread; in addition 
the labourer will guards the farm against crop theft. But the worker also lives on the 
farm because he has no land of his own (see also Stuchlik, 1976).
The arrangement as such is usually made for one season. But it is observed that some 
sort of client/patron relationship exists whereby the worker(s) approache(s) the same 
landowner for several seasons. This relationship is one of paternalism whereby the
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landowner shoulders the responsibility of looking after the labourer so as to motivate 
the labourer to continue the partnership over the subsequent agricultural seasons. Thus, 
the landowner provides medication during the labourer’s illnesses; and shelter, before 
and during the agricultural operations (this is elaborated below).
The sharaka. though not extensively practised by local farmers, is among the current 
labour forms occupying a modest place in the village farming system. It marks a shift 
away from the wage labour system to a form of partnership. In addition to such 
reasons as the shortage of labour supply sharaka may indicate an abandonment of 
the cash wage system as unsatisfactory. The point here, which hopefully could be 
generalized to other areas in Africa sharing similar characteristics, is that in 
circumstances of chronic labour shortage a farmer gains security in labour supply by 
resorting to sharaka rather than depending on the sporadic soliciting of hired labour. 
This is mainly because the sharaka is a ’tied’ system which goes on for several years, 
unless broken by one party for one reason or another.
There is yet another advantage of the sharaka system,in contrast to the wage labour 
system. Land owners believed that the sharaka system suits a local farming system 
which is characterized by scarcity of cash. Under the sharaka system the land owner 
is said to be able to spread the spending of the limited income at his disposal over a 
relatively longer period of time, while in the case of the wage labour system he has to 
pay the labourers all the amount payable in cash. To this is attached particular 
importance since a regular payment of wages would continually conflict with other 
demands for cash (eg. household consumption needs).
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Smith quotes Brook in describing the share system in Georgia between 1865-1912, 
which is also pertinent to the sharaka system;
under the share system, the landlord supplies every thing to make the crop, 
except the manual labour, and the owner and tenant are in a sense co-partners in 
the undertaking, since the landlord has undertaken all the risk, he claims the 
right of complete control over the tenant and the crop, just as in the case of the 
day labourer (in Smith, 1940:508).
This description is typical of the sharaka svstem in the project area.Not only does the 
land owner claim the right of complete control over the labourer, he may also call in 
hired labour to undertake the agricultural operations when he feels the partner is 
deficient, or too idle to carry them out sufficiently.In this case the cost of the hired 
labour is discounted from the income from the marketed crop. In other words, the 
tenant bears the cost of hired labour. It was also observed that some land owners may 
summon nafirs to undertake the weeding operation in the sharaka farm (e.g as in 
Dirra, Rasheed and En Nahud). Other costs, similarly discounted, include the purchase 
of chemicals, if any are used, and the expenses of preparing the crop for the market.
The recruitment of sharaka labourers partly occurs the moment they are needed, if 
sufficient numbers of labourers are already supplying their labour in the area. 
Otherwise it can happen by chance; as some land owners state, "we met in the town 
by accident as the agricultural season was approaching, talked to each other, and 
decided to engage in a sharaka partnership". Or a particular farmer may announce to 
his co-villagers that he needs his farm to be cultivated by sharaka labourers if he can 
succeed in soliciting them.Through communication the other farmers would get to 
know and if one of them was in contact with Dinka labourers wanting to supply their
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labour for a sharaka arrangement he will then refer them to the farmer in 
need.However, some farmers travel to the main towns of Ghubeish, En Nahud and 
Sug'al Jamal directly to solicit Dinka labourers for a sharaka.
Trust in the labourer should be guaranteed if partnerships are to be entertained, for an 
unfaithful labourer may run away upon the start of the heavy part of agricultural 
operations such as weeding. Since the labourer has up to this stage incurred no 
expenses out of his pocket, and bettring in mind that he had been allowed to freely 
subsist for a period often exceeding a month, an unreliable labourer might indeed be 
tempted to run away. To secure the good faith of the labourer successful land owners 
tend to establish a good rapport with their labourers. The land owner may take the 
labourer to the local health unit in case of illness and would provide him with some 
advances in the form of used clothes and nutritional food. In addition the land owner 
should tolerate or even respect the customs and traditions of the labourers who may 
need to observe some of the rituals which the land owner considers as conflicting 
with his own culture.
A good example is the custom of swearing among the Dinka. For a Muslim land owner 
swearing must be made with reference to the Quran or mentioning the name of Allah 
(as by saying wallahi which means in the name of Allah). But a Dinka (who is the 
labourer) swears by taking a piece of sand in his fingers which he then takes to his 
tongue and refers to as neivalik (which is his god). This indicates to the Muslim land 
owner a reference to sand instead of to Allah, which is, for him, tantamount to shirk 
(lit. polytheism). But this is respected and tolerated by successful land owners lest 
they offend their labourers and risk the termination of the sharaka on the part of the 
Dinka for the subsequent seasons. In addition, Dinka group dancing should not be
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interfered with. The often locally held stereotyping which labels these labourers as 
nuius (lit. polluted), or slaves, is largely restrained and neglected by landowners and 
their household members. Sharaka labourers who succeeded in establishing a 
sustained partnership relationship with their land owners are welcomed affectionately as 
they return at the start of the subsequent agricultural season. Cases of labourers running 
away are rare in the project area.
Land owners who have had at least an elementary level education keep written records 
of the sharaka agreement in which the total expenses incurred throughout the 
agricultural season are registered. As to others, one may cite Smith (who presents a 
case from South Africa, 1940:511-12) on the following merits and demerits of the 
sharaka system in general.The merits of the sharaka include,
i) It stimulates industry by giving the labourer an interest and pride in the crop. It has 
been found by experience that only a small minority of sharaka labourers has been 
influenced by these stimulants, but this nontheless is a positive factor.
ii) It is regarded by the labourer as a higher form of contract, and is , therefore, more 
likely to secure labour, especially in undesirable localities.
iii) It gives the labourer a motive to protect the crop.
iv) It does not subject the farmer to loss from a failure of, or decline in, the value of his 
crop.
v) It secures laboirrers for the year, with less likelihood of breaking the contract, a thing 
the labourer might be tempted to do when the hmd work begins (1940:511-12)
The disadvantages of the sharaka include.
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i) The difficulty of dischai'ging hands when they become inefficient or refractoiy.
ii) The great difficulty of carrying out the general work of the farm,the tendency being 
to drift into an exclusive concern with the one particular crop, a pernicious state of 
affairs that can lead to idleness on the part of the labourer for a large part of the year, to 
indolence and indifference on the part of farm owner, to decay and ruin in the farm, 
and a general decline in the productive resources of the country.
iii) Cultural or moral perplexity for the farmer due to tolerance of the labourer's 
idiosyncrasies.
iv) The disadvantage of having the labourers dictate methods of cultivation according 
to their own notions, which may not be the right ones (1940:512).
The ENSAP project, however, up to the present stage has made no interference with 
the sharaka svstem. including those farmers in the participating villages(PVs) of the 
project.
Both the sharaka system and the wage labour system have their advantages. 
Paradoxically,the points outlined above as disadvantages for the sharaka svstem 
indicate certain advantages for the hired labour system. These include;
i) It gives the farmer control over the labour, he having the power to discharge.
ii) It stimulates industry and enterprise in the farmer. Profits go into his pockets, losses 
come on his shoulders.
iii) It leads to economy in labour, causing the farmer to reduce the labourers to the 
smallest number consistent with the execution of the work
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iv)It enables the farmer to carry out a general system of improvement on his farm; to 
keep the fences., in proper repair and to pay attention to crops other than groundnuts..
v) It necessitates close personal attention from the fanner, forcing thriftiness upon him 
and preventing indolence, for the very essence of the system lies in constant and active 
supervision (1940:512).
The general impression of the landowners who engaged in sharaka arrangements with 
the Dinka labourers indicated self-criticism on the part of these land owners through 
their overt statement of grievance relating to the partnership. But despite this opinion 
some land owners still cling to the sharaka system. Some sort of indifference is clearly 
observable on their part. Farmers made the point that shares from the sales revenue 
which revert to the land owner (in instances where fanners can provide figures) were 
considerably low relative to the Dinka's share; moreover farmers would question the 
efficiency of the whole sharaka system (the estimates of the shares of the sharaka as 
given by the land owners in the project area are provided below).
The Dinka labourer, on the other hand, sees that in a favourable agricultural season he 
enjoys a good share of the revenue, while in a case of crop failure the cost to him could 
be minimal since he did not contribute to the various agricultural inputs( seeds, 
chemicals, implements etc.). But the Dinka also bears the brunt of forgoing the 
opportunity cost of working as a hired labourer and guaranteed wages. But when the 
wage rate is not much above subsistence level (as it could be given the rising cost of 
living and the effect of inflation on food prices) then the Dinka may still be losing 
nothing: the bulk of the subsistence costs for the labourer is already born by the land
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owner as part of the original agreement (see below). This could enable the Dinka to 
ensure subsistence until shortly prior to the harvesting period at which stage the Dinka 
starts to make iarura ( lit. drawing cash from the land owner; who would later deduct it 
upon the sale of the crop). The Dinka, however, seems-to well appreciate the fact that 
the most affected in conditions of crop loss is the land owner. This was clear from my 
interrogation of Deing Kwaj (a Dinka of 30 years of age who was engaged in sharaka 
in En Nahud in 1990) concerning his reaction in conditions of crop failure, which he 
summarized dismissively in the phrase "wad neivalik" ( lit. "it is an act of God").
In the following I provide my data on two cases (which are generally descriptive of 
sharaka in the project villages) in which land owners provided their own estimates to 
show the low shares they secured by engaging in the sharaka svstem.
The sharaka agreement stipulates a number of duties for the land owner which would 
enable the agricultural production process get started. These include the following as 
per village:
Case One: Murabaat Village:
i) The farmer supplies 6 kantars of groundnuts for the labourer who decorticates the 
crop off-farm before planting; this is done over the summer period (April and start of 
May). The farmer takes away these inputs immediately after harvesting the crop.
ii) The farmer should give the labourer cash money of LS 80 with each sack of 
groundnut initially provided (i.e 6 times LS 80).
iii) The farmer should provide 10 malwas of millet and cash money of LS 100 as. 
"summer subsistence expenses" to enable the labourer to subsist over the summer
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period and before finally moving to the farm itself on the 15th of June. During this 
period the labourer must have finished the decortication of the groundnuts crop and 
concluded the preparation of the land;
iv) The farmer should supply a sack of millet (30 malwasl for the labourer which 
enables the latter to subsist throughout the weeding operation and until the harvesting 
period; the farmer bears the costs of grinding the millet;
v) The farmer should bear the cost of building a thatched hut on the farm for the 
labourer;
vi) The farmer should supply the labourer with water (for drinking) on a regular basis 
according the needs of the labourer;
vii) The farmer should not ask for a collateral from the labourer as a security measure;
viii) The farmer should be able to provide iarura (ie. cash loan on request )for the 
labourer in case his subsistence needs are not met by the millet and cash money earlier 
supplied by the faimer;
ix) The farmer receives a half share upon the sale of the harvested crop.
The estimation of the costs, the sales and the shares reverting to each part is indicated 
as follows:
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costs of 6 sacks of gi'oundnuts 6x LS 150 = LS 900
cost of 40 malwas of millet ( 10+30) 40x LS 10 LS 400
cost of grinding 40 malwas of millet 40x LS 5 LS 200
total cash given to the labourer LS 100+ 480 LS 580
cost of building a hut LS 150
cost of water supply ( 4 barrels per month) 4x LS 120 LS 480
total cost LS 2710
The farmers' estimates of the average annual yield for 6 sacks of groundnuts is 50 kantars 
(sacks). Of these 50 kantars, the farmer retain 6 (which he provided at the begining of the season).
1 kantar fetches LS 150 in the market;
Thus total sales value 44 ( 50 - 6 )x LS 150 =LS 6600
Share to the labourer LS 6600/2 = LS 3300
Share of the land owner ( including the sale price of the 6 sacks he takes away upon 
harvesting i.e LS 900) = LS 3300 + (9 0 0 )-2 7 1 0  = LS 1491
The land owner believed , and the figures confirm it, that his share from sharaka is 
less than one third of the total sales revenue. To what extent are such estimates 
generalizable for the other project villages. Let us consider the case of EL Halfaya 
village.
The basic statement of the agreements in El Halfaya village sharaka are the same as
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those for Murabaat village. There are, however, some differences in the cash paid to 
the labourer along with each sack of groundnuts initially provided, as well as in the 
amount of cash given to the labourer for subsistence for the period of summer and 
until the labourer moves to the farm. In El Halfaya the farmer is required to pay the 
labourer LS 60 with each sack of groundnuts (rather than LS 80). In addition he gives 
the labourer LS 20 (rather than LS 100) as cash money to subsist before he finally 
moves to the farm. There is also some slight differences in the prices of milling as well 
as of the millet crop (millet is more expensive here). Another difference relates to soil 
fertility and to the estimated total yield (my informant reported during a period of 
favourable rainy seasons which afforded him an average yield he could easily 
estimate). The results are given as follows:
Case Two: El Halfaya
cost of 6 sacks of groundnuts 6x LS 150 ~LS 900
cost of one 40 malwas of millet 40 malwas xLS 25 = LS 1000
cost of grinding 40 malwas of millet 40x LS 4 = LS 160
cash money of LS 60 per sack + LS 20 = 6x LS 60 + 20 = LS 380
cost of building a hut = LS 150
cost of water supply 4 x LS 120 = LS 480
Total cost = LS 3070
The fanner's estimated average annual yield under the same environmental condition is 
estimated at 100 kantars of groundnuts for the 6 sacks ( 6 sacks will not be offered for sale, as in 
Murabaat ); therefore total gross margin of the sales as well as the shares of the two parts will be as 
follows:
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Gross margin from the sale of 94 kantars = 94x LS 150 = LS 14100
Share of the labourer LS 14100/2 = LS 7050
Share of the land owner = LS 7050 + ( 900 ) - 3070 = LS 4430
The share of the landowner is clearly less than one third of the gross margin. Note that
this holds true even as the yield in in El Halfaya is double that in Murabaat.
These figures were supported by verbal estimates cited by farmers from Um Sidair 
village, and the sheikh of Dirra village, Mohamed Ibeidalla, who said he had been 
engaged in shaiaka for a little more than a decade.Indifference tow i^rds the sharaka was 
cleaiiy inferred through my interrogation of him.
3.10 Implieaitions Of The Sharaka For the ENSAIP Project:
These findings have far reaching implications for ENSAP for the project is likely to 
accentuate the sharaka system since it recommends the expansion of the area cultivated 
by the groundnuts crop by 25% by 1993. As the cost of hired labour is continuously 
rising and there exists some form of competition for the limited labour supply (which 
will certainly rise in the near future as a result of putting a larger area of land into 
cultivation) the farmers participating in the project could ultimately resort to the sharaka 
system. In the following a contrast is made between skaraka and the hired labour 
system in an attempt to outline some recommendations for the ENSAP project 
administration.
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The Sharaka System The Hired Labour System
i) Risk averse. i) Risk involved.
ii) Indolence/Indifference. ii) Encourages thrift.
iii) Land owner presumes on labourer. iii) Encourages self-reliance.
iv) Lack of control over labour. iv) Tight control over labour.
v) Utilization of labour unspecified. v) Optimum utilization of labour.
vi) Control and supervision of land lies vi) PFs of the project control, supervise
outside the hand of the PFs of the project. and manage their famis.
vii) Project benefits partly leak outside the vii) Project benefits the communities
village communities of the project site. of Ghubeish targetted by the project.
viii) Extension advice not directly applied by PFs. viii) Farmer applies the recommended
extension techniques and innovations.
ix) Farmer not perceived by the AFEs. ix) AFEs can easily contact the PF in the
farm.
x) Encourages apathy towards the project. x) More commitment to the project
xi) Paternalistic. xi) Farmer himself and wholly the client to
the agency.
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The contrast makes the hired labour system unquestionably the form which is most 
consistent with the project target such as up-grading farmer skills and, more 
importantly, linking together all the project phases with the goal of 'sustainability'. 
The most dangerous part of sharaka which makes it not preferred within the ENSAP 
project, is that it leads to the development of indifference and apathy towards the 
project.
The nature of the social relations guiding the sharaka system is such that it is basically 
paternalistic. Paternalism implies too much a dependence of the labourer, economically 
and psychologically on the part of the land owner. With the larger proportion of 
sharaka income going to the labourer, this is equated by sharaka landowners, to the 
father-son relationship where the father confers a relatively larger share to his son 
without being sensitized by the outcome.At least the father is satisfied with the social 
relationship in which he assumed the 'privileged' position. For why else, given the 
concrete figures supporting their contention that sharaka is inefficient, does the land 
owner persist in the arrangement ?
We mentioned above that the sharaka system was started in the 1960's with the 
introduction of the groundnuts crop into the area. It then made a remarkable expansion 
up to the 1970's. But by the early 1980's the sharaka started a declining trend and 
consequently a number of large landowners who traditionally relied on sharaka 
labourers were forced to compete with the smallholders (who did not rely on sharaka 
labourers to the same extent) for the available hired labour supply. The reason for the
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Dinka in sababa market (En Nahud): decorticating ttie groundnuts
It
D i n k a  i n  t h e  D i s p l a c e d  P e r s o n s  P r o j e c t  i n  E n  N a h u d  
Q u e i n g  f o r  f o o d ,  1 9 9 0 .
decline in the sharaka system was two fold; a) for security reasons related to the 
breakout of the civil war in the South, the number of Dinka labourers migrating to the 
area significantly declined; b)the drought of the 1980’s adversely affected the project 
area and so the Dinka cut the supply of their labour to the region. Also related to the 
second reason is the declining faim productivity throughout the 1980's, compared with 
that of the pre-drought period, which implied lower returns for the Dinka labourers.
However, the decline in the supply of Dinka labourers had unfavorable consequences 
for the land owners. It has meant that the limited number of Dinka labourers has 
become strategically well placed to dictate the conditions concerning the sharaka 
agreement which gives them more independence and results for them, in greater 
financial returns. This is partly indicated in the figures above which show that 
although the land owners in El Halfaya offered their labourers only LS 20 for 
subsistence over the summer period, in Murabaat the Dinka labourers stipulated a full 
amount of LS 100 for the same purpose.This larger sum will absolutely reduce the land 
owner's share income from the sharaka arrangement.
The recent trends in the area also work to impose unfavourable conditions for the land 
owners who relied on the Dinka for agricultural production.The migrant Dinka's 
preference to join the camps of the Displaced Persons Project (DPP) in En Nahud town 
deflected a sizeable number of potential labourers who originally worked as sharaka 
partners. Food, clothes and shelter freely provided to the camp population provided a 
lucrative incentive for drawing the Dinka labourers into the DPP camp. This is 
reflected in the relatively small number of sharaka cases observed for the 1990/91 
season and was supported by the farmers' verbal statements which confirmed the 
declining trend in the sharaka system.The table below shows the variation in sharaka
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occurrence in the selected villages of the project for the 1990/91 agricultural season.
130
Table (13): Number Of Sharaka Partnerships And Variation Between The Selected 
Project Villages (among the PFs of the project)
Rasheed
Dina
(Farmers engaging in sharaka )
Village No. of sharaka partnership in 1990/91 No. of sharaka labourers/village
Murabaat 10
Abu Geid
El Halfaya
3 ( land owner not a PF)
12 40
(this last figure, i.e. 40, is because one farmer recruited a relatively large number of labourers ; but 
for the rest of faimers the average of sharaka labourers is 4 per village)
Seranbi 2 6
Wad Fadol 0 0
Barnawi
Ibeid
Um Sidair 
Source: Fieldwork.
According to Siddle and Swindell (1990) the context of the implementation of such a
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paitnership system is a need to redress demographic imbalances within the household, 
while Robertson (1987), who gives a similar view, argues that the persistence of the 
shaie-cropping system is due to the inherent instability of domestic groups combined 
with the economic uncertainties of national and international environments within which 
they are located.The cases of sharaka in Murabaat, Seranbi, El Halfaya, Dirra and 
Rasheed partly corroborate Siddle and Swindell’s and Robertson's argumentation 
concerning the reasons for the persistence of the partnership in general.
In these villages the major reasons for the recruitment of the sharaka labourers was the 
temporary movement of the household members outside the village(this was especially 
true of El Halfaya village due to the water shortage problem), economic uncertainties 
and the risk of crop failure( the cases of Ibeid and Murabaat), and the inadequacy of the 
household labour to do the various agricultural operations. However, in general ,the 
majority of the sharaka cases occurred on behalf of those land owners with relatively 
large land holdings,and also ( it is evident ) large family size with many young 
dependents. Yet other factors are also involved, as the cases below reveal.
Mohammed Abdallah of Dirra who heads a family composed of nine members has 
engaged in a sharaka with the Dinka labourers for the past few years. He cultivated a 
farm of about 27 makhamasat in 1990 agricultural season, with 12 makhamasat 
devoted to the cultivation of the groundnuts crop, and 15 to the millet crop. To 
optimally allocate household labour among the various agricultural plots he preferred 
to assign household members to the production of millet for subsistence and engage 
in a sharaka for the cultivation of the groundnuts crop. This will ensure some cash 
surplus from the share of the partnership income. In addition to the shortage of labour 
his main reasons for engagement in the shmaka was that it enabled him to devote part of
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his limited time to look after his herd which is composed of 15 goats, 8 cows and three 
donkeys. In addition he worked as a sababa (middle-man who buys animals and resales 
them for some profit; a sababa may also occur in the trading of agricultural crops). 
This represented the best combination to account for household subsistence, trade and 
animal husbandry.
Seranbi village provides another example of a sharaka whose land owner heads the 
largest family in the village. Mohammed All Bulluck, a forty year old farmer, heads a 
family of 16 members. He engaged in a sharaka arrangement with Dinka labourers in 
1990 agricultural season. Realising that a considerable portion of his household has 
either children below the working age or had temporarily moved out of the village for 
seasonal employment he ensured the livelihood of his large family by increasing the 
size of the area he gave over to the millet crop, relative to that for the groundnuts crop. 
He put into cultivation an area of 10 makhamasat for the groundnuts and a full 30 
makhamasat for the millet crop. This would be difficult without the sharaka labourers. 
The sharaka Dinka operated the 10 makhamas of the groundnuts, while the household 
labour was assigned to the cultivation of the food crop. However, despite the low 
returns form the sharaka due to the severe crop failure in the 1990/91 agricultural 
season, Mohamed Ali appreciated the sharaka arrangement, maintaining that it offered 
the most convenient form of production relationship "provided that the costs were kept 
at a minimum level". The costs, according to him, often increased due to the labourers' 
illness which imply additional expenses to be born by the landowner (for medication) 
without being deducted at the end of the harvesting period. Expenses also rise because 
of increasing food prices during the summer period before the labourers finally move 
from the house to the faim.
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Mohamed Hamdan, a forty year old who lived in Murabaat with his family which is 
composed of 13 members follows a strategy which is a combination of those 
advocated by Mohamed Abdallah and Mohamed Ali, though he cultivated less millet, 
relative to Mohamed Ali. He needed both to cling on to his work both in radio repair 
and as a porter while producing agricultural crops from his family farm. Thus he 
recruited sharaka labourers to cultivate 10 makhamasat of the groundnuts crop, and 
assigned the household labour ( which he himself organizes and occasionally assists in 
weeding ) to the cultivation of 15 makhamasat of the millet crop. This gave him the 
freedom to repair radios for the village. But realizing the limited income to be drawn 
form radio repair due to the limited number of radio owners in the village, he used his 
cart (drawn by a horse) to port water to the neighbouring villages as well as for 
obtaining wood from the nearby forest. This augments the meagre income generated 
from agriculture, and represented, to him, the optimum combination of household 
labour, sharaka and off-fann employment.
In Dirra village Idris Haroun, a forty five year old farmer heads a family of 12 
members most of whom were economically dependent and below the economically 
active age. His farm cannot be adequately cultivated by household labour since this 
would imply subsistence production falling short of satisfying household needs over 
the summer period. The total amount of loan of LS 1700 which he received from the 
ENSAP project in 1990 was inadequate to finance hired labour as well as the other 
agricultural inputs which had to be paid for in cash. He had no other job in the village 
to provide for the extra household needs, but he owned 25 goats, one cow and three 
donkeys. To fill the financial gap resulting from the deficiency of the project loans he 
was able to sell some of his goats and engage in a sharaka for the cultivation of 25 
makhamasat of groundnuts. The rest of the household members provided the labour 
required to cultivate 5 makhamasat of millet for household consumption. The main
134
reason for his engagement in sharaka was an inherent demographic imbalance (cf, 
Siddle and Swindell, 1990; Robertson, 1987), due to the large number of the dependent 
children in the household.
Zaki Hamdan (61 year old polygynist) who headed two separate families (each in its 
own household) with a total of 13 members, received a loan of LS 3500 from 
ENSAP project and this was thought to be adequate to finance his agricultural 
operations in the 1990 season. He was also able to mobilize household labour (which 
was reasonably sufficient since most members were economically active) for the 
cultivation of the 25 makhamasat of the millet crop. This ensures his household 
subsistence, but not his cash requirements since he needed to expand the capital he 
allocated to working as a sababa (middleman). So he recruited sharaka labourers for the 
cultivation of 15 makhamasat of the groundnuts crop and continued his work as a 
sababa. He purchased millet, groundnuts, okra, sheep and goats from the village 
during the harvesting period at low prices and sold them at lucrative prices in the 
neighbouring villages. However, despite the fact that this ensured him both 
subsistence and part of his cash requirements he was critical of the sharaka 
arrangement. His criticism was based on the fact that in the hired labour system 
agricultural income is conferred solely on the farmer rather than being shared by the 
farmer and the labourers.
The general view concerning the sharaka cases observed in the selected project villages 
is that they occuned mostly among the farmers who had another source of income to 
augment the income from agricultural production. Thus, being a sababa. or owning 
animals enabled these farmers to finance the sharaka labourers and the agricultural 
inputs. This is specially important during the summer period which is a period of peak
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demand for cash money. It is the ability of these land owners to finance part of the 
Dinka's subsistence needs which enabled them to recruit the sharaka labourers. A poor 
land owner is financially handicapped to support additional labourers along with his 
own household members. It was also observed that the farmers who engaged in 
sharaka owned relatively large makhamasat of land biit could not adequately expand 
the area cultivated due to the environmental hazards of low rainfall and agricultural 
pest infestations.In the project villages maximum landholdings ranged from 35 
makhamasat in Dirra and Murabaat (reported for Adam Hussein (60 years old) and 
Abdel Salaam El Neil, respectively, to 45 makhamasat in Seranbi reported for 
Mohamed Ali Bullck(cited above), and to a maximum of 100 makhamasat in Dirra 
reported for Ahmed El Sweid (this famier is characteristically rich in terms of animal 
ownership and is arguably a large-scale as opposed to smallholder farmer).These 
individuals certainly engaged in sharaka.
One important opportunity provided by the sharaka for the Dinka, and which the Dinka 
well exploit to their advantage relates to iarura. Jarura is an interest-free cash 
withdrawl the Dinka make from their future crop revenue during the pre-harvesting 
period (e.g.for spending on consumption). This doubly benefits the labourer. The 
reason is that if the labourer were to approach the money lender for borrowing this 
would imply a considerable reduction in the total income to be realized upon the sale of 
the harvested crop.The reduction is accounted for by the interest on the total money 
borrowed.Thus iarura saves the labourer this certain cost of borrowing from external 
sources.
In the second place iarura implied that the land owner subsidizes the labourers over the 
preharvesting period, during which time the purchasing power of the money lent to the
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labourer was relatively higher than that during the post-harvesting period. The fact to 
be established is that the food prices during the pre-harvesting period were lower than 
the food prices during the post-harvesting prices due to national inflationary pressure 
(roughly estimated at LS 250% In 1990). Since the land owner received his money 
back relatively later, this amount in real terms, does not represent the actual amount of 
money lent to the labourers. An amount of LS 25 lent to the labourer on which he 
subsisted for one day in September 1990 automatically rose to LS 40 if he was to 
subsist on the same food in December when the groundnuts crop is marketed.
Given these circumstances under which the sharaka system functioned it would be 
theoretically ill-advised to impute to it the Marxist notion of "land owners’ exploitation 
of their tenants". Bhaduri offered a theory in which he argued that the concurrence of 
a money lender and land owner in one person is so advantageous to the land owner that 
he will work to impede any likely external innovation which might lead to free the 
tenant from borrowing ( see Bhaduri, 1973 ). The Marxist idea focuses on the lucrative 
income which the land owner, it is supposed, reaps through the high rate of interest on 
the money borrowed by the tenant. If innovation were introduced, Bhaduri posits, the 
additional income realised from the improved productivity would enable the tenant to 
clear his debt (which traditionally binds the tenant to the land owner) whereupon the 
land owner will no longer be able to reap sizeable profits through lending to his tenant. 
But since the land owner in our sharaka system works not only to ensure 'free 
subsistence' for the Dinka labourers before the start of the agricultural operations 
proper, but also 'subsidizes' the Dinka labour over the pre-harvesting season through 
iarura. it is likely in this system, that exploitation is largely reversed to the disadvantage 
of the land owner. This is well realized by the land owners themselves who came to 
argue (supporting their claim with concrete figures) that their share from the partnership 
system is , in fact, less than one third rather than being half of the sales income.
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The village communities targeted by ENSAP project were touted as being the most 
suitable for the cultivation of cash and food crops, relative to the rest of the villages 
lying within the confines of the district rural councils. The cultivation of the food crops 
in this area contributed to the villages' self-sufficiency and had put them in an 
advantageous position to absorb the whims of the past droughts of the 1970's and 
1984/85. But the recent drought season of 1990/91 adversely affected every one of the 
village communities targeted by the project due to the meagre amount of rainfall. 
According to Hill who observed similar declining yields of the millet crop among the 
Hausa the production of these crops "required a well distributed rainfall with an 
absence of prolonged droughts..." (Hill, 1982:161). Figures showing this low yields 
of millet and sorghum crops are shown in chapter 5. Suffice it be mentioned here that 
in addition to the shortage of and the erratic distribution of rainfall and crop infestation 
are also responsible for the low yields of the food crops. Poor families are mostly 
affected by this low yield and for this reason they have borne the partial mobility of 
their household members outside the villages despite the fact that they received ENSAP 
loans. The poor cash income obtained from agriculture hardly sufficed for meeting the 
household's cash needs during the off-farm season and the poor households had to 
seek other opportunities to make ends meet until the onfall of the next agricultural 
season. The table below shows the major sources of household income in 1990 for the 
selected project villages (on average).
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Table (14): Average Household Income (LS) By Source In The Project Villages, 1990 
Source of income Total income (LS)
crops 1400
livestock 500
off-farm employment 800
total 2700
Source: fieldwork.
If this is compared with the average family expenditure on the fann (which according 
to my estimates was approximately LS 1050, in 1989) then it follows that the 
household is left with only a meagre cash income on which to rely from December (the 
end of the agricultural operations) to May in the next agricultural season.
The relatively better-off farmers decreased their dependence on seasonal migration 
by their ability to sell part of their animal herds (goats and sheep) to bridge the financial 
deficits brought about by the low yields of the food crops.We have seen above, in 
connection with the sharaka. how some of the land owners combined petty-trade as 
sababa as well as relying on theii* herds to cope with their financial deficits.
Thus, despite being generally referred to as smallholders by the project agency these 
famiers vary in their income sources (if we subtract animal sales from the table above it
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appears that the poor farmers, who do not own animals, have yet a smaller amount of 
income). The common thing about these farmers, however, is that all of them put into 
cultivation, or normally stated that they had put into cultivation, only small proportions 
of the total landholdings. Among other reasons, this is due to the fact that farmers tend 
to present figures which tally with figures stated in the eligibilty criteria of the 
project.The villages in 1990 which were economically advantaged by being able to sell 
part of their animal herds to cope with the low millet productivity included El Halfaya, 
Dirra and Murabaat. The proportion of household members which took to seasonal 
employment is relatively lower in these villages than it is in the remainder of the project 
villages. Abu Geid was particularly affected by the low yields in the food crops which 
prompted a large number of its able-bodied members to migrate to the bahar (meaning 
the prosperous towns bordering the Nile). However, the poor in the other villages 
which seemed better equipped to cope with the food deficit, also suffered equally with 
the poor in Abu Geid village. Thus Salim Hamad (40 years old), of Murabaat village, 
was too poor to provide for the subsistence of his household as a result of the crop 
failure. Neither did he find an alternative source of employment to augment the poor 
yields from his farm of only 10 makhamasat (4 makhamasat of millet crop and 6 
makhamasat of gioundnuts crop). Instead he relied on his brother who was relatively 
wealthy in terms of animal ownership. Through this borrowing from his brother he 
was able to survive the hard four months' period, from December 1990 to April 1991, 
the threshold of the new agricultural season. A smaller amount of income was 
generated during April from the collection and sale of wood, a task which was mainly 
undertaken by his wife. This brings us to the contribution of women in the household 
economy to which we turn.
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The women's major source of income is the sale of the iubraka crops grown in the 
vicinity of the house. Women often had a second type of iubraka field close by the 
village but not very unlike the main field operated by the males. The average size of 
the iubraka was 2.5 makhamasat. The income generated from the sale of the iubraka 
crops is spent on the purchase of utensils, food, spices, cloth, perfume, sugar, salt, 
sheep, water, and the educational expense of the children, as well as on social events 
(marriage of a relative, funerals etc.). The major crops sold are okra (dried and fresh) 
cowpea, cucumber (tibishk maize, watermelons, naiad (another variety of millet) and 
groundnuts.
Off-farm sources of income to women include locally made shamla (carpet made of 
animal wool), tabag (flat winnowing basket), iriiffa (basket), hababa (fan) and birish 
(mat, all made of dome tree leaves); and the sale of home-made foods such as zalabia 
(made of grain flour) and bread. However, these activities varied from one village to 
another and do not occur to the same degree in all of the project villages. While the 
average income earned from the combination of the iubraka production and handicraft 
was reported to reach a maximum of LS 1240 for Wad Fadol village (who intensively 
made shamla. birish. and baskets), in the other villages, such as Seranbi, and El 
Riteirit, it was at a minimum of LS 400 (in 1990 one shamla was sold for LSI240, 
costing LS 600 to make; a hababa realizes a net income of LS 1, and a basket a net 
income of LS 8). El Halfaya women, on the other hand, made use of their proximity to 
En Nahud town and in 1990 temporarily supplied items such as groundnuts, yughurts, 
butter (samin), dried okra, dried cowpea and cucumber, which were purchased by a 
group of sababa (middlewomen). The dependence of women on such towns as En 
Nahud had resulted in the development of a women's market there which brought
141
•Women's Sababa market, En Nahud, 1990.
suppliers from the neighbouring villages, and consumers from the main town.
The matmura (traditional undergr ound pit ) is used in almost all the pr oject villages for 
the storage of the millet crop. In the near past the matmura was constructed in the wadi 
(field), but recently it was moved to the village and located in the vicinity of the 
household. Often one may observe two matmuras in the same household which implies 
that the yield was in plenty. The matmura admits from 10 to 50 sacks of the millet 
crop. The crop is stored mainly for the provision of food surplus on which the 
household relied during the hungry months. The efficiency of this storage practice is 
supported by scientific research and the project did not interfere with it. The millet can 
keep well for up to three years without being affected by the crop storage pests which 
are widespread in the village communities. The pit is usually dug some metres down 
into the ground and the bottom is lined with the spikelets and auns of the heads of the 
millet crop after threshing and before grain loading. The sides are also lined as the pit is 
being filled. The matmura is touted by the project staff as being best suited to the local 
environment and as a safeguard against theft and fire.
Almost all the crops grown in the villages are severely attacked by crop-specific pests 
which ultimately result in low crop yields, if not damaging the entire crop. The pests 
attack the crops at certain stages of plant growth and feed on the plant.
The groundnuts crop is attacked by the microtemies (soil termites) at the collar of the
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Agricultural Coordinator examining the millet 
plant for pest infestation.
L o c u s t s  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  g u m  a r a b l e  t r e e s .
top roof, which causes wilting of the plants. At a later stage this pest also attacks the 
maturing pods and lead to considerable loss in yields. A bug (Elasmolomus sordidus) 
which is locally referred to as um sufut feeds on the kernels when the plants are stalked 
to dry after harvesting the crop. This leads to low oil content. The germinating seeds 
and seedlings are also attacked by a local surfa tmillipedesl with the result that plants 
only appear in relatively low numbers. Grasshoppers also attack the crop at this stage 
and contribute to crop loss.
The millet crop is attacked by the stem borers (Chiloparcellus and Sesamia cretical at 
the seedling stage, which causes dead heart to the millet crop and a low plant 
population per unit area. The millet head worm , locally known as nafasha. is the most 
damaging pest in the area. Sari el leil (local locust species) occasionally visits the millet 
fields and feeds on the crop in the milky stage,shortly before harvesting, resulting in 
severe crop loss. This pest equally affects the sorghum crop.
The sesame crop is mostly affected by the seed bug (see above) while the crop is left to 
dry at the harvesting stage, and is also attacked by grasshoppers which attack foliage.
The watermelon crop is attacked by the watermelon beetle, known as himavri, which 
attacks the seedling leaves; and the melon bug known as um bagga (Asmpongopus 
Viduatus) inflicts additional damage to the leaves.
In the iubraka gardens the okra crop is attacked by grasshoppers which result in low 
quantities of leaves, and the zurnakha (Mvlabris Ligatal feeds on the flowers and
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results in crop loss. Um kassara is a locally known disease caused by termites which 
attack the roots of the okra plant and lead to wilting.
Sorghum is attacked by grasshoppers, and by the pests which attack the millet crop.
The cowpea is mainly attacked by grasshoppers and the blister beetle. Hashab (gum 
Arabic trees) on the other hand, is attacked by the locust species which feed on the 
leaves leading to low crop yields.
All these agricultural pests result in additional expenses being born by the smallholder 
producer for the purchase of pest control chemicals, and this leads to increased 
production costs. The danger which these pests posed to the fanners in the project area 
is second only to the hazards of droughts and rainfall shortages.
Now to recapitulate and conclude. We have shown at the begining of the chapter that 
the majority of the ENSAP project villages were (in the pre-scheme period) passing 
thi'ough the second stage of agricultural transition. In this transitional stage there occurs 
a slight weakening in the farm-household relationship, with the development of an 
orientation to purchase part of the agricultural tools and inputs from the market. Here, 
also, credit, extension and marketing become more important. We have also shown 
how the simplicity of the agricultural techniques and the absence of institutions (such as 
research, extension, credit and marketing ) to back farmers has restricted these villages 
from passing through the third ( commercial and advanced ) stage of agricultural 
transition. After thus articulating the pre-existing farming system we proceeded to 
delineate the major agricultural and economic patterns of the villages relating to this
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transfoimation.
An outstanding feature of the agricultural system is the distinction between 'large- 
scale/progressive' (those who cultivate an average land area of up to 60 makhamasatl 
and 'smallholder/transitional' farmers (cultivating an average land area of 28 
makhamasat 1 This distinction points to the emerging trends of economic aspirations in 
Ghubeish communities affected by the project. We have thus shown that 
'smallholder/transitional' farmers constitute the majority of farmers (roughly over 95 
%). 'Large-scale/progressive' farmers held the bulk of capital in the project area, 
especially animtil wealth (sheep, cows, camels and goats ).
These characteristics of 'large-scale/progressives', among others, indicate the fact that 
rich farmers have the advantage over smallholders of being strategically placed to make 
use of the limited supply of hired labour during the peak weeding season. Having 
plenty of cash at their disposal, large-scale/progressives' are better placed to recruit 
adequate labourers during the weeding period (in this period smallholder farmers 
experience deep shortages in cash income). Another important point which emerges 
from our distinction between 'large-scale progressives' and 'smallholder/transitional' 
farmers relates to the agricultural decision-making processes. We have shown how a 
decision made by one class of farmers unavoidably affects the other. For example, we 
have shown that decisions made by a smallholder during the course of the activity (such 
as the sudden withdrawal from hiring out one's labour), can also adversely affect a 
'large-scale/progressive' farmer concerning the recruitment of labour. This may result 
in having less amount of land weeded (i.e. below the planned target, and consequently 
low income). Decisions made by progressive farmers also may adversely affect and/or 
ellicit a response from, a smallholder farmer. A good example is a case in which
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progressive farmers opt to raise the wage rate to attract more hired labourers to do the 
weeding operation. Being unable to compete with rich farmers in the recruitment of 
hited labour ( due to the high wage rate ), a smallholder faimer would need to decide on 
summoning a nafir. engage in sharaka. or hire out his labour. Another possible effect 
could also be the activation of a persistent seasonal migration among smallholder 
farmers. While a smallholder's income from hiring out his labour on this process may 
increase, there is also the adverse effect of having the supply of household labour in 
one's own farm significantly reduced (and this could lead to the weeding of only a 
smaller part of the household farm , which means less production and income).
In addition we have pointed to the fact that some smallholder farmers started to 
'emulate' large-scale farmers by engaging in sharaka with immigrant labourers (sharaka 
has been introduced by rich farmers). Farmers believed that sharaka results in 
spreading the risk due to loss or low returns, to both parts of the partnership. This held 
despite their acknowledgement that sharaka confers only a smaller share from the gross 
revenue. We have shown that, in fact, the sharaka works mostly to the advantage of 
the labourer. Thus I have argued in favour of an alternative hii'ed labour system as this 
is most conducive to the project's goal of "significantly increasing the incomes of 
smallholder farmers". Increasing farmers income could, consequently, help these 
farmer eradicate the problems inhering in the traditional farming system by dealing 
promptly with the shortage of agricultural inputs such as seeds, chemicals (to combat 
farm pests), and labour (both off-farm and hired labour).
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PART TWO
The Project
In this chapter we move to deal with the ENSAP project itself (as mentioned before, 
ENSAP stands for En Nahud Smallholder Agricultural Project). We touch paiticulaiiy 
on major issues related to the implementation of its credit and the extension 
components as well as the various innovations the project introduced into the 
traditional smallholder sector of the Ghubeish communities currently participating 
with the project. The project is located in En Nahud district of northern Kordofan 
province and was planned to cover two rural councils, viz. En Nahud and 
Ghubeish. However, the project initially concentrated its operations in Ghubeish 
rural council for the area is well known for its better soil fertility which is 
appropriate for the production of the major cash crop, groundnuts, sponsored by 
the project. Food crops were attributed some importance in the project, and the 
women were involved in a food and cash crops production programme to account 
for household's needs beyond basic provisioning.
Ghubeish rural council covers an area of 13500 square kilometres and is situated 
in the south-western part of En Nahud district of northern Kordofan, The area is 
located between latitudes I T 45' and 12” 38’ north and longitudes 28” 4 5 'and 28' 
15 east. The area lies in the savannah vegetation zone having a generally sandy 
soil topography with rich vegetation in the southern part and gradually moving 
to poorer soil fertility in the north. The further northern parts are lai'gely semi- 
ai'id, experiencing poor rainfall. Species of acacia trees are widespread in the 
central and southern parts which provide for a rich vegetation belt, in contrast to
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the soil erosion and desert encroachment in the further northern paits. Rainfall 
ranges between 250 and 550 mm. per annum.
The population of Ghubeish rural council was estimated in the 1988 municipal 
council's census at approximately 92 159 persons and is currently estimated to 
have arisen to 110000 of whom 90% are villagers and the remainder live in 
Ghubeish town.
There are about 140 officially recognized (administrative) villages comprising Ghubeish 
rural.council. The previous population census of 1983 had estimated Ghubeish 
population at 76649 persons. With a 20% increase from the 1983 census, the 
present-day population of Ghubeish rural council may be characterized as having a 
fast population growth.- inspite of being the most populous of the district rural 
councils, relative to the rest of the rural councils making up En Nahud district. 
However, Ghubeish mral council displays the least population growth The table 
below shows the percentage increases in population for the various councils of 
En Nahud district.
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Table (15) Populations Of The Rural Councils Of En Nahud District (1983-1988 
censuses)
Council
Ghubeish
Abu Zabad
Khwei
Wad Banda
1983 census 1988 census increase % increase
Odaya
79649
56815
39742
61204
56149
Sug'al Jamal 36719
En Nahud 64552
En N ahud town 61534
Total 452776
92159
88055
68922
97961
92592
44430
93412
80732
658263
15510 20
31240 56
29180 73
36757 60
36443 64
7771 21
28460 47
19196 31
204487 45
Source: District council, En Nahud, 1990.
4.2 ENSAP Project:
ENSAP is a development project implemented in En Nahud rural council, 1988/89 
through to 1993, with its final goal (as per document) "to affirm and reinforce 
traditional small scale agriculture as a viable and profitable livelihood in at least 
50 villages of En Nahud district, through the establishment of a self-sustained 
credit/extension programme appropriate for the needs of farmers cultivating under 
fifteen hectares". It is considered as a 'pilot/experimental' project since (by way of
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being the first of its kind in Ghubeish communities) it is assumed to spearhead the 
process of development in the ai*ea.
Two governmental (national) organizations and one NGO are involved in the 
project's design and implementation. The two governmental organizations are 
represented by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) and the Extension 
Administiation of the Ministiy of Agriculture (MOA). The NGO is represented by 
CARE/SUDAN (an international charity, see later details ). Each of the counteiparts 
is assigned specific tasks towards the achievement of the final project goals.
The ABS is expected to sustain, on its own, the provision of credit to the project 
beneficiaries once the project phase is over, in 1993. In the context of the project 
itself, it was assigned the following obligations:
a) The ABS is responsible for the secondment of three trained staff (agricultural 
Inspector, accountant and credit officer).
b) ABS coordinates the delivery of inputs, such as improved seed varieties, 
pesticides, fertilizers and animal traction implements approved by the Steering 
Committee of ENSAP.
c) ABS coordinates the project location, strategy development and training 
provided by ENSAP with similar components of projects located elsewhere in 
Kordofan in consultation with the chairman of the Steering Committee of 
ENSAP.
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d) ABS prepares all steps and procedures for phasing in its responsibility for the 
project operations within the fifth year of the project.
e) Participation in the mid-term and final evaluations of the project.
f) Chairmanship of the project Steering Committee, as described in the project 
proposal ; and
g) To manage and sustain project operations from the fifth year, once the phase of 
project implementation is completed (see above).
The Ministiy of Agriculture (MOA) is represented by its Agricultural Extension unit. 
The obligation of the Agricultural extension unit is the secondment of agricultural staff, 
and coordination of its activities with the agency.
The obligations of the NGO (CARE/SUDAN) were specified as follows:
a) Provision of the necessary funds, vehicles, materials and equipment in a timely 
manner.
b)The recruitment of, and the provision of salaries and benefits for, the Team 
Leader (TL) and Extension Adviser (EA) and the Sudanese staff hired by CARE.
c) The provision of any necessary field allowances and per diems.
d) The selection of, and payment to, Sudanese or expatriate consultants; and
e) Training of the ABS staff assigned to the project, through an in-service training 
programme, thi'ough providing internal training opportunities,or through short training 
courses, conferences and workshops outside the Sudan in consultation with, and 
after the approval of, the ABS management.
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Accordingly, the three counterparts provided the following staff, which 
constituted ENSAP's organisational stmcture:
ABS
i) one part-time, 
branch manager, 
ii) one agricultural, 
inspector.
MOA CARE/SUDAN
i) one project manager based at i) one team leader.
El Obeid. ii) one extension adviser.
ii) one extension coordinator. iii) one community development
officer.
iii) one credit officer. iii) one jubraka extensionist iv) one jubraka extension]st.
in) one loan accountant iv) one senior extensionist.
v) five agricultural field extensionists (AFE's).
The project is administered at the Board of Directors level by five members of the 
ENSAP Steering Committee, representing the MOA, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, the ABS, the Regional Ministry of Agriculture and 
CARE/SUDAN. The Steering Committee, of ENSAP is responsible for a) 
authorizing major programmatic changes; b)establishing the policies of ENSAP; 
and c) coordination between the three counterparts involved in the implementation 
process.
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At the regional level, ENSAP activities are coordinated by the MOA's regional 
manager of agriculture based in the regional capital El Obeid, who is a part-time 
manager. From the El Obeid base the project manager is responsible for i) 
providing insight on project implementation ; ii) representing the interests of the 
seconded staff; iii) facilitating communication between the regional government of 
Kordofan and related government departments; iv) organising ENSAP Steering 
Committee meetings; v) coordinating financial inputs from the project's contributors 
(see below ); and vi) political liaison with government organisations.
ENSAP's finance was provided by the Government of the Netherlands through 
CARE/SUDAN and with a smaller share from the government of Sudan. The 
contributions of the two counteiparts are, $ 2,837,996 from the Government of the 
Netherlands and $ 35,000 from the government of Sudan (totalling $ 2,872,996). 
The Government of the Netherland's contribution to the project's budget includes the 
following items for the full project life time of five years, from February 1988 
to Januaiy 1993:
Vehicles and maintenance $ 250,000
Equipment, supplies and services 152,145
Personnel salaries 1,026,351
Administrative costs 1,217,000
Miscellaneous 24,000
Total 2,837,996
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A considerable part of the above budget (approximately 1.2 million dollars) is 
devoted to credit services (loans to faimers, administration of loans etc.).
The project has clearly stated goals which are expected to be achieved within the 
limited period of implementation of five years. These goals are firstly, to establish a 
self-sustaining agricultural credit system that is appropriate to the needs of farmers 
cultivating less than fifteen hectares and women farmers cultivating jubraka 
gardens. Secondly, to increase, significantly, the incomes of traditional farmers by 
improving their agricultural productivity.
These two goals were meant to be achieved thiough a set of intermediate project 
goals. These intermediate goals include the following:
a) to increase the average annual area cultivated by 5000 faim families by 25% 
by 1993. Labour and other agricultural inputs will be increased proportionately.
b) to increase the average per hectare crop yields of the major crops (groundnuts, 
millet, gum arable and watermelons ) by 10% by 1993 for the 5000 fai*m families.
c) to decrease the average farm-gate costs of cultivation per unit output by 30% 
for 5000 farm families by 1993.
d) to enable 5000 women to establish and maintain seed stocks for household 
vegetable gardens by 1993.
e) to institutionalize within the ABS branch of En Nahud a proven system for 
providing credit (as an alternative to shell) to smallholders by 1993.
154
Taking into account its ambitions on behalf of 5000 farm families ENSAP's project 
design planned that 50 villages in the area should be covered, according to the 
following phased activities:
Operation Year One, 1988: To select and provide extension (advice, training,
agricultural inputs) and loans for 20 farmers from each of 5 villages to be served 
by the project for 1988 season, making a total of 100 farmers. Concurrently, 20 
women farmers in each of these villages to be selected and provided with 
extension and in-kind loans to grow jubraka crops, making a total of 100 
women.
Operation Year Two, 1989: To select an additional 15 villages for participation, 
targeting 600 and men and women faimers to receive extension and credit services.
Operation Year Three, 1990: An additional 15 villages to be selected, and all 
villages now in the scheme introduced to animal traction implements if judged 
feasible.
Operation Year Four, 1991: additional 15 villages to be selected, now making a 
total of 50 villages, each having approximately 80 men and 80 women 
beneficiaries.
Additionally, for the purpose of evaluating the project impact some further villages 
were to be selected as controls. As the project unfolds their 'undeveloped' agricultural 
performance is then compared with that of the participating villages (PV's). These
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control villages (CV's) were expected to be fully up-graded to participation in 
the subsequent season.Note, however, in the eventuality rather fewer control villages 
were incorporated in the scheme (see e.g. map No. 2 in the end pocket ).
4.6 ENSAP's
The candidate villages and farmers were required to meet the specific eligibility 
criteria of the project before being selected for participation. Immediately after 
selection for participation in the project, farmers are asked to form their village 
committees (whose membership is represented by the village sheikh, as chairman, and 
a group of guarantors). The eligibility criteria which the village should meet are 
defined as follows:
a) the village should have a good reputation. This is established by the project 
survey teams which interview the village sheikhs, shartai (ie. boss for the sheikhs, 
see chapter 8 ), district municipal council officers and the tribal nazir ( ie the boss for
the tribe) concerning village history, and the village's internal and external
relationships.
b) willingness to participate. This is ensured by first introducing the project to the 
villages thimigh a description of the project goals, and then leaving the initiative of 
paiticipation to the village thiough requiring a written application subject to testing 
against other eligibility criteria.
c) the village should have at least ten years of existence.
d) the village should have no internal leadership conflicts.
e) the village should have no external conflicts with neighbouring villages.
f) the village should not have security problems.
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Individual applicant farmers, however, were also required to meet ENSAP's 
farmer selection criteria. These eligibility criteria for a faimer's paiticipation include;
a) the farmer must be the head of the household (note that in the case of joint- 
extended family households each family 'component' is eligible for participation if it 
owns a plot of land),
b) he should be a land owner who enjoys a good reputation,
c) the applicant should occupy himself predominantly in a farming within the village,
d) the applicant must have been practicing farming for the past four years in the 
village,
e) the applicant should be recommended by the sheikh, and
f) the farmer must be guaranteed by a member of the village committee, formed 
by ENSAP, to ensure the repayment of the loans.
Loan guarantors, it should be noted, were not meant to repay the loans on behalf of 
a defaulted farmer. Rather a guarantor is assumed to present defaulted farmers to 
the district court for prosecution. ENSAP distinguishes between willful defaulters 
and those who defaulted for reason beyond their control such as drought and 
crop failure (i.e an arrangement will be made for rescheduling loan repayment for 
non-willful defaulters, whilst willful defaulters are prosecuted).
The main emphasis of ENSAP project from its initial conception as an idea was 
to be a test-bed for innovative ideas in the provision of agricultural credit to 
smallholder farmers (Vincent, 1990:1), the resulting system of which should be taken 
over by the ABS and institutionalized. Thus, the project had developed well defined
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policies for loan disbursement and a specific extension methodology. The fonnation 
of project-related local groups has been the main pre-requisite for the delivery of the 
project loans and services . Thus ENSAP project staffs basic step after the selection 
of the villages for participation has been the formation of the jamaa (sub-groups of 
farmers, each consisting of around ten persons), the committee of dum m an 
(guarantors, sin. dam in: each damin is responsible for a single jamaa) and the 
'association' or cooperative.These three main institutions were established to 
contribute to the project's goal of ensuring loan repaying through 'peer pressure' by 
the jamaa members. Note that iamaa committees give rise to the so-called "jamaa 
system".
The thrust of ENSAP's goal of 'sustainability' was the the formation of local 
organizations which ,by 1993, could effectively takeover the project activities with 
additional technical assistance from the project management. The jamaa system was a 
genuine step towards that end.From its inception the ENSAP project has been 
successful in understanding (through village surveys) the social , economic and, 
partly, the cultural background of the project site. Village surveys enabled the project 
staff to come to grips with the villagers' interests and felt needs and their indigenous 
institutions of group action and cooperation. In addition village surveys demonstrated 
that the villagers had not only known about the importance of group dynamics but 
had also already formed village institutions locally referred to as lijan ( lit. committees; 
sing, lajna ) to cope with the specific problems that affect village development. Thus, 
the majority of the project villages had a pre-existing mosque committee, school 
committee, water yard committee, grazing land and grain mill committees. These were 
democratically elected by the community members in the so-called ijtimaa (meeting) 
that brings all the village members together.
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Based on this understanding of the traditional institutions representing group action, 
ENSAP project has made the jamaa system central to its lending system. The 
advantages dumman committees were assumed to have in the project relate to the fact 
that a) committees do not conflict with local culture (which is very inimical to 
socialist forms of institutions), nor are they imposed from outside; b) committees 
formed at the village level are symbolic of popular participation and democracy; c) 
committees help initiate local self-reliance; d) committees give prestige to the work; e) 
committees give continuity to the work; and more importantly, f)committees involve 
local traditional powerholders (the village sheikhs) which obviate conflicts which 
would likely have been posed if these traditional powerholders had been kept outside 
the project's local administration.
The main features of the traditional village committees are that they are 
organizationally simple, composed of local people, and are not integrated into the 
external governmental or non-governmental bodies which would usually involve 
coordinated efforts and a considerable commitment of labour. But the traditional 
committees, being too often handicapped by financial constraints, were short-lived 
or functioned on only a short term basis. The new village committees formed by 
ENSAP, on the other hand, were required to be self-sustaining and well coordinated 
over a long period of time. Additional tasks expected of the new committees were 
pointed out by a group of committee members who told me: " today we are involved in 
complicated 'programmatic' and 'planning' undertakings which means that we should 
have more training in book-keeping and recording" (from Murabaat village, 1990).
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ENSAP's credit component is devised to work closely with two types of formal group 
organisation which function in place of providing loans services directly to individual 
farmers. This has been pai’tly to comply with ABS regulations and pre-conditions 
for loan delivery which stipulate that the ABS disburses loans to cooperatives or 
similar organizations, in contrast to individuals. Here ENSAP advocates the formation 
of either cooperatives or 'associations'. In the formation of cooperatives organized by 
the ABS staff the Cooperative Department (of the Sudan government) would detail its 
representatives to attend the meeting. As a necessary condition the Cooperative 
Department stipulates that membership should at least be fifty if the village is to be 
eligible for a cooperative society and thus receive facilities such as subsidized services. 
Associations , on the other hand do not have to satisfy this membership requirement 
and could form with a minimum of membership. The following aie the differences 
between cooperatives and associations:
Cooperatives Associations
i.Formation should be accomplished i.Formation solely accomplished by ENSAP agents 
attendance of the delegates of the C.D.
ii.Membership not less than fifty ii.Membership specified by the group itself.
iii.Should be registered with the C.D. iii. Not registered with the C.D.
iv. Assigned shaie of LS 20 per member iv has no shaie capital in the restricted sense
v.Liable to expand into other purposes v.May not be liable to expand into other purposes.
The distribution of the two institutions among the project's PVs shows a marked 
tendency for the farmers to prefer the formation of associations, as opposed to 
cooperatives (see below). Cooperatives are clearly more formalized and 
organisationally complicated than the association. When ENSAP teams approach the 
villages for group formation the farmers are given the option to choose from these
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two basic forms. 'Associations' have been touted by the project as an innovation 
that suits project communities and is appropriate to their needs and capabilities. It 
does not impose any financial burdens on local people (members do not have to buy 
shares), hence does not limit membership participation. In the case of the ENSAP 
project, however, there is no clearl evidence to say whether the 'association' is better 
than the cooperative or vice versa.Experience of both organizational forms with the 
project lends support to this fact.Thus, for instance, while the cooperative in UM 
Zaggaya village was unable to meet the 80% level of loan repayment specified by 
the credit staff, the 'association' of Dirra was able to repay more than 80% of its 
members' loans in 1989 season. It is the ease with which the 'associations' are 
formed that has partly resulted in a majority of the villages siding with 'associations' 
in preference to cooperatives. This is shown in the table below.
Table ( 16 ): Distribution Of Associations And Cooperatives Among The PVs 
Village Association Cooperative Yeai'
El Riteirit + 1988
Widaa + 1988
WadPadol " 1988
Sabi " 1989
Ghabash Hammad " 1989
Ibeid " 1989
El Halfaya " '89
Seranbi " '89
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Rasheed 
Dirra 
Balila 
Murabaat 
Um Zaggaya 
Migeilima 
Barnawi 
Wad Mitgil 
Wad Gassim 
Abu Geid 
Um Sidair 
Kijeira 
Wad Dinga
" control village 
" control village
+
+
N.a
N.a
'89
'89
'89
'89
'89
'89
'89
'89
'89
'90
'90
'90
'90
Thus, out of a total of fifteen villages participating in the ENSAP by the 1989/90 
season a total of nine opted for associations and six for cooperatives.
Upon selection as being eligible for participation in the project the village farmers 
concerned are required to select their own officers. The chairmanship of the 
cooperative/'association' and the dumman committee is served by the village sheikh 
when judged eligible by the project staff. The committee consists of elected leaders 
who are to act as the dumman ( guarantors) for the other members of the group. A
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damin is usually responsible for presenting a defaulted farmer for prosecution, as we 
mentioned earlier, rather than repaying his loans on behalf. Each group of, 
theoretically, up to ten farmers has a damin. The dumman themselves are guaranteed by 
the sheikh who is the damin el dummanC the guaiantor of the guarantors). The 
committee then, is formed from these dumman. and includes a chairman, secretary, 
deputy secretary and treasurer. In order to guarantee the repayment of the loans the 
project gets the sheikh ( who has no damin) to swear on the quran. The sheikh, 
acting as the damin el dumman. should ensure that membership in the 
'association'/cooperative should meet the eligibility criteria of the project. If a farmer 
fails to get his personal damin he will be refused to participate in the project.
Prior to the disbursement of loans a tripartite agreement (the committee, guarantor and 
the farmer ) for each Jamaa should be signed and witnessed by ENSAP; this is 
known as the jamaa agreement. This specifies the channels for loan disbursement and 
repayment, ensures access to a defaulted farmers' crop which is considered as 
collateral for the project loans and indicates the consequences (legal or otherwise) of 
loan default. Before the disbursement of loans a contract is signed in which the loan 
term, purpose, charges, security and consequences are stated. It was generally 
observed that for a significant number of jamaas of the ENSAP project membership 
draws on familial, social and neighbourhood ties. For a large number of cases the 
members of the jamaa come from the same areet. section of the village or village 
quarter.
The project committees at the village level were intensively involved in the decision­
making processes relating to project loans, through systematic planning and 
consultation with the project credit staff. These committee members were able to 
provide the initial estimates of loans demanded by the PFs (participating farmers)
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and to recommend the specific amounts, which would be finally approved by the 
project staff. Being in close contact with their fellow villagers, these committee 
members were well equipped (better than outsiders) to provide accurate and 
reasonable estimates of the loans which the project should provide for the individual 
farmers. Empowered with training in book-keeping methods these village committees 
seemed to escape the criticism often directed at traditional group institutions which 
come to play their tiaditional functions in connection with rural development. Thus 
Kloppenburg (1983:314) argues in this respect that "traditional forms of group 
action alone have often proven inadequate in providing a framework around which 
new forms of group activities appropriate to the demands of the development 
situation could be structured".
According to ENSAP's mission statement the principal beneficiaries of the project 
are smallholder farmers cultivating less than fifteen hectares (approximately 26 
makhamas). But ENSAP's credit system is meant to be sustainable within the ABS 
once the project phase is over. For this reason ENSAP had from its inception to 
account for both its own goals and also the requirements of ABS in terms of what is 
sustainable within the latter's system. Thus, the ABS was found already to be 
delivering loans to large-scale business. For this reason ENSAP adjusted its goal 
and incorporayed these ABS clients in its loan arrangements. Another reason for 
delivering loans to large farmers was the plain fear that these groups could 
thwart the project effort if excluded from participation: being strongly placed as 
powerholders large faimers are well equipped to distort project goals to their own 
benefits.
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ENSAP advocates a participatory loan delivery system.The determination of loan 
size lies with the farmers themselves, provided that the amount requested by the 
individual farmer falls within the limits specified by the credit staff. "Since farmers 
and their peers know best their capacity to repay, this flexibility allows 
individual circumstances to be taken into account in the determination of loan 
size" (ENSAP report, 1989:5).
ENSAP disburses two types of loans to smallholders. The first instalment, 
delivered in May and June, is the production loan meant to cover the costs of 
land prepaiation and planting. The second, planned to be disbursed in late 
August, is the consumption loan which was meant to replace the shell system, 
as the small farmer traditionally used to approach these money lenders at this 
period to provide for household consumption needs.The main purpose of the 
production loan is to assist the farmers' purchase of seeds and seed dressing not 
made available through ENSAP's extension unit. In addition it is meant to cover 
hired labour costs for the weeding operations. Farmers, however, use part of this 
production loan to cover household consumption needs on behalf of those 
household members who would traditionally absent themselves from the village to 
work as hired labourers. Movement of household members outside the village, in 
the past, resulted in reduced household labour being deployed in household farms 
and in turn a smaller makhamasat area being operated. Thus consumption loans at 
this time contribute to the stabilization of the household members in the village 
and to increasing farm productivity.
165
Two factors are taken into consideration when determining the limits to loan size. 
Firstly, the total amount of loan disbursed in the first instalment is determined by 
the total amount of land actually put into cultivation. Secondly, in the second 
instalment, the area cultivated, the quality of rainfall, the farm status and the 
household size are to be taken into account. Even so ENSAP has its own upper 
limit which was defined relative to the project mandate to develop services for 
smallholders. ENSAP's aim is to spread loan benefits to as many smallholder 
farmers as possible rather than ending up limiting the number of clients because of 
delivering relatively large loans to a few larger-scale farmers.
Each individual farmer gets his loan size estimated and approved by his damin 
(lit. guarantor) in the jamaa (group) and the amounts requested by the farmers 
should pass through these damins and group leaders before being submitted to 
ENSAP for approval. The ENSAP project then puts its own estimates which 
could be lower than the amount requested but not higher.
In the pre-ENSAP period, the ABS disbursed loans in three instalments.The first is 
for land preparation and planting which is the same as ENSAP's first instalment; 
the second is for weeding; and the third is for harvesting which is considered 
by farmers as tantamount to the consumption loan offered by ENSAP as most of 
the harvesting activities are carried by household labour. The justification for 
ENSAP's dropping ABS's second loan was that the administrative costs of this 
instalment would be too high to make loan delivery a viable enterprise. Moreover, 
the delivery of two instalments should not necessarily imply that the overall 
amount of loan per makhamas be smaller.
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The f aimers, however, attack ENSAP’s credit policy on the ground that provision 
of loans on the basis of makhamasat cultivated does not square with their- farm 
planning and decision-making processes. The disbursement of the production loans 
which are delayed until mid-May (to allow ample time for ENSAP teams to make 
accurate estimations of the number of makhamasat put into cultivation) would 
mean that the farmer had already made his production decisions which, since the 
loans could not be taken for granted, would be conservative ones. This will in turn 
result in a lesser amount of loan being received by an individual farmer. Had the 
credit teams disbursed the production loans around late March and early April, 
the farmers argue, their agricultural planning could have been much enhanced 
and a lai'ger amount of makhamasat put into cultivation. ENSAP's justification for 
the late delivery of the loans lies in the plain fear that loans be misused with 
the consequence of unavoidable loan default.
In 1988 a number of farmers were critical of ENSAP second loan (the 
consumption loan) which was limited by the project to a maximum of LS 75 per 
household member.Their view was that the amount set by that limit was gravely 
inadequate ( the agency disburses this loan pailicularly to allow faimers not to deal with 
sheil merchants). To account for the financial shortfall these farmers would resort 
to the traditional sheil lenders for the sale (in advance) of part of their farm crop 
during the preharvesting period. This is ironic since the project was originally 
aimed at the eradication of the exploitative sheil system. Consequently, the project 
readjusted its credit plans for the following season, 1989; a suggestion was made 
that the loan amount should be increased provided that the quality of the rainy 
season promised a good yield to the faimer. Thus the project teams would visit the 
project farms in July to evaluate the quality of the rainy season and the status of 
the farms. This procedure seems to be well received by the participant faimers.
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ENSAP also provides agricultural inputs such as aldrex-t, diazinon and propuxure
(pesticides) and improved seeds (Ugandi millet and Barbeton groundnuts) to 
farmers who voluntarily request it at a price determined by ENSAP. Rather than 
considering these inputs as in-kind loans ENSAP deducts the price of these 
inputs from the loans delivered in the form of production loans.
ENSAP deploys two forms of loan security. The first is the assured access to a 
defaulted farmer's produce to cover both the amount of loans delivered as well 
as the marketing costs of this produce incurred on the pai't of the project. This is 
clearly stated in the loan contiact and the jamaa agreement.
The second form of security is the 80%, 90% and 100% jamaa system. This 
system stipulates that to qualify for loans the in next season a) the membership of a 
cooperative/ 'association' should in sum, repay at least 80% of the total amount of 
the loans; b) The membership of a jamaa should in sum, repay at least 90% of the 
outstanding loans its members had received; and c) an individual farmer should repay 
the full 100% of his outstanding loans. The project, however, makes provisions 
for crop failure due to factors beyond the control of the farmer such as drought, 
in which case loans will be rescheduled to be repaid over the future period.
This 'jamaa system' is considered as an innovation by ENSAP project which' 
harnesses peer pressure on behalf of loan repayment. Failing to repay 90% of the 
loans will lead to the disqualification of the whole jamaa group; and failure to 
repay 80% of the loans by the association/cooperative will result in disqualifying
168
the whole village from participation in the project. For this reason the sheikhs and 
the dumman exert much of their influence ( both formally and informally) to 
ensure members’ repayment. Farmers who willfully default their loans run the risk 
of being taken to jail. Local farmers link prosecution notions of shame and 
dishonour. As has been observed by the project consultancy team of mid June 
1990 "the farmers felt that the shame of being put in jail would result in finding 
assets ( donkeys, goats etc. ) to pay what was owed. Confiscating a donkey could 
be extremely serious because this is how farmers carry the water they need" 
(mid-term evaluation report, 1990:10).
A few farmers object to loan rescheduling (see above), claiming that this reduces the 
amount of loan received in each subsequent season. The farmers have made their 
own recommendations that a thus partly defaulted member should be allowed to 
receive the full amount of loan for the current season while being requested to 
repay both the amount defaulted and that received this season by the end of the 
current season. This is justified on the ground that rescheduling otherwise means 
that the producer will have too little capital to invest in agriculture in the current 
season and would also lead to a higher probability of future default and a vicious 
circle of debt. To be allowed the full amount of the loan will, in contrast, lead to 
larger investment , larger returns and thus, higher probability of repayment. 
However, the farmers' recommendations have so far fallen on deaf eai's.
ENSAP loan repayment is due by the end of December and up to February of 
each subsequent year. While ENSAP encourages its farmers to reduce their loan 
charges by repaying earlier, it also allows the farmers plenty of time to repay,
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El Halfaya farmers receiving their loans, 1990
loan distribution in project villages.
allowing them to make the most of sales prices rising to incentive levels, provided 
that repayment is made within the duration specified by the project. ENSAP’s 
provisions toward the viability of its lending system is to charge 2% (in the 
second lending season raised to 2.5% and in the third to 3%) per month. The 
philosophy behind charging the interest rate on a monthly basis is to provide an 
incentive to those fanners who repay their loans eaiiy. But the experience shows 
that the farmers are not responsive to this incentive as the majority tend to wait 
until the prices go up in January and Februaiy.
Islam prohibits dealing with interest and the ideal, so far as the farmers of the 
project are concerned, would be to have an interest free credit system. However in 
its later stages ENSAP was partially able to get its farmers to believe that the 
loan charges were rather different from an interest rate in the proper sense and were 
meant to pay for certain costs - of administration and supervision (CAS), loan 
deliveiy, transportation, as well as the salaries of the credit staff.
For the interest of 'sustainability', ENSAP's long term objective is to gradually 
delegate the bookkeeping job to the committee officers (i.e the damins). The 
advantage of this approach is felt to be in its significant reduction of the 
transportation costs. In order for ENSAP to accomplish this goal the committee 
officers are trained in the business of keeping accurate repayment records, in loan 
monitoring and disbursement, and in the estimation of repayable loan size.
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ENSAP project is highly concerned about its PF's (participating farmers) 
marketing problems, which result in increased costs and lowered income returns 
to the farmers. Therefore, the project is currently planning to introduce an inventory 
loan policy for marketing PFs' crops at an incentive sales price. The policy had 
originated from ENSAP's recognition of the farmers' tendency to sell their crops 
at low prices, only for crop prices to rise dramatically later in the year with sizeable 
profits going to the merchants. The inventoiy loan policy calls the PFs to sell 
their harvested crop to the project at an initially reduced sales price( i.e slightly 
lower than the mling market price). When the prices later rise to perceptibly high 
rates then ENSAP will complete the purchase of the PFs' crops at this price, 
deducting a minimum percentage of this revenue to cover the project's supervision 
and storage costs. The ultimate benefit goes to the farmer thereby maximizing his 
income gains. As almost all the PFs of the project faced this marketing problem, 
this policy seemed to attract their interest with greater success.
4.9 The
The extension component of ENSAP project assumes the task of extending 
technical information and inputs to the project beneficiaries to assist with the 
realization of its goal of significantly increasing faim productivity, by 10%, for 5000 
farm families by 1993; concurrently it should assist 5000 women farmers to 
establish and maintain seed stocks for the jubraka (kitchen garden) plots by 1993.
As we have mentioneded earlier the intervention was meant as "a test-bed for 
innovative ideas in the provision of agricultural credit to smallholder farmers the 
resulting system of which the ABS could take over and institutionalize" (Vinscent,
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1990: Na ). Ultimately the extension innovation should be sustainabe within the 
ABS if it is to succeed in being continued on when CARE terminates its activities 
in 1993. Thus, from the inception the Agricultural Extension Administration of the 
MOA was involved in the ranning of the extension unit of the project with the 
insurance of this ’sustainability' in mind. This 'sustainability' was viewed in terms of 
the provision of services which are economically viable and practical (given the 
financial and technical constraints of the MOA and the Sudan government),in 
addition to being capable of reaching the farming communities both during and 
post the project life.
The theory behind ENSAP's AFE's extension plan is that the AFE's upon being 
placed in core villages (i.e central village amongst a cluster of villages), should spend 
their time among the village people, become acquainted with village culture, 
develop amicable social relations with the inhabitants and thereby stimulate the 
farmers' assessment and identification of their needs in response to ENSAP's 
innovative inputs. By so doing the AFE's were viewed as being able to gain the 
trust and confidence of the farmers.But this had resulted in considerable delay in 
the execution of the extension unit's planned activities since such rapport requires 
a relatively long period of time to establish. Moreover, the intensity of the tasks 
which the AFE's were required to accomplish often conflicted with the establishment 
of such a rapport with the village farmers. AFE's were placed in the core villages to 
carry on the following tasks:
a) they should be culturally adapted to work close to PF's (participating farmers) by 
living among them, hence enabling better understanding of their problems, 
concerns and needs.
b) they should provide technical assistance to faimers on the spot as they aiise.
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c) their placement enhances community participation in the project thi'ough daily 
contact between AFE's and faimers.
d) their monitoring and supervision of the demonstration fields ( ie. experimentation 
farms in core villages for demonstrating the soundness of the innovation; they are 
strategically placed as to be observed by all PFs) would be more intensive and 
vigorous by their timing close by these plots.
The placement of AFE's in core villages was also considered as an innovative step 
in that it squares with the goal of 'sustainability' since the donkey transport by 
which the AFE's tour the neighbouring villages implies low transportation costs 
which are absolutely manageable within the MOA once CARE hands over the project 
in 1993. The donkey transport was particularly recommended because of i) the low 
cost relative to other animals, ii)ease and low cost usage and upkeep and iii) the 
lower value and hence lower likelihood of theft.
The rest of the extension staff were office based and often launched team trips to the 
project villages for supervision, monitoring, evaluation, follow-up and reporting on 
project performance.
The extension service of ENSAP project was from the start beset with a number of 
constraints which limited its coverage capacity. One constraint was the 
inaccessibility of most of the PV's villages to the AFE's due to the limited 
distance a donkey can travel effectively. A good example was that in 1989 the 
small village cluster of EL Riteirit and Widaa' did not receive adequate extension 
services. The AFE who was based in El Riteirit found the four hour ride to
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Widaa' intimidating and was not able to provide services to that village (Project 
Report, 1990). Similarly, those villages closer to Ghubeish town received too little 
an extension advice in 1989 as the Senior AFE in charge of these villages was 
withdrawn to En Nahud town to assist in office work. Other villages such as EL 
Halfaya were entirely isolated from the rest of the cluster villages and were poorly 
covered by the Agricultural Coordinator from the base of En Nahud. Chronic fuel 
shortages also exacerbated the the lack of coverage problem (from the office base in 
En Nahud) thioughout 1989 towai’ds the mid of 1990.
ENSAP adopts a 'team work' principle to encourage a feeling of 'team spirit' 
among its staff to avoid the general problems of 'apathy' and 'low motivation’ 
that otherwise tend to chaiacterize government institutions' seconded employees and 
which result in low in their productivity. Moreover, the government seconded staff 
of the MOA were paid higher salaries compaied with the salaiies they got prior to 
joining the project. This had boosted staff morale and employee performance. But it 
also poses some future problems , relating to the sustainability within the MOA 
upon project 'phase-over' in 1993, since the government of Sudan is already beset 
with financial bottle-necks. This lucrative payment to the MOA staff had also 
stimulated a feeling among the MOA seconded staff that in the post-project 
implementation phase work with the MOA will not be attractive and alternative 
work should be sought with the other NGO's currently launching development 
programmes in the area such as the IFAD^ (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development ) project.
* IFAD launches a smilar project in En Nahud disti’ict, and provides lucrative salaries to the seconded 
agricultural staff. It provides loans to cooperatives through the Cooperative Department of the Sudan 
government.
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In the first operating season, 1988, ENSAP extension services were confined to a) 
the provision of agrochemicals (diazinon) and sprayers to be used in the control of 
um farrara (a local locust specie) ,b) launching an aflatoxin (against a fungal disease 
which attacks the groundnuts crop) campaign; and c) the issuing of the weekly 
newsletter in which market prices were introduced to the PF's in the three villages 
(Widaa, Wad Fadol and El Riteirit) receiving services in 1988. As the project 
expanded through the second season over 1989 to cover 971 farmers in the 
fifteen PV's the extension service of ENSAP was able to implement a range of 
interventions. These included i) the procurement of sodari variety of groundnuts 
and the Ugandi millet for experimentation and demonstration purposes. Both varieties 
were identified as high yielding varieties and drought resistant. The supplier was 
the National Seeds Administration (NSA) at Sennai' town. Selected farmers were 
provided seed varieties of Ugandi millet and the sodari groundnuts on credit. 
AFE's provided technical assistance for the selected farmers; ii) the provision of 
limited quantities of agro-chemicals ( aldrex-t, diazinon) and sprayers for pest 
control. The ABS was financially handicapped in providing foreign currency for the 
purchase of adequate quantities of these inputs and only limited quantities of 
sprayers were made available to the PF's, which were distributed through the 
latter's associations. Sprayers were hired out to the PF's on usage rate and the 
practice was monitored by the AFE's; iii) provision of aldrex-t seed dressing used to 
protect seeds against storage pests and soil borne pests, diseases and fungi. 
Supplies were procured through the ABS and distributed to the PF's on a credit 
basis.
The introduction of these inputs, however, interfered with some of the PFs’ 
traditional practices such as the rameil (ie. planting prior to the full stait of the rainy 
season; see chapter 7) operation. PF's were advised not to practice rameil in the 
planting of the new millet and groundnut varieties (i.e the Ugandi millet and sodaii
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groundnuts). In their traditional system the farmers practiced rameil to allow the 
plant to make the maximum use of water during the planting season since the 
amount of rainfall at this particular time is very limited. If rains happened to 
come immediately after a crop being planted this will imply greater productivity 
than if the crop is planted after the rains come. The farmers would use their 
knowledge of the kharif (autumn ; see chapter 7) calendar which tells them the 
expected time of rainfall and would make their agricultural decisions accordingly. 
ENSAP project,however, sees the rameil practice as involving high risks should 
the rains fail to come at the exact time of rameil planting. This is also coupled with 
the risk that PF's will develop a bad impression of the newly introduced 
innovations. In the event, both a lack of sufficient rains and pest infestation in the 
1989 season, resulted in severe crop failure for the new varieties. Mostly affected 
was the Ugandi millet crop which largely failed due to susceptibility to the 
millet head worm, locally called nafasha. which was prevalent in the area at the 
time. Ugandi millet was also observed by the PF's to be liable to lose its superior 
characteristics very quickly in the succeeding seasons unless the seed stock is 
continuously supervised- a practice which is entirely impracticable in the 
traditional smallholder sector. A fourth extension service intervention in 1989, d), was 
the consultancy provided to professor Siddig ( from the university of Khar toum, who 
is a specialist in the derivation of chemical extracts from local resources) to investigate 
the feasibility of utilizing neem ( Azidrachta Indica A Juss) extracts for the contr ol of 
a wide range of local pests. Neem extracts of both the seed and leaves were 
demonstrated as seed dressings, crop dusting, sprayers and for use in the 
underground pits (matmura) for the storage of the millet crop. The idea was to 
provide low cost and locally available chemicals for the PF's of the project. This 
would be as an appropriate alternative to the traditional, costly and health-hazard 
chemicals currently used by farmers. As the neem tree grows well in the area it was 
thought to provide a sustainable supply of chemicals within the reach of the local 
farmer. Indeed farmers are now able to prepare neem extracts for the control of
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farm pests with remarkable success. A fifth intervention e); a sonki tool for the 
tapping of the gum Arabic crop was introduced a an alternative to the traditional 
axe. The traditional axe was judged to be destructive to the tree and to shorten its 
productive life. To stimulate the sonki tool's adoption by PF's local blacksmiths were 
identified to supply the tool at prices closer to the prices of the traditional axe. 
However, the adoption rate for the 1990 season was still low since the farmers were 
not fully satisfied with the tool and offered their own suggestions to the project 
which might improve the tool and influence greater adoption. Other achievements 
for the extension programme for the 1989 and 1990 season was the intermittent use 
of Radio El Obeid for the broadcasting of extension messages to the farmers in 
their remote villages. Lack of radios and the high prices of batteries, however, 
resulted in little impact being achieved through this deliveiy system.
4.9.2 Formal Traimmg to Selected Farmers (¥PC§):
The ENSAP extension component was characteristically poor in its coverage 
outreach. The reason was the poor staffing (in terms of quantity , as the project 
expanded its activities over the numerous villages in subsequent seasons) ; in 
addition there were the recurrent fuel shortages which limited the staffs outreach 
from their base at En Nahud. As a result a decentralized extension approach was 
adopted in which participation by local farmers was encouraged to fill the gaps in 
the extension coverage.
One step towards the encouragement of local participation has been the selection 
of the village pest controllers (VPCs) from local villages which volunteered to send 
members for training in pest control . The first training course was held in 
Murabaat village in 1990 to upgrade the skills of the selected faimers who could
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by the end of the training period go back to their villages and assist their 
fellows in adopting the scientific methods of pest control. VPCs were given basic 
tiaining in the use of chemicals and applicators with special attention paid to the 
operator's safety and health. Emphasis was put on alternatives to agrochemicals 
such as the neem extracts. Assistance in the training of the VPCs was received 
from the Plant Protection Department and the Ministry of Health. The VPCs 
training included both men and women volunteers. But from a total of thirty six 
volunteers from the fifteen PVs only eleven were able to attend the tiaining course 
held in Murabaat village from 11th March 1989 thiough the 19th of the same month. 
The project plans to appoint at least two volunteer VPCs from each of the PVs of 
the project.
The experience of the VPCs was later extended to appoint more local extensionists 
to augment the extension coverage of the project. Thus a proposal was developed 
by the Agricultural Coordinator in 1990 to designate 'contact farmers'(CPs) and 
village extension agents (VEAs) to assist the AFE's as the project expands. 
VPCs were not salaried employees but payment from the small mark-ups in the 
prices of the in-kind agricultural inputs ( other than chemicals) was suggested as an 
incentive against apathy and low motivation. CFs and VEAs were thought to be 
remunerated by recruiting nafirs on their behalf for the weeding operations. This 
plan is likely to be of little practical success due to the lack of understanding on 
the part of the project staff of the realities of traditional agricultural institutions (this is 
elaborated in the next chapter).
According to the overall plans of the extension unit, as well as the currently 
functioning staff, the structure of the extension system of ENSAP project could be 
depicted as follows:
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Team Leader 
office headquai'ter level— Extension Coordinator
I
Senior Agricultural Field Extensionist (SAFE) -  - (one SAFE)
1
Ghubeish level  ------------ AFEs - - - - - - - -  (four AFEs)I
cluster le v e l  ^ - - - VEAs —  - (seygji VEAs)
I
village level - - -  -------* CFs  .............................. ..  (ten CFs)
The selection of VEAs and CFs is planned to be achieved jointly between the 
project and the PFs. Thus each jamaa will be requested to select one member who 
could volunteer to be their CF. Selection of CFs, however, will be subject to the 
following eligibility criteria:
a) the volunteer must be a member of the association/cooperative,
b) he should be accepted by his jamaa and the whole association/cooperative,
c) the volunteer must be a reasonably successful farmer but not the most 
progressive whose fellows would tend not follow his example,
d) he must be willing to try out the recommended practices of ENSAP and allow 
the other farmers to visit his farm when necessary,
e) he must be willing to cooperate at all levels,
f) the volunteer should preferably be literate.
The CFs were located at the lower level of the extension service to be directly in 
contact with the PFs, each covering approximately ten faimers in his jamaa group.
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VEAs, on the other hand, were placed above the CFs and below the AFEs and were 
charged with filling the gaps due to the poor coverage and reach-out by the 
AFEs.Thus, they were suggested to receive formal training to upgrade their skills to 
properly convey the extension messages. They are also required to supervise and 
provide occasional advice to the CFs. VEA also have to meet the eligibility criteria 
of the project in the selection process. These criteria stipulate that:
a) the volunteer must be active, confident and tiustworthy;
b) he should be accepted by his community;
c) he should be willing to cooperate with the project at all levels;
d) he should be able to understand the situation in which he/she is working;
f) he should be innovative;
g) he should be a good teacher;
h) he should be willing to cooperate in the community’s social events;
i) his age should be in the range 25-50; 
j) he should be respectful; and
k)he must necessarily be literate.
VEAs expect frequent training being provided on the part of the AFEs when the 
VEAs visit the AFEs' village base. The context for this training could range from 
formal to informal meetings according to well scheduled plans. Likewise, the 
VEAs on their part were required to conduct formal training to the CFs through 
personal visits to the farms to provide on the spot advice which in turn should be
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demonstrated by the CFs to the PFs. VEAs were each expected to supervise a 
maximum of ten CFs.
But, there is yet the impending danger that the training AFEs are required to 
provide for the VEAs could add to the burden on them in terms of extension 
coverage thereby conflicting with other calls on their time and in turn, leading to 
poor outreach to the PVs under the supervision of the AFEs.
ENSAP's extension unit have developed the following methodology which 
chaiacterizes its overall activities and innovative interventions to assist PF's with the 
appropriate inputs and services. The methodology shows the types of activities 
cairied out and their puipose and target.
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Activity conveyed through
Group meeting and discussion
Demonstration
Field visits
Daleel ENSAP 
(i.e newsletter )
Use of Radio
Use of audio visuals
purpose and target
Allow Extensionists to bring a group of
farmer together to discuss particular topics or 
problems.
Practical demonstiation to allow extension staff 
to introduce a new concept, tool or technique to
faimers (aflatoxin campaign,sonki use, cultivate
new varieties of sodari and ugandi).
Extensionists visit faimers in their fields and
provide advice and assistance where required
(also supported by group discussion &demonst-
ration).
An extension tool to dessiminate knowledge 
thiough AFEs, and to allow feedback and 
comments to be later incorporated in future 
editions of the Daleel 
To broadcast crop price news to project 
farmers thiough Radio El Obeid station.
Use on a limited scale thiee portable slide 
projectors powered by batteries charged
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by solar panels .Tape players have been little 
used as yet. Blank tapes,though,are very 
limited in supply.
Training This is formal training for farmers by the
Extensionist staff (e.g for VPCs).
Source: As viewed by Vin cent, the ex- Extension Adviser, (1990).
Formal training for the VPCs (ie village pest controllers) has been very limited and 
confined only to those farmers who aie more or less better educated than the average 
farmers. ENSAP's extension unit recognizes the fact that the taiget group of faimers 
is predominantly illiterate and would be unable to recieve formal training. For this 
reason the extension unit advocates the informal approach in training in sympathy 
with local farmers. Meanwhile formal training is systematically provided for the 
extension staff through a number of ways. The following were the major forms of 
providing formal training for the extension staff of the project (from the 1988 
operation season thiough 1990):
i) Training arranged by the Western Sudan Agro-forestry Research Project (WSARP) 
in Kordofan Farming Systems in EL Obeid town in Januaiy 1989 and in En Nahud in 
September 1989 (all extension staff attended).
ii) Attendance at CARE/Sudan workshop in a) administration, November 1988; b) 
training of trainers, December 1989 (for the Agricultural Coordinator, Adviser and 
Jubraka Extensionist).
iii) Consultancy visits, also constituted training activities; a) pest management 
specialist from Khartoum University, October, 1988, Dr. Mohamed Ragab; b)Regional
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Technical Adviser (RTA) for extension, West Africa and Sudan, February, 1989, 
Christine Holding; c)neem consultancy, September 1989, professor Siddig Ahmed.
iv) Field visits to Save The Children (USA) project in Um Ruwaba, November 1989 
(for the Coordinator and jubraka extensionists).
v) Regular training in data collection for the Base Line Survey (as world Bank does, 
see Salmen, 1987) and Project Impact Surveys throughout 1988-1989 seasons (all the 
extension staff).
vi) Agroforestry extension workshop organized by Kordofan Agro-forestry Extension 
Project (KAEP), June 1989 (for the Coordinator and jubraka Extensionists).
vii) Occasional mini- workshops for the AFEs when they visit EN Nahud . So far 
the AFEs have received training in a) the prepar ation of neem extracts; b)the use of 
knapsack sprayers; c)the maintenance of knapsack sprayers; d) the facilitation of the 
VPCs course; e) the use of slide projectors; f) the use of the sonki tool; g) the planning 
of extension calendars and reporting systems; and h) the collection and recording of 
rainfall data.
viii) The Extension Coordinator was sent to the American Farm School in 
Thessalonika, Greece, to attend a three weeks' workshop, June 1990( as result of this 
trip the Coordinator was inspired into developing the proposal for incorporating the CF 
and VEAs system into ENSAP's extension unit).
ix) Training for the AFEs in credit policies and procedures, 1990.
x) Consultancy in the extension system of ENSAP, Dr. Awadalla Mohamed from the 
University of Khaitoum, 21st of May, 1991.
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Mostly benefitting from this training were the AFEs due to their poor academic 
backgrounds, especially in the field of reporting and message deliveiy to faimers.
One of the basic tools which ENSAP project views to be of vital importance towards 
strengthening the extension and credit systems is that of coordination. Coordination, 
as I conceive of it, is to be achieved at three basic levels. The first is the agency/ 
client level; the second relates to the intra-agency coordination; and the third is the 
coordination between the agency and the existing governmental and NGOs. The 
importance of coordination lies in the development of linkages between the interested 
parties which leads to mutual benefits. Benefits arising in respect of coordination 
could range from close communication and exchange of ideas (such as that between 
ENSAP and the Save The Children Project in Um Ruwaba which led to the replication 
of certain aspects of one project in the other), to the direct involvement of one party 
in certain aspects of the activities of the other paity, such as the need for ENSAP to 
involve the Cooperative Department in the registration and selection of ENSAP's 
cooperatives). Thus we can describe coordination in the ENSAP project to be resulting 
from communication either between the agency and its client, intra-agency, or between 
the agency and other departments ( whether located in En Nahud or outside it ). These 
three main ai'eas of coordination could be presented as follows:
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Agency/client intra/ agency agency/other departments
i. village committees and the i.credit/extension staffs, i. ENSAP/Coop Office (relating
project teams (damin/credit team). jointly airange the mini- to ENSAP's cooperatives).
workshop course;
ii.training VPCs ,CFs and VEAs; ii.team trips jointly ii.supply of seeds from the
launched. NSA of Sennar.
iii.ijtimaa between the clients iii.orientation seminais iii visits to Save The
and the staff ; for the staff; Children's office.
iv. remunerating CFs,VPC,VEAs; iv KAEP (a CARE project iv consultancies.
in Elobeid town ) workshops.
V. AFEs pai ticipation in village v.Radio El Obeid's news to
nafirs. project farmers;
vi. village training centres; vi. IFAD workshop attended.
vi. sheikh's accommodation of the project by ENSAP staff;
visiting teams; ii. supply of chemicals
and seeds thiough MOA.
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The above presentation shows the various levels of coordination which were established 
as a result of project implementation and which need to strengthened through effective 
communication.One of the ironies of the lack of coordination in ENSAP is its formation 
of the cooperatives independently of the involvement of the government Cooperative 
Department in the selection and registration processes. One official in the Cooperative 
Department in En Nahud office was critical of ENSAP staff forming agricultural 
cooperatives without consultation and involvement of the Department. He remarked (to 
me in 1990) that "neither of the ENSAP's cooperatives that are currently being formed 
had been registered with the Cooperative Department, nor does the project staff 
effectively communicate with us in that respect". The impending danger from this lack 
of coordination between the Cooperative Department and ENSAP, is likely to be that 
farmers who opted to select cooperatives in contrast to associations stait to develop 
apathy upon the 1993 phase- over of the project, especially when they continuously 
experience the malfunctioning of their cooperatives due the Cooperative Department not 
being prepaied to provide facilities to unregistered cooperatives.
Equally important is the coordination between the agency and its clients. This 
importance derives from the fact that coordination at this level leads to the gradual 
transfer of the project experience down to the village due the strong linkage between the 
project office and the project villagers. This will also amount to the encouragement of 
peoples' participation in the running of project activities which, in the end, will have to 
be unilaterally carried out by the people themselves (this is especially true for the 
communication between the project staff and the CFs, VEAs, VPCs and the village loan 
committees). Only when such linkages are strengthened and developed will ENSAP's 
extension unit be practically practising what it calls the 'decentralized extension 
approach'. But this 'decentralized' extension approach has both merits and demerits. 
These could be outlined as follows:
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merits of the decentralized extension approach demerits of the approach
i.sound coverage thiough ancillary seiwices; i.additional burden to clients (eg CFs);
especially if not supported by material 
incentives;
ii.increases local people's confidence in their skills; ii. it develops a sense of 'dependency'
and 'presumption' among the various 
task groups e.g AFEs on VEAs, CFs and 
vice versa;
iii. leads to more participation;
iv. creates more communication links within the 
extension unit of the project; hence the
timely solution to problems as they arise.
Lack of communication was largely observable in connection with the women jubraka 
faimers. Due to cultural impediments relating to effective contact being made between the 
project AFEs and women farmers the extension coverage to the female groups was 
characteristically poor throughout the project villages.
The seeds and advice relating to jubraka extension were mainly provided by the female 
extensionists who are office-based for the large part of their time. The messages were 
mainly conveyed through group meetings held in the villages or through the medium 
of the Daleel ENSAP which the local jubraka committee member (mainly the chair­
woman) reads for the rest of the group members. The male AFEs were considerably 
impeded ( by cultural factors) for reaching these jubraka women. As a result, only the 
following extension messages were delivered to the women jubraka producers:
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a) Pest control in jubraka. The promotion of low cost, low health risk and sustainable 
methods of pest control was emphasized; in 1989 (the first season of the implementation 
of the jubraka programme) this meant the introduction of neem based extracts for pest 
control. The response had been very positive as a large number of women applied the 
chemical in their jubrakas.
b) Soil fertility maintenance. The women's group were advised of and introduced to the 
use of crop residues, animal manure and weed mulches in their jubrakas. Composting 
was also discussed in the village meetings and covered in the Daleel ENSAP.
c) Seed selection. The female extensionists provided jubraka women with advice on the 
selection of the best quality seed to to be replanted in the subsequent season in order 
to maintain the quality of each succeeding crop.
d) Improving the self-image of the village women.
The jubraka programme, however, was beset with a number of problems which limited 
its impact. Among these was the lack of fuel for staff to conduct fieldwork, the limited 
number of project female staff working with women (only two female extensionists 
who were required to cover a total of 50 villages by 1993; in 1989 these two female staff 
were serving a total of 553 women in fourteen villages). The idea of introducing a cash 
lending programme also remained a paper prescription throughout the 1990 season due 
to the lack of funds to get the proposal fully operationalized.
Generally, the extension system of ENSAP project can claim to have been largely 
successful in innovating a low-cost,'sustainable' and village oriented extension system 
that interacts directly with the PE target. Reliance on donkey transport in the villages 
reduces the costs and ensures that the services reach farmers even when engine oil
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and diesel are in short supply. In addition the AFEs were able to build intimate 
relationships with farmers that would not be possible with centralized system. Farmers 
came to the AFEs as friends, sharing their lives and problems rather than seeing them 
as privileged government employees. The disadvantages of the extension unit, however, 
lie in the inability of the innovation to reach the PVs which were out of the village 
cluster (or located farther away from the core village). In addition the supervision of the 
AFEs by the senior staff was characteristically poor due to the vast distance between 
the project office (based in EN Nahud) and the AFEs based in Ghubeish villages. Lack 
of systematic visits and effective supervision could have resulted in theAFEs' poor 
reporting and overall work performance. As we shall see in the next chapter ,even the 
senior staff of the team who occasionally visit the village sites, tend to work with only 
a paiticular section of PFs to the neglect of the poorer group of farmers who needed 
the services most.To this and other issues relating to the project impact we will turn 
in the subsequent chapter.
As we have described earlier ENSAP teams approach the project site at the start 
of every season to select the villages which will participate for the season while 
at the same time selecting a few others for control purposes (the latter aie referred 
to as the 'control villages', or CV's). The CV's are promised that they will be fully 
upgraded to participate with the project in the subsequent season. The project 
teams make occasional trips to these CV's to gather data on the selected control 
purpose farmers to enable compaiison with those on participating farmers (PFs), 
and this will allow the project to weigh the real impact of its intervention.The 
project expects the ai'eas cultivated, as well as the per unit yield, for the PFs to be 
significantly greater than that for the CF s (control-purpose farmers). The project.
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however, for both technical and financial constraints was bound to reduce its 
hoped for target of reaching 50 villages, following the recommendations of the mid­
term evaluation team of 1990. Due to inflationary pressure, the costs of loan
delivery, as well as fuel shortages, the project was forced to reduce its planned
activities and its reach out.Thus, in the first season of project operation, 1988, 
ENSAP selected Widaa', Wad Fadol and EL Riteirit villages for participation; and 
Ibeid, Ghabash Hammad and Sabi villages for control purpose. From February to 
June 1988, ENSAP spent a total of $ 26443 on its initial operations. In the second 
season 1989/90 the number of PVs' rose to fifteen and the project spent
$811142. And in the third season 1990/91 the number of PVs' rose to seventeen
and a cost of $1191722 was spent. Jubraka women were selected in the second 
season of project operation, 1989/90, with a total of 591 women receiving in-kind 
loans in fourteen of the fifteen PV's( one village refused, viz, Barnawi).
The complete placement of ENSAP's extension programme facilities was delayed 
till the end of April 1989, until the final placement of the Agricultural Field 
Extensionists (AFE's) in core villages, the production of the extension newsletter 
and the launching of a number of extension campaigns. Mainly the extension 
campaigns focussed on the useof knapsacksprayers, control of the aflatoxin 
disease in the groundnuts crop and the use of the sonki (a gum Arabic tapping 
tool) for tapping the gum Arabic crop as an alternative to the axe. Later the 
project extended the newsletter into a complete extension guide, Daleel ENSAP. This 
includes sections dealing with extension messages, credit, women's activities, 
farmers news and marketing information. The Daleel is produced on a monthly 
basis and the AFE's were sent copies which they should read to their 
PF's.Among the major operations of the project were the formation of the 
village committees, jamaa. cooperatives and 'associations'. These were meant to 
coordinate and assist in the implementation of the credit and extension activities.
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ENSAP, however, depends largely on the involvement of the chairman of the 
village committee (the committee is represented by the chairman, secretary and the 
treasurer), the village sheikh and the guarantors for loan assessment,delivery and 
repayment. The project also tested the feasibility of introducing animal traction 
technology (using the experience of the En Nahud intermediate technology project 
which was operative in the area since the eai'ly 1980's). The findings of the test, 
however, had shown that the available technology (oxen drawn implements) was 
fairly expensive and involved the delivery of intermediate term loans. Moreover, 
the new technology was found to be consistent only with those farmers classified 
as the most progressive and wealthy farmers. These were not the real target of 
the ENSAP project; and the idea was refused. As a result of project implementation, 
which started in the 1988 season (though due to delay in project operations the 
services which were provided by the project were delivered after the PF's had 
started their planting operations and thus, in that season, the loans delivered did not 
lead to significant change in the PFs' decision-making processes, and the area 
cultivated of the crops was not increased),and continued until the 1990/91 season, 
the project was able to cover the following villages.
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Table ( 17 ) Participating and Control Villages For 1988, 1989 and 1990/91 Seasons
ENSAP (PV's) Seasons of Paiticipation CV's
Widaa'
El Riteirit
Wad Fadol
Sabi
Ibeid
El Halfaya
Seranbi
Rasheed
Dirra
Balila
1988,89
1988, 89,90
'88 , '89
'89
Ghabash Hamad ' 8 9
'89
'89 ,'90
'89, '90 ( Kirja) 
'89, '90 
'89, '90 
'89, '90
Murabaat (or, Kiija) '89, '90
Um Zaggaya
Migeilima
Barnawi
Wad Mitgil
Wad Gassim
'89, '90
'89
'89, '90
'90
'90
Sabi
Season
1988
Ghabash Hammad ' 8 8
Ibeid '88
Wad Mitgil
Wad Gassim
'89
'89
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ENSAP (PV's) Season of Pai ticipation CV's Season
El Tamba '90
Abu Geid '90 Jaruda '90
Wad Danga '90 El Bweitil '90
Um Sidair '90 I'yal Na'eem '90
Kijeira '90
Of these villages, my field work was focussed on ten selected villages (which were 
described in chapter 1). These villages were Dirra, Rasheed, Ibeid, Wad Fadol, Um 
Sidair, El Halfaya, Murabaat, Abu Geid, Seranbi and Barnawi. The selection was 
guided by a concern to take account of those villages with a good repayment 
record, those with bad repayment (and which thus dropped from participation), as 
well as to account for geographical variation and ethnic composition of the villages. 
Moreover, those villages which played the role of control for the other PV's, and 
which were later upgraded to full paiticipation in the subsequent season, were also 
represented in the coverage. In chapter six I proceed to measure the project impact on 
these villages.
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Agency Versus Clients:
Views, Conceptions And Goals
Sol  ImtmduGtory:
As more and more development projects aimed at improving the quality of life of 
the rural people in underdeveloped countries fail to bring about the desired results, 
planners, policy-makers and social scientists find themselves increasingly challenged into 
probing deeper to investigate the real reasons behind such recurrent failure. In this chapter 
one possible reason for failure is investigated; that a gap exists which separates the views, 
perceptions and goals about development of planners, policy-makers and social scientists 
from those of the people at the grass-roots. This fact will be illustrated by striking some 
contrasts between local views and conceptions and those held by development agents. 
The point is, people at the grass-roots do not receive development inputs 
'unquestioningly', though in reality they may feel that 'development' constitutes one of 
their overriding goals. For instance, people might question whether the teims concomitant 
with the provision of credit are consistent with their value system before making the 
decision to participate in a development project.
In this regard traditional development approaches which view the rural people as incapable 
of lifting themselves out of the vagaries of dire poverty,and who necessarily need the 
guidance and intellectual support of outsiders clearly have to be discarded. Agents tend to 
hold such views.
Anthropological micro-studies have shown that, contrary to such approaches, rural people 
retain their own views, goals and conceptions on what constitutes a better way of life. They 
know the possible solutions, given the resources and the main constraints. Thus, a number
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of empirical studies have recently emerged to warn planners and policy-makers against 
un thoughtful interventions into the indiginous institutions of rural folk (Schultz, 1964; 
William, 1981; Davis,1971; Wallman, 1971; Alan, 1974; Donatus,1980; Wenger, 1982).
In this dissertation we therefore importantly include the views, goals and perceptions 
relating to the ENSAP project, pertaining to both the agency and its fanner clients, which 
undoubtedly reflect on the unfolding of the project; indeed, we shall see that the clients' 
views and goals may be dealt with from two rather separate perspectives. In this particular 
chapter we directly consider the clients' views, goals and perception of development. In 
addition we shall consider the agency's views and perceptions of development as held by 
the project staff and project planners. Meanwhile, in chapter 8, on local government, we 
examine the views of the clients as these are represented by the local government officials.
In the previous chapter the main elements of the ENSAP project were outined. This 
chapter then describes how the various parties experience it, and how this has bearing 
on its fortunes. As such the chapter is a direct conuibution to the study of innovation, the 
more so since it is concerned with "finding out what people think" (Bailey, 1973: 11) 
when something new comes along (i.e. ENSAP's innovations). Bailey defines innovation 
to broadly mean " to put an item in a context in which it was not found before" (1973:8). 
Being mainly concerned with the institutionalization of an innovation (cf. Wade, 1973: 
219), this chapter supports the point that when something new comes along people "make 
guesses about its consequences by setting it into an already existing matrix of values 
and beliefs" (Bailey, 1973:11). An assessment of expected costs and benefits (material, 
social and cultural) is also made by coming to grips with people's knowledge of the 
"world around them, what they want out of life, what they think can in practice be 
got, and whose advice they are willing to accept on these matters " (Ibid.: 11).
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Some major issues relating to innovation are dealt with here: concepts about village 
leadership, stereotypes, conceptions related to fear of failure, communication and 
feedback, and the main values guiding the agency's programmes. Thus local people who 
assign their village leaders certain tasks associated with village development feel that the 
cost of doing so, in terms of the opportunities foregone, is high (cf. Wade, 1973: 240, 
Bruce, 1976:140). Paradoxically, the consequence of this burdensome obligation on 
community leaders is the development of sound coordination brought about by avoiding 
conflicts likely to arise if the number of men involved together in the development becomes 
proportionately large. Another point about leadership relates to the effect of social 
organization on conflict (an issue which is grossly neglected by anthropologists (see eg. 
Wade, 1973 : 250). As will be shown below, the social relationship developed as a result 
of groups of people coming together and frequently interacting, leads to the formation of 
groups (iamaa) seemingly to provide properly organized potential participants. However 
organizing on the basis of iamaa, leads to conflict between the project and other farmers 
(who are not represented in the project's beneficiary group), since such organization does 
not make full representation of these other farmers. On the matter of the analysis of 
stereotypes and concepts relating to fear of failure, we refer to the fear of accepting a 
practice whose consequences are unclear which is generally refered to as " the inhibiting 
effect" (see Layton, 1973: 62) since it can negatively affect the future adoption of such a 
practice. By and large, such fear is related to considerations of social and economic losses 
which follow experimenting with new techniques. In the empirical case discussed here, in 
addition to material loss (in teims of income), other relevant uncertainties include the lack 
of security and the likely loss of farmer's 'independence'. Communication and feedback, 
however, are shown to reduce this "inhibiting effect", thereby stimulating greater adoption 
by faimer clients. Overall, this chapter shows the effect of different perspectives which 
clients and other segments of the community, and the project agents bring to bear on the 
solution of social and economic problems.
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The Ghubeish client fanners' views and perceptions of their own development are 
represented in their verbal statements as well as in their past and present-day efforts at 
household and community improvements.
A correct account of innovation should start from labelling innovation as a 'process' in the 
sense of unfolding events rather than an ubrupt and once-for-all change. This points to the 
location of innovation in a well defined economic, social and evnironmental context as the 
main point of departure. This will allow us to come to grips with changes already taking 
shape and to account for changes arising in the new context (implied in the new 
interventions) which can in turn lead to further changes. The importance of such an 
approach lies in the fact that it allows us differenciate changes that are intrinsically the 
outcome of previous processes from those resulting from the new situation (cf. Redclift, 
1973:118). This argument therefore, poses 'interpolation' as central to the analysis of 
innovation. I have already furnished some material on the socio-economic background of 
Ghubeish communities in the previous chapters (2, 3 and 4). However for the convenience 
of the reader some of the salient feautres of Ghubeish communities are recapitulated here as 
a stalling point to our analysis. Explicit in the analysis below is my support of the fact that" 
the problem of the study of change lies in the nature of the descriptive concepts we 
habitually use" (Ibid, 1973:119).
On the role of the government, welfare measures at the grass-roots are grossly neglected. 
As a result poverty remains unresolved and in coping with it the local people must depend 
on their own initiative. The main problem facing the government was and is the existence
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of a vast number of scattered village communities awaiting social welfare amenities. The 
majority are predominantly rural. Their cultural and value systems are well integrated with 
the basic forces and relations of production. The village people, all sharing one common 
way of life, are closely related by ties of kinship (ahal), ethnicity, religion (Islam), 
language (Arabic), locality and common intersts. Basic social categories pertaining to both 
individuals and villages are dictated by social relations, economic pursuits and ecological 
circumstances. Production is largely for subsistance, with additional provision for a 
marketable surplus to cover exti'a-subsistence household needs. The village communities 
subsisted on millet and dura (sorghum) cultivation. Those villages located in the northern 
parts of Ghubeish are beset with high risks in the market sector due to relative land 
infertility and rain shortages. Those located towards the southern zone enjoy better land 
fertility which makes commercial production and agricultural expansion highly appealing. 
However, poor infrastructure in terms of lack of improved roads,transportation,water and 
marketing facilities,coupled with high levels of illiteracy, seriously impaired such potential 
expansion.
The agency had, therefore, to launch its project activities in the context of this precarious 
background. The agency, however, advocates a cautious, exploratory and non­
interventionist approach that is primarily based on bottom-up planning. Thus, it strongly 
favours providing opportunities for smallholder fai'mers to increase fami productivity and 
incomes through the provision of credit loans and technical assistance through extension 
and improved agricultural inputs (seed varieties, implements and chemicals). The agency 
recommended these innovative interventions with a view to the development of cash 
cropping. The project implementation and planning was preceded by a micro survey at the 
village level which assessed local resources constraints, needs and production patterns and 
practices among traditional small-holder farmers. The underlying assumption has been that 
with technical information, inputs and loans, and by being backed with close supervision
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and management, small-holders are likely to make a significant break into the production of 
marketable crops.
The ultimate focus of the agency is on the individual smallholders with secure land 
holdings, who are to be up-graded to 'master farmers': ENSAP was developed and 
implemented to 'create' such farmers. A key assumption, however, was that this had to be 
obtained through rationalizing, as opposed to radically changing, the indigenous 
institutions, and adapting them to the needs of the economic opportunities of the project. 
Underlying this conception was an appreciation of the scale of grass-roots problems. In 
this regard, the mobilization of groups provides an appropriate means likely to boost such 
local administrative tasks as village improvement since to attend to the difficulties inherent 
in the traditional agricultural setting, uncoordinated individuals may be deemed too slow 
and organizationally handicapped.Traditional leadership was therefore involved which 
allowed for the relevant political variables and minimized potential conflict. Looked at in 
terms of its approach and respect for traditional culture as well as its provision for local 
needs and goals, ENSAP seems to escape criticism. However, there are a number of 
factors impinging on its implementation as the project unfolds which will have influenced 
its outcome. These factors have to do with local people's perceptions of leadership roles, 
and with clients' personal relationships with their leaders.
Trditional common consensus among Ghubeish villagers implies that certain individuals, 
eg., sheikhes, shartais (the sheikhs' boss) etc., play the leadership roles on behalf of their 
communities. Indigeneous communities express clearly recognized needs in terms of goals 
such as the achieve- ment of a more sanitary water supply, and the building of local 
mosques, schools etc.- all directed to the common good of the community. Thus leaders
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were expected to lead their groups towards those goals. Sheikhs in all village communities 
play the role of organizing self-help projects.The moral gratification from this was, in turn, 
an incentive to the village leaders to consolidate their positions by manipulating local 
and/or external initiatives promoting 'collective good' projects in local communities. Thus, 
when during the previous drought periods of the 1970s andl984/85 foreign agencies 
approached local communities for the distribution of relief food and the provision of health 
facilities, the sheikhs had to make available the extant distributive channels through 
traditional leadership procedures. That this increases the responsibilities of traditional 
leaders, is well accepted by the people and intensifies the salience of the community's 
public goods. Sheikhs appreciate their people's commending of them as cooperative, active 
and innovative.
This local conception about local leadership will enhance the likelihood of success of any 
external intervention which places traditional leaders in the spearhead of the respective 
programmes. Thanks to the organizing and mobilizing capabilities of local leadership, the 
initial reactions of leaders largely influence grass-roots responses. Furthermore, "the 
rewards of leadership, hightened by role expectations and perhaps some prodding, can 
induce organized activity for the success of voluntaiy collective action" (Bruce, 1976:140).
Attaching primacy to tiaditional leadership for the realization of public good in village 
communities is bolstered by yet another body of indigenous thought, concerning the costs 
and rewards of providing collective goods. As the indigenes see it sheikhs, who have taken 
office through succession fiom ancestors, are blessed with inborn skills and qualities which 
unquestionably makes them the sole candidates for leadership. Their paramountcy is 
moreover acquired by being brought up in leadership homes. Secondly, locals realize that 
being a leader implies social costs, including the responsibility of making a greater than 
average contribution to the common good (c.f, Bruce: 140). As a consequence, by letting
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another (the leader) do the larger part of the ptu ticular task, each member of the community 
would enjoy the maximum reward and minimum cost in respect of publicly provided 
goods. ENSAP staff, as well, recognized this fact, bearing in mind the resources ENSAP 
would contribute to the local economy. And to minimize the dependence of clients from 
thinking of these resources as free gifts, both local iamaas (i.e groups) and village sheikhs 
were involved in the project. The cients' thinking in terms of free gifts might be encouraged 
by the agency's provision of relief food to Dinka families who had been displaced by the 
war and drought, and who were resettled by the agency in its camps in En Nahud town. 
Thus the involvement of leaders has been a pre-requisite of successful mobilization and 
support forthe project. ENSAP has benefitted from the fact that traditional leaders, who 
were often high-status individuals (e.g. the sheikh of Dirra village), are generally "opinion 
leaders" (see eg. Bruce, 1976) who could easily rally grass-roots support by influencing the 
opinions of others. This marked a remarkable success, for the ENSAP lending programme 
could never had been possible had local leadership voiced their opposition. Clients 
proclaim that their acceptance of ENSAP loans had initially posed them social costs:the 
interest rate which they have to pay to the project administration has shaken the sanctity of 
the religious institutions of the society and made them the target of criticism fi*om religious 
people. This feeling of guilt on the part of clients was repressed through common 
participation and discussion with local leaders.
By involving local leadership ENSAP benefitted from other aspects of traditional social 
institutions: the sheikh's home is the centre of face to face contact within the village. As 
observed in Diraa village, groups of individuals come not only for consultation with the 
sheikh on matters relating to everyday conflicts, they have made the sheikh's home an 
arena for gossip and conversation. This results in the formation of primary groups, small, 
naturally-organized groups, capitalizing on the social gratification of face-to-face contact 
through gossip and sociability. It is this traditional institution of the primary group which
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has formed the basic target group for the projectithe iamaa. Investigation of the previous 
social ties between the members of ENSAP iamaa shows that most of the members were 
already involved in primary group activity (i.e constituting a first instance reference group 
in situations of mass mobilization for provision of public goods or organizing social 
events). Those farmers who form a iamaa which is not recruited in terms of kinship or 
ethnicity will certainly have been involved in the primary group. This, as well as being 
empirically observable, is supported by the respondents’ verbal statements that what links 
them with the rest of the iamaa members is the ties of ushra. Ushra refers to close and 
long teim acquaintance and belonging together.
The advantage to ENSAP of capitalising on the primary group has been a) soundly 
organised groups forming project iamaas. and b) less potential friction among the group 
members of the iamaa thanks to their previous traditional ties. Yet this opportunity for the 
ENSAP project is not without its disadvantages. The organised primary groups coalesce 
around and form the iamaa who are the main beneficiaries of the project. Some primary 
groups are also those who are closer to the sheikhs and thus, influenced by his opinions. 
The members were also closer to one another by virtue of the ushra ties which consolidates 
the group into a unified unit. However, the village community has a wider social network 
system and clients have social relations with other segments in the community. Due to the 
intensity of personal knowledge and acquaintance a person will have social relations with 
others who are not necessarily included in his primary group. As these other persons are 
more likely not to be represented in the iamaa and thus the project, since they do not draw 
from a primary group, they are in a position to voice their grievance at being excluded from 
participation in the the project. So it was that they criticised the project for directing its 
benefits to in-groups related by ties of kinship, ushra or even ethnicity (as respondents 
from Dirra have remarked ). They met the elegibility criteria of the project (in terms of
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being landholders, heads of households and being commited to agiiculture for the past five 
years), yet were denied any involvement.
Thus, ENSAP’s emphasis on groups for the reason that they can provide for what the 
project calls 'peer pressure’ on iamaa members to repay project loans, have made it the 
tai'get of accusations of being biased towards particular segments in the village community. 
This leads us to the conclusion that where specific groups exist in the community 
seemingly more strategically placed to manipulate the benefits of intervention programmes, 
these groups are more likely to be the target of the benefits, irrespective of whether thev ai'e 
alreadv 'progressive', or of the rich segment of the communitv. Thus those generalizations 
(eg. Ahmed, 1977) which state that most projects in developing countries tend to favor 
specifically the ’progressive’ or the 'rich' should be revisited to account for evidence for 
alternative or additional explanations in terms of 'peer group’, or 'social group'. Common 
about all these groups (including progressive ones) is that they are related together by a 
common interest, whether social as in the case of our primary group , or, economic as in 
the case of the progressive and rich. This obviously extends Chambers generalization that 
"the poor are residual, the latest in the land, the most difficult to find, and the hardest to 
learn from. Unless paupers and poverty are deliberately and persisrently sought, they tend 
to remain effectively screened from outside enquirers" (Chambers, 1983:19).
In general sheikhs display a recognized influence over their subjects such as by their 
capacity to supress local conflicts such as the disputes over grazing lands, as well as by 
their continuous efforts at village welfare. Village sheikhs in the project area do not 
distinguish themselves from the average villagers in terms of house style, dress or general 
economic standing. Their houses are typical of the the village buildings, being composed of 
one or two thatched houses, a rakuba (thatched square building for reception and 
entertainment of guests), and a neighbouring jubraka. In addition to the clients’ dependence
204
on and recognition of the importance of their sheikhs in dealing with major issues related to 
village welfare, the sheikhs themselves have their own vested interests as office incumbents 
(such as prestige and social status). This, probably, has cemented their support to the 
project agency.Observation has shown that :
village leaders are jealous of their power. If they find some one attempting to usurp 
their rights, without paying the price their suspicions are aroused. If they discover a 
villager is being drawn away from them at any one point, they become antagonistic 
toward the agency which is drawing him, and eventually device some means of 
forcing him back.This accounts for the failure of many a cooperative society which 
has reached past the leaders and drawn its membership from dissatisfied followers 
(King, 1965:45).
But the villagers themselve (to the extent that they are dissatisfied with their traditional 
leaders) also make their own evaluations as to whether to replace their sheikhs by new 
forms imposed by the agency. The evaluations they make are guided and influenced by 
their past experiences with traditional leaders, their influence on the local and external 
world and their success in dealing with village welfare affairs. In the main, the majority of 
villagers are not critical of their sheikhs. Moreover villagers evaluate the new benefits to be 
received from the project in relation to the effectively everlasting services they are apt to 
secure through their sheikhs. Thus, for instance, villagers in the project area well 
acknowledge that they would receive a package of services and financial assistance by 
participating with the project for at least five years of its operation. But on the other hand, 
they feel they cannot be sure that the inflow of these services will continue when the 
agency passes the project to the government by the end of the fifth operating year, since 
they traditionally have no trust on the government. They weigh this against the overall 
benefits they receive from their sheikhs in terms of interfering on their behalf on matters 
related to conflict over grazing rights in agriculture, representing them in front of the
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government and raising disputes at the district level. To sever their ties with traditional 
leadership could even be more difficult when it involves personal and social relationships, 
especially if connected with subdivision alignment. Villagers have found it socially 
unacceptable to replace their sheikhs on merely financial grounds for it is in their mores and 
proverbs that the "ushra is worth more than money".
However, as has been intimated, ENSAP had a relatively great scope for success as it was 
introduced with the support of local leadership. The majority of the project village sheikhs 
had proved cooperative and approachable. The sheikhs who have recognized the 
importance of cooperation for the success of ENSAP project have enthusiastically accepted 
the new role assigned to them by the agency as the Damin al Dumman (lit, the guarantor of 
the gurantors). For example, among the villages participating in the ENSAP project, Dirra 
has performed fairly well, with the cooperation of its sheikh. Mohamed Ibiedallah. This 
village did not limit its ambitions to the new services provided by the agency; in addition, 
thanks to the innovativeness of its sheikh, it also fostered the development of the village 
through its efforts to form agricultural committees to solve the problems facing individual 
farmers in the village (such as supplying poor fanners with tools and agricultural inputs). It 
had already extended the village welfare activities in the realm of market supervision and 
school maintenance operations. Dirra, by advocating long-term village level improvement, 
seems to particularly exemplify the agency's goal of sustainability.
Seranbi, on the other hand, could endanger the agency's goal of 'sustainability' as a result 
of its non-aquiescent sheikh whose behavior towards the agency could be described as at 
best, ambivalent. In the 1989 operating season of the project the sheikh himself was 
actively participating in ENSAP. In the subsequent season the sheikh turned to be against 
the agency's credit system. Being influenced by the opinions of religious people, the 
sheikh then voiced his resistance to ENSAP's interest rate on the basis of it being un-
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Islamic. Eventually the sheikh decided to opt out. The danger which lingers in the futur, 
however, is that the sheikh might make his sbjects (especially the iamaa) lukewann to the 
agency through this opinion. Up to the present date, however, that opinion had not been 
diffused among the other participants in Seranbi who still continue to receive ENSAP 
loans. Among other things, the sheikh of Seranbi's response is partly attributable to 
misunderstanding between the agency and its clients, a misunderstanding which was an 
outcome of diverging views and thoughts concerning project aims and goals. These are 
often evident in the stereotyping one party has of the other.
5.4
Clients have their own stereotypes of the agency, though these stereotypes may be 
conflicting.Thus the indigenes view the agency Whites as irreligious 'kafirs' (lit. infedils), 
but also as non-liars.This seems contradictory since telling lies should be seen from an 
Islamic point of view as an attribute of 'kafirs'. This has had its effects on the project, 
partly desirable and partly not. For example the people of Wad Fadol village have this 
contradictory stereotyping of Whites which is verbally expressed in their group gossip. 
Farmers who defaulted on their loan repayments at first did not care about such misuse of 
the agency's financial resources. They saw the agency was providing free food relief to the 
displaced Dinka people in EN Nahud town, and this led them to view ENSAP loans as 
giants as opposed to repayable credit. Consequently when the credit staff of the project 
approached the village for discussion about refoming the participating groups for the 
subsequent season, the clients did not attend the meeting and the agency had to drop them 
from the project. Later on when asked to explain this irresponsibe behavior towards the 
agency the clients stated that they now knew from the agency's warning that defaulters 
would be taken to prison and they said the agency 'tells no lies'. Thus despite the fact that 
the agency had no intention of taking its defaulters to court the outcome had been the 
disqualification of the village from participation.
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Another case of racial stereotyping comes from Murabaat village.
In mid-July 1990 the project staff approached Murabaat to evaluate its agricultural status 
on the basis of which they would make their estimât- ions of the amount of loan 
subsequently to be disbursed. Some of the participating farmers had been adversely 
affected by the su bn a (lit. a drought interval) and consequently stood to have their loans 
considerably reduced. Thus when they assembled in the AFE's house the credit staff 
decided to visit selected farms to get an impression of the circumstances of the project 
farms. An old farmer who was present at the time said that he would be delighted if the 
staff would escort him to see his farm. When I told him that it might be the Agricultural 
Coordinator who would accompany him he was pleased, "I would like that White (to do 
so)". The farmer did not knowthe White was in fact a Sudanese. The point was, should a 
White monitor a farm whose performance the famier was happy about, the fanner believed 
that the loan he would receive would certainly meet his aspirations. In other words,this 
would not have been the case were his farm to be monitored by a non-White staff, for the 
latter, it is believed, do not keep up theh* words.
Clients have yet another set of views and conceptions of the agency which have influenced 
their participation in the project;
a) Villagers thought the agency would go about christianizing the indigenes thereby 
corrupting their traditional religious faith and beliefs. The agency being run by 'Whites' is 
an indication of that.
b) The agency aims to experiment with local farming and to produce crops for the 
international markets.
c) The agency must have its own 'hidden interests' which obviously are not mainly to the 
advantage of the rural farmer. For, "how else could one logically interpret the sizeable 
amount of money spent by the agency roaming from one village to another distributing
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small amounts of seeds to jubraka women producers". In the rural farmers' opinion this is 
tantamount to lavish spending (which they do not see as a general feature of 'White' 
society). The CAS (cost of administration and supervision) which is paid by the 
participating farmers will obviously never cover these expences.
d) Some clients view the 'White' as communists who are probably likely to spread their 
ideological 'poisons' among the sacred village cults.
Villagers say that if it happens that one of their sons studying in school in the towns be 
accused of adopting communist ideas ,his parents would not hesitate to send him out of the 
house. People could not tolerate being gossiped about by the rest of the community of 
having one of thek house- hold members being converted to communism.
e) (related to d) The clients' thought that the agency had come to propagate collective and 
cooperative institutions, a lifestyle modelled after that of foreigners. 'Associations', 
groups, Jamaas and cooperatives were the devices for achieving these goals.
f) A few clients thought that the agency aimed to emancipate rural women,turning them into 
liberal citizens. To recommend separate women's programmes from those of men is to 
allow for much freedom and independence for women. The rural society will thus no 
longer be male dominant. This in some villages, had resulted in men's refusing their wives 
to receive project loans (e.g. Barnawi village).
However clients stated that they later altered some of these views as a result of open 
discussion with the agency as well as the involvement in project adminisü*ative tasks. Thus 
it was argued that the agency's non-intervention in Islamic practices connected with 
agriculture, such as the zakat (lit. payment of alms), which farmers pay out of the 
agricultural surplus, had overruled the villagers' negative views about the agency. 
Appointment of local farmers in administrative positions such as Village Extension Agents 
(VEA's), Contact Farmers (CF's) and Village Pest Control agents (VPC's) had, inturn,
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overruled people's fear of foreiger intervention into the sanctity of village life. Moreover 
the AFE's placement among village people and their sharing with them of the hardships of 
village life had further reassured them.
Equally important to our analysis are the views and perceptions of the agency versus clients 
about cooperative societies. A characteristic feature of Ghubeish village communities is 
their lack of pre-project local coop- erative societies to render services to village fanners. 
The Cooperative Department based at En Nahud has recently been established with the aim 
of providing and encouraging the formation of cooperatives at the village level. Only a 
handful of villages in Ghubeish presently have cooperatives. ENSAP administration 
thought it would be to the advantage of both the project and the participating villages to 
foim farmer cooperatives. The gi'eater potential security of providing loans to cooperatives 
as opposed to individual farmers would benefit the project. Via the cooperative, assured 
repayment of loans stems from the cooperative's shai'e capital resources out of which a 
likely default could be met. Individual farmers, on the other hand, have little by way of 
assets to provide for repayment.
Furthermore, farmers were believed by the agency to be stimulated by the economic 
incentives which cooperatives enjoyed but which individual farmers could not get. Among 
these, local cooperatives enjoy the benefits of tax exemption on their farm produce as well 
as securing fuel prices at rates below black market prices which are absolutely high. This 
will ultimately reduce transportation costs to the advantage of cooperative members.
Given these economic incentives the village farmers' response has not been as anticipated 
by the agency. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, ENSAP staff had pointed out to 
the participating villages the advantages and disadvantages of both cooperatives and 
associations, the major group forms recommended by the project as the prerequisite for
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loan eligibility and a large number of villages opted for associations as opposed to 
cooperatives. Even those villages which opted for cooperatives were not fully committed 
to cooperatives ideals. Project staff, on their part, seemed apathetic about these 
'dysfunctioning' cooperatives, without coming to grips with the reasons for this poor 
response. For the project administration the reason lay with the people themselves rather 
than a deficiency on the part of the project.This can be inferred from my interrogation of the 
project team leader, Jordan Holtum, concerning the reasons for this bleak outlook with 
project cooperatives. In reply to my question, "what is your problem with these 
cooperatives? his answer was "rather the problem with them"?, implying that the project for 
its pait had succeeded in the fomiation of these cooperatives and it is the task of the farmers 
to get their cooperatives 'sustained'.
This inherent nonviability of project cooperatives should not unthought- fully be taken to 
imply a lack of a spirit ofcooperativeness at the individual or at the community level. At the 
individual level the existence of the nafir points to cooperativeness on the part of the 
farmers. At the community level the multiplicity of self-help projects (locally referred to as 
aliuhdal sha'abi) points to the independence and self-reliance of village communities. The 
answer to the evident misgivings about cooperatives is apparent in the people's verbal 
statements. In my talk with a village farmer in Abu Geid village about the lack of preference 
for cooperative societies the answer was that "being impaired by the vagaries of poor 
infrastructure and pauperism we are not yet well-equipped to have viable cooperatives ". 
The farmer stated that the meagre incomes generated from smallholder farming which is 
frequently beset with environmental hazards of poor rainfall and agriclutural pests would 
not allow for long-teim investment in cooperative ventures (eg. buying shares). Thus, it 
became clear that people's views about development and a better life squares with the 
agency's goahsustainability. As to the cooperatives which were established in ENSAP, the 
members shared this negative apprehension, although this was not realized by the agency.
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Won*y about this lack of 'sustainability', implied in people's verbal statements, was 
augmented by the villagers' previous experiences with the government. We have seen that 
local people hold negative views about the government, which provided no appreciable 
welfare services to the villages in their remoteness. Forming a cooperative implies that its 
members should frequently approach governmental depai tments for cooperative facilities. 
This would become more acute when the project administration is phased over to the 
government by the end of the fifth year of project operation. This unreliable dependence on 
government will ultimately jeopardise the 'sustainability' of potential cooperatives.
A related factor, also, is the reality that villages in the project tend to learn from the 
experiences of other villages which have been convinced by the project to form 
cooperatives, developing hope that the former will 'emulate' the success of the latter. 
However the 'emulating' villages had found that project cooperatives were not so 
successful as to stimulate 'emulation'iThey had observed that ENSAP administration were 
unable to convince the Cooperative Department (presumably because of its pre- occupation 
with foiTuing new cooperatives in other parts of the district) to get project cooperatives 
'officially registered' - a procedure without which the services of the Cooperative 
Department would not be accessible to any cooperative.
The experience in the Kordofan region has been a general disillusionment with 
cooperatives. In respect of the Southern Kordofan province Omer (1982) recommends the 
formation of cooperative societies on the grounds that this would reduce the tax burden on 
faimers, create favourable atmosphere within which poor faimers would maximize their 
revenues and, consequently, lead to more savings. Being aware of the potential constraints 
which are obviously likely to arise when projects imposed from outside and instigated
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without due attention given to local circumstances, Omer (1982: 21) recommends the sort 
of cooperative that must :
first and foremost be organizations that are closely associated with indigenous 
socio-cultural factor that largely avoid the application of unquestioned 'imposed 
models, and that reduce the impositions of institutions on people.
In counter-argument to Omer, and specifically in the context of the Habila scheme (the area 
where Omer recommends cooperatives), I have established (see Adam, 1989) that 
cooperatives, among all institution- alized forms of developing traditional agriculture, 
commanded little interest- a fact which was originally documented by Affan (1978). I have 
argued first, and this equally applys to our Ghubeish communities, that development plans 
initiated from outside are invariably looked askance at by the so-called receivers of 
development inputs. And second, that development, whether through cooperatives or 
otherwise, must be "subject to social choices and agricultural values proper to the 
developing community itself" (Baumann, 1984: 459). The presence of some traditional 
form of cooperation (eg. nafir. iamaa or committees), though necessary, is not enough as 
to provide favourable basis for modern cooperatives. Nafir exists both in the context of the 
Southern Kordofan provice as well as in the context of Ghubeish communities. Yet in both 
contexts planners were disillusioned from the failure of modern cooperatives to be 
facilitated by the existance of such a cooperative institution. A more appositely stated 
argument in this respect holds that:
however suitable a foundation a traditional system apparently provides it will 
inevitably contain elements 'dysfunctional' for cooperative development (Riches, 
1977: 215 ).
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A set of local conceptions were related to the fear of failure. Among smallholder farmers in 
the project villages this relates to the limited resource outlets and alternatives to rely upon in 
conditions of failure. A fanner who is faced with an opportunity of adopting a new farming 
technique would, first of all, think of the adverse consequences to his household in terms 
of food defficiency and income. Farmers aigue that "the experiences of the past droughts of 
thel970's and 1984/85 have tought us how a foregone opportunity of producing food for 
the household is costly in terms of social and economic imbalances". Indeed the large 
family size each farmer is required to support exacerbates his fear of loss and and points to 
the potential magnitude of such social and economic imbalance. In other parts of Africa 
where fear of loss and failure has been observed it is also found that this is connected to a 
fear of loss of prestige through this failure. Thus Fogg (1971:590) argues for the I bo 
smallholder farmers of Nigeria that a farmer who tried a new technique and failed, 
however, would be called a fool and would lose a good deal of face in his community. This 
should have its implications for ENSAP farmers who were required to make a significant 
break with traditional agricultural techniques and to produce more cash crops in proportion 
to the production for subsistence. Thus, I came across a farmer who 'blames' a fellow 
farmer when the latter complains of the relatively low amount of gum arabic yield he 
produces by using the Sonki tool which was recommended by the project as an alternative 
to the traditional axe. The complaint is that by merely making a superficial scratches on the 
tree the yield is not up to the traditional standard. My farmer's reply is that "do you think 
that they [the agents] know our environment better than we do..., after all ,they do not have 
hashab [i.e gum arabic trees] in their native countries". By this statement my farmer 
disparages the complainer, who loses face.
Such views are yet related to another set of conceptions held by both the agency and the 
clients. These conceptions are to do with target goals and imply inherent shortcomings
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relating to the identification of target aims. These shortcomings are, firstly, the 
underestimation of the difficulties to be faced at the grass-roots; and secondly, the 
overestimation of the agency's influence over smallholder production (see,eg. 
Making, 1967;32). The fact of the matter is that agency and clients diverge in their 
assessment of the target goals (though these were clearly stated in the project document). 
The agency, when evaluating target goals, looks for evaluation yardsticks in terms of the 
number of farmers attending AFE's meetings, the number of farmers applying the 
recommended extension techniques and the incease in area cultivated and in production of 
cash crops as a result of the project. The clients on their part make their assessments in 
terms of the project's contribution to the villagers' ideology of self-sufficiency. In so far as 
their participation in the project had ensured a sufficient food production for the sustenance 
of the household then they are satisfied with the outcome, which is tantamount to the 
achievement of their target goals. This, howevere, may not reflect the target goals perceived 
by the agency in terms of achieving a break with the the traditional production patterns and 
the 'sustained' production of cash crops (as stated in the project document refered to in the 
previous chapter). Thus, clients would see themselves contributing to the final goal of the 
project even though they did not expand cash crop production 'significantly' (as the agency 
document states) in proportion to the production of the food crops. This satisfaction will be 
cemented if loan repayment is concomitantly appreciated by the credit staff.
In short, ENSAP has thus been considerably constrained in its attempt to achieve a 
predetermined target goals in terms of output. The project has its main techniques in the 
form of loans, extension services and improved inputs (seeds, tools and chemicals). 
Neither of the main project components (viz, credit and the extension package) seem 
entirely satisfactory in the eyes of project clients. The credit component is affected by 
clients' religious beliefs and conceptions (see e.g. chapter 7), fear of failure and 
stereotypes.
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There are also some salient views about spending. Smallholder fanners were of the opinion 
that what matters most in terms of income disposal is to provide for family needs, social 
events (marriage, funerals etc.) and then, according to preference, for community-felt 
needs, A fanner thinks of educating his children, buying livestock for family ownership, 
assisting relatives and contributing through effort and small financial contributions to the 
collective good of the community. Such spending, however is mainly guided by an 
ideology of providing for the immediate future. Spending on social events and relatives is 
immediately reciprocated, "what we give away today will certainly come back after some 
time as our village life is one of recurrent social events which necessitate reciprocation". 
ENSAP's ideology, however, upholds long-term goals. Studies have shown that "the time 
horizon lengthens with the level of education and the amount of capital available" (Fogg, 
1971: 591). As the majority of the project villagers are illiterate , the introduction of 
ENSAP project might accentuate such social spending. For the time being it is too early to 
detect such a tiend.
Another factor bearing on the credit component of ENSAP is the clients' perception of 
some degree of 'independence'. This holds despite their recognition of the worthwhileness 
of the project loans. The relevant fact here is that for a significant number of participating 
farmers ENSAP loans are not adequate to provide for all the production inputs needed as 
well as to cover household consumption needs over the harvesting period. Thus farmers 
still have to use their limited capital resources to supplement ENSAP loans. But farmers 
believe that the project is an experiment and involves a factor of risk to which they are 
traditionally averse. Now that they are apt to receive project loans they were unavoidably 
exposed to that risk. Thus, an imminent crop failure is likely to tax not only the project 
through default of loans, but also their own money which farmers add to the project 
resources. Now this effective sharing in the project resources on the part of participating
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farmers is received by them in terms of notions of 'independence' which results in 
negative views about loan repayment. Based on the belief that they are being subjected to 
the agency's experiments, which might not be very useful to them, participating fanners 
would opt to default in conditions of low agricultural yield rather than repay their loans and 
thereby lose that part of the money they contributed from their own limited resources.
Participating farmers also feel that the project implies other social costs which traditionally 
never existed. For example the presence of an AFE means that a fanner spends more time 
on his farm to make a good impression, even though this does not involve additional 
agricultural work. The cost to these clients is viewed in terms of the leisure time forgone, 
"no longer do we find enough time to sit together and talk., except when participating in an 
active nafir". Farmers in the project area usually start agricultural operations as early as 
eight o'clock in the morning and return home at about four o'clock in the evening. The 
farmer then has a rest for about one hour's time, to have his meal, and then goes out to 
chat and gossip with fellow villagers under the shade of a tree. This continues until the 
sunset prayers time (Maghrib). Or, otherwise the farmer may greet visitors in the rakuba 
where guests are entertained. It implied a lot of cost to discount such 'social time' as it is 
highly valued.
This has adversely reflected on the performance of the extension system of the project. 
Adoption of the recommended techniques of the extension unit has been too slow and 
sporadic a procces. This is partly attributable to farmers' appreciation of their tiaditional 
techniques which they do not want to abandon (such as the rameil and seed application 
rates and the axe). Villagers speak not only about present-day sucessful 'traditional' 
farmers, but also of ancestors who passed down their 'farming experience' to the present 
generation. Such traditional practices and techniques are considered by farmers as 'tried' 
and practically 'proven' to be fit and sound for agriculture. Thus being largely
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experimental, the project should be based on these 'tried' techniques and practices. These 
notions, held by the participating farmers, have been paradoxically bolstered by the 
agency's responding to some of the suggestions and feedbacks concerning the use of the 
recommended tools of the project. Thus when the project agency returned some of the 
sonkis to the office in 1990 as a result of the participating farmers' suggestions for further 
improvements, the farmers' positive image of thek own competence was further cemented. 
The farmers’ stereotyping of the agency itself also has bearing on thek motivation towards, 
and adoption of, the project innovative techniques. Thus it has been the perception of a 
significant number of project farmers that experimentation with their agriculture was 
guided simply by the agency's goal to further its research ventures, "the fact that most of 
the project personnel, consultants and visitors coming to our villages carry with them their 
note books, cameras and pens justify our views about them....These foreigners know that 
we have non-human resources which are not available in their home countries and which 
they need to experiment with for their own interest... for, what do you say about the neem 
(azidracta Indica A Juss) ti*ee extracts which the agency have experimented with and later 
told us to use as an alternative chemical to aldrex-t". In fact, the experiment with neem 
extiacts was welcomed by participating farmers who subjected them to test and reported 
positive results. But a farmer who, early on, applied the recommended chemical was asked 
later to report on its 'safe' adoption lest he be accused by fellow villagers of an 
unthoughtful break from tiadition, as happened in the case of the sonki (see above). The 
relevant context here is that participation in a trial is likely to arouse concern on the part of 
the whole community since this (the community) is closely interwoven into a unified social 
network system. This has been observed to be a common phenomenon:
one value of revitalizing useful traditional practices is that in many societies a 
ti aditional practice in one field is linked by an elaborate and comprehensive network 
of social institutions with many practices in other fields. It is often impossible to
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pick out one existing practice from the network and replace it with a new one 
without affecting or undermining the fundamental spritual and social consensus of 
the society (U.N, 1953:340).
ENSAP's foreign staff, however, do not fail to understand this likely friction between 
project values and clients' values, thanks to experience gained through working among 
'other cultures' for decades. Rather, the agency directly contributes to minimizing such 
conflict through fostering the so-called intangible social goals of the project. These 
intangible social goals include :
(i) Developing a spirit of local self-help and initiative.
(ii) Encouraging a sense of human quality and of the potentiality of the human being.
(iii) Creating gi'eater and more effective community solidarity and cooperation.
(iv) Encouraging greater appreciation and revitalization of local traditions.
(v) Helping to make life spritually and emotionally more rewarding for the people on their 
own terms and within their own culture.
(vi) Finding ways of embedding improved practices in local society without
causing too sharp a change in those existing spritual, cultural or social frameworks which 
give meaning, satisfaction or security to the people (Ibid.: 330).
The main problem with these social goals lies precisely in their being in- tangible to the 
clients, who tend to overlook them, especially during the early period of project 
implementation. They are means rather than ends in themselves since they are devised to 
pave the way for achieving the final tangible goals of the project (however, these social 
goals have not been made clear to the farmers, they are mere statement in the agency's 
documents). The agency perceives that developing good working relations within the local 
culture will insure that these intangible goals lead to the realization of the final tangible 
goals. Good working relations were to be secured through:
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(a) Familiarizing the project staff with indigenous practices, local vernacular and techniques 
developed and used by local people. For example, from among these the project had 
acquainted itself with local vernacular relating to agriculture ( eg. subna. rameil. areet. 
budra (i.e powder) neem. sonki. riba, iitimaa. aliuhdal sha'abi taiammu'a (ie 'association'), 
karama. zakat etc.).
(b) Consultants procured by the project for specific tasks (eg. evaluation or suggesting 
appropriate devices for the improvement of a specific aspect of the project) to be briefed 
about local conditions before talking to the people at the grass-roots and offering their 
advice.
(c) In order to secure full benefits from the project consultancies ENSAP selects university 
lecturers and experts rather than researchers. It is stated that these type of personnel are 
more sociable and skillful in communicating with local people than researchers who lue 
primarily concerned with eliciting information from their respondents (Ibid.:338).
(d) Stimulating grass-roots identification with the project through developing a feeling that 
the success of the project has been the result of the people's, as opposed to the agency's, 
efforts. ENSAP did this successfuly through commending those villages which had 
reported the best repayment results of their loans of the 1989 season. The letters of 
congratulation sent to village sheikhs were warmly welcomed by the whole village as this 
amounted to the publicization of village competence within the project area. This squares 
with the views of scholars dealing with working relations between development agencies 
and their clients. Thus it has been argued that"working cooperation will be greater if the 
outside expert shuns publicity and lets indigeneous leaders receive credit for any 
innovations or improvements" (Ibid.:338).
(e) Consultation with and, orientation towards local officials (the nazir of Dar Hamar, 
shartai. municipal council officers etc.) as well as native experts such as local blacksmiths 
and experts on local chemical uses in traditional agriculture (eg. the neem consultancy of 
Dr. Siddieg in 1989).
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IF r o m  r i g h t  t o  l e f t ;  E N S A P  T e a m  L e a d e r ,
D r .  A w a d a l l a  ( c o n s u l t a n t )  a n d  t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  C o o r d i n a t o r .
(f) Consultants' neutrally to be strongly advised, which will lead to their sympathatic 
understanding of local people and respect of local knowledge, especially because these 
people are predominantly illiterate. To give a case in point: In his consultancy for 
evaluating the perfoi*mance of the extension component of ENSAP in mid-June 1990, Dr, 
Awadalla's respondent told him that he applied 'samad' (lit. fertilizer) in accordance with 
the recommend- ations of the project staff; in fact the chemical concerned is not a fertilizer 
but a pesticide (locally called budia or samad). However, recognizing that the majority of 
smallholder farmers are illiterate Dr. Awadalla by-passed correcting his informant. 
According to Dr. Awadalla, to have done so would doubly jeopardize the project. In the 
first place it would develop a feeling of offence in the informant and undermine his 
knowledge of which he was proud. Secondly, being informed that the chemical was a 
pesticide (budra) the informant would tend not to apply it since fertilizers count as more 
important to him than pesticides for which he has a number of local alternatives.
(f) Native i.e Sudanese staff were required to brief foreign personnel in matters relating to 
the project in order to show their willingness to learn more about the local culture. The fact 
that ENSAP personnnel work as a team has resulted in mutual cooperation through the 
desire to learn from one another's experiences. The project Coordinator, however, feels 
that excessive briefing is boring and time consuming.
Briefing , however, is mainly important when it comes from the clients, on thier own 
initiative, especially relating to matters which local people consider to require privacy. This 
is so becaus should the agency impose direct questioning it would be difficult to induce 
real answers from clients who clearly appreciate that the disclosure of certain facts would 
give offence to the agency providing them with financial assistance. Clients certainly
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perceive that what conflicts with their own culture could be an ideal in the case of another 
culture such as that of the agency's.
This perception is clearly manifest with ENSAP loans which touched directly on the 
society's sacrosanct values. ENSAP loans were tantalizing to smallholder farmers. On the 
one hand they implied attending to people's needs in terms of making cash availabe to 
remove a main constraint on smallholder farming. On the other they implied the 
involvement in illegal practices which are religiously prohibited (such as the payment of 
interest on project loans). In this respect three groups emerged. In the first category were 
those farmers who were most recalcitrant to ENSAP loans, and thus refused to participate 
in the project.Among these was the sheikh of Seranbi village. For this group the payment 
of the interest which loans imply is tantamount to committing adultery with one's mother. 
The second group includes those who reluctantly receive the loans. These were observed to 
take the loan but either refuse to repay the interest rate, or deflect its use by forwarding it to 
a relative (who himself may not be eligible for a project loan), as was practiced by some 
farmers in Murabaat village. This conflicts with ENSAP's recommended use of the loan as 
stated in the project document. This corroborates the argument that the introduction of 
improved technology in underdeveloped societies "runs into formidable obstacles if it 
seems to impinge on religious institutions, beliefs and practices" (Watson, 1971: 495). The 
third group includes those who positively responded to the project loans and continue to 
receive it.
An effective means of persuasion was later followed by the agency to get participants 
adapted to the idea of project loans. This was as a corrective to the agency's implicit and 
erroneous assumption that "where the chronic lack of adequate fund had been a major 
factor in holding back the rate of development there was perhaps a tendency to assume that 
development could be bought if there was enough money to buy it" (Making, 1967:35).
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Face-to-face communication with clients would redress the fact, which the agency 
presumed, that project aims, stated in the documents as being 'non-profit', had not 
explicitly been made known to the clients. The importance of communication between the 
agency and its clients on this matter was evident to the agency from open dialogue in the 
project villages such as that between Mike, the then team leader in 1989 and Hamad, a 
farmer from Murabaat village. The agency perceives this particular instance as instrumental 
in influencing greater support for the credit component, and so the case is worth 
documenteding:
Hamad: ...let's forget about the matter of repayment for a while..if you have any doubt
about the repayment capacity of our village ,then come in December [the start of the 
repayment period] and you will see for yourself.
Mike: I do not doubt...rather, I would like to let the farmers know about the repayment
policy of our project.
Hamad: When should we repay the loans?
Mike: It is up to y ou... when ever you like from now[ December] up to the end of
February.
Hamad: How much profit per pound should we pay out of pocket for the loan to the
agency.
Mike: O Hamad, our loans do not claim profit....instead, we stipulate that the cost of
administration and supervision be borne by the participating farmers. In other words, the 
costs of getting out the loans are levied directly on the farmers in their villages, including 
the cost of fuel and the salaries for the the project staff.
Hamad: Yet, you have not told me the size of the cost of administration and supervision. 
Mike: Be patient Hamad, and I will tell you...the costs of administration and supervision
are calculated on a per month basis,not per annum. This means that for every 1 Ls there is
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an exra repayment of 2 piasters per month . Those who repay early will therefore incur the 
least cost.
The conversation points to the importance of listening to the people at the grass-roots rather 
than stating the goals for villagers (the majority of whom are illiterate) in the project 
documents. However, despite this importance, a large number of villgers participating in 
ENSAP state that they do not get the opportunity to express their views in a direct 
communication with the project staff. As a consequence they remained vague about the 
aims of the project and its real targets. But, even though the successful case of Mike and 
Hamad was not typical of the communicat- ion network of the project, its inclusion as an 
illustration in Daleel ENSAP, which was widely circulated to the farmers, resulted in 
bridging the gap between the farmers, who did not have the opportunity to directly secure 
such information, and project staff.
Local farmers tae also observed to be selective of project inputs . They opt to follow those 
which square with their needs and discard those which do not suit them. For instance, 
ENSAP disburses loans to the participating fanners to expand the area cultivated by cash 
crops as a wealth-enhancing gambit. But farmers, on their part, base their farming 
decisions on whether expanding the cash crops results in greater food security (e.g. 
enabling the purchase of food from the market) than if the farmer chooses not to expand it. 
Moreover they state that even with the help of the project loans expanding the area 
cultivated implies increasing costs in tenns of labour and capital: "this will eat our loans". 
Being unaccustomed to seemingly large amounts of cash on behalf of capital investment 
had resulted in some farmers' keeping part of their loans lying idle in their pockets until 
repaying them at the end of the farming season.
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Judged in terms of the limited time of project implementation, 1988/89 through to 1992/93, 
it would be safe to argue that underlying the agency's more particular" aims was a rapid 
modernization of smallholder agriculture of the project communities of En Nahud district 
targeted by ENSAP. This is implied in the project objectives which included a)heavy 
financial inputs as loans for a widely scattered number of villages (5000 farmers targeted); 
b)increased efficiency and farm management through extension support to significantly 
increase productivity by 10% by the end of the fifth year; and to increase the area cultivated 
by 25%. This in terms of theory looked plausible in tenus of identification of causes and 
prescription of remedies which most of the recent theorists of 'modernizing traditional 
smallholder agriculture' would support (eg. Schultz, 1964 ; Making, 1967). However, the 
project was considerably hampered in getting its AFE's to motivate the farmers to raise 
their managerial capabilities (by investing more of their time combating farm pests, and 
proper application of the recommended techniques) sufficiently to achieve the targeted 
efficiency in project farms. It has been argued in this respect that "it is necessary to 
recognize,..that when capital is made available to an agricultural industry in the early stages 
of development the stage is quickly reached at which the capital injection will become 
wasteful unless it is complemented by adequate gains in management ability" (Making, 
1967:41). One major reason for this deficiency in the extension component of ENSAP 
project stems from two conflicting aims, relating on the one hand to the government 
seconded staff in the extension unit of the project, and on the other hand to the foreign staff 
at the higher level of the administi ation. The conflict was atU'ibutable to differences in work 
experiences and institutional rationale. The government seconded staff are drawn from 
government agricultural departments which are used to implementing their agricultural 
plans using government funds with the aim of pursuing the government policy. This 
would not necessarily be concerned with making profit since any losses would be covered 
by subsidies. The agency, on the other hand, had as its purpose to provide loan assistance
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with the objective of profitably enhancing the production process (though this profit was 
assumed to accrue to the farmers ).
This divergence of purpose relating to how an NGO's capital, technology and management 
are combined on behalf of smallholder agricultural production, relates in this instance to 
the fact that the NGO's capital is di’awn from the NGO's own resources but is backed by 
the government of Sudan's financial support. Thus, the agency's aim is guided by a 
concern, however undisclosed, to ensure a profit at least to pay for the project's CAS; but 
the government's concern is more focused on total farmers' income, part of which goes to 
the government in the form of production taxes. The difference between the national- 
seconded staff and the agency itself therefore lies in this :the objective of the agency is the 
expansion of production for the purpose of profit making, while that of the government 
seconded staff is the expansion of production for the execution of the government policy ( 
c.f.,e.g. Making:43 ). Such inherent conflict of ideas within the NGO , one would suppose 
would likely be resolved, at the level of project impact, in favour of the ideas of the 
government-seconded staff since it is they who execute the project, as the AFE's, the 
senior AFE and the Extension Coordinator. Here we note that government-seconded 
personnel will be influenced by having worked, during the large part of their office 
experience, among smallholder producers whose aims were the production for subsistence 
and self sufficiency. This does not square with the agency's aims which are influenced by 
technical and cultural experiences largely at variance with the peculiaiities of the indigenous 
smallholder production.
An important factor related to this point is the observation that the AFE's themselves, being 
Sudanese nationals, do not dwell sufficiently on the recommended practices and extension 
techniques of the project which they are required to impart to participating farmers of 
ENSAP. Apart from the first season of project operation, which was guided by
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enthusiasm, the AFE's never heeded too much v/hen participating farmers avoided 
applying the recommended techniques of the project. Their enthusiusm was later retarded 
still further by the feeling of apathy and low motivation due to work in the harsh rural 
environment. As a result an ample number of participating farmers resorted to their 
traditional techniques. This defeated the agency's view that once got started with the 
innovation, clients would follow the new techniques without being provided with technical 
assistance and supervision. The case of the Dirra farmers participating with the project 
who eventually resorted to their tiaditional fanning practices upon the transfer of its AFE to 
another village is a good example. Murabaat farmers' who resort to their traditional 
farming practices would avoid the AFE, Mohamed EL Nil, lest this lead to confrontation 
with the agency. Faced with a similar phenomenon among smallholder farmers under 
external intervention Yudelman quotes the remarks of a disillusioned interventionist:
if the demonstrators are withdrawn or moved elsewhere, it will be found that the 
plotholders and cooperators, notwithstanding the fact that they have been shown, 
and have actually carried out the new methods, will slip back into their old ways. It 
is necessary to put this on record in order that we do not deceive ourselves in 
dealing with an uncivilized native population (sic.) by assuming that because a 
native has been taught how to carry out what is 'modern', that he will continue to 
do so as soon as the controlling authority is withdrawn (1964:146).
This arguably has its implications on the 'sustainability' of the extension component of 
ENSAP project. On the one hand, the AFE's were too few in number to adequately 
supervise participating farmers. This poses a first problem in the short run. Then, in the 
long run, as ENSAP's AFE's are expected to be replaced by indigenous VEA's, CF's, 
VPC's etc., this uend of slipping back into the U'aditional ways is likely to be accentuated.
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Roaming around Kirja, Seranbi,Abu Geid and back to his base village the AFE of 
Murabaat village, Hamad El Nil, had a lot to say about the ambitious production targets of 
the agency which are basically guided by the target concept in development planning which 
aims at rapid modernization of agricultural practice. Despite being theoretically sound, in 
reality we have come to notice that at the practical level there are a host of problems which 
render the management practices of traditional farmers too difficult to change. Hamad El 
Nil says that " the basic features conducive to efficient farm management, proper seed 
spacing, timely cultivation, proper use of tools and application of chemicals, desease and 
pest control and timely preparation and marketing of crops,are not compatible with the 
conditions of smallholder faimers cultivating small plots, using simple tools and guided by 
the ideology of producing for subsistnce".
In addition to these, other barriers in certain aspects of the social system, 
such as beliefs and religious practices (see eg. chapter 7), kinship obligations, and views 
about the 'tried' and 'proven' agricultural practices of the past had imposed themselves so 
as to circumvent the agency's goals, views and perceptions.
The divergence, therefore, between the agency and its clients lies in the differences in 
views preceptions and the final goals held on both sides. The agency is guided by a view to 
expand agricultural production. The villagers on the other hand are guided by the ideology 
of self-sufficiency and producer welfare in general. As Making states (1967:52) and, 
indeed, as we have seen, the producer approach is through extension, supported by credit 
aid and the provision of services, but it has become wasteful as ENSAP has spread this 
support over widely scattered villages. Equally, the production approach makes much 
much greater use of capital and managerial ability in relation to labour and land but with 
ENSAP, because of the inherent difficiency in management and the inadequacy of the loans 
provided to smallholder producers, it has run into difficulties on this front as well.
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Hamad El Nil (AFE in Murabaat) on his donkey 
transport.
ENSAP's goal of sustainabilty could add further difficulties in achieving its final targets. 
The agency's concern about 'sustainability' is justified by its recognition of the inadequacy 
of government resources, and paiticularly the scarcity of trained and experienced personnel 
which are to provide basic project execution by the end of the project life. This has led the 
agency to reduce the extension available to a large portion of the small- holder producers to 
the extent that a large body of paiticipating farmers remain not effectively reached by 
extension services. Seen from this angle, we could argue that the agency’s conception and 
views about sustainability have victimized the clients who are denied the opportunity to 
secure the maximum benefits of the extension services. In order to bridge this gap, 
however, the agency has resorted to the deployment of its NGO resources in terms of its 
other basic principledocal participation. The victims of the extension services are 
considered to be better reached if local volunteers are drawn into the 'on the ground' 
extension unit to serve as catalysts in their villages,thereby contributing to 'sustainability'. 
In my view,this would still not escape the criticism of being in contra- diction to the goal of 
'sustainability', for, how could the newly appointed VEA's, CF's, and VPC's be 
remunerated? If they are to be considered as salaried personnel then this would imply 
added costs to the Ministry of Agriculture which is assumed to carry the project operations 
upon phase-over to the government. Recognizing this difficulty,the Agricultural 
Coordinator of the project who was highly concerned about the involvement of these local 
level farmers in the extension services of ENSAP prepared a draft paper (without 
consulting the people at the grass-roots) suggesting that these new staff be rewarded 
through nafirs being recruited on their behalf by the other farmers benefitting from 
extension services. However, it is doubful that this in fact amounted to a reward (see 
below).
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5.7 Micro
Clients' concepts are generally derived from the grass-roots level and these form the bases 
of their decision-making processes. The agency , on the other hand, relies on macro-level 
information due to the professional nature of the staff forming the top-level planning body. 
Thus their decisions are affected by their own disciplines. These personnel were often 
referred to as development experts, implying that they possess skills which they may 
project on their clients at the grass-roots level (see eg. Briggs, 1980:103 ). But these 
decisions do not always square with those of the indigenous people. Wenger states in this 
respect that
Already it can be seen that the selection of expert by the government or agency 
involved in itself represents a value judgement, which can affect the nature of the 
policy which will be ultimately adopted. The role of theprofessional legitimizes the 
social construct of the policy-maker and devalues the local construct 
(Wenger, 1982:7).
In respect of the ENSAP project the decisions taken by the staff were those which the 
agency perceives as appropriate for its goals (sustainability).
Thus, information is sought according to the disciplinary perspectives guiding such 
'development experts' rather than stepping down to the people at the grass-roots for 
empirical information. The case of the Agricultural Coordinator (cited above) is a good 
example to elaborate here. As we mentioned the Agricultural Coordinator was faced with 
the problem of poor coverage in the extension project, and this in the 1990 season had 
resulted in poor application of the recommended techniques of the agency. He was then to 
design a plan for bridging the gap in the extension coverage. In my interrogation of him 
concerning what he perceives to be the appropriate solution, he remarked that " I am very
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tempted by the idea of the training and visit system in the literature of extension". 
According to this, local volunteers are to be selected from the grass-roots and designated as 
'contact farmers' who are to visit the participating farmers of the project in their farms and 
homes and provide them with extension advice (see e.g Yudelman, 1976a:378). As a 
result the extension Coordinator designed his extension model (which had worked 
sucessfully in other contexts) to fit into the culture of Ghubeish farmers without consulting 
them about the inteiwention. The agricultural Coordinator, however, was faced with the 
problem of rewarding these 'contact farmers’. His initial goal in referring to local 
volunteers was that this would imply less administration costs to the agency, hence 
contributing to the agency's goal of sustainability.
The agricultural Coordinator believed, as I have mentioned, that the best way of rewarding 
the suggested 'contact farmers' would be through there being nafirs on their behalf since 
the nafir participants will have benefitted from these 'contact farmers'. But doing this 
without consultation with the CF's would ultimately not solicit local volunteers to work 
with the project agency even though the idea seemed to depend on a pre-existing 
indigenous institution. My interrogations, also supported by direct observation, have 
shown that, according to the volunteers themselves, a nafir on their behalf would not 
amount to being rewarded. The fact is these volunteers were already enjoying nafir 'credit' 
accrued to them from participating in other farmers' nafirs in the past. They expect these 
other farmers to reciprocate in order to clear" their 'debts'.
This links us with yet another point, which is to do with information flow.
This relates to the real impact of the project, as assessed by both the agency and its clients. 
ENSAP staff draw their information about project performance on inferences derived from 
the reports of loan repayment. The loan staff do not draw such information about loan 
success through communication with their clients. Despite the fact that the project staff is
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happy with the repayment performance of the participating farmers there are still some 
farmers who expressed their doubts (to me) about the reliability of the project loans. This 
scepticism was voiced by those farmers who had to resort to the sheil merchants to 
supplement ENSAP loans. They were of the opinion that the better repayment results 
should not be taken by the project agency to imply that they had really benefitted from the 
project having made their repayments from an improved 'surplus' income. Rather loans 
were repaid to 'guard their honour' against local criticism directed mainly by non- 
participants at defaulters who would be taken to court. Another category of farmers argues 
that repayment is complied with because they come to believe that 'debt is bad', and 
should be avoided (c.f. Riches, 1971:22).
Thus, while information for the agency is aggregate and based on the reports of the the 
project in the form of 'quantity', that of the clients is largely 'qualitative' and different. 
Wenger, who observes the same phenomenon, argues that local information sources 
"... are. .experiential, specific, based on small areas, include a subjective component and 
know- ledge of social and psychological aspects of the situation not immediately available 
to professionals" (Wenger, 1982:7). The unwitting result has been that in the evaluation 
phase of the project both the local project staff and the visiting consultants had remarked 
that the sheil system had entirely disappeared as a result of the project.
The communication channels also differ for both the agency and its clients.
The clients' ideal of communication is thiough word of mouth in face-to- face contact and 
traditional local channels. These were reflected in the local iitimaa (meeting) that brings 
people together, ranging from a small group of village committee members , to a council of 
elders, to a large meeting calling all community members such as for communicating an 
idea about aliuhdal sha'abi (requiring, for instance, fund raising for the construction of a 
local water-yard).
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Another simple way of communicating information is where a kinsman assumes the 
responsibility of conveying a specific message (e.g. an invitation for a wedding feast or 
important news about the village community). For matters relating to village welfare, such 
as the building of a local school, health unit or a water-yard, the village sheikh's house 
provides the appropriate arena for the participants to covene for communication. Traditional 
communication channels are constrained by the limited institutional structures for 
interaction (the majority of villages lack local clubs or community centres in which to 
launch an iitimaa) due to the limited nature of local resources. In the past the bulk of local 
projects launched through aliuhdal sha'abi were preceded by information being passed to 
the paticipants in an iitimaa being held sporadically in a village school, in the open yards or 
though word of mouth. The effectiveness of these local communication channels varies 
from one village to another. In a small village such as A1 Halfaya, communication through 
word of mouth seems effective. This effectiveness is bolstered by the stiong kinship ties 
that link the village members together as well as the proximity of the agnatic ally related 
households to one another. In the larger villages such as Dirra and Rasheed the iitimaa is 
the most appropriate meaas of communication. To insure that such an iitimaa is fully 
attended the village sheikh will beat the nuggara (drum) which calls immediate attendance.
This diverges from the channels propagated by the agency for communicating important 
information. Major ones include policy documents or even the use of the regional mass 
media (such as radio El Obeid for broadcasting the extension messages to ENSAP fanners 
in their villages). In response to the use of radio El Obeid as a means of extension coverage 
local feedback (recorded by myself and the agency) has shown that clients are generally 
concerned that radio messages are out of reach of smallholder farmers the majority of 
whom do not own radios. Even the negligible number of farmers who owned radios 
maintained that the prevailing high prices of batteries (a pair cost LS 50 in 1990) meant that
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listening to the radio had become too costly as this amounts to fogoing two days’ 
household consumption spending.
This points to the inherent divergence in respect to means by which each side views the 
whole situation relating to both, before and after the implementation of ENSAP prject. 
Wenger (1982:5) provides an apt summary to what has been covered in this section:
It is now accepted theoretically that development planning should be based on some 
form of consultative relationship between the planners and the recipients of 
development programmes..but the problems continue to arise in the implementation 
of planed changed. Part of the reason for this may be the effect of different 
perspectives which different segments of society bring to bear on the solution of 
social or economic improvement. Problems of communication arise even when the 
perceived objectives of the separate groups are seen to the same; they think they 
agree.
Along with the agency’s specific targets as raising the agricultural productivity of 
smallholder farmers, broadening the investment scope for the rural people through 
increased earnings, the agency attaches importance to the value of establishing greater 
confidence in smallholders to help themselves. The involvement of ’locals' in the 
impementation and plannng processes finds its expression in terms such as 'community 
organization' and 'effective participation', as well as 'sustainability'. The terms were often 
summed up in the phrase,'the bottom-up' approach for community development, which 
assumes self-planning as opposed to planning by outsiders for the rural people. In the rest 
of this chapter we deal with these three ingredients in the agency’s approach to designing 
and implementing community development projects. But since these terms raise some
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problems as to what exactly they mean I will start with some of the currently circulated 
definitions.
The following ai'e some of the salient definitions of community oraganization:
1. ...a community identifies needs and takes action, and in so doing...develops 
cooperative., attitudes and practices (Murray, 1955: 39).
2. [Community organiztion] may be chiefly concerned with problems of accomodation and 
social adjustment...it is concerned with the interrelationship of groups within 
communities, their integration and coordination in the interest of efficiency and uinty of 
action. In a wider sense it may also include the Adjustment of a local community to the 
larger social unit of which it is a part (Steiner, 1930: 20).
3. ..the general aim of community organization is to bring about and maintain a 
progressively more effective adjustment between social welfare needs. This implies that 
communiy organization is concerned with a) the discovery and definition of needs; b) the 
elimination and prevention of distress and disabilities, so far as possible; and c) the 
articulation of resources and needs, and the constant readjustment of resources in order 
better to meet changing needs (Robert, 1939: 500 ).
4. ..community development is a process dealing primarily with programme relationships 
and is thus to be distinguished in its work setting from those other basic processes, case 
work and group work, which deal with people.
Those relationships- of agency to agency, of agency to community, and of community to 
agency- reach in all directions from any focal point in the social work picture. Community
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organizaion may be thought of as the process by which these relationships are initiated, 
altered or terminated to meet changing conditions; and it is thus basic to all social work" 
(Kurtz,1940: 401-402).
5. Community organization in its generic sense is deliberately directed effort to assist 
groups in attaining unity of purpose and action. It is practiced, though often without 
recognition of its character, whenever the objective is to achieve or maintain a pooling of 
the talents and resources of two or more groups in behalf of either general or specific 
objectives (Wayne, 1947: 110).
Central to these definitions are the phrases "development of cooperative attitudes and 
practices", "the problems of accommodation and social adjustment", "the articulation of 
resources and needs and the constant readjustment of resources"," dealing with 
relationships between agency and community", and the "integration and coordination of 
groups in the interest of efficiency and unity of action". It is ideally the combination of 
these which collectively define community organization. But why is community 
organization necessary for the interfering agency? The answer is that the agency considers 
community organization as the primary institutional base within which the various groups 
and individuals targeted by the project may have their activities coordinated and delivered. 
It is this objective, of institution building that is centi'al to commuity organization.
However, community organization needs at least two igredients in order to get established 
and maintained. These ingredients are captured in the notion of effective participation and 
sustainability. Community participation in the institutional base is clearly important in that it 
brings together the interested parties, groups and individuals who are to be mobilized to 
form 'community organization'. But participation is an elusive term and is widely
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discussed in the literature on rural development. The following are some of the salient 
definitions of participation.
1. Participation means... to sensitize people and, thus to increase the receptivity and ability 
of rural people to respond to development programmes, as well as to encourage local 
initiative (Lele, 1975:73).
2. Popular participation in development should be broadly understood as the active 
involvement of people in the decision-making processes in so fai" as this affects them 
(Uphoff and Cohen, 1979: 79)
3. Participation includes people's involvement in decision-making processes, in 
implementing programmes.... their sharing in the benefits of development programmes, 
and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes (Lisk, 1973:19).
4. [participation means]...the organized efforts to increase control over resources and 
regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements of 
those hitherto excluded from such control (Pearse and Steifel, 1979:8).
5. ..the creation of opportunities to enable all members of a community and the larger 
society to actively contribute and influence the development process and to share equitably 
in the fruits of development (U.N, 1985:5).
Common to all these definitions is the 'involvement' of local people in the process of their 
development. As development planners are increasingly dissatisfied with imposed models 
for social development the tone of development planning is gradually being shifted from 
being patron-biased to being client-biased. The United Nations have spearheaded the 
bottom-up planning and implementation approach and considered the approach as an
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alternative to state bureaucracy interventions in which little attention is paid to the people at 
the grass-roots. It is indeed an attack at the stereotyping (by the often arm-chair planners 
and scholars) which labels the rural people as 'passive receivers' of development benefits. 
CARE agency considers such stereotyping to have no justification in the context of local 
communities which have traditionally organized their efforts to get community 
improvement underway.
CARE advocates 'pai ticipation' with a view to achieving two short-term and one long-term 
goals. The two short-term goals are mass mobilization of local resources, and local level 
needs identification and assessment. The long-term goal is the 'sustainability' of the 
achieved development targets. Since the achievement of the two short-term goals, of local 
resource mobilization and the identification and assessment of local needs, is largely 
dependent on the efforts and collaboration ofthe local people the interfering agency needs 
first to build on the trust of local people.
The need to build on the tmst of local people stems from the recognition of the fact that the 
participating villages (PVs) of the project are assumed to develop largely on the basis of the 
pre-existing human and material resources both during the agency's presence and after its 
withdrawl. It is these villages which state, and share in, the evaluation of their needs and 
potentialities: the realization is that the problem relates to 'them', i.e the people as opposed 
to 'us', the agency. Based on people's faith in the process of their development the agency 
directs its material and technical assistance resources contending that such 'bottom-up' 
planning leads to goals and objectives which are more precisely formulated and realistic.
The agency identifies three categories as essential for participation in a project. The first is 
the local government officals who tend to have some influence in the process of village
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development by virtue of their traditional authority over local welfare affairs. This group 
includes the municipal council's administrative officers, the shartai and the nazir of Dar 
Hamar. The nazir and the administrative officers were involved only in rendering advice 
concerning the historical background and the reputation of the villages applying for 
participation in the project. As the agency receives a large number of applications from the 
villages out of which the agency selects some for participation and rejects the rest, such 
information effectively leads to the selection of villages most eligible for participation.
The second basic source of participation in the project is the village leadership. Village 
sheikhs aie involved in both the process of farmer selection as well as in the execution of 
project tasks at the village level. Thus the village sheikhs brought to swear on the Quran 
when recommend- in g their village farmers for participation with the project according to 
the agency's eligibility criteria for member selection. The sheikhs are also brought in to 
assume the leadership roles in the locally institutionalized cooperatives and 'associations' 
through which the major project services are delivered and coordinated. Replicating the 
village leadership in their traditional positions implies, for the agency, the absorption of 
conflicts likely to arise should the agency by-pass these leaders who have vested interests 
in leading their communities.
The third group the agency calls for participation are the local farmers who ttre selected 
from among the principal project beneficiaries to play 'catalyst' roles for delivering services 
to their fellow farmers. The participation of these volunteer village agents is particularly 
important in that it constitutes the first step towards the delegation of project 
implementation to the local community. Such roles played by the VEAs (village extension 
agents), VPCs (village pest controllers) and CPs (contact farmers) would back the coverage 
of the extension services of the project and lead to local people's identification with the 
project. When the skills of these 'catalysts’ are up-graded to fully shoulder the
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responsibility of handling the project extension tasks, then 'sustainability' is ensured, since 
upon the withdrawl of the agency the project could continue without external assistance. 
This invites us to deal with this particulai* concept invoked by the agency: sustainability.
5.11
Central to the agency's project implementation approach is the concept of sustainability. 
This is well stated in the agency's project document: "the final goal of [ENSAP] project is 
to affirm and reinforce traditional, small-scale agricultre as a viable and profitable livelihood 
in at least 50 villages of En Nahud disrict, through the establishment of a self-sustained 
credit/extension programme appropriate for the needs of farmers cultivating under 15 
hectares".
The agency loosely defines sustainabilty as the potential continuation of the project 
activities after donors have ceased to provide funds. The task of the agency, therefore, lies 
in identifying those aspects which could lead to sustainability and make them operational; 
and at the same time in avoid- ing those which would prove unsustainable without the 
backing of the agency. There are certain indicators for sustainability which the agency 
seeks to be met when introducing an innovation or a new technique:
i. The extent to which it dovetails with the macro-economic circumstances of the country in 
question and national government policy.
ii.The quality of the management and administration of the project, particularly the abilty to 
analyze external changes and to relate them to the circumstances of the project,and the 
ability to mobilize the political support necessary to influence external circumstances.
iii. A secure long-term financial base, which is necessary to facilitate the necessary 
investments and to cover operating costs.
iv. The need to anchor the project in the social and cultural context of the region or 
country, so that the population- particularly the target group- will accept the activities,
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support them, take part in them and wish to continue them. This requires, among others, a 
careful coice of technology and organizational airangements.
V. The need to take account of environmentatl conditions and the potential of natural 
resources in the area.
vi. other external circumstances such as political and economic stability (Project Document, 
N.a :16).
Putting into consideration the above requirements the agency then tests sustainability 
against the following key ingredients of project implementation:
i. Whether the goals and aims of the project square with the clients' goals and aims.
ii. Whether the project activities will continue to be funded adequately by the national 
government after the withdrawl of the agency.
iii. Whether overburdening the local people and the environment is avoided and minimized; 
and
iv. Whether the project innovation is accepted and backed by the community's support.
Sustainability depends on two independent but interrelated factors. The first is the local 
resource base; and the second is the external donor resource inflow. There exists the danger 
that excessive funding by donor agencies creates 'dependency' on external assistance to the 
extent that when the donors withdraw it becomes too burdensome for the local element to 
carry on with project activities. A reliable local resource base, therefore, should exist if 
local people are to keep faith with the formidable task of assuming the responsibility of 
continuing the project implementation process without external assistance.
The project agency has so far achieved the following targets which it judges sustainable in 
the context of the governmental institutions constituting the counterparts of the project:
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1. The creation of a credit system that is well adapted to the needs of smallholder producers 
hitherto neglected by the previous credit lending institutions. The ABS could easily take 
over the innovation and institutionalize it within its credit system.
2. The initiation and implementation of a low-cost extension delivery system based on the 
placement of extension agents within the rural communities targeted by the project, thereby 
enhancing greater extension coverage. The AFEs who are supported by donkey transport 
were able to live among local village people, identify with them and share in their 
hardships.
3. The mobilization of local support through the organization of local people into 
cooperatives, associations and jamaas (groups) leading to an optimum combination of 
agency and local resources for the realisation of project objectives. These organizations 
were based on the pre-existing indigenous institutions such as the Hi an (committees) of the 
villages.
4. The utilization of the local material resources such as the neem (Azidrachta Indica A 
Juss) extracts which are used for pest control, the sonki (locally manufactured tool for the 
tapping of the gum Arabic trees) and the local seed dressing prototypes for mixing the 
seeds with chemicals.
With regard to the project activitites to be realized the agency plans the gradual devolution 
of project activities to the local institutions as the implementation process proceeds rather 
than delaying this process to the final stage of project phase-over. The whole idea of 
devolution hinges on building coordination links at two levels: a) the national level 
represented by the ABS, MOA and the other governmental institutions such as the 
Cooperative Department and the National Seeds Administration which provide input 
supplies for the project, and b) the local level, through organizing task forces for local 
action. The two levels represent vertical and horizontal linkages, respectively. The vertical 
linkage, of the project beneficiaries with the ABS, leads to familiarizing the clients with the
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latter institution as a lending system attending to their needs on behalf of the NGO. The 
second is a horizontal linkage, which is basically an organizational strategy whereby the 
village institutions are supported and devolved responsibilities within the project. The 
process of giadual devolution of project activities to both national and local institutions can 
be well understood with reference to the following model which exemplifies community 
involvement in the participatory project planning and implementation processes.
f o c u s i n g h a n d o v e r  t o  c o m m u n i t yi m p l e m e n t a t i o n
a b s o r p t i o n  b y  
t h e  c o m m u n i t y
p l a n n i n g
p h a s e
E n t r a n c e  
A g e n c y  1 9 8 8 E x i t  - A g e n c y  1 9 9 3
Life cycle of a project in which the agency 
bases on community pai ticipation
Interpretation Of The Model:
In order for the community to be effectively participating in the planning and 
implementation processes of the project a number of considerations should be made. In 
respect of ENSAP project these considerations include:
A. The planning phase:
i. The enlightenment of the community leadership with the agency.
ii.The enlightenment of the community with the agency.
iii.The identification and formation of the local plannimng group.
iv.Setting the tasks and responsibilities for the planning group and the methods to be 
followed.
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V . The identification of community needs.
vi.The identification of the priority needs to be met.
vii.The seletion of the target group(beneficiaries) according to the priorities.
viii.The identification of the goals to be achieved.
ix. Setting out alternative (probable solutions) techniques and methods.
X . Review and prioritizing the alternatives in accordance with a)the feasibility studies, b) 
the available resources, c)the community's support,
d) the applicability of the alternatives, e) continuity and sustainability, f) the support of the 
counterparts g) the lessons drwan from other similar experiences.
xi. The appropriateness of the intervention (staff should be mostly experts).
xii. Identifying the particulars for the selection of the project committee.
xiii. The formation of the project committee.
xvi. Drawing up the proposal in which the goals, the activities,the needed resources and the 
execution of the project are cleaiiy stated.
XV. Planning the execution of the project.
xvi. Preparation of the follow-up and monitoring plan.
xvii. Preparation of the project evaluation plans.
xviii.Scheduling the hand over of the project and the final exit of the agency.
xix. Defining the tasks to be accomplished by the local project committee members and the 
way the tasks are organized.
XX. Defining the roles and responsibilities of the agency and the counterparts.
B. The Implementation Phase: This phase includes;
i. Approaching the community.
ii.The involvement of the local community in the preparation of the action plan.
iii. Designating the project staff.
iv.Training the project staff.
V. Conducting the base line survey.
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vi. Initiating the experimentations and demonstrations.
vii. Evaluation and review of the project performance.
C. The Focusing and Concentration Phase; This phase experiences the focusing of the 
agency on those aspects of the project which proved sustainable and the implementation 
process draws on the results of the evaluation of results of the previous phase. The major 
acitivities conducted in this phase include;
i. Finalizing the project implementation plan on the light of the project evaluation and 
review.
ii. The executon of the finalized plan.
iii. The exchange of the gained expertise.
D. End Of Project Life And Phase Over: This phase includes the,
i. review and finalizing phase over as per project plan.
ii. Local community assumes the task of project execution (administrative 
and financial).
iii. the development of the follow-up and evaluation plans for the post phase over stage. 
The agency practiced this participatory planning and implementation process through the 
following steps.
1. The selection of the villages for participation.
In this stage the selection of the villages for participation with the project lies with the 
project agency which states the eligibility criteria for selection. The sheikhs, the shartai 
(sheikh’s boss) and the administrative officer were involved in distributing the application 
forms to the candidate villages and in participating in the selection process (by 
recommending the villages most eligible for participation). The local police, the court 
(which is assumed to later prosecute the loan defaulters), the extension administration and 
the Farmers Union were called in to participate in the slection process. According to the
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recommendations of these parties the project agency selects the optimum number of villages 
among the candidate villages.
2. Selection of the individual farmers.
In this stage the sheikh is called to swear on the Quran his recommend- ation of the village 
members for participation.
3. To be fully participating in the project, the candidate farmer should have a guaiantor. 
This calls for the organizing of the participating farmers in iamaas (gi'oups) each headed by 
a guarantor responsible for his group.
4. The candidate should also be a member of the association or the cooperative. This gave 
rise to the formation of associations and committees the executive committee members of 
which assumed the responsibilty of coordinating local tasks with the project agency.
These constituted the basic foims of community organization and participation at the local 
level.
By the end of this stage the implementation process gets started with the simultaneous 
involvement of the local people in running project activities. At a later stage the 
appointment of the local VEAs, VPCs and CPs and the mobilization of local community 
resources such as the neem extracts, the sonki tool and local seed dresser prototypes 
constituted the optimum utilization of local human and material resources for project 
development. Meanwhile the training of the executive committee members of the 
associations and the cooperatives in book-keeping and accountancy marks the up-grading 
of local skills in behalf of assuming credit allocation tasks upon the project phase-over.
By this stage the project will be fully focussed towards the achievement of the set goals 
most of which were partially realized. These included the raising of farmers incomes and 
agricultural productivity as well as the expansion of the area cultivated. At the same time the 
institutional framework represented by the newly established cooperatives and associations 
will be strengthened and up-gi'aded to handle the tasks of delivering credit and extension
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inputs. This marks the gradual devolution of the project tasks to the local community which 
on its part needs to absorb the innovation and institutionalize it. The most practical step 
towards this end has been the movement of the ABS branch office from EN Nahiid to 
Ghubeish, the main site of the project villages, in mid-1991.
Up to this stage the project's achievement of its set goals is rather piecemeal due to the 
environmental hazard of low rainfall which led to considerable loss in yields and crop 
failure. Sustainability of the innovation without external support depends on continuous 
project success in terms of increased productivity and income which in turn leads to 
guaranteed loan repayment. Without this continuous success sustainability will be 
jeopardized by the successive decline in project finance due to the persisting decline in loan 
repayment which had characterized ENSAP's credit component.
To sum up it is well to draw a comparison between the project's overall approach to project 
planning and implementation with the rural modern- ization strategy pursued by the United 
Nations. This enables us to locate ENSAP among the international approaches to rural 
development.
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ENSAP Strategy 
Approach
50 villages of Ghubeish, mainly 
smallholder faimers.
Rural Modernisation Strategy-United Nations
low income farmers and peasants living in rural 
areas, outside cities, towns and industrial enclaves.
i. Increase agiicultural output and 
productivity.
ii. Diversify the economic base of 
small-scale producers by the prod­
uction of food and cash crops.
iii. Reduce the number of people 
living in relative and absolute 
poverty.
iv. Reduce out-migration from 
the villages.
a) transform rural regions from subsistence to 
commercial agricultural areas.
b) modernize rural inhabitants and change attitudes 
towards development.
c) increase per capita income of economically 
active population.
d) ensure minimum food supplies and basic 
nutritional requirements.
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1. Rural poverty results from low 
agiicltural productivity and lack 
of economic diversification.
2. The poor have limited access to 
services and technology.
3. Vested interests (e.g. sheil lenders) 
limit opportunities for productivity 
and income expansion.
4.Quality of life in rural areas can be 
improve through the mobilization of 
the limited capital and laboiu resources 
if backed by external assistance.
i) low productivity is due to persistence of 
traditional attitudes, mores, and institutional 
structure.
ii) small proportions of national resources 
ai'e now invested in agricultural production.
iii) traditional land systems perpetuate subsistence 
farming.
iv) Coordinated inputs of services, facilities, 
and infrasti'ucture can uansfoim tmditional 
communities.
5cl2o4 Operational Premises: 
1.Successful rural development 
requires the effective participation 
communities and counterparts.
2.rural programmes can be designed 
to reach large numbers at low cost.
3. Inputs must be supplied through 
low cost delivery service.
1. Adverse geographical and ecological factors must 
be analyzed and of local communities and 
appropriate solutions to probelms tested within eacli 
rural region.
2. Programmes must generate economic resources 
for investment in directly productive enterprises and 
social services.
3. Institutional and social chage must be induced in 
order to transfomi and modernise rural communities.
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4. Rural associations and cooperatives 
essential elements of the 
administrative system.
5. appropriate and adaptive technology 
packages should be developed for rural
areas.
4. Political and administrative mechanism must be are 
designed specifically to implement rural programs.
5. Agricultural technology must be transformed and 
new technology adopted to increase output.
6. National government institutions 
equally involved in project execution.
6.services, facilities, technical and administrative 
inputs and infrastructure must be combined into 
'minimum packages'.
1.Bottom-up approach:
Experiment with Other countries' 
experiences with paiticipatory 
approaches to project planning and 
implementation.
2.The agency to provide financial and 
technical assistance in project design, 
implementation and evaluation.
3. The NGO provides technical 
assistance in strategy and evaluation 
evaluation of successful projects for 
potential replicability into other 
countries, or paits of Sudan.
1. No single approach recommended:
rural transformation should be the basic objectiev
of any integrated strategy.
2. Evaluate on-going programmes in various 
developing countries and determine how they can 
best be expanded into integrated projects.
3. United Nations to provide technical assistance
in strategy and evaluation of successful 
projects for potential replicability into other 
countries.
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One of the striking differences between the two approaches is that the United Nations' 
'Modernization Strategy' broadly deals with the poor in both sectors of the economy (urban 
and rural), whilst ENSAP focuses on specific target group (poor smallholder farmers) 
living in rural areas.
Another distinctive feature of the agency's overall intervention is its tendency to be guided 
by a set of predetermined principles. These principles are followed not only by ENSAP 
project but find reflection in the majority of the CARE's programmes. These worldwide 
programming principles include:
a) Significant Scope:
The problems to be adressed by the project are common to a significant number of people 
throughout the project area. The project will affect not only the direct beneficiaries, but also 
create benefits for other disadvantaged groups( eg. labourers) outside the project.
b) Fundamental Change:
ENSAP will encourage local participation of the poor households and address their felt 
needs in a significant way as to bring about changes in the behavior and outlook of local 
participants.
c) Working with the poor:
This principle is expressed in the CARE statement of purpose: CARE's puipose is to help 
the developing world's poor in their efforts to achieve social and economic wellbeing 
(project docuemnt, Na ).
d) Participation:
Full and active participation by the local villagers and local government officials is central to 
the meeting of the goals of the project, 'bottom-up' problem identification and project 
planning by villagers will be combined with the technical expertise from CARE and the 
government.
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e) Replicability:
Basic approaches to development problems will be simple and appropriate 
to the social, economic and physical environments, and will thus be adapted 
elsewhere for other areas.
f) Clustering:
The agency works with a cluster of villages rather than with geo- graphically dispersed 
villages. In addition to its merit of reducing supervision and administation costs this 
clustering of projects is viewed to bring about "developmental synergisms through the 
strategic linking of two or more interventions"(Ibid, N.a).
g) Critical mass:
Village development organizations will be nained to identify projects which can fill gaps in 
the developmental process, and thus create the critical mass of socio-economic conditions 
required to initiate and sustain long-teim development.
We have seen that the agency’s views, perceptions and goals were largely guided by these 
'worldwide' programming principles which are by and large 'scholarly formulations'; 
while those of the clients are problem related and characteristically 'indigenous'.
To sum up and conclude: We have discussed the project clients' views, perceptions and 
goals and contrasted them with those of the agency. This included both clients' pre-existing 
views, perceptions and goals as well as those which unfolded while both parties 
experienced the ENSAP project. We then showed how these had a bearing on the EnSAP's 
fortunes. The major issues at the centre of the discussion were localpeoples' concepts about 
leadership, stereotypes, conceptions relating to fear of failure, communication channels and 
feedback, and the values guiding the agency's intervention. I have argued that some of 
these variables are conducive to project development: the apparent contention on the part of 
local people that local leadership is suited to guide them towards the achievement of the
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common good of the community (both prior to and with the introduction of the project) - 
thus conflict on who should play in the leadership role in the project was successfully 
avoided. Similarly, conflicting steotypes were promptly solved by colser communication 
and by “listening to local people” (c.f. Salmen, 1987).
However, it later came to be realized that locals’ views, conceptions and goals were 
predominantly micro-level derived (from the grass-roots), while those held by the agents 
are influenced by their disciplines and are largely macro. Some of these macro- views, 
conceptions and goals are even undisclosed to the clients (such as the intangible social 
goals. We have also examined, and contrasted, the overall approach of the agency, by 
refering to project documents, with that advocated by the Hinted Nations. It appeared that 
to a large extent the agency tries to replicate some of the United Nations’ approaches to 
development. I included these 'prescribed solutions' (in the agency's documents) because 
we need to put them into consideration when we turn to evaluate the project impact in the 
following chapter.
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Project Impact
In chapter 4 we furnished some facts on the major issues that related to the 
implementation of the credit and and extension components of ENSAP project. These 
ranged from the main project credit policies, village and farmer selection procedures 
and jamaa formation, to the extension methodology itself, its innovations and its 
various devices for iterpreting the extension unit's 'decentralized extension 
approach'(seen in terms of the project's predilection to incorporate local farmers, e.g. 
CPs, VEAs and VPCs, in the administration of the extension services at the grass­
roots). We made no mention of the real impact such implementation had on the current 
PVs of the project. In this chapter I turn to deal with the real impact ENSAP project 
had and is likely to have on the present-day Ghubeish villages targetted by the 
project. We will be dealing with both the economic impact as well as the social 
impact of the project. But before doing this some light will be thrown on some of the 
issues that relate to the project’s own methods of evaluating its current activities since 
these also relate to our evaluation of the project impact.
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Evaluation refers to the measurement and assessment of the project performance 
with an eye to weighing the successes and failures on behalf of future improvement, 
termination or continuity of the project implementation activities. The aim is to find 
out what impact the project had during a particular phase of implementation. In our 
case the evaluation is made against the project's stated objectives and goals. Included 
in project evaluation is research that is conducted both prior to and after the 
evaluation process. It depends on the previous records and trip reports furnished by 
the project staff at various stages of project development. These are important in 
guiding the evaluation teams (whether foreign or national evaluators and consultants) 
and in providing clues for future evaluation phases. But evaluation puts greater
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emphasis on the research carried out by directly the evaluation team,. Project surveys 
of the PVs provide evaluation teams with information on the existing farming 
system, major project activities,potentialities and constraints as well as the peculiarities 
of the local culture (however dearth the latter may be). The facts are then recorded to 
be weighed by the evaluation team against the final goals which the project purports to 
achieve. The evaluation itself could in the end show whether the original objectives 
stated by the project administration are realistic or unrealistic, depending on the 
project's capacity to reach them or fall short of achieving them.
The project agency procures the evaluation teams mainly from outside the project 
staff. This, I posit, is an advantage since it relates directly to 'objectivity'. The 
evaluation is deemed objective as it draws the evaluators from sources independent 
of the project administration. But there is also the danger that the evaluators, 
academically oriented as they are, be tempted by their theoretical disciplines and 
background and arrive at a biased evaluation of results. This could also lead to 
imprecise conclusions. The facts arrived at by the evaluation team are also 
governed by the time period spent in the field.The results of an inadequate 
evaluation would be a failure to uncover the shortcomings in the programme and 
suggest remedies (this problem of time constraint had particularly arisen in respect of 
the mid-term evaluation team of 1990,as the foreign staff faced some problems 
connected with entry visas to the Sudan; as a result an important component of the 
evaluation team was unable to participate).
Another strength of CARE consultancy is that the evaluators are requested to 
comment on only one field (i.e. credit or extension), or an interdisciplinary team 
may be recruited if what is to be evaluated involves both components of the project. 
Focus on specific fields leads to conclusions more precise and honestly stated. This 
is mainly because the evaluators are usually drawn from more or less one 
specialized discipline. But as the programme in its totality should not be viewed
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simply as the sum total of the different fields it also needs an overall evaluation. 
So far (towards the mid-term of project implementation) this is not forth- coming. 
Moreover, the evaluations carried out by the foreign teams had overlooked a number 
of equally important aspects: the extent to which the project neglects non-member 
smallholder farmers, denying them project loans even though they are eligible; some of 
the cultural practices related to the project which either affect it or are being affected 
by it (see e.g chapter 7) and the villagers views and conceptions (see chapter 4) as 
well as their attitudes towards the new institutions (e.g cooperatives/'associations', 
jamaa. etc.) and, above all, the negative attitudes and the indifference factor with 
respect to the project.
One of the most important views put by the evaluation team concerned the realism of 
the project's stated goals, and relates to the recommendations (put approximately 
towards the mid-term of project implementation) which led to the project's scaling 
down its target of reaching 5000 farm families to one half of that number. This was 
necessitated by the financial constraints which faced the project, the fuel shortage 
problems as well as the understaffing problem, especially with respect to the field- 
based AFEs. However, an evaluation could often have some adverse effects on 
particular aspects of the project or its personnel. I observed this for Dr. Awadalla's 
consultancy of 1991 in respect of the extension unit's performance. Dr. Awadalla's 
evaluation, which criticized the AFEs' qualifications, brought about dampened 
morale and lack of enthusiasm and distress. This will ultimately have some 
implications on the AFEs' future performance.
A related process is, also, the project routine staffs evaluation of ENSAP. Needless 
to say, this is an assessment by ENSAP of its own performance. The refresher 
training which the staff hold in the project office is a forum whereby this sort of self- 
criticism is elicited as ideas flow to and from the AFEs, senior AFE, the 
Agricultural Coordinator and the team leader.
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The project impact evaluation, as we will see below, shows that the project's 
achievements by the mid-term had fallen short of the stated planned targets. 
However, the newly adjusted targets (i.e to cover less than 5000 farm families) could 
be more realistic over subsequent seasons, given that other constraints should not 
appear and hamper project operations. The figures below compare the planned project 
tai'gets with the actual achievements for the past thi'ee yeai's of project operation.
Table (18) Planned and Actual Tai'gets:
Year No. of PVs % of target achievement No. of PFs (beneficiaries) % of tai'get
planned actual planned actual achievement
1988/89 5 3 60% 200 191 95.5%
1989/90 20 15 75% 1600 971 60.7%
1990/91 35 17 48.6% 2800 907 32.4%
Source: Fieldwork.
The table shows that in terms of village coverage the project had displayed a fairly 
good performance in the first and second seasons of project implementation. In the 
third, 1990/91, the project had considerably fallen short of achieving the target of 
reaching 35 villages. Instead, it achieved only 48.6 percent of the planned target. This 
is clearly reflected in the number of beneficiaries receiving project loans. The 
corresponding figures for the three seasons were 95.5%, 60.7% and and only 
32.4%, respectively. Moreover , despite the high figure for the actual number of 
villages reached by the project in the second season (a total of fifteen villages), the 
number of clients who received the loans for the same period was relatively small. 
So, the number of villages covered by the credit project in the second season does 
not tell us about the actual number of beneficiary PFs reached by the project. As we 
have seen in a previous chapter , the technical , financial and logistic constraints
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which were largely responsible for this poor coverage were even more pertinent as j
the project expanded thi'ough the third year, resulting in the achievement, in that yeai", 
of only 32.4 % of the planned client tai'get. Hence the idea of reducing the planned 
target of the beneficiary group from 5000 to 2500 in the 1990 season.
Farmers income depends on the size of makhamasat put into cultivation, loan size, 
environmental factors and the availability of the agricultural inputs such as the 
improved seeds, chemicals and labour. Furthermore, as a result of the provision of 
loans, farmers' incomes could rise relative to the reduction in the cost of production 
such as the abandonment of the sheil loans. In its intermediate goals, ENSAP 
requires a 10% increase in the average per unit area crop yield of the groundnuts, 
millet, watermelon and sesame; an increase of 25% in the average aiea cultivated (all 
crops); and 30% decrease in the average cost of production per unit output. Costs per 
unit of output are used rather than costs per mahkamas because the introduction of 
new inputs such as chemicals will actually increase costs per makhamas. The project, 
however, considers the corresponding increases in yields, and by evaluating costs per 
unit output yield increases are taken into account. Eight types of costs are compared, 
including costs for tools, pesticides, nafirs. capital, marketing, hired labour and 
household labour. The project, however, expects to have little impact on tools (and 
seeds in the first year of project operation) because no activities were targeted 
specifically to them and other activities were not expected to affect the levels of costs 
associated with them. For some inputs such as pesticides, the project expects costs in 
PVs to be higher than in CVs. The project also expects costs of nafirs to be lower in 
PVs. Nafirs are mostly summoned by those farmers who are late in concluding the 
weeding activity because they have spent the bulk of the time working as hired 
labourers. When they returned to their village farms they had no alternative but to 
organize nafirs so as to accomplish the weeding operation before it is too late. Project 
loans work to stabilize PFs in their farms and farmers are thus commited to spend most
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of their time labouring in he farm. Consequently the costs of nafir will be dramatically 
reduced. Cost of capital (2.5 percent per Ls.per annum) is lower than that from sheil 
merchants fsheil is mostly made for cash crops). Sheil cost, relating to the advance sale 
of crops in order to raise capital, is usually the difference between market prices and 
sheil prices (the total will be multiplied by the total number of sacks sold). Sheil prices 
are usually below market prices for the same item, the difference representing a return 
to the merchants. Among other costs which the project expects to increase in PVs are 
the costs of household labour and hired labour. Hired labour increases are triggered by 
the availability of cash loans for weeding and harvesting. It should be stated here that 
the project (at the time of fieldwork) expects only little positive impact as a result of its 
services since the delivery of inputs started after farmers had already concluded the 
planting activity in the 1988/89 season (the project was able to provide consumption 
loans and pesticides at a later stage).
Low rainfall and crop infestation in the subsequent seasons, however, had adversely 
affected farm productivity during this period and resulted in poor yields and, 
consequently, low income earnings. The amount and distribution of rainfall was 
fairly low, relative to the pre-drought period of 1984. The rainy season which 
starts from May up to September was disturbed by long periods of subna (drought) 
especially in the 1990 season which was laigely a drought season.
ENSAP's Impact Survey of 1989 had reports that the average per makhamas yield 
for the groundnuts crop 'increased' from 6.3 kantars to 9.7, a percentage increase. 
This 'increase' is not an increment at the present period from that of the previous 
year. Rather, the project makes a comparison between yields in the same season of the 
CVs and PVs. This is mainly because the agency believes that an accurate evaluation 
of project impact on yield should include all factors which come to bear on 
productivity. This mainly refers to environmental factors (such as rainfall, drought, 
pests etc.). Thus 'increase' on yield is calculated on the basis of the overall effect of
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these environmental factors. Therefore, according to this evaluation a present period's 
yield could be said to be greater than a previous year's, despite the fact that the latter is 
numerically greater than the former). Rainfall for the 1988/89 season was, as it 
happens, described by the farmers as better than average. Due to the fact that the 
project provides only millet and groundnuts seeds to its beneficiary farmers, 
evaluation is made only of these two major crops (sesame itself is not widely cultivated, 
and sorghum cultivation is, in fac t, on the decline due to emphasis on millet). The 
table below shows comparisons for the average yields for the main cash crop, 
groundnuts, and the main food crop, millet, for the PVs and the CVs over the 
periods,1988/89, 1989/90 and 1990/91.
Table (19): Average Yield in PVs and CVs For 1988/89,1989/90 And 1990/91 
seasons (per makhamasl
(yield for groundnuts is in terms of kantar while for millet it is in terais of sacks)
Year
groundnuts: 
average yield 
millet:
average yield
1988/89 
PVs CVs 
9.7 6.3
1989/90 
PVs CVs 
5 3
2 1
1990/91 
PVs CVs 
0.5 0.45
0. 0 0.0 (crop failure)
Source: Senior AFE (Bashir), 1991, and ENSAP, 1989 report.
The table shows that compared to the average yield for the CVs, and given the 
constraints of rainfall shortage and pest infestation, the project was able to obtain 
some significant increases in yields for both the groundnuts and the millet crop.
The average area cultivated of the cash crop and the food crop reveal that in the second 
agricultural season PFs reduced the cultivation of the millet crop relative to that of the 
cash crop. But eventually in the subsequent season, 1990/91 the trend has been 
reversed, with relatively increased areas being cultivated of the food crop. My own 
figures for the selected villages show that the PFs put into cultivation larger
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makhamasat for the production of millet in 1990; moreover the farmers stated that 
they planned to cultivate the same proportions for the two crops in the subsequent 
season, 1991/92.
Tracing the trend throughout the three seasons we get the following fluctuating 
figures for areas cultivated of the cash and food crops (including in the farmers' 
statements, from the third season on there is a decline in the area cultivated of the cash 
crop and a corresponding increase in the ai*ea cultivated of the food crop):
Table (20)
Average Aiea cultivated 
(per makhamas) 
groundnuts 
millet
1988/89
7.2
17.3
1989/90
9.9
16.2
1990/91
17.9 (yet to rise for 
1991/92)
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The following figures, given for selected PVs , are a breakdown of the figures on the 
table above.
Table (21) : Average Area Cultivated Of The Two Main Crops, 1990/91 season:
Village Average Area (per makhamas)
groundnuts millet
Seranbi 7.5 18.8
Dirra 12.7 19.4
Rasheed 11.2 21.3
Barnawi 7.9 18.8
Um Sidair 7.7 17.9
El halfaya 9.8 16.4
Murabaat 6.9 18.7
Abu Geid 6.8 11.9
Averages 8.8 17.9
Source: Fieldwork.
The reason behind the PFs' subsequent emphsis on the production of more millet 
relative to groundnuts is not far to detect. In the first and second seasons of project 
implementation the PFs could see that the cultivation of large areas of the cash crop 
received more attention from the project (given the fact that the project supplied larger 
amounts of the groundnuts seeds and only a smaller quantity for the Ugandi 
millet).Thus the PFs believed their emphasis on the cash crop would result in larger 
amounts of loans being delivered by the project.This resulted in the corresponding 
increase in the area cultivated with the groundnuts crop in the second agricultural 
season. However, towards the end of the 1989/90 season and throughout the 1990/91 
season the prices of the food crop on local farmers significantly increased and by the 
end of the 1990 season there was a huge food deficit throughout the area.This resulted
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in the PFs' decisions now to opt for more food production (to save having to buy food) 
rather than the production of the groundnuts crops (adverse rainy seasons in 1989/90 
and 1990/91 made farmers unable to provide precise figures on cash incomes ). The 
continuation of this trend will pose serious problems for the project in its attempt at 
significantly increasing farmers' incomes through increased production for the mai'ket; 
we will stress this point to see its implication for the future of the project.
It is generally contended that innovative interventions aimed at increasing agricultural 
production should rely on incentives to the farmer if they are to elicit a response 
(Parikh, 1971:291). Farmers are directly affected by such interventions in that 
changes in the allocation of resources and pattern of production will imply change in 
their traditional decision-making processes and, in consequence, a need to adjust to 
the new fluctuations in prices and agricultural income. It is well stated that the 
"effectiveness of price in causing changes in production patterns depends on the 
extent to which the prices actually change, the relative profitability of the different 
farms, and secondly on the farmers' attitudes to new profitability relations" (1971:291). 
This is absolutely supported by ENSAP PFs' case as it emerged throughout the 1990 
and 1991/92 seasons. The case of ENSAP's PFs shows that a farmer's option to 
cultivate a particular kind of crop variety depends on his evaluation relating to other 
options, of the alternative benefits that might accrue to him in terms of cash income 
generated as well as household subsistence. This evaluation is made in terms of price 
relations (i.e whether the change in the price of one crop leads to a more lucrative 
income than changes in the price of the other crop).
Prices of the food crops (millet and sorghum) have increased dramatically, as we said, 
in the second and the third seasons of project implementation. This increase in food 
prices, however, was not matched by a corresponding, or proportional, increase in the 
price of the groundnuts crop, as my data indicate (see table No. 22).
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Table (22): Changes In The Food And Cash Crop Prices, 1988,'89,'90 (LS)
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Groundnuts crop 68 90 140
millet crop 175 350 430
sorghum crop 130 250 330
Source: fieldwork.
These figures are supported by the municipal council's Agricultural Survey of October 
1990 which assessed the food deficit situation in the 1990 season and its effects on 
smallholder farmers. In line with my findings, the number of smallholder farmers 
purchasing food crops is shown to be continuously rising over the three past seasons.
Hereunder are the figures:
Table (23) Percentages of Farmers Purchasing Food For The 1988/89, 1989/90 And 1990/91 
seasons in En Nahud District:
1989/90 
% No. of Farmers %
82.8 190 66.7
17.2 95 33.3
Year 1988/89
No.of Farmers 
Had not purchased 236 
Purchased food 49
1990/91
No. of Farmers 
113 
172
%
30.6
60.4
Source: The Agricultural Survey, October, 1990.
Farmers adduce other reasons for their shift to the production of food crops. They 
argue that their experience in the past with producting more cash crops relative to 
food crops was bolstered by the lucrative revenues generated from the production of 
the cash crops which could be used to purchase food crops not produced by the 
household. But the present situation showed that the revenues generated from the 
sales of the cash crops could not cover the cost of food purchased by the household 
(this is aggravated by large family size ). This, farmers ai'gue, holds true even when 
they are supported by ENSAP loans. Should ENSAP credit staff urge farmers to
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further increase the areas cultivated with the groundnuts crop, then the ultimate result 
will be that farmers will perceive that little income has been generated as a result of 
their participation in the project. Or, as often happened, farmers would report to the 
credit teams inflated figures for the total areas they actually put into cultivation and 
,secretly, would devote larger areas of their plots to the production of the millet crop. 
The fact that the control of the means of production (land and labour) lies with the PFs 
rather than with the project facilitating this. William, speaking generally about peasant 
production strategy, had this to say about the problem:
Peasants control over their means of production gives them a certain 
independence and security, which enables them to protect their own way of 
life. Peasants have responded to new opportunities and have organized 
production in new ways to improve and protect their conditions of life. They 
have refused to give up their way of life, and regal'd with suspicion the plans of 
outsiders to transform or improve i t . The recalcitrance of peasants to outsiders' 
conceptions of progress and the peasants' place in them, defines the peasants as 
a problem (William, 1981:29).
If this definition of the peasants as a problem has to be directed to our PFs of ENSAP 
in their present conditions, then such an accusation could be categorically misplaced as 
far as the PFs themselves, and indeed as I myself, view the situation. Moreover, PFs 
know that even when their incomes increase as a result of producing more of the cash 
crops, this increase is only attained at a relatively higher cost of production (in terms 
of total inputs, rather than per unit of output). These costs of production are 
represented by the hiring of more wage labour for the weeding operations, more 
chemicals for pest control and larger maiketing costs. At its best the project has opened 
up new economic opportunities for the PFs, who perceive them, however, quite 
differently from the way the project agency views them. We have stated earlier that the 
project aims to reduce costs per unit output in PVs compared to CVs (e.g. due to 
reductions in costs of nafirs. see above). But farmers themselves stated that costs of
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nafirs are not necessarily reduced because the expansion in the area cultivated as a 
result of joining the project implied an additional demand for labour. This demand is 
met by mobilizing nafirs. especially when hired labourers are in short supply. So, 
while the project agency thinks in terms of average costs per unit output, farmers are 
mainly concerned with total production costs (these costs are especially unaffordable to 
poorer farmers who get inadequate loans from the project).
ENSAP's policy towards the food supply problem is to encourage jubraka women 
producers to produce kitchen garden crops to cover household subsistence needs 
thereby enabling the male farmers to devote relatively more resources to production for 
the market. As we mentioned earlier, the jubraka programme is based on providing in- 
kind loans (seeds) to women producers in order to increase food (kitchen garden 
crops) as well as cash crops (such as watermelons) production.
This programme is seen as resolving the potential conflict that might arise 
consequential to the emphasis of cash crops at the expense of the food crops. However, 
the performance of the jubraka programme was very poor, thus not alleviating the 
PE's dilemma over rising food prices and the production of the cash crops in favour 
siding with the production of food crops. The table below shows the performance of 
the women jubraka programme.
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Table (24) Average Yields (per Makhamas)For Women Jubraka Crops For 1988/89 (in En 
Nahud demonstration fields), 1989/90 and 1990 (in sacks, except for water melons)
Year 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Average yield:
oki’a .75 1.5 0.0
maize 0.0 0.0 0.0
water melon 0.0 £15000 0.0
cow pea 3.0 2.0 (25% of average.
Source: Jubraka Field Extensionist (Fatima). 1991.
The table shows the obvious failure of the jubraka crops in achieving significant yields 
in the PVs. The main reason is that these crops are not drought resistant and largely 
susceptible to pest infestation which requires closer management, which is very 
difficult for the village women who are trapped into other tasks related to household 
management and child rearing.
The poor economic impact of the jubraka programme, which allocates only in-kind 
loans, has prompted the project administration to consider the feasibility of delivering 
cash loans to women.
The food deficit pai'tly resulted in reducing the total amount of disposable income of 
the PFs as they devoted a large part of their agricultural income to the purchase of 
food crops. This also resulted in declining loan repayments with the project. The 
main reason is that faced with the option of either of defaulting or forgoing present 
consumption the farmer would opt to default and thereby ensure household 
subsistence. The overall repayment trend with the project is presented in the table 
below.
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Table ( 25 ) Repayment Profile For ENSAP PFs For The 1988/89, '89/And 1990/91 
Seasons
Year
Loans Disbursed 
No. of instalments 
Average loan/ farmer 
Repayment Rate 
Interest rate
1988/89
LS 105,715 
1
LS 553 
99.3%
2%
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92
LS 2,049,457.50 LS 1,885,362 LSI,469740 
2 2 l(ls t Instl.)
Ls2111
80% est. 20% N.a
2% 2.5% 3%
Source: ENSAP Credit Officers, 1991.
The good repayment rate for the first season was attributed to the project's jamaa 
policy (see chapter 4) which stipulates that the repayment should be 80%,90%and 
100% for the 'association'/cooprative, the jamaa and the individual farmer, 
respectively. This policy made use of peer pressure on the PFs for repayment. But 
with the 1990 crop failure this policy was subsequently abandoned.
My default suiwey revealed that the main cause of loan default was crop failure due 
to subnas and environmental hazards. Willful default ranked second. Inability to repay 
ranked third; and the malpractices of the dumman last. The table below shows the 
percentages of total default.
Table (26): Cause of default in loan repayment among ENSAP PFs
Cause Percentage of total default
Crop failure 56.3
Willful default (some farmers considered loans as grants) 19.7
Inability to repay 16.1
Malpractice of the dumman 5.5
Fuel Shortage (limied field repayment trips) 2.4
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As cited by the farmers the reason for willful default was as a response to the strong 
opinion of religious people against interest-related transactions. Instead of paying 
interest the farmer would opt for total default on his outstanding loans. The 
malpractice of the dumman was explained in terms of the the damin failing in his 
responsibility (in terms of fully representing his group and repayment of the whole 
group's loans to the agency) by absenting himself during the loan repayment period or 
directly by pretending not to be able to repay his own loans. When the damin fails to 
repay his own loans the whole jamaa under his guaranteeship is disqualified from 
future loans. However this does not pose an unreconciliable conflict since the 
(social)pressure from the jamaa members (works to redress such potential confict.
Despite the fact that ENSAP loans worked to assist smallholder farmers increase 
their agricultural productivity there are still those PFs who seem indifferent to these 
loans. Among these are those farmers (a very small number) who are trapped by the 
inadequacy of ENSAP loans to resort to their traditional shell lenders to supplement 
the project loans. Their indifference related to the fact that these farmers still view no 
appreciable improvement in the quality of their lives.However the impact of the 
project on the shell system varies among the PVs of the project. The following table 
show the impact of the project on the shell system in some of the PVs of ENSAP, 
1990/91, in terms of the percentage of farmers who still practice shell borrowing.
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Table (27) : Project Impact On The Shell System (% age of Farmers dealing with the 
shell ) For the 1990/91
The most tangible impact of the credit system of ENSAP
Village Percentage o
Dirra 0%
Rasheed 2%
Murabaat 3%
Barnawi 0%
El Halfaya 0%
Um Sidair 0%
Abu Geid 3%
Seranbi 1%
Source: Fieldwork.
The table shows while the percentage of PFs borrowing from the shell merchants in 
four of the eight selected villages is small the other four villages have been able to 
entirely eradicate the shell system. The reason for the success of these villages is 
explained by the availability of the credit loans from the project. But, most 
importantly, some of these villages were able to dissuade the PFs against the shell 
merchants. The sheikh of Dirra village said that he was able to politicise his farmers 
against the shell merchants with the result that by 1990 season the percentage of PFs 
borrowing from the shell merchants dropped to nil. Some of Dirra farmers,as well as 
from the other PVs which had been able to eradicate the shell system, remarked that 
the most tangible effect of the project was that they were able invest their surplus 
income in the purchase of sheep and goats which is the major form of wealth in these 
villages. One farmer in Dirra remarked that he was able to finance the naming 
ceremony arranged by his wife for his newly born child and could entertain his guests 
—this was thought to have been absolutely difficult had he failed to secure the project
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loans. Another farmer in Dirra ai’gued that he needed to express his contentment with 
the material benefits of joining the project by naming the goat which he bought, 
after the project, i.e, ENSAP, since his children depended on the goat for the milk it 
supplied.
One of the significant socio-economic impacts of ENSAP project had been its ability 
to stabilise the PFs in their villages during the planting period. Prior to joining the 
project the farmers resorted to hire out their labour to other people's farms. This 
often conflicted with the time which they needed to spend planting the family farms 
(for they would return late in the season). The loans which they now receive from the 
project allow them to get sufficient money for financing the agricultural enterprise 
as well as to provide for household subsistence. However, there exists the impending 
danger that the PFs of ENSAP increase their traditional dependence on the sharaka 
system as the number of PFs who engage in sharaka with Dinka labourers is still 
significant. Dependence on the sharaka system will conflict with the objective of the 
project of up-grading PFs' skills through the technical extension assistance provided 
by the AFEs. Being engaged in the sharaka implied that the PFs will not commit 
themselves to farm management themselves as the Dinka run the farming business on 
their behalf.
We have dealt with some of the major achievements of the extension unit of ENSAP 
in chapter 4, in which it was shown that despite the fact some positive responses 
were observed, in which PFs started to adopt ENSAP's innovative inputs (chemicals 
such as the diazinon, aldrex-t and the neem extracts; and the tools such as the sonki, 
prototype sprayers etc.) , most of the formal training went to the VEAs and VPCs 
who represent a negligible section of the village community. Also we have mentioned 
that mostly benefitting from the formal training were the extension staff (AFEs ,The
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Agricultural Coordinator and the jubraka extensionists). Hereunder are some of the 
claims of the smallholders about the extension unit of ENSAP.
The needy smallholders were often invisible to the senior staff of the extension service 
and claim to receive little contact with them, even though they often invited the senior 
staff to their farms. The case of Ibrahim Abdel Daayim and the project visiting team to 
Murabaat village (discussed in chapter 5), was but only one example. While the poor 
faimer was desperate for advice and tried to solicit the senior staff to come to his 
farm, the visiting team turned down the invitation. The team was preoccupied with 
the time factor and was wanting to cover as amny PVs as possible in too short a 
period of time. It was also clear that the poorer farmers got less attention than the 
relatively better-off PFs within the same association or cooperative. This was mainly 
because the relatively better-off farmers were economically advantaged for entertaining 
the visiting teams upon their arrival in the PV.
My observations of the team’s visit surveys are that upon their arrival at the 
village the team is welcomed by a group of farmers among whom will be those who 
will eventually invite the team to eat. While being thus entertained, the group will 
gossip for a while and the farmers then solicit the team to their farms and get the 
appropriate extension advice. The basic feature of the team's survey is the tendency to 
cover only a representative part of the PFs thereby leaving a large section of poor 
farmers unreached. In his description of a similar phenomenon among poor farmers, 
Chambers (1974:81) had this to say: "These farmers have a low capacity for 
demanding services, negligible sanctions to exercise if they do not receive them, and 
little or nothing to offer in exchange; and they are often caught in a trap of little 
land, poverty, ill-health, large families and apathy".
The eligibility criteria for the selection of the VPCs, VEAs and CFs also carries in its 
content a sort of inherent bias towards those who are potentially progressive
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farmers. To be 'innovative', 'successful','literate' as the main requirement for 
selection implies that the training to be provided will ultimately benefit those who 
need it least.Since the majority of the PFs do not satisfy the literacy criteria the the 
selection of the CFs, VPCs and VEAs is likely to create and accentuate a class of 
progressive farmers within the poor smallholder farmers of the j amaa and 
'association'/cooperative.
The extension staff, however, recognizes this danger of siding with a group of 
progressive farmers and this was clear in the phrase" but should not be the most 
progressive, whose fellows tend not to follow his example" (see chapter 4).To 
partially avoid this problem of being biased towards the progressive farmers, then, 
the senior extension staff should not dominate the selection process (i.e. concerning 
which farmers should be brought into the project, since they simply do not know the 
village farmers as do the PFs themselves.
Among the PFs of the project were also those farmers who are too poor to fully 
apply the recommended inputs (chemical such as the propuxure, aldrex-t etc.) since 
they were financially constrained (this was especially ti*ue for farmers with large family 
size in Murabaat, El Riteirit and Wad Fadol) from purchasing these inputs. The solution 
to this problem hes in intensive face-to-face contact between the extension staff and the 
farmers so as to discover those who needed the extension services most. This happened 
in the first season of project operation when the project team was able to launch such 
contacts in its visits to the PVs of El Riteirit, Widaa and Wad Fadol. This was 
facilitated by the small number of villages to be covered in the first season. When the 
team members discovered that a small number of PFs were financially handicapped to 
apply the chemical aldrex-t in their farms their immediate reaction was to duly 
recommend the delivery of adequate loans to these needy farmers. ENSAP's 
endeavour to ensure closer contact with PFs could be summed up in the following 
measures:
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a) AFEs convenience to work with groups of farmers rather than with individual 
farmers.This method was observed to have been adopted by the AFEs in Murabaat 
and Dirra in the 1990 season.
b) The Issuing of Daleel ENSAP in which, among others, the farmers were advised 
to contact their AFEs should need for advice arise. This method is generally referred 
in the literature of rural development as mobilizing farmers demand for extension 
services (Chambers, 1974 :82). It also enables the AFE to record, through personal 
contact, the number of farmers contacted or visited. One result of Daleel ENSAP's 
contribution to more tangible benefits to the extension was that (as the project AFEs 
noted) "one farmer [in 1989] reported that he was able to produce a neem 
suspension using the instructions provided in the Daleel. He applied the chemical to 
his okra and is now an outspoken supporter of the neem product" (ENSAP Report, 
1989)
c)The extension methodology's adoption of an MBO (management by objectives) 
method in work organisation which specifies particular targets for the extension staff 
to guide their job performance.Thus, according to this methodology, the AFEs were 
able to keep records of the farmers contacted and the services delivered within the 
period of time specified in the extension calendar kept by the AFEs. This helps the 
extension unit make assessment of the actual number of farmers reached by the 
AFEs.
In general the impact of the extension coverage is quite limited (i.e the core villages on 
which the AFEs are based tend to receive greater attention) and it also varied from one 
PV to another. For the PVs selected in the research the extent of impact has been 
cited ill the following declining order: Murabaat, Dirra, Rasheed, Seranbi, Um Sidair, 
Barnawi, Abu Geid, the least, El Halfaya. However the average coverage for all 
selected villages is 24% which is absolutely small.
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ENSAP project impact should also be assessed in terms of its contribution to 
providing extra benefits to poor villagers not directly targeted by the project. We 
have argued that one of basic programming principles of the project agency is 
'significant scope' by which it is intended to touch on the problems relating both 
to groups pai'ticipating with the project as well as those outside the project. One such 
effect relates to the provision of wage employment as this leads to income 
redistribution and equity. This effect is stressed because the project works with only 
a limited proportion of Ghubeish villages- the majority comprising poor peasants 
producing partly for the market and partly for subsistence. Yet other villages have 
already applied to participate in the project and await the lucrative loans and 
services of the agency.Thus villages outside the project (which included Jama'a 
Kokada, Himeir El Wall, Atrun and Jidada) were able to supply hired labourers to 
the project villages and receive lucrative income which augmented their limited 
earnings from traditional agriculture. They were able to combine hired labour and 
bildat (lit. farm) cultivation. The main project villages which were able to absorb the 
hired labourers from these villages included El Halfaya, Seranbi, Abu Geid, 
Murabaat and El Riteirit. The benefits from wage employment with the project 
varied according to the proximity of the sending villages to the project sites. 
Distance works to adversely affect villagers who combine hired labour with bildat 
(traditional farm) cultivation because the hired labourer needs to return to his village 
before it is too late to undertake the agricultural operations of his own household faim. 
The latter is heavily relied upon for the household's subsistence which could 
certainly not be secured entirely by selling the member's labour. Smallholder 
farmers outside the project with low income can thus, potentially and sometimes 
actually, considerably improve their wellbeing through this strategic combination of 
occupations.
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But competition between ENSAP’s PVs for the limited labour supply has resulted 
in differential wage rates mling in the various PVs. Thus while the wage rate in 
Murabaat village was around Ls 230, in 1990, it was LS 250 in Seranbi and LS 
275 in EL Halfaya.
The remoteness of El Halfaya was the main reason for offering the lucrative 
wage rates to solicit a greater supply of hired labourers. This is also coupled with 
the problem of water shortage. Thus farmers in Murabaat village voice their 
complaint against other PVs' raising the level of the wages which has resulted in 
a dearth of hired labourers in their village. Competition over the limited supply of 
hired labour is believed by such farmers in Murabaat as leading to lower 
revenues being realised since the increased hired labour cost "eats the additional 
benefits from the project". Thus hired labourers were reported to derive a level of 
income of LS 1050- 2000 (per person per season ) from the project villages which 
was absolutely high (by the village standards in 1990).
For the hired labourers' part the combination of hired labour and bildat cultivation 
can often conflict with the optimum allocation of labour resources since this 
implied less time devoted to the cultivation of the household farm. Distance and 
logistic problems often prevented the hired labourers from returning home in due 
time to do the weeding operation. Mostly affected by such constraints were the 
labourers from Himeir El Wall who supplied their labour to El Halfaya village 
which due to its remoteness lorry tiansport seldom approached.
One of the important reasons behind this competition for hired labour is the 
expansion of the area cultivated in PVs as recommended by the project agency. 
Farmers participating with the project, particulary those who seemed indifferent 
about the project benefits, voiced the claim that traditionally they never relied on 
such outside labour to the extent of conflicting with an optimum allocation of
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labour. These particular farmers were of the belief that expansion in the area 
cultivated was not matched by a corresponding proportional increase in the income 
realized. As a result they still had to partially rely on the traditional shell lenders 
to provide for their extra financial needs. The common trend, however, is for the 
demand for hired labour to increase proportionately with the farm size, despite the 
large average family size in the project villages. The agency, however, originally 
assumed that the claim on wage labour as a result of the project would not be 
problematic since part of the household labour which traditionally left the village 
on seasonal migration would be stabilized in the village and would augment 
household labour.
But the project also works to adversely affect those families outside the project 
which traditionally relied partially on hired labour to accomplish the agricultural 
operations (including families headed by widows). Thanks to the ENSAP project 
these households were handicapped in competing with the PFs for the limited 
labour supply. PFs were now able to afford the cost of hhed labour, because of to 
the loans they regularly received from the project agency. As a result these 
disadvantaged farmers often reduced the area cultivated to well below the 
traditional optimum size. Particularly targeted for reduction was the size of the 
plot traditionally devoted for the cultivation of the groundnuts (cash crop). The size 
of the area cultivated of the food crop was not proportionately reduced since 
subsistence production was given primacy over production of the cash crops. 
Ironically, these households were often tempted into reverting to the sheil system 
to cope with their predicament. This is ironic since the project was particularly 
launched to combat the sheil system. As such the project rather accentuates 
economic divisions within the village.
Another effect of the project on the PVs is its contribution to redressing the 
problem of long-term migration. Prior to the implementation of the project some
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household members would migrate to al bahai- (the Nile borders) in seaich of urban 
employment. This had resulted in only low returns both because these illiterate 
villagers worked in low paid jobs in the urban centres and because the wage incomes 
were partly spent in financing the cost of transportation on return to their 
communities (this was estimated at LS 350 in 1989). What was left at their the 
migrant's, disposal was judged insufficient to provide for household requirements. 
Migration also implied an additional burden on the migrant's relatives( usually 
father and brothers) who were assigned the responsibility of looking after the 
migrant's family. Mostly engaged in such urban migration to al bahar were the 
villagers of Abu Geid, Rasheed and El Halfaya.
Critics would argue that wage employment with the project would in the end lead 
to the creation of a wage labour system which in turn could result in low 
investment in traditional agriculture. However, in a previous work I have made the 
point that " cash incomes in traditional agriculture are low; yet along with the 
security provided through kin groups traditional land farming at least enables 
households to maintain themselves at low cost by producing subsistence crops"( 
Abdel Raouf, 1989:118). But where seasonal employment with the project 
conflicted with labour allocation in the household farm the effect is a diminished 
investment in traditional agriculture. It is stated in this respect that:
on the whole, however, the periodic and sustained absence of the most 
productive elements in the labour force must retard agricultural 
development. Although there is under employment in agriculture, it is not 
necessarily the size of the labour force that is of overriding importance in 
considering the relation among land, labour and capital in peasant 
agriculture. The composition and quality of the labour force is as important 
as its size (Yudelman, 1964:133-134).
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The effect of labour supply to the project villages on traditional agriculture can be 
well grasped since it is reported that the project villages required over 31,500 
mandays for accomplishing the weeding and harvesting operations in 1990 
agricultural season. The table below shows the seasonal labour requirements in 
ENSAP PVs for the 1990/91 season.
Table (28)
Seasonal Labour In ENSAP Project Villages, 1990 
Operation total Mandays No. of Hired Labourers Period 
Weeding 13,500 1,050 Jul.- August
Harvesting 18,000 2,600 Oct.-November
Given the large household size the effect of the project on overall employment is 
absolutely significant. This implies that the project is drawing a significant 
proportion of labourers from their traditional farming occupations to assist with 
the weeding and harvesting operations.
While this works to contribute to equity by providing gainful employment to poor 
households outside the project its effect on retarding investment on traditional 
agriculture could counter-balance these benefits.
As we have mentioned earlier, the project staited the delivery of its services to the 
jubraka women producers in the second season of project implementation and was yet 
to have a significant impact on the women producers for the 1989 and 1990 seasons. 
The latter season, in particular, was one of severe rainfall shortage which affected the 
jubraka farms most. Also men farmers were to some extent resistant to having their 
wives participate in the jubraka programme for cultural reasons, as we again 
mentioned before. This ranged from covert reluctance, as in some villages whose
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women the project reported to having returned the loans without using them,to direct 
resistance as observed for Barnawi village in which only the men participated in the 
project. But a large number of women in the village covered in my field work who 
could not participate in the project, despite their enthusiasm towards the jubraka 
programme,, voiced their grievance at being excluded from participation. The main 
reason cited was in fact the program's eligibility criteria which they could not meet. 
These eligibihty criteria were stated as follows:
a) Ownership of jubraka ;
b) Not indebted to a sheil merchant or any other institution;
c) Having an interest in the programme;
d) Having a history of practicing jubraka for at least the past three years;
e) Should be married (with a household);
f) Husband paiticipating with ENSAP;
g) An old woman, grandfathers and grandmothers.
Mostly cited among these as restricting women participation were criteria e), and, 
to a less degree, b). Thus unmarried women who owned and practiced jubraka farnhng 
for a long period of time were mostly affected. Poor women who resorted to sheil 
merchants for financing their jubraka activities were also excluded despite being the 
most needy (in relation to those who do not practice the sheil and since the sheil is 
always practiced as a last resort).
The poor economic impact of the jubraka programme on women producers could be 
seen from the relatively small number of women reached by the project in the process 
of its development. The table below shows the number of jubraka women receiving 
in-kind loans (watermelon,oki*a maize and cowpea) interpreted in financial figures:
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Table (29)
Year No.of beneficiaries No.of villages Value of the loan 
1988/89 84 2 LS 6700
1989/90 533 14 LS 30500
1990/91 418 17 N.a
Repayment rate for 1989/90 = 83.2%
Source: Jubraka Extensionist, Giseima, 1990.
Location 
En Nahud R/C 
Ghubeish R/C 
Ghubeish R/C
The number of women beneficiaries dropped from over five hundred to 418 as a 
result of Barnawi village’s opting out from paiticipation. This also points to the fact 
that as the project expanded towards its mid-way the jubraka programme had largely 
failed to reach the target specified in the goal statement document (i.e 25000 
women). However, one major benefit for the jubraka women was cited by the 
evaluation team of June 1990 (p, 23), that "the programme has helped village women 
build a preliminaiy resource management capability which will significantly improve 
the potential success of the women's cash lending program which will begin this year 
[1990/91]". The fact that the project has expressed its satisfaction with the repayment 
capacity of women, which stood at 83.2 for 1989/90 ,(which the project sees to be 
better than that for men) had stimulated a high concern on the part of ENSAP 
administration to get the suggested women’s cash lending programme implemented
Anthropologists have noticed the profound impact capital has on the kinship 
structure of agricultural societies. Meillassoux (19884:xi) has emphasized the 
importance of relating kinship systems to the underlying forces of production. This 
emphasis derives from the recognition of the fact that the family and kinship systems 
of these societies effect and are affected by the material conditions of production. 
Moreover it has also been argued that while in African societies which have been 
enmeshed in commodity markets investment is often evaluated in financial terms,in
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other societies evaluation may be based on prestige, honour, social dependents and the 
ability to accumulate power (Bates, 1990:154).
Such divergence concerning the proper way of investment of capital could lead to 
conflict between the project planners, whose goals behind the provision of financial 
assistance are primarily based on the material aspect of investment, and the village 
people who have other aims and goals such as spending on social dependents or the 
accumulation of power. As ENSAP project is primarily concerned with the 
'sustainability' of its credit component, it is ideal that we analyse the loan system in 
light of the people's values influencing their notions of wealth and financial 
investment.
We have seen in chapter (1) that the Hamar tribes of the project area were 
transformed over time from pastoral nomadism to follow a sedentary form of 
agriculture. We argued that towards the end of the past century the tribal wealth in 
terms of livestock exceeded the wealth of the other tribes but as a result of their wars 
with the Kababeesh they lost the larger part of that wealth. The Hamar tribes of the 
present-day Dar Hamar still have these glorious days in memory and aspire to the 
nostalgia of that era. Today the importance of animals still rides high in the tribal 
economy. Both the ownership of animals and the farming business make claim on 
financial spending. But spending on animal ownership is affected by the household's 
spending on family members. We have seen that most of the project villages, being 
largely sedentarized, have recognized the importance of education and thus have 
made remarkable efforts towards raising the levels of their children's education 
taljuhdal sha'abi has played a significant role in getting the elementary schools 
established in the majority of the villages covered by the field work). Parents devote a 
significant part of their capital to children's education with the hope that the latter could 
support them in old age.
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The farmers of the project would remark that despite the high cost of investment in 
the education of children the expected returns could be absolutely high as to offset that 
cost. Getting a salaried job in the towns, farmers argue, is more secure and lucrative 
than investment in agriculture which is faced with the vagaries of recurrent drought( 
pointing to the 1984/85 and 1990/91 droughts) and the sinister attack of pests. The 
expected remittances these salaried people send back to their parents can supplement 
household income, especially in adverse agricultural seaons when it was quite 
difficult to get a return from agriculture.
As observed in other parts Africa (see,e.g Bates, 1990:155), people in the project area 
tend to withhold resources from present consumption and invest them in their 
children. Thus, a farmer who owned some animals will opt to sell one or two head 
to meet the cost of sending his children to secondary school ( this was cited for such 
villages as Abu Geid, Murabaat, Dirra, Rasheed, Um Sidair and Bainawi). Or, equally 
observed, a mother who had reaped agricultural surplus from her jubraka garden 
would spend part of the marketed revenue in a child's education rather than devote it 
to household consumption. For this reason the villagers dietary structure was very 
poor and nearly similar throughout the project villages. The meals consisted mainly of 
asida (millet or sorghum pourage) or kisra (another version of the same millet or 
sorghum pourage) with sauce made of meat (often dried),onions,okra or potatoes (or 
the sauce may be a mixture of locally collected wild vegetables such as abadeib (a local 
wild plant ) which has characteristics similar to the okra) cooked with yoghourt. Fruits 
and vegetables were largely absent from the diet ingredients, except those which are 
cultivated in the jubraka gardens such as cowpea, cucumber and watermelons which 
appear for a period of darat (lit. when the agricultural crops are harvested and 
plentifully supplied in the market,usually from November up to February).
Risk aversion in traditional agriculture provides yet another reason for people to seek 
alternatives such as investment in children. High risk in African agricultural systems
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has been widely documented in anthropology. It has been argued that in poor 
savannh zones rainfall is so unreliable that it generates limited amounts of moisture 
(see. Little, 1989). Yet, other authorities stated the adoption of a number of devices and 
techniques in such zones (such as those of the villages in the northern part of the 
project area) for spreading the risk:
they develop means for storing their crops, they domesticate plants species that 
on average do less well than others yet are more likely to crop even in yeais of 
drought; and they diversify their crops and sources of income, maintaining 
cattle as well as farms..A principal way., is through the lineage system...the 
lineage., .confers upon the members of its household access to a portfolio of 
assets (Bates, 1990; 157-158).
Generally observed for the PVs of the project, the villagers spending on the education 
of thek children was meant to provide the insurance against life hazai'ds.
Another source of spending which involves kinship support is animal husbandry. 
Animals are raised by the PFs for a number of reasons. Among these, animals, as we 
mentioned before, are a means for storing the wealth of the household, they provide 
prestige to the household members and also other benefits such as transport, carrying 
water and the provision of milk. But animal husbandry entails laborious work for 
grazing and herding. In such conditions support is sought through kinship. Families 
which realize the importance of kinship support for the tending of animals will, in 
return, ensure every assistance to kinship members in conditions of need.Thus, even 
uncles would provide financial support for a brother's son since he can solicit the 
latter for a specific duty which would pay for the cost of this support. We have seen 
that in Um Sidair, Omer Mohamed (a pseudonym) who received ENSAP loans would 
pass the loan to his sister's son in return for the latter's attending of his animals. 
Noting a similar phenomenon in Africa Bates argues that possessing a broad-based 
lineage enables the households to spread the risks since they “disperse their cattle to
284
family members located in different contrasting settings; drought in any paiticular area 
is therefore likely to affect but a small portion of the individual's herd” (1990:158). 
This also happens in Ghubeish villages.
As is the case with investment in children, keeping animals also provides insurance in 
old age (due to inability of the breadwinner to continue labouring in the farm) and 
promises future improvement in the household's quality of life as the result of benefits 
in terms of material support (e.g. when the herd expands as a result of reproduction). 
But spending on the education of children implies less investment in animals. Those 
families in the PVs with relatively large herds (e.g in Dirra, Murabaat and El Halfaya) 
maintained that possession of large numbers of animals was accompanied by a dearth 
of spending on child education. Moreover these families were often obliged to keep 
their children out of schools to attend and graze these animals. This fact holds 
especially true for the previous generation, which attached lower preference to 
education in that time before aljuhdal sha'abi could be mobilized for the establishment 
of local schools. The fact that more than ninety percent of the elders of Ghubeish PVs 
remain illiterate reflects this fact.In another article Bates (1976:160) has made a similar 
observation, “that increased holdings of cattle strongly correlate with reduced levels of 
literacy, schooling, and urban migration”.
As a result of project implementation we have seen the preference towards keeping 
more animals (though actual investment on animals is observable for only a handful 
of farmers) while investment in children is said to stay at the same pre-scheme levels. 
Farmers argue that until they can ensure sizeable returns from the project, spending 
in schooling has to stay at the same previous levels. The argument is based on the 
grounds that returns from schooling are long-term goals . Investment in animals on 
the other hand, finds strong support and a large number of farmers is still willing to 
invest in animals should the returns from participation with the project promise 
adequate suiplus income. Animals, it is believed, provide an additional asset as well as
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a collateral the farmer can rely upon in conditions of controllable default on the 
farmer's outstanding loans. PFs realize that their farms are liable to animal trespassing 
and pest infestations which may lead to crop failure. To ensure the future loans being 
secured from the project the farmer needs to repay present loans even if his crop 
proves a failure (e.g of PFs citing this are those farmers drawing from the PVs of 
Dirra, Rasheed,El Halfaya, Seranbi and Murabaat). One way of overcoming the 
problem of animal trespassing as we have argued before (chapter 1 for Dirra), was the 
formation of the animal grazing regulation committees which stipulates fines on 
animal owner for tiespassing other villagers' farms.
As the project recommends that farmers expand the area cultivated by 25% by the end 
of the project life, farmers who owned animals came to realise the benefits of such 
expansion. As farmers argued and, indeed, I observed, in addition to the increased 
potential incomes from farming the remains of the stalks of groundnuts provided 
additional staple nutrition for their animals. This encourages farmers to purchase yet 
more animals should surplus arise since the farmer sees the cost of feeding his animals 
increasingly reduced. The importance of animals for ENSAP project will be fully 
recognized as the project administration has been testing the feasibility of introducing 
animal traction implements in the smallholder farming system. The initial feasibility 
study had found that at least at this stage,such innovation is unfeasible since the 
introduction of animal drawn implements deflects the focus of the target group from 
smallholders to large-scale farmers. In the long run, however, and as more of these 
smallholder farmers have adequate number of animals, ENSAP could succeed in 
stimulating smallholder farmers to use their own animals in the farm enterprise with 
impunity. If smallhoder farmers could increase their income sufficiently so that more 
animals were to be bought and reinvested in agriculture (e.g. in plowing), then is 
cound, in the long-term, lead to bridging the economic gap between 
smallholder/'transional' farmers and those large-scale/'progressives', in Dar Hamar. 
This economic equlity being measured in terms of animal wealth has been widely
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observed by anthropologists who studied east African traditional systems (see e.g 
Holy, 1987; Shneider, 1979:10 ).
Apart from changes in traditional agriculture there existed several trends of cultural 
changes which have their bearing on agricultme and the whole community. In the old 
tradition( several decades ago) prestige in the village was from getting a household 
matmura (underground pit) filled with the food produce to ensure subsistence caiTy- 
over into the subsequent season. The land provided a good economic incentive for 
good cultivation. This prestige was second only to the prestige of being a sheikh 
or a shartai (cf. De Schlippe, 1956:235). In present-day Ghubeish village 
communities prestige derived from getting a salaried job, wearing cloths brought 
by sons who were expatriates in Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. We have 
seen that a large number of village members took off to neighbouring countries prior 
to the implementation of the project. Concern for such prestige had prompted 
villagers to invest in educating their children (often at the expense of investing in 
agriculture).
Education, which is the avenue towards securing a ‘salaried job’, ultimately draws 
youth out of agriculture. The villagers recognition of the importance of education 
had resulted, as we have seen, in extensive efforts through self-help to get schools 
locally established. At the present time (1990/91) the number of schools is still veiy 
small and is unable to satisfy this demand for education of the growing young 
generation in the project communities. The prestige attached to salaried people has 
been expressed in the village women's songs:
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dahabanfi sanduga 
naktib leika-y wasifuka
al-wasifa leik mabruka; which could be translated as; 
the gold is there in its box
we write you [an amulet!] so that you will be a personnel in office 
and we congratulate you for the job.
The song relates 'gold' which is the symbol of wealth to the 'salary' which is the 
prerogative of the office incumbents and which is the means of securing wealth. 
The ritual element of writing an amulet also has its implications. The amulet is 
meant as a guard against a bad omen which usually befalls things which are 
highly valued.
By increasing incomes the project on its part could lend support, however minimal, 
to households which consider educating their children as a new avenue for 
investment and economic incentive.
288
PART THREE
liefs And
Rituals, Religious Beliefs And Development
Modern development approaches view the commercialisation of agriculture as 
leading to specialization in cash crop production and sustained improvement in 
people's quality of life. Advocates of this approach assume that once such a 
process of commercialisation gets started, internal transformation follows whereby 
ti'aditional producers become increasingly innovative, propagating sound economic 
decision-making processes (see e.g. Mendonsa, 1980:275). When such transformation 
fails to come about justifications are proposed which label farmers as the main 
constraint . It is often argued that farmers include non-economic factors in their 
decision-making processes which ultimately block the transformation process (Foster, 
1962). An array of factors such as social and ritual practices and traditional values 
should accordingly be considered among the non-economic factors inhering in the 
process of transformation. Thus, it is argued, to make transformation more successful, 
such traditional values, ritual beliefs and practices should be radically altered.
But there are counter-arguments, which view traditional producers as, in fact, not 
tradition-bound. Rather, in the context of the distinctive logistical predicaments of 
peasant farming, farmers are considered as rational decision-makers and/or profit- 
minded (Shultz, 1964). According to this view peasants can readily be seen not "as 
irrational, but as conservative people who tend to maximize actions that ensure 
security" (Mendonsa, 1980:275). For Shultz the reality has been that traditional 
agriculture has reached an equilibrium point where further internal investment is no 
longer profitable. To inject innovative inputs into traditional faiming a solution should 
be sought from external sources. Now, "actions which ensure security" in the absence
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of such external inputs (or packages) include the manipulation of rituals and religious 
practices. Therefore when assessing the totality of farmers' economic decision-making 
it is important that we investigate the ritual practices as an inherent part of the decision­
making process. In the space below we deal with some of the ritual practices and 
beliefs connected with agriculture in the project area. An attempt has been made to see 
how the project affects or is affected by such beliefs and practices.
Farmers in the project area thus effect their decision-making in accordance with a host 
of factors. Some of these factors are ecological (e.g,what sort of soil type to cultivate 
that best suits a particular seed vaiiety), some are economic (relating to the estimation of 
farm size to put into cultivation; hired labor etc.). Then there are social factors, such as 
the value of cooperative relationships with community members on behalf of nafir 
recruitment, and cultural factors stemming from the belief system. The latter are the 
notions farmers have developed through generations of experience with agriculture. In 
this chapter we deal with this system of thought as it pertains to and guides farmers' 
decisions. The relevant notions are primarily cosmological and some are religious. 
These beliefs are largely held more by elders than by the younger generation. We will 
start with a discussion of local peoples' notions on the various seasonal variations 
giving a particulai' emphasis on the rainy season as this relates directly to the indigenous 
farming system. It will be shown how local people mark time by building on their 
previous experiences with climatic changes, and how this influences part of farmers' 
agricultural decision-making processes. Inspiration is drawn from de Schlippe's 
observation of similar phenomena among the Zande of the Southern Sudan (de 
Schlippe, 1956). Then in the rest of the space we will be dealing with some of the 
rituals and religious practices among Hamar farmers, covering aspects relating the 
overall Hamar economy and culture. Comparative analysis is made with reference to the 
available hterature on ritual and religious practices among other tribes in the Sudan (e.g. 
Buxton, 1973; Douglas, 1964: Holy, 1991; Osman, 1983; Nadel, 1946; Trimingham, 
1949).
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The a'ina are weather signals which local people take to refer to specific inteiwals, or 
to a period of time, during a season, especially during the rainy season (khariff). It 
denotes a sign for distinctive weather, and, correspondingly, certain phase of 
agricultural operations which should therefore begin. For example, during the khariff 
(May or June - October) the a'ina indicate a state of the weather in which the people 
will experience continual rainfall. Thus somewhere in aina following the first 
showers is the so-called batnal khariff (lit. the centre of the rainy season) in which 
people experience heavy rainfall and intensive plant growth. Then the khariff a'ina 
stops for approximately one week, during which the weather is characteristically 
alternating, between a day hot and a day wet. Then toward the end of August and 
the onfall of September the air changes its direction from rih (lit. north) to 
sa'id (lit. south).This is the start of the shita (lit. winter). People know this from 
observation of the location, direction and distribution of the clouds. When the 
clouds are widely scattered and located towards sa'id , this is a prelude to a 
waning khariff. At this point the agricultural activities have to be adjusted accordingly. 
The watermelon plants need to be cleared of the weeds and pesticides should also be 
applied to combat the bug which attacks the watermelon plants at this time. Farmers 
state that this particular aina is suitable for the growth of watermelons. In the 
following passages some specific ainas are considered in detail.
.1
Tarfa refers to the first showers preceding the full start of the khariff. The tarfa 
is in three stages locally known as the first, second and the third tarfa (or first, 
medium and final tarfa ). The time interval between each is estimated to be forty 
days making a total of one hundred and twenty days for the whole pre-khariff. 
However, these stages of tarfa contain a number of intervals which are in turn 
known through other signals also each referred to as the a'ina of that specific
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interval. The three stages are identified according to the intensity and colour of clouds. 
Intensive and dark clouds imply that khariff is approaching, and scattered white 
clouds indicate that khariff will take a longer time to start. Farmers attach more 
emphasis on the khariff ainas due to these ainas' direct relevance to agriculture. To 
these various ainas we turn below.
X
The angareib refers to a traditionally known constellation of four stars whose 
distribution over the sky foims the shape of an angareib (bed). Nearly all the 
communities in the project area refer to these four stars as the angareib. The 
angareib has three stars beside it called banat el angareib (lit. the daughters of 
the bed). The angareib and banat el agareib collectively provide signals for the 
khariff.
In the khariff the angareib and its three daughters appear in the direction of rih . 
As the angareib fades away there is said to be an a'ina. Also its two back legs 
each denote an a'ina when they disappear. And the disappearance of the three 
daughters also marks the onfall of a a'ina. The angareib is said to disappear in 
the north-east and reappear in the east. When the two front legs of the 
angaieib reappear this is a a'ina. Upon the appeaiance of the two back legs there 
is a further a'ina. When each of the daughters appear there are corresponding 
a'inas. The a'ina of the second and the third daughters are called suheil. 
Locally there is a common proverb about suheil a'ina , "suheil alma agabha 
sell" (lit. "suheil that will never be followed by a rainfall"). This marks the end 
of the khariff. But, according to this belief, if it happened that rains follow 
suheil then this is mere chance, and those communities which experience such 
rains are referred to as bukhat (lucky). Accordingly, the rains that follow 
suheil are known as matar al bukhat (lit. the rains of bukhat). But even these 
bukhat rains are expected to be meagre and sporadic. These angareib ainas allow the
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farmers to get prepared to concluding their agricultural operations due to the gradual 
disappearance of the rainy season, the particular activity to be targeted here is the 
harvesting. Farmers who make their agricultural decisions on the basis of these ainas 
can often have some advantages over other farmers (who do not respond to these 
ainas). A good example is when it happens that suheil rains fall heavily and destroy a 
crop which has just been harvested but still left on the ground due to failure to respond 
to angareib ainas. In this case the delay of the harvesting operation results in either total 
crop damage or smaller agricultural produce.
The tiraeva is a local star which provides khariff a'ina as well. The tiraeya 
usually disappears in the west making an a'ina. But in case it disappears 
without being followed by rainfall, then it will instead be followed by a haboob 
(wind). If the tiraeya disappears in this way there will certainly be an aina on its 
reappearance. This certainty of a'ina derives from the belief that tiraeya's 
disappearance and reappearance will never both be without an a'ina. The a'ina 
following the disappearance of tiraeya signals rains called bitein. This bitein 
rainfall comes at the end of April or the start of May. It is advised that the
farmer should start planting his crops during this bitein a'ina since the
probability of success is reckoned to be a hundred percent. There are also ainas 
preceding bitein. referred to as hoot (shark). In case the shark and the bitein 
rains come concurrently then this marks the signal for a full khariff. In 
addition, shortly before the disappearance of tiraeya there is a rainfall called 
natah. This is known for its ability to cause tree trunks to break. Observation of 
trees will provide the local farmers with information about the nearness of the 
khariff.
In case rains fail to fall on the appeaiance of tiraeya then it is certain that
rain will accompany the appearance of the so-called abu raeya (a local stai) and
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its issi (lit. sticks) which accompany it. Abu raeya is locally known to appear 
after the appearance of tiraeya. As is the situation with the angareib and its 
daughters, the appearance of abu raeya itself marks an a'ina and the issi each 
would have an a'ina. Also in the process of their disappearance a'inas follow.
Apart from these a'ina there are other a'inas. appearing during khariff, which are 
more specific and attached to paiticular dates which are conceptually represented as 
13.3 days apart. These are kept by Dirra and Rasheed farmers. There are seven such 
a'inas , as follows:
Type of A'ina 
Natra
Taifa/bukkay
Jabha
Kharsa
Saif a
I'wa
Simak
Date
21st of July
3rd of August
16th of August 
29th of August
13th of September 13.3
26th of September 13.3
10 th of October
Interval (days)
13.3
13.3
13.3
13.3
[end of khariff]
7.1 4 N atra :
The natra marks the inception of the rainy season which falls on the 21st of 
June of every year . It is said that when the 'natra falls' the village will be 
self-sufficient in its water resources. This self-sufficiency is implied in the local 
proverb "hilla ma tardi hilla" (lit. "a village never fetches water in another 
village"). Such self-sufficiency saves villages which lack local water yards a lot 
of time and money, especially for women who spend a great deal of their time 
fetching water for both household consumption and livestock.
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1
P
A n  o l d - t i m e r  w h o  i s  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  a b o u t  k h a r i f f
s i g n a l s  ( r i g h t )  w i t h  t h e  A F E  ( m i d d l e )  a n d  a  p a r t i c i p a n t  f a r m e r ;
M u r a b a a t  v i l l a g e ,  1 9 9 0 .
.1
This alludes to the notion of tarfa. mentioned eaiiier above, but in this case is more 
specifically located as to occur between the natra and the jabha. The time 
interval between the start of natra and the start of tarfa (also called bukkaya. 
which literally means the weeper) is estimated to be 13.3 days. According to its 
name the bukkaya is usually accompanied by a lot of thunder. This a'ina lasts 
for 13.3 days and is succeeded by the jabha. Farmers reckon this tarfa to be the 
optimal time to start the planting operation since the rains which succeed this aina are 
expected to be at least above average.
This a'ina experiences a moderate rainfall that makes even the solid and dry 
sand more fragile and easy to dig. There is also a local proverb addressing the 
jabha , that "the summer's hole if not opened by the jabha will never open". This 
implied that the jabha's rains provide the most suitable time for farmers to start 
planting plots with characteristically solid and diy soil since the land is still 
easy to dig.
.1.7
This a'ina is characterized by a lack of thunder while the rainy season is in its 
middle stage (thus its name 'the deaf). This also lasts for 13.3 days and is 
succeeded by the sarfa. Farmers are advised not to delay the start of weeding 
beyond this stage.
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The sarfa is the a'ina which marks the gradual slow-down of the rainy season. 
It can be marked by intermittent subnas (lit. intervals of lack of rainfall). The 
sarfa lasts for 13.3 days and is followed by the i'wa. Farmers who fail to return 
on time from seasonal migration (hired labour) will be disappointed when they start 
weeding their own farms at this stage because the subsequent rains will be very 
meagre.
7 . L 9  I ' w a :
This a'ina is the prelude to khariff s end which will mean a long interval of 
time before the rains start falling again. During these last rains the clouds start 
to move away toward the south as the air reverses its direction from the rih 
to the sa'id.
The simak a'ina marks the end of the rainy season and the start of shita 
(winter). The main signal is still more scattered clouds and then their gradual 
disappearance. The agricultural operations should accordingly come to a halt before 
harvesting is started ( as this is the period when the plant ripens ). So farmers consider 
this stage as a break which they can spend on leisure or other social events. Farmers 
may need to make frequent visits to supeiwise the eaiiy performance of the water 
melon plants which grow better at the start of the winter.
In general the natra. tarfa and the jabha a'inas stipulate the heaviest rains in 
relation to the rest of the khariff a'inas and farmers adjust their operations to 
take full advantage of these a'inas. Farmers generally expect the end of the 
khariff to be the 21st of October of every year. The proper phrase for the simak 
a'ina which ends the khariff is as follows:
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Ya matar kafak 
aija' bi gafak 
ya rabbi amsik mak; i.e :
O rains that's enough 
please go back 
O lord hold your waters.
The timing of rainfall is not static. The local people do not seem to be clear about 
the occurrence of this change . However, the information provided by the 
farmers of Sabi village presents a calendar for the date a'inas with dates which 
differ from the a'inas as they apply to Dirra and Rasheed villages. This difference 
in dates in the onfall of the a'inas points to a shift in the general timing of the 
start of the rainy season which has occurred over the past decade, rather than a 
change in the timing of the rainy season in the same year reflecting different 
geographical locations. The calendar held by Sabi farmers ,however, being mostly 
known to the elders (rather than the younger generation) also supports this 
general shift in the timing. Thus if (hypothetically) the younger generation had a 
calender for the khariff a'inas then I suspect its a'inas would have dates 
approximately the same as those of the Dirra faimers. The Sabi farmers' calendar for 
the onfall of the khariff a'inas looks as follows:
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Traditional calendar for Khariff a'inas kept by Sabi Farmers
Type of a'ina Date Interval
Bitein 5th May 13.3
Tiraeva 18th May 13.3
Hana' 1st June 13.3
A'gaba 14th June 13J
Diran 28th June 13.3
A'ssa 11th July 27 [nearly double the above inteiwals]
Jabha 8th Sept. 16
Makhaieeg 24th Sept. 13.3
Sahraa 7th October 6 [half the interval]
Suheil 13th October Tend of khariff]
Today the elderly generation of Sabi farmers who keep such records state that 
the first three a'inas i.e,bitein, tiraeya and han'a do not correspond with (they are 
calendrically earlier to) ainas held by other villages and as a result the khariff 
fully starts with the onfall of the a'gaba a’ina. The performance of the rest of 
the a'inas (diran, assa. jabha. makhareeg. sahraa and suheill is more or less 
similar to that described above in the calendar kept by Dirra and Rasheed 
farmers. However, as de Schlippe (see de Schlippe, 1956) also observes among the 
Zande of the Southern Sudan, the dates do not always correspond with the 
interval figures given beologically by the people (i.e. 13.3 days); the interval 
between start of the assa a'ina and the start of the jabha is in fact more than two 
weeks (it is four weeks); and the jabha itself lasts for two and half weeks 
before the makhareeg falls. Also the sahraa lasts for only one week. This 
divergence would also lead farmers' to adjust their planned agricultural 
operations in order to fit into the corresponding a'ina. The argument points to the 
fact that farmers’ verbal statements (e.g. that the interval between two different ainas is
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13.3 days) could be mere generalizations, since their farming decision-making is 
influenced by the actual knowledge rather than these verbal statements. This could be 
clarified with respect to the a'ssa aina which is actually 27 days. A farmer whose 
decision-making is governed by the sweeping generalization that an aina lasts for 13.3 
days would on the fourteenth day (of the a'ssa aina) start adjusting his decisions such 
that they fit into the subsequent aina. i.e jabha. Consequently he might unwittingly end 
up making the wrong decisions. In contrast a farmer who is knowledgeable about the 
actual interval between the a’ssa and the jabha would elect not to change his agricultural 
decisions on the fourteenth day on the grounds that the a'ssa has not ended yet.
Farmers state that such a calendar enables them to undertake specific
agricultural tasks more successfully than they undertake other operations. For 
instance, a Sabi farmer would opt to carry out the maggein (transplanting) while 
the diran a'ina was fully operative rather than do it during tiraeya. Since the 
diran is marked by rains heavier than those of the tiraeya the transplanted plants 
are said to make the best use of the available water with greater success for 
growth. Similarly the knowledge relating to suheil will enable the farmer to 
safely harvest the groundnuts and the millet crops since he knows for sure
that during this period rains will never fall and the harvested crop will
escape being damaged by rains while heaped on the threshing ground
(jurun).
Faimers in the project area also have other signals for the khariff. some of 
which are dealt with in the following.
7.2.1 Bird
Local farmers know the inception and the end of the khariff through their 
observation of bird migration. The general understanding is that birds usually 
move from one place to another in search of areas where water sources are 
readily available. In addition these birds feed on local grass. Two main types of
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birds are taken as signals of imminent khariff : the rahow (Iris) and simbir (Ar. ; 
also locally known as kiljowl. The arrival of these birds announces the onfall of 
the khariff, after which it may take only a few weeks to start raining. Activities 
such as land preparation or even rameil (planting shortly before the rains) get 
started upon the arrival of these birds. Inversely, as the outmigration of these 
birds starts this marks the end of the khariff. The harvesting operations then 
start.
A caterpillar locally called nana (the larva of the butterfly) is also taken as a 
phenomenon that correlates with specific aspects of the rainy season. In its 
eaiiy development stages this caterpillar hangs on the local trees for some time 
before it finally crawls down to earth. Its appearance on the trees marks a 
a'ina which is associated with plenty of rains. Such rains lead to the reproduction 
of the leaves on which the caterpillar feeds. Thus throughout the rainy season the 
caterpillar deposits its excrement on the ground under the tree. As the caterpillar 
gradually comes down from the tree the rain is said to be getting to be in 
short supply. The final rains will wash away the stool from under the tree 
and this will mark the end of the rainy season, together with the disappearance 
of the caterpillar.
7.2.4
Rainbow is locally referred to as hajjazel matar (lit. the break in the rains). As
is clear from its name, when it appears the rainbow is believed to cause the rain
to stop. However, this will not necessarily imply the end of the khariff but
merely a temporary cessation in the rain.
300
Rain, however, is also believed to be caused to stop by ritual practices by a 
farmer's enemy. To these and other religious practices connected with 
agriculture in the project area we shall now turn.
This sub-section analyzes local ritual practices and contrasts them with those performed 
by other communities in different parts of Sudan. It should be made clear at this point 
that the arguments which follow from the analysis and contrasts are directly valid for 
the Hamar.
Inherent in orthodox Islamic beliefs are local peoples' traditional religious elements 
- a  direct product of the process of assimilation (see e.g. Trimingham, 1949: 163). As 
Trimingham states there exists an inner nexus linking animism and Islam which 
facilitated its assimilation by African people. This linkage has aiisen from a common 
belief in the supernatural powers, mediated through jinns, spirits and angels. This is 
explicit in the following Quranic verses:
Say, I seek for refuge in the Lord of the Daybreak, 
from the evil in what he has created; 
from the evil of the moon when it is eclipsed; 
from the mischief of women blowing on knots [with 
incantations ];
from the evil of the envious when he envies (Quran, cxiii.).
"Mischief of women blowing on knots" (i.e sorcery and black magic) and the belief in 
the evil practices by people (including belief in the evil eye), therefore, is shaied by 
Islam and the traditional belief system. This sharing of common beliefs led some 
observers to argue that the introduction of Islam in Sudan in fact did not entirely 
overthrow the previous beliefs, but was correlated to them. And that "all old customs 
still persist : family life, for instance, is governed very definitely by Islamic Law, yet
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every single practice connected with it is indigenous, even the marriage contract 
needs to have a propitious date and hour found for it by the Muslim faki 
[religious specialist] who has replaced the pagan kujur [ritual specialist]” 
(Trimingham, 1949: 165). This similaiity between pagan kujur and Muslim fakis can be 
clarified by the following analogy. In his study of shamanism among the Nuba, Nadel 
describes a spirit of a kujur (called Layin) as powerful in several spheres: "it could 
make grain grow and cure illness; its most outstanding gift was the cure and 
prevention of barrenness (coupled with the faculty of causing it)..his intervention was 
sought at every marriage in the neighbourhood..and he could foretell the occurrence of 
drought]" (1946:28). Similarly faki has comparable powers since he is called to do 
similar things a kujur does. The main difference lies in that the faki undertakes his 
speciality in the context of an Islamic community, while a kujur acts in the context of 
paganism. Moreover, a kujur starts his career with consecration ceremonies as a 
prerequisite to the attainment of the full status of a spirit priest, a faki. on the other 
hand, might start 'practising' if he finds clients ready to consult him (see also 
Osman, 1983) (given that he has the ability to read and write). Another difference 
between a kujur and a faki lies in the act of 'seizure by spirits' (or trance) being a 
prerogative of the kujur. Again, while both the faki's and the kujur's position in the 
community are defined by the nature of their spiritual faculties the former concerns the 
contingent needs of individuals (such as warding off farm pests, prosperous trade 
etc.), the latter concerns the community at lai'ge (such as communal rain-making etc.). 
Unlike shamans, fakis are more concerned with the problems relating to individuals 
since this implies more income (fakis who lead communal prayers aie not paid).
A final point of comparative analysis is made with reference to the Mandaii people. 
Three main points are stressed by Buxton (1973: 335) when analyzing Mandari rain 
rituals: firstly, account is given to certain aspects, viz, that rain is associated with 
particular people (clans and ancestors) and is therefore vulnerable to "spoiling and loss" 
(Ibid, 1973: 335). The second point of emphasis is the distinction between 'owned
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rain' and 'non-owned rain', or that of the Greater. The third point of focus is the 
acquisition of rain paraphernalia (rain drums, spears and stones) which have symbolic 
significance in the rain rites. A brief comment on the thiee points is in order, as they 
relate to rain rituals in the Ghubeish communities. Notwithstanding the recognition of 
the faki's influence on the amount of rainfall, local people believe that the faki does 
not 'own' the rain in the strict since; he can only 'control' it for some time. This is 
mainly because one act by a faki to stimulate rainfall might be offset by a counter 
act by another, thereby 'withholding' it. This is how rain is believed to be 'spoiled' or 
'lost'. Secondly, Ghubeish villagers distinguish between rain that is a direct result of 
human action (as by rain-making) and rain which is caused to fall by the will of the 
Greater. To both kinds of rain are attached some causational factors (justifying why 
rain has fallen, or not fallen at that particular moment) as we will see below. As far as 
symbolism is concerned rain drums are used in the context of the Ghubeish 
communities mainly to summon villagers for participation in the ritual, not to play any 
symbolic significance. Symbolism occurs only in the act of rearranging the clothes in 
which one is dressed so that the inner layer appears on the outside. This amounts to 
ritual purification which appeases the supernatural and influences His mercy. Unlike 
the Mandari, Ghubeish villagers consider such paraphernalia (rain drums stones and 
spears) as inanimate objects, having no influence on rains. On the contrary, if they 
were brought to play such symbolic roles they would rather lead to rain being withheld 
by the Greater, since in the final analysis He is the sole disposer of rains (i.e the 
Greater will be angered because believing in the power of such paraphernalia is 
tantamount to associating other powers with Him ; and Muslims are strongly prohibited 
from this). Thus it occurs to me that while some of the ritual practices connected with 
rain-making by the Mandari ai e lai gely similai' to those of the Ghubeish communities, 
others are quite contradictoiy . Typical of Hamar religious rituals are those practised by 
their neighbours, the Berti, described by Holy (1991) and Osman (1983). This is more 
so since both share a similar culture and religion. In both contexts one is struck by the 
belief in the "power of words" (c.f.Tambiah, 1968), specifically of the Quranic text.
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The overall speciality of the faki hinges on the derivation of Quranic words (in the form 
of formulae) believed to have the power to influence events. The dua' (invocation) 
itself, which is also described by Holy (1991) and Osman (1983), and which consists 
of verbal, as opposed to written 'words', can also be seen to have similar 'powers'. 
However since the ritual practices themselves are the product of the local environment it 
could be argued safely that such practices can differ in their importance from one 
environment to another. The Berti lived in a zone of erratic rainfall, compared to their 
neighbours, the Hamar. Thus the Berti aie more likely to mobilize its villagers for rain- 
making rituals than are the Hamar who would instead embark into practicing other 
rituals such as those having to do with raising productivity, marketing, riches which are 
in much demand etc. As Holy forcibly argues elsewhere " even the most aident critics 
of cultural materialism admit the determining role of nature in the relationship between 
the natural conditions in which a society lives and its culture" (Holy, 1988 :152 ).
From the various religious ritual practices among Hamar we are concerned here only 
with those which have direct bearing on the project (such as those related to fai*m 
productivity, farm management and marketing etc.).
Religious specialists (fakisl provide the major force that reinforces ritual practices 
and beliefs. It is commonly believed by Muslim faimers in the project area that 
crop failure and misfortunes in general aie supernatural punishments sent to afflict 
those who committed wrong deeds. This is also supported by some Quranic 
verses which the rural people often recite; these verses read as follows:
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God sets forth a parable; A city  ^enjoying a security 
and quiet, abundantly supplied with sustenance from 
every place:
Yet was it ungrateful for the favours of God:
So God made it taste of hunger and terror
(in exti'emes closing on to it)
like a garment ( from every side ), because
of the evil which its people wrought (Quran , xl. 110-112 :686). And,
If the people of the towns 
Had but believed and feared 
God, we should indeed 
Have opened to them 
(all kinds of) blessings 
From heaven and earth ;
But they rejected (the truth).
And we brought them
To book for their misdeed (Quran, V11, 96-99:370).
The verses make direct mention of the rural populations, who come to respond 
positively in a number of ways lest they be afflicted by the supernatural 
punishments. The village people's means of livelihood is said to be conditional 
upon their deeds. They believe that failure to observe the religious rituals will 
automatically result in baraka (blessing) being withheld from them. Baraka 
connotes all aspects of better life, rains, plenty of food and the absence of fatal 
diseases. With respect to present-day activities (in relation to agriculture , trade or 
any other form of activity in which the people aie engaged), one's behavior must 
be adjusted to avert impending supernatural affliction. We note that the belief that
 ^ The reference may be to any of the cities or populations in ancient or modern times, 
which were favoured with security or other blessings from God, but which rebelled from 
God's law and tasted the inevitable penalty, even in the midst of their inequities.
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rain failure results from human misdeed is also common among the Mandari, as stated 
in the following:
Those acts which they [the Mandari] see to be harmful and destmctive to their 
specific rain relate to their own unique predicament. One objective of rain rites 
is, therefore, to guard their 'owned' rain from actions which threaten it, from 
sin in the community, from sorcery, and from breaches of rules regarding rain­
water or failures to observe symbolic oppositions in ritual in general. As most 
rain failure thus stems from human failure, it could be said in a very real sense 
that for the Mandari the rain is within the person (Buxton, 1973: 351).
In the case of ENSAP participating faimers potential crop failure is explained in 
terms of Islamic warnings against dealings with riba (interest, usury), which are 
traditionally forbidden in Islamic culture. Thus when in the 1990 agricultural 
season a lack of rains resulted in crop failure religious people not participating 
in the project accused the participating farmers of bringing about supernatural 
affliction. Thus the sheikh of Seranbi village believed that ENSAP interest on its 
loans was the major sin which such village farmers were committing. He argued 
that it is a direct affront to the warning that :
God will deprive usury of all blessing 
But will give increase for deeds of charity 
For He loveth not
creatures ungrateful and wicked, and ...
Those who devour usury 
will not stand except 
As stands one whom 
The devil One by his touch 
Hath driven to madness 
That is because they say: 
trade is like usury,
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But God hath permitted trade
And forbidden usury... (Quran, S.l 1.275-279:111_ 112).
Accordingly the sheikh forecasts a concomitant decline in the number of farmers 
participating in the project in the following seasons. However, the participating 
farmers of ENSAP observe another set of rituals connected with agriculture 
which are believed to ward off an impending supernatural affliction. Among 
these rituals are the rain-making prayers, amulets (charms) and erasure (texts and 
symbols written on a wooden slate and washed off with water, or 'erased', and then 
prescribed to a client). Amulets and erasure are believed to work because of the 
'miracles' of the Quranic verses, the 'blessed' names of angels and the magic of 
numbers used in the derivation of the formulae (this formulae is rectangular, circular 
or a square). But this justification is not plausible since amulets and erasure often 
include names of jinns (which local people consider as 'polluted', rather than 'blessed') 
and incomprehensible words.
As I have mentioned fakis are the religious specialists in Hamar society, leading and 
practising the religious rituals. They may practise their religious rituals with the support 
of other groups from the community (as in the case of rain-making rituals, in which 
case they assume the role of leaders), or individually when his "work" is said to 
require privacy (such as in the case of issuing amulets ). A separate room in the faki's 
home is often reserved as an office where he keeps some of his ambitri (reference 
books on the derivation of certain ritual formula and charms), some loahs (wooden 
slates for writing texts and symbols), and also as a reception room for his clients. 
Unlike the priest a faki need not mobilize some people as his own disciples, nor is he 
required to deliver 'orations', on religious matters, to his community. Excepting his 
role as a leader of communal prayers and rain-making rituals the faki hardly practises in 
public - as his speciality is one which entails "privacy". However as a member in the 
community faki might engage in other forms of occupation to augment the income
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derived from his religious speciality. Thus most of the fakis in Dar Hamar are 
themselves farmers (mostly smallholders), some others engage in petty trade. By and 
large fakis are more or less similar to other average farmers (economically speaking), 
given the meagre income generated from his religious speciality.
It is important to note at this juncture, that faki's clients are not of the opinion that it is 
actually the faki who brings about the desired result from the ritual performances. A 
fact which even the faki himself admits is that he can only "trigger-off a cause", so to 
speak, (or what is locally referred to as sabab i.e., cause). This means that the efficacy 
of the rituals is not the responsibility of the faki. rather, this, in the end lies in the hands 
of God. This notion draws validity from the Quranic text which stresses the "miracles 
of the Quranic verses", and the "blessedness of God’s names". From here we can 
make the point that all ritual practices of the fakis revolve around this belief inherent in 
Muslim communities - hence the strong connection between action and belief. The 
belief that the ultimate 'power' rests on the hands of God can allow the faki to escape 
being criticised (when his rituals fail to produce the desired result) of failing in his 
speciality. However clients could still criticise a faki for not selecting the most 
'effective', 'powerful' or 'blessed' words. A faki who fails persistently in his speciality 
is liable to have the number of his clients continuously diminishing. While a faki 
considers his speciality as a "business enterprise" from which to make money for one's 
livelihood, he is assumed not to receive any financial rewai’d from leading communal 
rain-making prayers, or, generally, rituals performed for the common good of the 
whole community. With these communal ritual practices we now stait our analysis.
7.3.1
Rain-making prayers are usually performed during a period of long subna. The 
ritual is announced two or three days in advance. Children's participation in 
the ritual is strongly recommended. This is mainly because children are 
'innocent ', not having committed bad deeds so as to be punished. Through them
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(i.e, in their favour) the impending supernatural affliction will be removed. 
However the ritual prayer is generally led by the elders. The rain-making ritual 
may be performed several times during the rainy season until rain is released. 
The participants usually congregate at a specific place outside the village and the 
ritual is started with dua' (invocation of God) in which confessions of 
committed sins and accumulations of bad deeds are openly made. And the 
people ask forgiveness from one another. The collective prayer is then 
performed and a sacrificial animal may be slaughtered. The whole ritual practice 
is taken to connote a change of behavior for the better and for this reason we 
often observe some of the participants airanging their clothes in such a way that 
the inner layer appears on the outside . This is symbolic of a removal of ritual 
pollution by purification. Rain-making ritual performed during the 1990 agricultural 
season include four rituals performed in the district town. En Nahud, two in 
Rasheed village and two in Dirra village . There are yet other villages which are 
said to have performed the ritual . These included Widaa' Wad Fadol, Murabaat, 
Riteirit, Seranbi and El Halfaya. In the space below we indicate the number of 
rain-making rituals performed in these villages in both 1989 and 1990 seasons and 
the source of some of the participants since the ritual brings people in from the 
areet to be actively involved.
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Season village No. of rituals No. of participants Some location of
(per ritual) participants
1989 Dirra 1 27 village + the areet
1990 2 39 village + the aieet
1989 Widaa' 1 12 village only
1989 Rasheed 1 21 village only
1990 2 29 village + the aieet
1989 Wad Fadol 1 13 village only
1989 Riteirit 1 20 village only
1989 Seranbi 1 11 village only
1990 2 23 village only
1990 Murabaat 2 33 village + aieet
1990 El Halfaya 2 16 village + areet
1990 Ell Nahud 4 145 town only
Ill the district town En Nahud, information about a rain-making ritual is 
communicated by the calls from the mosque but the ritual itself is not 
performed in the mosque. In the project villages such Dirra and Rasheed a 
congregation of people may decide that due to worry about the long subna it 
would be useful to arrange a rain-making ritual . Once decided then the 
information is passed through these people to the rest of village. Participation in 
the ritual is voluntary, and a ritual performed by just a group of village 
members would be considered satisfactory by the rest of the village. The number 
of rituals performed depends on the quality of the rainy season. The number 
falls as rain increases. The ritual could be performed at any phase of the 
agricultural season with the exception of harvesting since rainfall during this 
particular phase is destructive. The predominant context for a rain-making ritual in 
the project villages are social events (funeral , mairiage and nafirk This is indicated
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by people saying "we had a nafir on a neighbour's farm and upon concluding 
the weeding task we decided that it would be better to arrange a rain-making 
ritual since the farm we weeded was too dry". Such a suggestion will be 
fully backed when an elderly farmer describes the present state of affairs as one 
whose a'ina promises little rain. Temporal rain loss is a feature of the Northern 
Kordofan region. Yet apathy is religiously condemned when rain-making rituals fail to 
be followed by adequate rains. On the contraiy people are advised to be 'confident' 
and continue with their rain rituals since apathy itself can further lead to rain being 
withheld by the creater. Contraiy to the Mandari, the wider range of responsibility for 
rain leads to a correspondingly broader placing of responsibility for its failure (see 
e.g. Buxton, 1973:352). This is related to the belief that local rain failure can be caused 
by the sins of neighbouring territorial divisions within the country. Or it can be 
generally stated by local people that "rain is withheld because of the corruption of 
government authorities in the centre". Up to the present time some villagers in 
Ghubeish maintain that the drought of the 1984 year was partly attributed to the 
cormption of the then May regime.
An amulet (hjjab) consists of a square of paper containing Quranic verses, names of 
God, names of angels and jinns, numbers, and cabalistic signs arranged within squares 
called 'the seals'. Amulets are usually written by a faki to serve a particular 
function or functions (such as to prevent an illness, to protect against the evil eye or 
sorcery,to attain success in trade or other business, to gain someone's love, and to 
obtain a situation etc.). Some people write these amulets for themselves from 
Ambitri ( books dealing with rituals) which are obtained from the towns or 
inherited from an ancestor who was once a faki. But the majority get them 
through the faki who is most knowledgeable about the rituals.
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A farmer would approach a local faki to issue him an amulet for his farm 
depending on the specific agricultural stage. Thus during the pre-harvesting period 
a farmer needs to ensure a good yield and to ward off agricultural pests such 
as birds and locusts. The amulet prescribed for such particular purposes is 
called al hairas (the guard) and serves the function of guarding the farm . This 
saves the farmer a great deal of time which before using the amulet he had to 
spend scaring birds by making sounds. Moreover he can now combat the locust 
which reduces the total farm productivity. However, bad occurrences in 
agriculture can be sent by enemies who have approached a faki to destroy one's 
farm. Local people state that such practices are performed by the non-Hamar 
tribes (such as the Berti, Manana and Gora'an) more often than by the Hamar 
themselves. Thus such practices are more often mentioned in villages such as 
Ibeid than in El Halfaya as the foimer is mostly inhabited by the Berti 
while the latter is almost entirely inhabited by Hamar.
There is yet another significant religious ritual, performed mostly by the farmer 
himself (though he may approach a faki to do it on his behalf in case he 
does not know the proper formulae to do it himself). This ritual has to do with 
decision-making in agriculture as well as in other forms of business. The ritual 
helps the individual airive at a decision as to whether to engage in a particular 
activity (to invest in agriculture or not). It is ,if you like , an alternative to the 
concept of the 'net present value' in project appraisal which is used to 
arrive at mathematical figures showing the worthwhileness of a project. This 
ritual , of course, does not show the result in terms of mathematical figures. 
Rather, it seeks to solve a farmer's decision-making problem by recourse to the 
supernatural being in a private ritual prayer of consultation, hence the prayer is 
called istikhara (consultation). The ritual consists of a prayer and a dua' (i.e. 
invocation ). The dua' which is basic to the ritual can be translated as follows:
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0  God I refer to You with your Knowledge, 
and invoke You with your power,
1 beg your mercy (fadl), the omnipotent, 
for. You predestine, and I predestine not,
and you know and I know not, and
You are the cognizant of the uncognizable,
O God if you know that this (stated objective; e.g. joining ENSAP) 
is of value to me in terms of my religion, seculai' life, 
means of livelihood and that following as a consequence 
and that which is concomitant to it (i.e, to the objective), 
and that which is delayed for a later period, then God
predestine i t , make it easy and bless it for me.
And if You know that this will do me mischief, 
in terms of my religion, secular life, means of livelihood, 
and that which follows as a consequence, and that which 
is concomitant to it, and that which is delayed for a later period 
then God, turn it away from me and turn me away from it, 
and predestine to me all that is good (kheir) wherever it is
and let me be satisfied with it.
At the end of the ritual the farmer praises the prophet (Mohammed) and then
goes to bed. It is believed that the answer comes in his dream and in the
morning the decision about whether to join the project is made. Othei*wise 
the ritual may be repeated.
This religious ritual indicates how people's religion acts as a means of control 
whereby their behavior is influenced. It also tells us how religion comes to be 
relevant in situations of economic opportunity. Thus the decision to participate in 
the ENSAP project is predominantly dependent upon and sought with reference
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to existing religions institution and the belief system. For some scholars - this 
amounts to 'fatalism' (see, e.g. Foster, 1962) but for me it is not explicable in 
that light since the farmer himself has stated his decision-making problem in 
such a wav as to take account of both alternatives (i.e. either in expectation of a 
positive answer in which case he will join the project, or in the negative, which 
implies not to participate). This is supported by the fact that the farmer is 
already keen about the economic opportunity at his reach but the seizure of this 
opportunity should find validation from the existing religion. Thus the economic 
sphere is quite interrelated with religion and any social or economic act should 
be explained in tenns of whether it finds religious justification.
This istikhara ritual, in particular, came to bear on ENSAP project. It had been 
performed by at least two farmers in the project area in order to arrive at a 
decision as to whether to participate in the project or not. One farmer was from 
Murabaat village and the other is the sheikh of Seranbi. Both had arrived at the 
decision not to participate. This was the major factor behind the sheikh's opting 
out from the project in the second year of project implementation. This religious 
ritual, therefore, had serious implications for ENSAP project, especially as 
concerns its goal of sustainability. If the other farmers were to perform this 
ritual with similar results then the the project would ultimately be doomed to 
fail. This ritual practice, however, is not readily observable due to its privacy, and 
it could only be known from the informant's verbal statement. There are, 
however, other rituals which can be observed, to do with amulets which are 
often hung around the farm for particular purposes (including rain-making, pest 
control, breaking a subna. ease of crop marketing , invalidation of sorcery or 
even sending mischief to an adversary). Below we provide some of the 
currently used and performed rituals.
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Most of the amulets were directly collected from the local fakis in the project 
villages. The following amulets, however, pertain mainly to farmers of Ibeid ,
Dirra and Rasheed villages and to a smaller group of non-Hamar tribes in 
Murabaat. Even when these amulets were hung on the farm trees or bushes they 
were difficult to observe since an amulet is written on a small piece of paper 
and often one observes other pieces of cloth also hung on the bush or trees.
Often these amulets were fixed to the Dummy (hawada) which the farmer 
hangs up to ward off the birds. In other cases, for reasons of security and privacy, 
the amulet itself was buried under ground. These amulets were sold by the faki 
at a price of LS 20 in 1990 season, but generally the price varies from one 
village to another and according to the type of amulet. Those amulets which 
serve the function of invalidating sorcery were said to be more expensive and 
can claim a price of up to LS 200. ,
A general comment on the contents of the a vaiious amulets described below is in order 
(as relates to the Aiabic script, Quranic verses, names, numbers and figures). Common 
to most of these amulets is that they start with the mentioning of the name of God 
(especially the names refered to as hosna. i.e beautiful names as in amulet 2
for loan repayment (see below), and are concluded with the name of prophet 
Mohammed (by writing the phrase 'peace be upon him). They are said to be the 'key' 
to acceptance by God of any ritual obseiwance. Often a so-called khatim suleiman (i.e.
Solomon's ring, which is a five-pointed star) is drawn in the bottom of the amulet and 
is also considered to be of similar importance. Khatim Suleiman is also considered as 
an alternative to the name of prophet Mohammed and it is clear that when it is drawn 
the name of the prophet does not appear ( see e.g. amulet for marketing and amulet 
for riches). The Arabic script can be grouped into four foims as they appear in the
amulets. In some amulets they are Quranic verses directly quoted (as exemplified by
iamulets 1 against the evil eye, amulet against bird attack, amulet against rats and |
locust, amulet 2 for rain-making, amulet against a destructive wind, amulet for stopping j
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the rain, amulet for impaired marketing, and amulet for loan repayment). A faki would 
select those verses or words which bear similar meaning and consider them as relevant 
for a particular purpose. For example, in the amulet against the evil eye the relevant or 
'key' word is (keeping in guard by God); Similarly other 'key words'
appear as lé (go back) in the amulet against bird attack; and
(ran backwards) in the amulet against rats and locust; and 
LJikb (if He wills He can stop the wind), in the amulet against 
a destructive wind; in the amulet for riches the key word is \
which refer to the treasuries owned by Qarun who rose in opposition to prophet 
Moses (he was known to be the richest man in his time).
The second form of Arabic script is the mixture of Quranic verse with letters, numbers, 
and non-Quranic phrases which are often incomprehensible to the ordinary man. These 
are exemplified by amulets for inducing storms, amulet for raising farm productivity, 
amulet for marketing, amulet 1 for riches and amulet for storage of farm crops. In 
these amulets both the words or phrases quoted from the Quran and the other scripts are 
held as 'key' to the functioning of the amulet. The third form of Arabic script contained 
in the amulets involves the combination of Arabic letters (alphabets) and numbers (from 
1 to 9) to the exclusion of Quranic verses (the interpretation of these scripts is shown 
below). The fourth form of Arabic script is dua' (incantation), this time written and 
used because the user does not commit the dua' to memory (as is generally the case). 
This is exemplified by the amulet 2 for loan repayment. Amulets also vary in the way 
they are used. As stated by Trimingham amulets are worn if preventive or curative, and 
destroyed or put in a special place if they are used for witchcraft ( 1949 : 169 ). For a 
detailed description of amulets and their various contents the reader is refered to Osman 
(1983) since my concern here is mainly with the various functions and implications of 
amulets as they relate to the ENSAP's participating farmers. However a brief mention 
of the significance of Arabic numbers and letters is in order, since they appear in a 
number of amulets presented below (e.g. amulet for breaking a subna. amulet for rain-
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making, amulet for farm management, amulet for raising farm productivity, and amulet 
2 for marketing).
The table below shows the values assigned to the Arabic letters used in some amulets. 
Table (30) The Numerical Values of The Aiabic Letters:
No. Aabic letters Corresponding1 1 12 23 4004 d ll 500
5 36 z 87 ‘er 6008 > 4
9 5 70010 % 20011 V 712 6013 300
14 90
15 (jb 80016 lo 917 Jk5 900
18 70
19 < 100020 <3 8021 ÏS 10022 2023 J 3024 S 4025 5026 jS> 527 s 628 c5 10
All the Arabic letters are assigned corresponding numerical values. These letters appeal* 
in the amulet either each occupying a particular square in a khatim (as appeal's in the 
amulet for rain-making, below; see the bottom khatim), or may be connected to form 
words (as in line 2 in the amulet 1 for farm management, and the Arabic script inside 
amulet 1 for riches). Inversely, the numbers in the amulets, such as in amulet for rain- 
making (above square), and amulet 2 for marketing, stand for words which the faki 
might not be interested to write down mainly for privacy.
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The Arabic letters are often written each in a squaie in the khatim to stand as proxies 
for a whole word or a meaningful phrase (often meaningful only to the fakil. This is 
exemplified by amulet 2 for farm management (see the khatim. i.e squaie). This 
particular khatim is commonly known as khatim batad (as the first three letters in the 
first line in the square read (i.e.batad). Each of these letters corresponds to
a meaningful word (often a name) or phrase (often Quranic), as is shown below.
Table (31) Significance of Some of The Arabic Letters (mostly as appear in khatim 
batadl
Aabic letter Signifies Translation
To Him is due the Primal origin of the heavens and 
earth: when He decreeth a matter, He saith to it : 
“Be”, and it is ( Quran, ii, 117-118: 49-50).
Jc> caJo TAHA: a name of the Prophet Mohamed
(Quran, xx:788).
^  :> Prophet David (Quran, xxxviii, 22:1221).
C>** tlJJ <2^ “Fair in the eyes of men is the love of things
c 2 2 \  (— covet” (Quran,iii: 125).
^  Ha Mim A’in Sein Qaf: Non-translateable
Quranic verse (Quran, xlii, 2: 1305).
S  L.'T ^ -2 15  “And proclaim the pilgrimage among men”
(Quran, xxii, 32:857). 
f k s Ja J  cUJ I “Gracious is God to His servants: He gives
Sustenance to whom He pleases” (Quran, 
xlii, 19: 1130).
^  “Ha Mim: Who forgives sin, accepts
j J  1  repentances” (Quran, xi, 2:1262).
^  «y Lm J i “Strive hard against the unbelievers”
(Quran, xv, 9: 1572).
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Quite often farmers who observe a decline in faim productivity resort to ritual 
practices in order to restore the expected standard . The background to this is that 
thi'oughout the project area fertilizers are not available , and the farmers rarely 
apply animal manure to their farms as an alternative to chemical fertilizers. 
Under-production usually means that the household will be unable to subsist on 
farm produce right through until the onfall of the next agricultural season. The 
alternative off-farm employment results in some of the household members being 
dislocated for a considerable period of time searching for wage labour in the 
neighbouring towns or big villages. Therefore an easy way of ensuring increased 
fai'm productivity is by using the following amulet.The ritual connected with this 
amulet consists of a khatim (square) and a verse. The farmer writes the formulae twice 
and throws the soil in which it was written. This is done in the early period of land 
preparation.
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This amulet consists of letters (from 1 to 16) and its significance (and of course its 
function) is known only to the faki and the farmer who uses it. This amulet should 
either be carried in the pocket or be hanged on a tree in the farm to ward off
pests. It also works against sorcery.
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This amulet functions for a wide number of purposes and spheres of business. 
It can be used to ensure reliable and prosperous trade, or in case of farming as 
a guard against the evil eye cast by other farmers envious of relatively well 
growing crops. This amulet was used by a farmer in Murabaat village in 1990
season in his millet field which was obviously promising a more prosperous yield 
than neighbouring farms. It contains a Quranic word, i.e. 'a key word', which reads 
(from the verb to keep in guard) and this renders the amulet efficacious.
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Birds cause a lot damage to crops and farmers have limited means of 
controlling them. Relative to the other fai'm pests, birds are difficult to control and the 
farmer spends considerable time in trying to control these pests. A faki provides one 
means of controlling birds against attacking local farms. An alternative to the 
hawada (dummy) is the following amulet. The farmer catches a bird attacking his 
farm and slaughters it.The blood is then used to write the following formula on 
four pieces of paper each hidden in one corner of the farm:
C ^ -
J )  u '  L  AJu l i >  c l / l i ’
This particular amulet is easy to translate ;
In the name of God
Pease be upon the prophet Mohammed And his companions 
Behold ! A party among them said:
Ye men of Yathi'ib!
Ye cannot stand ( the attack ) !
Therefore go back ! "
And a band of them
Ask for leave of the Prophet,
Saying, " Tmly our houses are bare and exposed:
They intended nothing but to run away (Quran, xxxiii:13 ).
In is cleai' from this amulet that the local fakis relies on existing phrase, or 
phrases fitting appropriately to the present circumstances if he is to derive the
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appropriate formulae for the amulet. This phrase is then quoted and used to address 
human beings, birds, animals or inanimate things. The amulet thus derived applies even 
if the situation which the Quran is describing or addressing actually refers to different 
things or people.The faki has his own justification for this. It is the contention of 
almost all Muslims (both those who believe in the legitimacy of using amulets and those 
who do not) that the "Quran is suitable for all times and places". This provides strong 
ground on which the faki can justify both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the 
amulets. According to the faki. disbelieving the validity of amulets is tantamount to 
disbelieving the 'miracles of the Quran' (a contention by almost all Muslims).
Thus, the amulet above uses the Quranic verse which tells the people of Yathrib 
(i.e Mecca ) to 'go back' là (reference was actually made to those hypocrats
during the period of the Prophet Mohamed, who pretend to withdraw from the battle 
for the defence of their homes, though their homes were not exposed ) . So the 
attacking birds were scared to go back. The papers were placed in the four 
comers of the farm so that the directions are closed to the attacking birds 
which will find no way but to 'go back'.
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Locust is the most widespread crop pest in the project area and clearly adversely 
affects farm productivity. The Plant Protection Department is often handicapped 
in controlling these pests due to its limited resources as well as to logistical 
problems which render getting access to the widely scattered project villages a 
difficult task. Farmers have therefore to do the task of pest control themselves. 
The following is the form of the amulet prescribed for the control of locust and 
rats .The locust usually attacks the millet and the sorghum crops while the rat 
attacks mostly the groundnuts crops.
The amulet consists of Quranic verses and stresses a 'key word', viz, L» (a
screen )to retard pests from intrusion into the farm, and a phrase
(ran back, and hence the pests are scared and run away ); both work to render it
efficacious.
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When a farmer starts to worry about a long lasting (subna) he may approach a 
faki for 'breaking this subna'. The amulet is made to rescue the farm from an 
impending crop failure. Usually it is used after weeding has been concluded and 
the farmer is awaiting rains to enhance plant growth. This amulet is used without 
relying on the other rain-making ritual collectively performed by the village people. 
Thus it is considered as an alternative to the rain-making prayer ritual. It is written on 
a black stone which is then hidden under the ground in the middle of his 
farm. This amulet consists of Arabic letters and numbers, but it also contains 
multiplication signs (X) not commonly used in the derivation of amulets. This amulet 
has no specific 'key word'.
325
\ ^ c , c \ ^ n V \ \  
0
\  c A A /  P "
In case the farmer needs plenty of rains he uses the following amulet. The 
formulae is to be written on a piece of paper and then fixed to the back of a 
tortoise and then hidden inside a hole in the middle of the village. This amulet 
consists of Arabic numbers (from 2 to 62, the upper square) and Arabic alphabets 
(bottom square), between which is written the name of God Ja-u* W \ (meaning He 
who secures man's fortune). This name is one of the names refered to as hosna (i.e.
beautiful, see above) and it therefore stands as the 'key' for the efficacy of the amulet.
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A farmer can resort to amulets for 'holding' or stopping the rains which he 
thinks could enhance the productivity of an enemy's farm. This is usually done 
in the early stages after the crop has been planted and is at its peak need of 
rains. Due to the lack of alternative means of irrigation ,'holding' the rains 
would ultimately lead to crop failure and loss. This amulet does not make direct 
reference to rain but refers to a planted seed which gives prosperous yield 
(exemplifying those who spend their money as aims). The amulet is used mainly by 
farmers who do not memorize this verse. Each time the farmer puts a small stone 
inside a paper in which this verse is written three times ; then he throws the paper 
towards the clouds. This is repeated forty one times.
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7.3.11
A person may resort to an amulet to induce heavy storms which could lead to 
crop damage on an enemy's farm. The storm is meant to break the stalks of 
the millet and sorghum crops as well as to completely ruin the sesame crop 
during the harvesting season. This amulet includes incomprehensible words ( the 
second line ) followed by Quranic verses which do not include any readily known 'key 
words' or 'beautiful names'.
328
/ /
3 ^ " '  3  o ^  O J J  C y Y ^ V
c - f C -  K _ S ^ - " ^  ^
( _ Y ^  L Y ^  c j J_ L -A j- i ^ _ j f - U  A- L p —
^ Y - 9 / i X à C - '  ( Y j 3  3  U ^ //  r f \  .
 L y Y " ^ ^  ' J ' " ^  ( T ^  ^
7.3.12
A wind which is suspected of having been sent by an adversary should also be 
controlled by the appropriate rituals and amulets lest it damages the whole farm 
either by breaking the stalks of crops or blowing away the harvested crop on the 
jurun (the ground where the hai'vested crop is usually heaped). The amulet stresses
* ^  f. .*♦the Quranic verse ï-üo, Ù ^  (if He wills He can stop the wind) which
signifies God's ability to control the wind.
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Farm management is a time-consuming task which costs the farmer in terms of both 
labour and money. For the general management of the faim, for example to keep it 
clear of pests , free from malpractices and well watered by rains the farmer uses 
the following amulet. It resembles the amulet for breaking a subna in that it consists of 
Arabic numbers and incomprehensible words such as .As the case is with the
amulet for breaking subna the contents of this amulet aie difficult to interpret since they 
lack the familiar 'key words'.
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The farmer who purports to afflict an adversary's farm with damage through 
sending rats and locust would use the following amulet which consists of 
dua' and some formulae. The ritual is performed as follows: The square ( which is 
called khatim. i.e. ring) is drawn in the earth in an enemy's farm, and in the blank 
space one writes the purpose ( i.e to destroy the farm through sending locust rats and 
agricultural pests). Then the dua' (which is written above the khatiml is recited and 
repeated four thousands and forty four times.
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Farmers in the project area are considerably handicapped in marketing their farm 
produce. Poor infrastructure is the main constraint and the remoteness of the 
villages render marketing by the farmers themselves too cumbersome a task. 
Middlemen who come to the villages in the post-harvesting period to purchase the 
farmers' crops offer 'non-incentive' prices on the grounds that it is they who will 
bear the heavy costs of transporting the produce to the town markets as well as 
the payment of crop taxes to the government officials. A farmer who is not 
satisfied with the offer made by the middleman may use the following amulet to 
facilitate the marketing of his produce, for example to secure better prices and easier 
access to markets.This ritual consists of a duaTthe fust phrase) followed by a Quranic 
verse and is then concluded with khatim Suleiman (Solomon's ring,or, a star).With the 
exception of khatim Suleiman, this ritual derives from the prophetic tradition (sunna). It 
contains contains the verb (to endow, by God) as the 'key' for securing
prosperity in the market. Amulet 2 consists of some verses which make direct reference 
to ^  U p (trade), to signify that the purpose of the amulet is to facilitate
marketing, and is followed by a khatim (the square). The amulet is written on a root of 
a local specie of a tree (called usher) which is then hid under the soil in the market 
place.
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A farmer may also need to ritually impair the marketing of an adversary's 
produce thereby causing him and his household to suffer from a lack of 
disposable income during the critical period of money shortage which 
characterizes the post-haivesting period. Or, as it often happens, a farmer who 
repeatedly suffers the undervaluation of the price of his produce but finds no 
alternative but to sell at that undervalued price would voice his grievance by 
arguing that the middleman had manipulated him through ritual practices. 
Typical of the amulet form used to impair a farmer's produce or any form of 
trade is the following: the ritual consists of a verse which stresses the inevitable 
'running out' of what man possesses, in contrast to God (refering to wealth ), as is 
deal' from the 'key word' jx iù j (meaning to run out). The written verses are then 
erased with water and thrown in the market place. The outcome is believed to be a 
drastic reduction in the number of buyers.
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Farmers generally consider loans as undesirable, which should be sought only as a last 
resort when subsistence is impossible without borrowing. This is mainly because loans 
are believed to imply additional financial burdens which should never have arisen had 
the farmer properly mobilized the labour and land resources at his disposal. Farmers 
who complain of such financial burdens argue that the bad aspect of debt is in its 
causing the borrower some psychological unease until the debt is repaid. When 
traditionally a farmer who borrows from a shell money lender starts to worry about 
repayment he eventually resorts to some ritual practices which could reduce such 
financial burdens and therefore secure psychological relief. Today in the context of 
the ENS AP project a number of farmers resort to practising these rituals to ensure that 
they repay on time thereby contribute to the sustainability of the project. Repayment 
on time also saves the farmer the cost of additional financial levies stipulated by the 
ENSAP loan agents. The following aie some forms of amulets currently used by the 
pai'ticipating farmers of the project. Amulet 1 is a Quranic verse which stresses
(benevolence) as being in the hand of God. The repeated recitation of 
this verse is believed to be 'key' to securing such a benevolence, represented by the 
agency's loans. Those who can not recite it obtain it in the form of an amulet. Amulet 2 
is a repetition of the God’s name (Great) which is among the names
refered to as hosna (and is therefore effective in influencing God's reaction).
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Crop damage due to improper storage results in the reduction of the total crop 
reserves upon which the smallholder faimers lean during the hungry months just 
before the onfall of the next agricultural season. We have mentioned that the most 
appropriate form of crop storage in the project villages, given the poor 
infrastructure, is the traditional underground pit ( matmura ) which may keep up to 
forty kantars of millet or sorghum. But still some losses do occur which reduce 
the amount of crop stored. Thus farmers practise the following rituals to support 
the matmura storage of their crops.
The amulet makes use of the same verse used in the amulet against the evil eye ( see 
above ) but is followed by a drawing in the bottom which include ( J r ^  3  \ (earth) 
as a 'key word '. Farm production is best stored under the ground, viz, in the 
underground pit.Therefore 'earth' is believed to be the most secure place for storage.
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The use of amulets for riches indicates that smallholder farmers aspire to wealth 
and devise means of attaining it. Thus it could be argued that irrespective of the 
means by which farmers seize economic opportunities this supports the view that 
such farmers' economic behavior should not be seen as non-economic. Economic 
opportunity is clearly evident in the farmer who decides to seize it within the 
means at his disposal, whether through the practice of rituals or through other 
means.
In this respect the farmers were observed to use the following amulets which also 
include Dua' (invocation of God). Amulet 1 consists of Quranic verses (whose 
wording is slightly changed in order ) written on four sides of a khatim (square) which 
includes incomprehensible Aiabic script. All the Quranic verses verses in the four sides 
of the khatim include names described as hosna. such as ' CJkW \ djJl
Amulet 2 is a repetition of one Quranic verse describing the richness of Qarun (as we 
mentioned above ). The 'key word' is (treasuries). Unlike other amulets
this one is concluded by a couple of khatim Suleiman (five-pointed stai's).
The discussion of the rituals such as amulets for afflicting others, (e.g.stopping the 
rains, sending locusts and rats to others' farms, inducing storms, impaired maiketing 
etc.) implies the existence in the Ghubeish communities (which seem to enjoy a 
relatively harmonious life) of so-called 'economic enemies'. As we are moving 
towards a conclusion some clarification and elaboration on this are in order. While it is 
true that such ritual practices are meant to destroy a farmer's 'economic enterprise' the 
main intention should not be taken to connote the rise of 'economic rivalry', since they 
might not actually be enacted to achieve 'economic ends'. Excepting rituals directed by 
middlemen against smallholder farmer (such as to 'impair' a farmer's marketing), the 
intention behind most of these acts could be to "retaliate" on behalf of one's grievances
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which are brought about by minor disputes in the village community. Such disputes 
arise due to animal trespassing on others farms, or due to homicide etc. The context for 
this is that the resolution of such disputes is more normally sought with reference to a 
local traditional session refered to as a joudiya (see introduction). The joudiya brings 
about local people who are known to be far sighted in dispute resolution. These people 
are called the ajaweed and the disputants aie required to comply with the verdict of the 
ajaweed. The ajaweed's approach to dispute resolution involves, among other things, 
"getting the miscreant to confess to his crime, promise not to repeat it again, and pay a 
specified fine (financial) to the aggrieved". Those who do not comply with the 
ajaweed's resolution will be denied the opportunity to summon these ajaweed for their 
own cases in the future. A joudiya is looked at as an ideal way of resolving local 
disputes away from court. However, some people might still be not happy with the 
ajaweed's verdict (though these might be a minority). It is these people who resort to 
'retaliate' through other hidden practices, i.e., rituals. This supports the notion that 
these rituals do not give rise to "economic enemies" in the strict sense.
However, as I alluded before, the notion of "economic enemies" does apply when a 
middleman approaches a faki to perform a ritual with the intention to impair another 
farmer's marketing of his crop. Marketing is done with reference either to the local 
middlemen, local village, or away in the district town. Thus the performance of this 
ritual could entail denying such a faimer (the one targeted by the ritual) to fetch the best 
price from maiketing his crop. The middleman could now divert the faimer from selling 
to 'others'( i.e other merchants), and thereby secure the farmer's crop at a relatively 
low price. Though in this context the middleman might consider 'other' merchants as 
his main "economic enemies", the faimer himself could label this middleman as his 
"economic enemy", as this (ritual practice) directly interferes with his economic 
decision-making.
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The question which forces itself here is why should the rise, albeit minimal, of these 
"economic enemies" not lead to local disputes and thereby adversely affect local 
people's 'harmonious life' ? The answer to this question lies in the fact that in the 
majority of cases what "causes affliction through ritual acts against others" is mere 
verbal accusations, mostly circulated through gossip. This point finds further support 
from our recognition that these ritual practices are performed with full privacy.
7.4 C onclE sion :
Now we may conclude with reference to relevant literature on rituals and economic 
development. In this analysis of rituals we elaborated the commonly held notion that 
ritual practices generally consist of words (such as in amulets and dual and deeds 
(actions by a faki or his client) - a point which has been stressed by Tambiah (1968: 
175). It is recognized by both faki and his clients that though necessary for the efficacy 
of the ritual, words could not work effectively without the appropriate deed. For this 
reason ordinary people would hardly try to perform a ritual on their own even if they 
knew the 'powerful, or miraculous words'. Not only that, but ordinaiy villagers often 
argue that the handling of the ritual practices by a non-specialist could lead to negative 
results (such as madness, epilepsy etc.).
We have also made the point that even under the auspices of the ENSAP project some 
of these rituals continue to be practiced. Farmers used these religious rituals as 
'instruments' to achieve particular ends. Two main points have been made in this 
connection. One finds support from Mary Douglas in her analysis of the relationship 
between technical advancement and religion, the other amounts to a critique to Douglas.
The argument which I have stressed here is that Hamar farmers resort to ritual 
performances when confronted with a problem to which they could not find a ready 
solution, given the constraints of the environment, technology and culture. They are 
confronted with a problem, have exhausted all their skills and means available, but they
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still think they "have to do something about it". We have argued in the beginning, in 
line with Schultz (1964), that our Ghubeish farmers are very skilled and are efficient 
cultivators. Yet despite that skill they resort to the practice of religious rituals. Sense 
for this is provided by Douglas who argues that "in simple societies, people use gods 
as instruments primarily in situations where they feel they are at the mercy of the 
environment or other outside forces", [ and that] often the result of any given activity of 
a small-scale society remains uncertain even when people's skills have been used to the 
utmost" (Douglas, 1964: 123).
However, Douglas' argument that "in the event of diseases, famine, or drought, a 
simple community is quite powerless to affect the outcome....But with the growth of 
technology comes an ability to control at least some of the natural forces; and so 
religion becomes concerned with other, less worldly matters" (Ibid: 123), seems 
implausible in the case of Hamar Muslim communities. Her argument is clearly along 
the lines of evolutionaiy theoiy which thinks of a unilineal transformation of traditional 
societies from simple to complex and that in the course of this event religion becomes 
overshadowed by scientific and 'rational' calculations. This point is not substantiated 
with respect to the farmers participating in the project and who are subjected to an 
intensive extension education. It also fails to find support in this context if we bring to 
the surface local people's conceptions about religion (which western anthropologists, 
such as Douglas, too often do not refer to, or even neglect, in their analysis). This 
neglect of local people's views and perceptions (to which this dissertation wishes to 
attract attention), is the primary reason behind the one-sidedness through which foreign 
anthi'opologists come to study other cultures. This issue will be clarified with respect to 
Hamar communities views about religion and economic change.
Common among the majority of western anthropologists who study Muslim 
communities is the tendency to "separate" religion (as seen by local people) and 
economic change and science. This is a total misreading of local people's views. Now
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only that, they also impute their thoughts on local people. For local people, it is the 
centrality of religion (Islamic), with reference to the Supreme God, that lies at the heart 
of any economic change. In other words the major cause of economic change (whether 
positive or negative) is the Supreme being. It is also held that even in non-Muslim 
communities it "God who is behind their affluence or backwardness". This is explicit 
(in the verse which I quoted above), when I argued that misfortunes in Hamar 
communities are believed to have been sent to afflict those who committed wrong 
deeds. But, this should not be taken to imply that the more religious the community is, 
the more affluent it is. On the contrary it is believed that Muslim communities could be 
subjected to atrocities, as my informants say, "as a test by God, to see whether they 
observe Him during calamities of failure". Claiming support for such beliefs, Hamar 
Muslim communities are of the view that the present prosperity of the non-Muslim 
developed communities is ultimately "caused by God, in the form of test, rather than 
from their own advanced skills". Thus when during the 1984-85 famine American 
relief was sent to the affected Hamar communities local people had their own views on 
the source of this relief. Being one of the distributors of food relief in En Nahud town, 
and being able to read the information written on the sacks of food, I told a group of 
local people that " the source of this food is U.S.A., where economic advancement has 
resulted in affluence". The major synonymous reaction of the group was that " rather 
this relief is sent by God, America is but a means".
As for science, local people do not either separate science from religion and its 
relatedness to the concept of the Supreme being. Validation of their argument is also 
sought with reference the Quranic text, or, to Islamic knowledge in general. Thus it is 
commonly argued (by Hamar) that "knowledge (scientific or otherwise) can be 
bestowed by God onto Muslims who fear Him most". From what we have said it 
appears that not only can religion advance, or persist, in the face of rapid scientific and 
economic development, it can also be invoked as the primary engine of economic 
change and advancement. What can evolutionary theorists say about this?. Whatever
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their answer might be, it is the case that Hamar Muslim farmers 'negate' evolutionary 
forecasts that the introduction of modern techniques can ultimately lead to the 
dissolution of religious establishments, and to their relegation to a so-called "less 
worldly matters", as Douglas (wrongly) wished to argue (Ibid: 123).
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Local Government
In chapter 5 we dealt with the goals and conceptions held by faiiner-clients relating 
to development in their communities. We considered the way these goals and 
conceptions partly squared with the agency's goals and perceptions and paitly 
diverged. In this chapter we will be dealing with local government and its past and 
present attempts at community development, enabling us to come to grips with 
further major factors (internal to the village community as well as external to it) that 
bear on community development. Also in chapter 5 I stated that I will be dealing here 
with local governments' representations of clients' perceptions. It is important to 
deal with local government for two main reasons. In the first place it is the local 
government which assumes the basic function of responding to needs for village 
development through effective planning for the rural people. Secondly it is important 
to see whether such planning for the rural people is acceptable to the people at the 
grass-roots.
Local government throughout northern Kordofan region in very recent times has 
seen minor adjustment to the system which resulted from the upheavals of 
independence and post-independence governments. The most pragmatic change in 
the administrative system has been the decentralization policy of the 1970's that 
resulted in the devolution of power to the provincial government system and at the 
same time, overhauled the traditional system .Thus throughout the project area the 
fundamental administrative units (the larger towns and villages) within the district 
have remained largely the same throughout history. The changes have concerned the 
power of the local level chiefs and the administrative offices which they fill due to 
changes in the whole government machinery in the centre. For instance, the current 
central government's policy which designates elected local level ' Salvation
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Committees' implies the interference with the traditional power structure, relegating it 
to a less important position.
The traditional system of local government runs through the nazir (which can be 
translated as ' tribal boss'), the shartai at the lower level, and the village sheikhs. The 
nazir officiates on administrative affairs related to the villages at the district level. 
The shartai supervises a collection of villages (his main responsibility is to act as a 
link between the sheikh and the nazir concerning matters beyond the capacity of the 
sheikh ), and the sheikhs administer a single or a couple of villages, together with 
the village areet. This hierarchical local government system can be represented by the 
following diagram:
district level..................nazir of Dar Hamar/Administrative Assistant
I
collection of villages............................. shartai
I I 1- - - - - - - - 1
village level............................  sheikh sheikh sheikh sheikh
The nazir at the district level is locally referred to as the nazir of Dar Hamar (since the 
area is mainly inhabited by the Hamar) and he is also the administrative assistant 
(assisting the administrative officers through advice on matters related to Dar Hamar) at 
the district council.
Sound coordination exists between the nazir's office and the other the local 
government departments. Tasks are coordinated with the police office, security office, 
the cooperative department, the administrative office at the district level and even the 
NGO's currently launching their community development projects in the area, 
including IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), The RFPP (i.e 
Regional Finance and Planning Project: another project run by CARE in En Nahud),
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ENSAP and the DPP (Displaced Persons Project run by CARE organization). The 
office of nazir is held through inheritance and since the British rule up to the present 
time it has lain with the single family of Elhag Munaym (see chapter 1). Among the 
well known nazirs from times past were Sheikh Munaym, Mekki Munaym, the latter's 
brother Ismail, and Mohamed El Sheikh around the time of Mahdist rule (towards the 
end of the last century ). Subsequently the British assumed power and designated 
Ibrahim Wad el Malih (see leadership system below) in 1920 as the recognized chief. 
Subsequently, as the Hamar became sedentarized and grew in number this authority 
was inherited through members of the Hamar elites including Ismail Garad el Gash, 
Abu Dagal, Ahmed Ismail and then Munaym Mansour the father of the presently ruling 
family. The present nazir is known for his decisive word in the major administrative 
affairs and enjoys a respected social status among the villagers as well as at the 
district level. He is lauded for his talented approach to the settlement of disputes and 
the coordination of tribal conferences .Thus the locally known leaders through whom 
the office has been inherited include the following, down to the present holder, Abdel 
Gadir Munaym.
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Elhag Munaym
Mekki
I
Ismail Munaym 
Mohamed El Sheikh
Ibraim Wad el Malih
I
Ismail Garad El Gash
Nasir Mohamed El Sheikh
Hamid Bey Abdel* Rahim ï^ h im  Nasir Abu Dagal |
M ansour Ismail Garad El Gash
Ahmed Ismail Garad El Gash
I
Munaym Mansour 
Mansour Munaym Mansour 
Abdel Gadir Munaym Mansour
A local ancient story concerning the traditional leadership's coming to power runs 
as follows: [Elhag Munaym came to Dar Hamar as a pastoral nomad and later settled 
in the area. The then chief of the tribes in this area (a non-Hamar), the Sultan Hussein, 
came into conflict with Elhag Munaym and the chief ordered Elhag Munaym to leave 
the area. Elhag Munaym turned the order down and the chief's followers arrested him 
and kept him inside a well known as Um Dor which was then covered with a strong 
skin. Later on, Ismail, his son, assisted by the chief's slave was able to pull his 
father from the w ell. Elhag Munaym was still alive. He was taken by Ismail and 
the slave on a bed, like a dead man , into the village. Elhag Munaym then explained
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inazir of Dar Hamar (middle) with the sheikh 
of Dirra (to his right) and the ENSAP Credit Officer.
nazir of Dar Hamar (middle) with the sheikh 
of Dirra (to his right) and other Salvation 
Committee members.
his survival in the well to the chief who was surprised. Elhag Munaym told the chief 
that he was assisted by 'an act of God' according to which he was able to feed on 
watermelons throughout his time inside the well. Then the chief ordered Elhag 
Munaym to be the leader of the tribe and he was given the nahas (chiefly drums). 
During the rule of Nasir Mohamed El Sheikh in the second half of the last century 
conflicts over tribal leadership arose and sub-divisions of tribal chieftainship 
emerged representing the three main sub-divisions of the Hamar tribe. Thus Hamad 
Bey emerged as nazir for the Dagageem; Abdel Rahim Abu Dagal for the Gharaysia, 
and Ibrahim Nasir for the 'Asakira section. After the office was assumed succeeded 
by the family of Garad El Gash, represented by Mansour Ismail and his brother 
Ahmed Ismail, the British government stepped in and appointed Munaym Mansour 
as nazir of all Dar Hamar in order to resolve the tribal conflict. This is how the nazir’s 
office came to be conferred on the presently ruling family, represented by Abdel 
Gadir Munaym].
In the past a local omda was assigned the responsibility of settling minor issues 
coming to the district court. The omda ranked next to the nazir. but today the omda's 
office in the civil court is independent of the traditional administrative system; thus if 
the omda fails to settle minor disputes at the district level the case is raised to the 
judge . ENSAP's loan defaulters were expected to be prosecuted mainly through these 
channels.
Most of the villages in the project area are similar in terms of political structure; they 
each constitute what can be described as a natural community. Power in the community 
is vested in the sheikh: it therefore follows that only powerful sheikhs are able to 
mobilize community action for village improvement.The villages' remoteness from the 
main towns and government offices at the district level has meant that the 
government authorities, being weak financially, are not well placed to render social
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welfare services to the village communities. The table below furnishes some data on the 
social services in the seven district councils of En Nahud:
Comparison of the social services in the seven councils of En Nahud district.
Table (32): Social services in En Nahud District council: 
rural
council doctors clinics
Ghubeish 2 2 
Odaya - 2
first aid
3
1
health
unit
16
6
assistant health officer schools water-yard wells
51 M 69 
31 23 36
mm-
kets
4
7
En Nahud 5 8 3 14 1 57 12 17 1
Wad Banda N.a 6 2 5 - 34 20 31 2
Sug'al Jamal " 2 3 - 20 24 34 2
El Khwei 2 6 5 - 37 14 23 3
Abu Zabad 1 4 2 7 - 53 26 31 2
Source: District council, En Nahud, 1990.
Given the population in each district council (see chapter 4, Ghubeish rural council 
cuiTently has a total population of 110,000 persons), and given the remoteness of 
villages from the sites of the services, it is crystal clear that the social services for the 
whole district are meagre. All the same, farmers expect the local government 
authority to provide their communities with basic infrastructural facilities in return for 
their financial contributions to the local government in the form of taxation on 
agricultural producers.
The village farmers are obliged to pay marketing taxes to the local government on a 
per kantar basis. They have two alternatives if directly marketing their crops. They 
may transport the crop to the market in the towns, sell it at the fixed price (the
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government fixes the prices for the groundnuts and gum Arabic crops) and then pay 
the taxes. Or, they may pay the taxes to government officials, receive a document 
showing the payment of the taxes, and then go to the crop market to sell his crop at 
the fixed price. But the farmers opt to sell their crops to local merchants at reduced 
prices and let the merchants pay the taxes.The latter policy stipulates that the 
producers pays the ushur ( crop taxes ) which was estimated at 15% of the crop 
value.
Zakat is the Ishimic tax which the producers pay out of the proceeds from 
agricultural production. According to the prophetic tradition the zakat becomes due 
a year hence on present investment or liquid money being saved over that 
period of time if it has reached a nisab (lit. a specific minimum level on which zakat 
becomes a must). It is usually paid to the poor (whom the donor chooses).
The zakat usually amounts to one quarter of a tenth of the total income. This 
differs from zakat on agricultural production which is usually one tenth of total 
production (given out immediately after harvesting). In the project communities the 
percentage of farmers who are reported to have paid zakat on crops for the 1988 
season was 29%, and the average amount for all the farmers was LS 27.2, total each 
(Base Line Survey, 1989:25).
Zakat is also collected by the Zakat Office at the district council located at En 
Nahud. The office (also referred to as Diwan El Zakat ) for its part allocates zakat to 
the poor according to Islamic law. Diwan El Zakat in En Nahud town had made 
an enormous contribution in respect of collecting zakat and redistributing it to the 
poor . This is one of the pragmatic steps made by local government authorities in 
their attempt to assist the needy and to bridge income inequality. However, the 
zakat is mainly contributed by the producers and, therefore, it partially reflects
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the contribution which the producers make in respect of the national economy since 
the zakat is paid out of the total revenue of the crop marketed through the 
official channels at the district town. The table below provides estimates for the 
zakat collected in En Nahud by Diwan El Zakat for the past four years.
Table ( 33 )
Estimates of the zakat over the past four years:
Ifa a  1986#M 198%%8 1988Æ9 1989/%)
Zakat (LS) 23845.47 50808.81 120207.03 833493.64
Source: District council, En Nahud, 1990.
The table shows that the producers' contribution to the zakat as continuously 
rising throughout the period 1986-1989/90. However, during the drought period of 
1990/91 the contribution of producers to the zakat office dramatically dropped to 
less than that of the 1986 level, though figures were not, then (1991), ready to 
report at this stage.
The poor transportation system of the area has resulted in only sporadic contact 
between the village producers and the large town markets located at Ghubeish 
and En Nahud. The remote and isolated villages such as El Halfaya tend to be 
most handicapped as regards accessibility to these markets. In tiansportation from 
El Halfaya to En Nahud a farmer would spend a period of three to four days 
away from home. The remoter the village from the main market towns , the 
more the dependence on middlemen for the marketing of smallholders' crops and 
the more the under-valuation in faimers' selling prices.
Inter-village transportation is very difficult and is largely through donkey and 
camel transport. The sandy topography renders travelling by lorry a difficult
349
task. This had led to the development of minor markets located at a handful of 
large villages attended on a weekly basis by the majority of the neighbouring 
villages. Such markets, located at Sharfa, Kileijow, Abu Rai and El Sug'a have 
become a nuclei for middlemen who regularly come there to collect the crops 
cheaply supplied by smallholder producers. These middlemen are mercantile 
channels for a series of wholesale merchants based at the larger market towns of 
En Nahud and Ghubeish.
Despite the poor infrastructure and the transport system the contribution of 
farmers to the local economy is appreciable. The table below provides estimates 
of the total amount of the main cash crop (groundnuts) marketed at En Nahud 
market, and the sales revenues.
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Table (34)
Amount of the groundnuts crop supplied at En Nahud market and the sales prices 
for the period 1981-1990.
Year amount (per kantar) Sales price (per kantar) Revenues (LS)
1981 246000 13 3,198,000
1982 131000 17.5 2,292,500
1983 104000 23 2,392,000
1984 69000 26 1,794,000
1985 194000 47 9,118,000
1986 261000 55 14,355,000
1987 284000 55 15,620,000
1988 664000 72 47,808,000
1989 286806 131.25 37,643,287
1990 26 396 N.a
Source: En Nahud crop market, 1990.
The table shows an increasing trend of farmers' production for the market 
despite the bottle-necks of transport. However, the bulk of the crop supplied at En 
Nahud market is collected by the middlemen from the weekly village markets at 
reduced prices and is transported by these middlemen to the town market. Thus, 
the table does not reveal the amount of income for the producer as a considerable 
part of this agricultural revenue flows to the middlemen in the form of under­
estimated sales prices. It has been argued that the total percentage of profit 
accruing to middlemen upon the purchase and resale of the smallholders' crops 
during the 1978 period was equivalent to 40% (conference paper, 1978).
Overall, this under-valuation of the producers' crop prices is partly attributable to 
the poor transportation system and partly to the government's taxation policy. A 
small amount is also levied by the government authority on the farmer which
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was meant to finance alinhdal sha'abi projects (also referred to as al a'wn el 
thatil However, the famiers are of the opinion that their financial contributions to 
the local government are destined to subsidize projects aimed at the improvement 
of the main towns rather than being directly spent on local projects for village 
improvement.
In the table below we provide estimates for the other cash crop, the gum Arabic 
which is also supplied to En Nahud market. Gum Arabic provides additional 
income surplus necessary for the household's realisation of the extra household 
cash needs.
Table (35)
Total amount of the gum Arabic crop supplied at En Nahud market and the sales 
prices over the period 1985- 1990:
Year amount (per kantai) sales price (LS per kantar) annual revenues (LS)
1985 64956 111 7,210,116
1986 83591 360 30,092,760
1987 45771 449 20,551,179
1988 155786 420 65,430,120
1989 88665 445 39,455,925
1990 166741 450 (estimated) 75,033,450
Source: En Nahud crop market, 1990.
Production of the gum Arabic crop has resulted in the diversification of the 
traditional farming system; in this a cash crop is harvested after the sale of the 
principal farm crops (millet, groundnuts, sesame, sorghum), around December. As 
such practice has not conflicted with the traditional farming practices ENSAP had 
also encouraged it as it partially contributes to the repayment of project loans from 
the sales revenues.
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Efforts on the part of the local government to improve the well-being of the local 
communities have been sporadic and most of its plans remain largely as paper 
prescriptions. One of the most important efforts was the First Conference For 
the Development of the Western Area of Northern Kordofan (FCDWANK) launched 
in 1978. As this particular conference represented local government’s goals and 
aims in planning for the interests of the local people we should try to establish 
the major issues to see whether the conference represented the goals and aims 
of the local people at the grass-roots and whether it was acceptable to them.
In anticipation of the conference local officials and scholars were called to 
conduct local surveys touching on various development aspects in the area and to 
provide their conclusions which should ultimately be addressed by the local 
government in its main development plans for the 1980's and 1990's. The major 
issues covered by the conference, and which provided the basic planning target 
aims of local government, were the following:
a) The role of cooperatives in resolving credit problems.
b) Agricultural industrialisation in the western area.
c) The role of marketing in the development of the western area.
d) Grazing belts around the towns.
e) Agricultural crops and their effects on the development of the natural resources.
f) Consumption goods and the western area.
g) Banks and their effects on the development of the western area.
h) marketing the animal resources in the western area.
i) Education and culture.
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In the space below I will touch only on the main conclusions and recommendations 
of the conference as these were intended to reflect the views of the people at the 
grass-roots.
The conference papers viewed the major problem facing the agricultural producers 
to be that of marketing farm crops - a situation which had resulted in farmers' 
failing to realize the value of their crop and the development of the middlemen 
and the shell system. The solution was said to lie with the encouragement of 
production and maiketing cooperatives which would empower the local producer 
to market his crop at reasonably lucrative prices.
Another recommendation viewed the fixing of a minimum price payable by the 
purchasing agent to lead to greater income accruing to the producer; this should be 
supported by proper official supervision of the village markets against illegal 
exploitative practices by middlemen. Improvement of roads was also viewed to lead 
to the partial solution of the fanners' marketing problem.
A third recommendation saw the encouragement of an Agricultural Bank to supply 
credit to the small farmer as the most effective solution of the problem of low 
productivity and also to lead to the eradication of the sheil system.
The fourth point emphasized by the conference was the creation of grazing belts 
with seedings of the crops already produced by the farmers, such as the gum 
Arabic tree. This was especially recommended as it squared with the objectives of 
the six year plan of the central government ( 1977/1983 ) which put a lot of weight 
on the creation of grazing belts in the western area of Kordofan region. The need 
to create such grazing belts was to correct the fact that a large part of the area 
stayed ungrazed due to the lack of water resources, and this had aggravated
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competition from the nomadic population on the limited grazing areas that were 
available.
The fifth point recommended the encouragement of the marketing of the livestock 
production in order to boost income inflow through the exportation of animals 
outside the district thereby attracting lucrative 'foreign' finance. It has been argued 
by local veterinaries that the Hamar sheep is the best type of sheep in the world 
in its high resistance to diseases and in its patience during migration from the 
grazing sources to the towns and water sources. It was also observed (without, 
however, understanding the reasons) that the total number of animals supplied at 
the market town was small in relation to the total number owned by the rural 
households. The figures below are believed by local government authorities to be less 
than the total animal ownership (this is, however, a rough estimate, since no figures 
are given which confirm this statement; local officials say it is difficult to provide 
accurate figures on the animal population due to movement while grazing and because 
owners underestimate the number for fetir of being taxed).
Table (36) Number of animals supplied at En Nahud livestock market, 1976/77.
Type 1976/77 Total number of animals (estimated)
sheep 32000 458,233
camels 5000 152,450
cattle 16000 242,260
goats 8000 379,042
Total value of animal wealth LS 36,113,402
Source: conference papers, 1978, En Nahud district council.
Mis-identification of the causes of the under-supply of animals in the market town 
had resulted in the pin-pointing of two factors as being behind such under-supply.
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These included:
a) the lack of veterinary services and b) the lack of adequate salt for animal 
consumption and of water sources. However, in chapter 6 we have argued that the 
main reason animals are kept by local fanners is to store their wealth at least 
so long as the amount of income at the producer's disposal is deemed inadequate 
to cover the basic cash needs of the household. This means that any attempt at 
inducing the local farmer to sell his animals is doomed to fail unless it accounts 
for the real reasons underlying the predilection to withhold animals from the 
merchant.
A few remarks on the conference's recommendations are attempted here which 
would enable us link the analysis with chapter 5, concerned with the perceptions 
and goals of the people at the grass-roots. Given the conference's agenda the 
recommendations amounted to the local government's representations of the local 
peoples' interests; and we should see whether such planning is acceptable to 
them and the extent to which it diverges from their own conceptions of 
community development.
Towards the end of 1980's the local district witnessed the establishment of the 
Cooperative department and the branch bank of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
(ABS), both of which were meant to attend to local producers' problems 
concerning economic development, as stated in the recommendations of the 1978 
conference. The ABS established in 1987, focuses its activities on rain-fed 
traditional agriculture and provides its loans through three basic channels. These 
include a) loans directly disbursed to individual farmers; b) loans provided through 
the farmers' union; and c) loans disbursed through cooperative societies.
Currently, the ABS disburses three types of loans: short term, medium term and 
long term loans. The short term loans are meant to meet the costs of agricultural
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inputs and operations such as weeding and harvesting. The medium term loans 
are meant to cover medium term costs arising in respect of agricultural 
technology, weighing balances and trucks for transportation. The ABS stipulates 
that repayment of the short term loans be made within the same season 
immediately after the harvesting of the crops, i.e. within the 'crop mortgage period' 
of three to four months. Medium term loans should be repaid over three to 
four years in three to four equal instalments with a grace period of one further 
year. Long-teim loans, on the other hand, extend over more than four years, and are 
mainly accessible to large-scale landowners and merchants who are able to offer 
collaterals to the bank as security on their loans.
In terms of loan charges the ABS claims an annual interest rate of 19% and 
accepts various types of properties as security. Among these are a) fixed assets 
and properties including buildings, land etc. , b) cash deposited in banks, c) 
cheques, e) saving premium bonds, f) movable assets including machinery, 
equipment and cars, g) security of the Ministry of Cooperation and h) security 
arising from the existence of a foimal institution (e.g. cooperatives). However, due to 
weakness in the farmers' union and the risks of lending to individual farmers, the 
ABS stresses lending through cooperatives.
The ABS started its lending activities in 1987 with an emphasis on eight 
agricultural cooperatives in En Nahud rural council. The ABS did not follow the 
crop mortgaging policy for loan disbursement. This policy requires that the ABS 
guarantees to take only 30% of the crop's market value, leaving the remaining 70% 
at the farmer's disposal. This policy was considered by policy-makers as 
protection for the farmer against crop loss due to sales at reduced prices. Due to 
the ABS's neglect of this policy farmers marketed their groundnuts crops at a 
price of LS 30 per kantar while later the merchants resold the same crop at LS 80
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for each kantar. However, in this first year the cooperative achieved 98% repayment 
on behalf of participating farmers.
The following year, 1988, the ABS followed the same policy which resulted in 
loan repayment rate declining to 80%. In the 1989 season IFAD project stepped 
in and started lending to smallholder farmers through the ABS. IFAD, however, 
did not inject any adjustment into the ABS policy and followed the latter's suit. 
The same decline in loan repayment was recorded with IFAD in its first year 
of operation. Note that IFAD works with smallholder farmers of Abu Zabad and 
En Nahud rural council, leaving ENSAP to work with Ghubeish smallholders.
In the main we find that the interests of smallholder producers are not correctly 
represented. The first criticism to be directed at the ABS stems from the bank's 
policy which inherently tends to favour the rich famiers, which relates to the ABS' 
policy of loan disbursement through farmers' agricultural cooperatives and 
farmers' trade union. Through- out the whole area such institutions draw 
membership largely from the most commercially-minded farmers who started 
production for the mai'ket long ago, especially through the sharaka system which 
draws a large number of labourers from Dinka migrants. Moreover , such institutions 
as cooperative agricultural societies were never fully appreciated by or developed in 
a significant section of smallholder producers which might potentially be targeted 
by lending projects - a fact well understood by local government machinery as the 
conference papers also indicated (e.g.conference paper on cooperatives). This 
applies equally for the farmers' trade union. The majority of Ghubeish 
smallholder faimers presently participating in ENSAP project are non-members in 
the farmers trade union whose office is based at Ghubeish town.
Smallholder famiers tend to see the farmers' trade union as favoring mainly 
those rich farmers based at the town of Ghubeish whom they considered to be
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exploitative. Thus the farmers of Rasheed village remttrked: "the trade union famiers 
of Ghubeish town tend to monopolize every opportunity which arises and would 
happily leave the mass of the small producers entirely dependent on the limited 
resources of the village community".
Another point which needs to be stressed relates to the ABS's 19% interest rate 
on the loans disbursed to individual famiers. As the majority of smallholder 
farmers residing in the remote rural villages are disposed by their Islamic beliefs 
to oppose the notion of interest, the ABS clearly failed to account for local 
culture.
ENSAP has successfully resolved this problem nonconfrontationally within the 
parameters of the local culture. Persuasion on the part of ENSAP credit staff had 
assured the reluctant smallholder producer that the CAS was meant to pay for 
transportation and the administration of project loans and are not intended as 
interest per se. This has resulted in a relatively great participation by the 
smallholder farmers targeted by ENSAP project.
With respect to the local government's recommendation encouraging local 
cooperatives in the village communities the smallholder farmers' own experience 
tends to negate the realism of such contention. While a large number of Ghubeish 
village communities still lacked cooperative consciousness (as the conference 
papers themselves were able to recognize) the majority of those villages which 
did approach the Cooperative Department office at the district town, En Nahud, 
failed in their genuine attempts at getting an officially registered cooperative 
society. Among these villages were Rasheed, Barnawi and Seranbi.
With respect to local government's efforts in the sphere of 'education and culture', 
as stated in the recommendations of the conference, local villages have not seen any
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appreciable development apait from the staffing of the village elementary schools 
initiated through aliuhdal sha'bi. Elementary school education was first introduced 
between 1911-1938 and reached its peak development after 1969 with the then 
government mobilized self-help (refened to as al a'wn althatil for the construction 
of schools. The western area of Northern Kordofan has about 95 elementary 
schools of which 65 were for boys and 30 for girls with a total of 25,000 
pupils.
The effect of aliuhdal sha'abi on boosting the educational system in the western 
area can be seen from the fact that all schools of secondaiy level were built 
through aliuhdal sha'abi , with the exception of one secondary school built in 
1949 and other secondary schools subsequently built around the past few 
decades.
Local villagers view the initiative to build elementary schools through aliuhdal 
sha'abi as a practical attempt at getting the local government involved later on, 
for the practice indicates that the villagers have genuine concern for community 
development. We have presented the total number of schools in the area in table 
(31) above. This small number of schools tallies with the fact that about 90% of 
the Ghubeish communities targeted by ENSAP project today remain illiterate. 
Most of the village schools are faced with the problem of water shortage, 
especially during the summer which often forced them to temporarily close down.
The conclusion to be drawn from this account of local government efforts at 
community development is that despite the huge contribution which flows from 
the village to the district and, of course, to the centre, in terms of agricultural 
production and taxes, the inflow of government services is gravely insignificant. 
This experience with local government has resulted in the development of a 
negative attitude on the part of smallholder producers towards local government
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officials and to projects initiated by local government departments such as the 
Cooperative Department.This negative attitude is, in turn, expressed in respect of 
local elites who achieved higher levels of education and occupy privileged 
positions in the main towns. Local people at the grass-roots remark that these 
elites, who join local government offices, tend to sever their links with the rural 
society and establish their own intellectual culture.
Most of these group work in the judiciary , executive, politics, universities and as
administrative officers. But this gloomy prognosis on community development, as 
viewed on the part of the rural producer, has started to be over shadowed by the 
new paradise made available by an NGO (i.e. CARE) touted for its huge wealth 
with interests quite dissimilar to those of local government, and which purports 
to lift the most needy households from the vagaries of dire poverty.
In this chapter we have stressed matters which relate local government rather than 
the central government basically for three reasons. In the first place 'rural man' 
remains in much closer contact with local government machinery than he does 
with the central government. He needs it for the enrolment of his children in 
schools, for medication, for water supply for providing sanitary services to his 
village , for staffs to man the elementary schools built through aliuhdal sha'abi. for 
trade licenses, and the like. Secondly, the local government also has greater 
knowledge than the central government of local needs and problems. The central 
government often has little interest in local communities.
Third, local government is viewed as being useful in adapting central government
policy to meet local needs and in influencing future policy by keeping central
government in touch with the interests of the local people (c.f Batten, 1954:132). |
We have seen that the educated elite (who represented the panel of the |
conference) were able to express their views on community development, which j
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the local government ultimately adopted in its plans for the people at the grass­
roots. However, as we have seen such views often conflicted with the views of 
the local people and were guided by the so-called "conventional wisdom which 
puts forward a particular view on the rural economy" (King, 1981:276). This 
conventional wisdom, as stated by King (1981:276) and which also squared with 
our analysis of local government goals prescribed by the educated elite in Sudan, 
include 1) agricultural investment does not take place because farmers are poor; 2) 
credit is necessary to help farmers to make investment; 3) informal credit is 
inadequate and grossly exploitative to farmers; 4) cooperatives provide a fair and 
democratic method of providing farmers with the formal credit which they need.
These views, which the educated elite held about local conditions surrounding 
the rural man did not reflect the reality as seen, and expressed by the people 
themselves. In chapter 6 we stated that even those farmers who were convinced 
by ENSAP staff to form cooperative societies were still indifferent about their 
choice. The example of Rasheed village tells this fact.
Lack of understanding on the part of these educated elite of the realities of the 
rural communities partly explains this misplaced judgement concerning the fitness 
of cooperatives for the local environment a vague belief that the cooperative 
ideology is correct in spite of the reality of its impact (1981:277).
A related factor which explains the educated elite's predilection for cooperative 
societies is the tendency of such a class to serve the interests of the government. 
Linking the concept of 'secure credit' with the creation of cooperatives points to 
this fact. 'Secure credit' in the sense of guaranteed repayment, is believed by 
this elite to be achieved through a cooperative society which is both financially 
and institutionally empowered to get its cooperative members to repay their 
outstanding loans. This, in turn, will ensure the sustainability of the credit
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institution which is supposedly a government institution. However, even this 
belief of the educated elite did not find empirical justification in respect of the 
present-day lending institutions currently delivering credit services in the area. 
The table in page (285) shows the repayment performance of the lending 
institutions in En Nahud town. Suffice it to mention here that cooperatives do not 
necessarily lead to better loan repayment compared to lending to individual 
producers.
Contention on the pait of the educated elite that the encouragement of agricultural 
cooperatives will also facilitate the marketing of the producers' crops through the 
cooperative channels further reflects this tendency to side with the interests of 
the government. Since the final destination of the crops marketed through 
farmers cooperatives is the government's Cooperative Department or the 
Cooperative Union, then this will ultimately imply that the government can evade 
offering incentive prices within its fixed price scheme (see above). The incentive price 
policy is usually meant to encourage farmers who produce for the market but 
who are handicapped by marketing bottle-necks which will lead to reduced 
income. But with cooperative marketing, precisely because such bottle-necks can be 
avoided the government need not offer such lucrative prices to the producer. 
Therefore, it partly follows that cooperatives are encouraged by these educated 
elite to serve exactly this purpose of increasing government revenue through the 
purchase of the producers' crop at the low prices fixed by the government. In the 
final analysis, then, this policy will conflict with the interests of the producer 
since it does not increase farmers income (see also, 1981: 278).
Finally, the cooperatives suggested by the educated elite, and also, by the local 
government conflict with local producers' ideology (which we refered to in chapter 
5) of food self-sufficiency. This is mainly because cooperatives tend to encourage
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the producer to increase production for the market at the expense of the food 
crops.
The case of the traditional native authorities, meanwhile, looks very different. 
These were recognized in the early days of the colonial rule because they were 
both acceptable to the people and reasonably representative of them (see also. 
Batten, 1954:137). And they still justify their continued recognition since they 
were able to retain these qualities. In chapter 2 we have seen that the village 
sheikhs played significant roles in respect of getting their villages to secure their 
local needs. Throughout the project area there was no single village which had 
not mobilized aliuhdal sha'abi through its own local labour, financial and material 
resources for the realization of 'collective goods' for the community. The 
contribution of the traditional village leadership is quite appreciated by the rural 
masses who come to recognize the sheikh's representation of the local people 
independently of the local government system of which this traditional leadership 
is a part.
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This dissertation is primarily concerned with discussing and exposing as full a range as 
possible of economic, social and cultural dimensions, both micro- and macro-, which have 
had a direct bearing on how a major development project - the ENSAP project - has 
unfolded. Within this context I have attempted to deploy a wide range of analytical ideas, 
extending over the disciplines of rural sociology, social anthropology and, to a degree, 
economics. Reference to these various disciplines has, indeed, been dictated by the nature 
of the rural development process itself: it is a multi-dimensional process (involving both 
qualitative and quantitative aspects) which should be grasped at a number of different levels 
and from several different perspectives.
In Sudan, the ENSAP project represents one of the most ambitious attempts at 
improving traditional rain-fed agriculture in Northern Kordofan region, and in En 
Nahud district in particular. This attempt was intended as a gradual breakthrough 
rather than as an abrupt, revolutionary break from the existing agricultural pattern. 
With the ambitious objective of raising agiicultural productivity for smallholder 
faimers through the optimum use of land, labour and technological resources, the 
project implied an appropriate inteiwention with traditional agriculture. The programme 
envisaged an expenditure of $ 2.8 million to go in the form of loans to poor 
smallholder farmers for consumption and agricultural production, the ultimate aim 
being to increase incomes from the cultivation of cash crops as well as to augment 
subsistence surplus from the production of food and iubraka crops.
The Ghubeish rural environment, as opposed to that in other rural councils of the 
district, was upheld for its better soil fertility conducive to agricultural development, 
and was viewed to pose no insurmountable technical problems. This provided the first
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advantage for the agency to launch its programmes. The other advantage was the 
possibility of growing high-value food and cash crops (millet and groundnuts) which 
constituted, and indeed squared with, the major traditional crops in the area. 
Furthermore, the village communities themselves, having being left out of the 
development process on the part of the government, expressed an enthusiastic desire 
for improvement and welcome to the innovation. The approaches deployed in the 
analysis of the ENSAP project and which we summarized via the notion of 'eclecticism', 
included actor-centered and heimeneutic positions. This, besides its theoretical vigour, 
has allowed us to rid ourselves of accusations of value judgement and ethnocentrism 
that are common in social research. We have also resorted to ethnoscience when dealing 
with oral tradition, which could only be meaningfully accounted for with reference to 
records and the knowledge retained by the elderly generation (see chapter one).
The principles of hermeneutics are clearly reflected in the chapter dealing with the 
relation between the views, goals and conceptions of, respectively, agents and clients 
(chapter 5). We have illustrated this with reference to the agents’ active attempts to 
come to grips with local customs and ideas concerning interest on loans, and the 
bases of the traditional leadership system. Also in the same chapter we have shown 
how the agents have made use of such pre-understanding by intensifying 
communication with the people at the grass-roots. This has enabled the agents to 
bridge some of the divergences in cultural values vis-a-vis the clients. In chapter 7, we 
also incorporated the hermeneutic approach, in discussion of rituals, religious beliefs and 
practices, to show that despite the introduction of new and seemingly better practices (as 
viewed by the agents) such as chemicals and pesticides and science-based agricultural 
production, the clients can yet continue their traditional practices (such as rameil) often 
with reference to ritual practices or 'local ways of reckoning' (as shown in the case of 
a'ina).
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The project, however, despite a successful start, which was to a large extent the 
result of cooperation from the local community leadership who were brought in to 
assume the leadership roles in the project, is in too early a stage to be described as a 
blue-print for an agrarian breakthrough in the area. Smallholder farmers have 
expanded the ai'ea of land put into cultivation of the food and cash crops. Expansion 
in the area cultivated, however, has often gone hand in hand with an inadequacy of 
loans as well as with poor income gains from agricultural production. The latter 
deteriorated in the 1990 season due to severe rain shortage which led to crop failure. 
Some faimers also expressed their discontent, though it was not that serious, in the 
early periods of project implementation, relating to negative attitudes towards the 
notion of interest rate on loans. This was largely from the influence of religious 
people, and it affected not only the ordinary villagers but also some of the village 
leadership (as with the case of the sheikh of Seranbi). This, however, was in the main 
later eliminated due to the cooperation of the village leadership with the project 
agency.
Among the positive results smallholders remarked on as having being achieved from 
participating in the project were the stabilization of household personnel in their 
villages (rather than some members taking off on seasonal migration ); the abandonment 
of the traditional sheil system, and the ability of a significant number of households 
to keep their animal herds from being sold to finance agricultural production. Despite 
the full crop failure of the 1990 season village farmers remarked that the project loans 
worked at least as a stop-gap ( relief) against an impending famine which could have 
claimed a good number of their animals through sales to provide for subsistence. There 
are also some farmers who reported having been able to realize some surplus income 
which was spent on the purchase of animals. Interestingly, agency intervention has
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corne to be looked on by such farmers as an occasion which ( since it will not last for 
ever in the village) needs to be "recorded as a memory". Symbols for tlie remembrance of 
the agency include the keeping of precious gold (the act of keeping gold being viewed as a 
prerogative of women married to rich men) on the part of a women who succeeded in 
realizing sizeable income gains from her iubraka farm; and by one farmer naming one of 
his goats 'ENSAP' (i.e. after the project).
The adoption of the extension techniques is proceeding at a slow rate, the problem 
being mostly technical and relating to accessibility rather than farmer resilience. The 
relatively low agent/famier ratio in the 1990 season easily explains the poor coverage 
of the extension component of the ENSAP project. ENSAP's approach to smallholder 
farming is of an exploratory nature and is strongly in favour of providing 
opportunities to the poor faimer to enlarge his investment capacity in agriculture 
with the assistance of loans and pest control inputs. Since labour was considered to be 
relatively abundant, attention was paid to labour intensive devices rather than 
interfering in traditional methods with capital intensive innovations. With respect to the 
expansion of the aiea cultivated the project has been largely successful in providing 
environmental contiol against the possibility of land degradation.
The most salient features of the ENSAP project are the close administration and 
supervision of project activities and the deployment of local human and material 
resources for project sustainability. Loan repayment, to ensure a secure project 
finance, was brought about through the iamaa approach which capitalized on 'peer 
pressure' and led to the avoidance of default. Another feature is the incorporation of 
village sheikhs in leadership positions with the project. The selection of PFs is careful 
and is accomplished with the assistance of the sheikhs. Information on the reputation 
of the candidates is also secured by reference to local government officials and the nazir
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of tribe.
With regard to the number of the PFs andPVs covered the project has not been as 
successful as was originally planned. A major problem has been with fuel shortage 
which has affected the accessibility of project sites to project agents.
According to the project's approach, which stresses the goal of 'sustainability', the 
amount of supervision delivered by the AFEs to the PFs is assumed to be going to 
diminish every year as the project proceeds since PFs must have acquired the 
knowledge necessary for the adoption of good crop husbandry practices. Observation, 
however, shows that few farmers have actually improved their farm husbandry 
practices. Some farmers were either awkward, or else lacked interest, in following the 
recommended techniques. This was partly accentuated by the low yields from 
following the recommended techniques and which implied increased production costs 
to the farmer. Some famiers were disillusioned given their expectation that once they 
participated in the project they would become rich farmers in a short a period of time. 
These farmers relied on hired labour for the accomplishment of the agricultural 
operations and assumed the character of a landlord. Another group of farmers relied 
on the sharaka. despite the relative discontent with this partnership system. Ironically, 
the evaluation teams which the agency procures as consultants failed to observe the 
inefficiency of the sharaka system and hastened to recommend the encouragement and 
incorporation of the sharaka system into the project. My warning against such 
unconstructive recommendations is that the encouragement and incorporation of this 
system into the project will ultimately conflict with the objective of "significantly 
increasing the levels of income for the PFs of the project". The agency, however, 
recognizes the partial soundness of the traditional agricultural practices in smallholder 
farming and the approach it undertakes is largely one of rationalizing rather than
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radically changing the ti*aditional system.
A few remarks, selected from different chapters, are in order to sum up the work.
The outstanding feature of the Hamar is the individual's strong identification with the 
tribe (ahalk The gabila (lit. tribe), theoretically consisted of a group of families related 
by blood relationships of varying degrees (see Trimingham, 1949: 26). However, the 
tribe was sub-divided during the past century into various sub-divisions which resulted 
in its partial disintegration. Some of the sub-tribes ( or khasim buvut ) are grouped 
together under one name, such as the Dagageem and the Gharaysia, but in general the 
dominant element is the clan. Despite the multiplicity of the ethnic groups in the whole 
area the structure of the villages is simply based in the amicable social relations that the 
Hamar have developed with their co-residents such as the Berti, Zaghawa, Bidayria, 
Manana'a and Riyash. The absence of conflict between these tribal groups over tribal 
leadership has resulted, among other things, in a unity of interest and community 
cohesion. This later on facilitated the incorporation of the village leadership into the 
ENSAP project and contributed to the mass mobilization of village farmers for 
participation in the project.
What is also conducive to community development with regard to the project villages is 
that, despite the interlacing of ethnic groups, these did not come into conflict over 
land resources. The equality of access to land (distributed indiscriminately by the village 
sheikhs) implied that a large number of the poor families would have equal access to 
project loans and services. Other factors conducive to project success included the role 
village teachers came to play in respect of assisting village farmers to cooperate with 
the agency, which led to the labling of the teachers as "key persons" who spurred the 
process of village improvement.
370
In chapter 2 we also saw how the right to use land in another village contributed to 
unity and social cohesiveness. Meanwhile, the importance of 'social structure’ as an 
aspect of community development was well illustiated. It was shown that membership 
in particular groups (domestic, neighbourhood, subdivision, ahal etc.) enabled the active 
recruitment of these members on behalf of the realization of economic goals. This 
applied whether at the level of the individual or at the level of the society at large. 
However, the existence of these common goals and interests are by themselves 
insufficient to enable project communities to adapt to the process of planned change. 
This is mainly because "as the goals of local communities change, so must they be 
able adapt their inherited structure" (Batten, 1953 :85), and the development of the 
community will be hindered if there is failure to encourage the development of suitable 
community structure. In the case of the ENSAP communities this adaptation has been 
well achieved through the institutionalization of the iamaa system which is an elevated 
form of the tiaditional 'group'.
The treatment of social structure is also designed to take account of notions of 
solidarity, which are too often equated with the concept of 'community' (see also, 
Batten, 1953:85). Thus my concern to come to grips with recruitment is a purposeful 
attempt to delineate the relationships which shape human interaction within the 
domestic unit, as well as within the community at large. Recruitment, which is a fonn 
of solidarity, presupposes the existence of common goals, interests and values (which 
we covered in chapter 5). But as development involves the creation of relationships 
over wider areas the analysis was also raised to take account of the intia-village 
relations outside the confines of the closed (household ) corporate groups. It is this 
relationship between such corporate groups that is vital in the study of development 
since it becomes invoked during project implementation for participation in the project. 
We have seen that the larger social groups (iamaa ) which meet at the sheikh's house
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made use of these relationships for the recruitment of damins (guarantors) for the 
project loans, thereby ensuring participation in the project. Failure to account for the 
social relationships inhering in the process of community development has been 
utterly criticized by scholais of community development. Thus Batten (1953:86) 
argues that "in fact, a study of many community plans and progress reports indicates 
that community development is more often seen primarily as a problem of promoting 
material interests and goals than a problem of values and human relations".
A final remark, relating to chapter 7, dealing with ritual, religious beliefs and practices is 
appropriate to sum up. Ghubeish rural communities are influenced in their attachment 
to the land by the natural environment which has as its chief manifestations the type of 
soil fertility and the distribution of rainfall. The type of soil fertility and the amount of 
rainfall and its distribution set the upper limit to the time available for, and the crops 
that need be put into, cultivation (cf. De Wilde vol. 1: 26). These areas have been 
adapted to crop cultivation over a very limited planting and harvesting period and 
faimers have to make the best utilization of the limited amount and distribution of rainfall, 
as well as the prevailing soil fertility. The faimers , through inherited experience (which 
they argue they have acquired by "instinct") have come to terms with the frequent paucity 
of the rainfall. This has been built into their local repertoire of knowledge which is 
expressed in terms of assigning probabilities to the amount of rainfall as well as to its 
timing. This helped us grasp the strategies the farmers adopt by manipulating their 
knowledge of the surrounding ecology and the measures they take to make the best 
use of this knowledge. We have established, however, that much of this knowledge is 
not readily available to the young PFs since the bulk of it is retained by the elders and 
may in the present time be considered as merely "survivals" of the past. Thus when 
asked about the khariff signals on which farmers often depended for the start of their 
agricultural operation, only aged people were able to tell what these signals meant and
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when they occur. However, despite being understood by an insignificant proportion of the 
PFs they have some implications for the ENSAP extension component since the elderly 
generation is able to pass on this knowledge to the younger generation. The implication 
of acting upon this knowledge when applying it to one's farms may be that some 
practices are, to borrow phrases (de Wilde: 27), pertinent to the types of crops one has 
been growing,...they may not be relevant to the new crops, improved varieties 
[particularly the ugandi millet variety] ..which may be [and indeed are] different in their 
requirements, for nutrient and water". Lack of knowledge on the part of the project 
agents about this local knowledge on which farmers based their agricultural decisions 
made their evaluations of the proper planting dates result in recommendations (such as 
the abandonment of rameil) which farmers often failed to apply. The implications also 
apply to the other ritual practices connected with agriculture which included the use of 
amulets , karama rituals and rain-making rituals.
By and large the 'eclectic' approach is clearly manifest throughout the different parts of 
the thesis. But it is mostly stressed in chapter 5, in the comprehensive discussion of the 
different subjectivities of the development agents and the actors. We have seen how 
these subjectivities arise from empirical events in the nation-state at large that have a 
bearing on what has prevailed in the local community. Aspects of these perceptions derive 
partly from the clients' previous and recent experiences with external agencies (including 
government representatives ), and partly from stereotypes (and ideologies and values) held 
by both the development agents and their clients. We have also seen that such 
subjectivities ultimately constrain misunderstandings of the 'other side', but attempts to 
understand and communicate ( both personally and through the newsletter, Daleel ENSAP, 
and by directly involving the clients in the project evaluation) have greatly reduced such 
misunderstandings. At the macro-level we have been able to come to grips with the 
subjectivities of local government agents only by dealing with the latter's plans in the
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interests of local people (hence the shift in the analysis to deal with ’macro-processes). In 
chapter five we showed that these plans are largely 'top-down' plans which diverge greatly 
from those of the people at the grass-roots. The government's neglect of local people has 
paradoxically stimulated the active involvement by local people in the process of 
community development through 'self-help' movements. This 'community vitality' feature 
(i.e 'self-help') has, in turn attracted the development agency's intervention in the interests 
of local people.
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Appendix
Questionaire
1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Marital status and family size?
4. Enumerate what you own from the following?
(i) cows (ii) sheep (iii) goats (iv) camels (v) donkeys
No.
5. The number of makhamasat devoted to cultivating the following crops?
(i) groundnuts (ii) millet (iii) sorghum (iv) sesame (v) watemielons
6. The No. of gum arabic makhamasat you hold?
7. Occupation other than farming?
8. What are the main problems which face you as a faimer?
9. What do you think the ENSAP agency is here for?
10. What changes has the agency introduced in your village?
11. Does the loan you recieve from the ENSAP agency meet your needs?
12. If the loan is inadequate, to which of the following alternatives do you opt? 
i. sale of animals ii. borrow from sheil merchants iii. borrow from
relatives iv. off-farm work v. hire-out your labour in others’ farms 
vi. other sources specify).
13. Do you practise skaraka? if yes how many labourers do dou recruit 
yearly?
14. How long have you been practising sharaka?
15. Why do you prefer sharaka to the hned labour system?
16. How and where do you store your crops?
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17. What chemicals do you use to combat farm pests? who supplies these?
18. What can you say about the iamaa system?
19. who are the members of these iamaa? are they related by kinship? 
or by neighbourhood? or ethnically related? or other, specify?
20. what is your relation with your damin? a) a relative b) neighbour 
c) other (specify)?
21. What did the village people accomplish thi'ough aliuhdal sha’abi? 
e.g. building schools, mosques, health units etc. ?
22. Does the village have a cooperative or an association? why opt for one rather than the 
other?
23. How many nafirs did you summon this year? and how many nafirs did you attend?
24. what is your opinion about the village sheikh? is he really concerned about community 
development?
25. Give an overall view of the ENSAP project, its goals and aims, and compare these with the 
goals and aims of the villagers? again, compare these with those held by local government 
officials?
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